You refuse. And it would seem the reason for your refusal - which I find sophistic - is that you define "perception" differently, as "relational." In this you step back into the problems that Kant resolved, and that takes you back to Hume and Berkeley, et al. Which perhaps you can resolve in some new way. What, exactly, do you mean by "relational"? No appeal to practical knowledge - that's already there.Now try to say something, anything, about the chair that is not in any way conditioned and informed by (your) perception. — tim wood
That's just as I said: your ideas about science and the PSR are idiosyncratic, and I expect that you will find few allies, regardless of their position on naturalism. And when you add boasts like this, you, frankly, sound like a crank. — SophistiCat
If you want to make a persuasive case, you don't want to explicitly hinge it on extreme foundational positions that few are likely to accept as an unconditional ultimatum. — SophistiCat
It depends on what you mean by "supernatural and theological explanations." — Dfpolis
I mean the kind of explanations that hinge on the existence of a powerful and largely inscrutable personal agent. — SophistiCat
Any system that exhibits any regularity has "telos" in this sense, but so what? Any connection to intelligence is far from obvious. — SophistiCat
if everything is perception (in Kant's sense, which is not as simple as here represented), then how do you get beyond or outside of it? — tim wood
The question amounts to asking how we can pierce the barrier that perception interposes between us and out there. Kant's answer: we cannot. — tim wood
You refuse. And it would seem the reason for your refusal - which I find sophistic - is that you define "perception" differently, as "relational." — tim wood
What, exactly, do you mean by "relational"? — tim wood
If it's relational, then it's "out there." Out there invokes the Humean problem. — tim wood
Many biological processes are too complex to calculate mechanically; however, their ends are clear. We cannot calculate how a spider will respond to a fly caught in its web, but its ends predict its behavior. Rejecting teleology’s predictive power is the irrational imposition of a dogmatic faith position. — Dfpolis
I was telling what happened, not boasting. — Dfpolis
Any system that exhibits any regularity has "telos" in this sense, but so what? Any connection to intelligence is far from obvious. — SophistiCat
I am glad that we agree. But, if biological systems do tend toward determinant ends — Dfpolis
My problem is that Kant has put together an incoherent and even parochial system. I think I understand his goals and even his outlook, and obviously he has thought deeply, but he seems to have researched no further back than Descartes, Wolff and Locke. — Dfpolis
My problem lies with the claim that we have no knowledge of noumena -- and that is a widely held interpretation of Kant. (As illustrated by a number of quotations I posted yesterday.) — Dfpolis
the noumenal chair cannot be the phenomenal chair because in knowing the phenomenal chair, we know nothing of the noumenal chair. If they were the same being, in knowing one, we would necessarily know the other. So, why add a noumenal chair, when, ex hypothesis, we have no way of knowing it? — Dfpolis
The difference is that the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition recognizes that when we actualize sensibility, measurability and intelligibility we are informed about reality. — Dfpolis
Have you heard of teleonomy? It is teleology evolved. Teleology was left — VoidDetector
Have you heard of teleonomy? It is teleology evolved. Teleology was left behind after the scientific revolution. — VoidDetector
Wikipedia Teleonomy vs Teleology: "Teleonomy is sometimes contrasted with teleology, where the latter is understood as a purposeful goal-directedness brought about through human or divine intention." — VoidDetector
Teleology, (from Greek telos, “end,” and logos, “reason”), explanation by reference to some purpose, end, goal, or function. Traditionally, it was also described as final causality, in contrast with explanation solely in terms of efficient causes (the origin of a change or a state of rest in something). — The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica
Teleology concerns religious endeavour. — VoidDetector
So we know religion is obsolete — VoidDetector
If telos characterizes everything in existence, simply in virtue of the definition that you give it, then it is a vacuous concept — SophistiCat
Your analysis of teleology is wholly inadequate, or rather it is wholly absent. Once again, I recommend that you actually read something on the subject — SophistiCat
Ok. You see a tree, You tell me: what, exactly, do you see? Hint. It's not, never was, never will be, the tree. In the light of that, care to give an account of how what you see is what you see?As I've pointed out, everything can't be perceptions because a perception is always perception of an object by a subject. — Dfpolis
Alternatively, you could argue that Kant recognised and responded to issues that are particular to the advent of modernity, which the ancients could have had no conceivable way of understanding, given the vast difference in worldviews. — Wayfarer
He recognised and was responding to implications of modern scientific method, in a way that the medievals could not. — Wayfarer
The difference is that the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition recognizes that when we actualize sensibility, measurability and intelligibility we are informed about reality. — Dfpolis
How then is it possible that there is such deep conflict in modern culture about the nature of ultimate reality? — Wayfarer
And doesn't the Thomistic tradition also emphasise the importance of revelation? — Wayfarer
Aquinas posits a “twofold mode of truth concerning what we profess about God” (SCG 1.3.2). First, we may come to know things about God through rational demonstration. By demonstration Aquinas means a form of reasoning that yields conclusions that are necessary and certain for those who know the truth of the demonstration’s premises. Reasoning of this sort will enable us to know, for example, that God exists. It can also demonstrate many of God’s essential attributes, such as his oneness, immateriality, eternality, and so forth (SCG 1.3.3). Aquinas is not claiming that our demonstrative efforts will give us complete knowledge of God’s nature. He does think, however, that human reasoning can illuminate some of what the Christian faith professes (SCG 1.2.4; 1.7). Those aspects of the divine life which reason can demonstrate comprise what is called natural theology — Shawn Floyd, Aquinas: Philosophical Theology
In other words, there is a requirement to believe certain articles of faith which are themselves not established on the basis of reason, nor of direct perception, but by way of belief in the Bible. — Wayfarer
Ok. You see a tree, You tell me: what, exactly, do you see? Hint. It's not, never was, never will be, the tree. In the light of that, care to give an account of how what you see is what you see? — tim wood
As I read Kant, the noumenal chair cannot be the phenomenal chair because in knowing the phenomenal chair, we know nothing of the noumenal chair. If they were the same being, in knowing one, we would necessarily know the other. So, why add a noumenal chair, when, ex hypothesis, we have no way of knowing it? — Dfpolis
I note, with regret, that you have chosen not to respond to the arguments I specifically asked you to comment upon. — Dfpolis
The contradictoriness of the Kantian doctrine of things in themselves is indubitable...
— T. I. Oizerman, I. Kant's Doctrine of the 'Things in Themselves' and Noumena
Since the thing in itself (Ding an sich) would by definition be entirely independent of our experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal realm.
— The Philosophy Pages by Garth Kemerling
Though the noumenal holds the contents of the intelligible world, Kant claimed that man’s speculative reason can only know phenomena and can never penetrate to the noumenon. Man, however, is not altogether excluded from the noumenal because practical reason—i.e., the capacity for acting as a moral agent—makes no sense unless a noumenal world is postulated in which freedom, God, and immortality abide.
— The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica — Dfpolis
I find your claim utterly incoherent. If I see this tree, necessarily, I see this tree. What I do not see is the exhaustive nature of the tree. — Dfpolis
The difference is that the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition recognizes that when we actualize sensibility, measurability and intelligibility we are informed about reality. — Dfpolis
How then is it possible that there is such deep conflict in modern culture about the nature of ultimate reality?
— Wayfarer
I am not sure I understand your question, but perhaps the answer is that the Aristotelian-Thomistic view is, as SophistiCat said, seen as "idiosyncratic." — Dfpolis
That is why my question, "How do we know noumena?" is critical -- because it must be some non-standard way of knowing, if it is knowing at all. — Dfpolis
Ok. You see a tree, You tell me: what, exactly, do you see? Hint. It's not, never was, never will be, the tree. — tim wood
Utterly incoherent? Really? — tim wood
Does the phrase "a mere appearance of who knows what unknown object" seem like not positing a "a separate unknowable entity" to you? — Πετροκότσυφας
There are not two things, noumenal and phenomenal, but a single thing understood from two perspectives. And the point of there being two perspectives is to demonstrate the constructivist and conditional nature of knowledge, not to posit a separate unknowable entity. Hence, not a dichotomy, but a duality of mutually implicative concepts. — Wayfarer
So, of course, I agree that the approach of modern science is deficient in that fundamental sense. But what has been lost or forgotten is the original sense of there being a 'higher knowledge' (which is the subject of the 'analogy of the divided line' and also 'the analogy of the cave'.) So the general idea is that we don't 'see things as they truly are' - the philosopher has to 'ascend' to that through the refinement of the understanding. — Wayfarer
That is, the expression, "I see a tree," is perfectly common, perfectly well understood. It just does not happen to be even slightly accurate with respect to the actual process. Think about what light has to do with it. For example, no light, no see the tree. — tim wood
All of our concepts of what it means to be a chair, as well as other things, are based in phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle on the other hand provided us with a law of identity which identifies the thing itself. His law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. What this does is create a separation between the individuation and identity which we hand to reality (we individuate and identify "a chair" for example), and the identity which things have, in themselves. — Metaphysician Undercover
So it allows that there are actual individual things in reality, and each has an identity, a "whatness" (what it is) which is proper to it and it alone, regardless of whether human minds have properly individuated and identified the things. — Metaphysician Undercover
I note, with regret, that you have chosen not to respond to the arguments I specifically asked you to comment upon. — Dfpolis
You mean these? ... — Wayfarer
I ask that you carefully consider and respond to the following:
(1) The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. Because of this identity, there is never a gap to be bridged. I have put this in neurophysiological terms by pointing out that, in any act of perception, the object's modification of my sensory system is identically my sensory representation of the object. In other words, the one modification of my neural state belongs both to the object (as its action) and to me (as my state). There is shared existence here, or, if you will, existential or dynamical penetration of me by the object of perception. There is no room for a gap and no barrier given this identity.
(2) A second way of grasping the unity here, is to consider the actualization the relevant potentials in the object and subject. The object is sensible/intelligible. The subject able to sense/know. The one act of sensation actualizes both the object's sensibility (making it actually sensed) and the subject's power to sense (making it actually sensing). Similarly, one act of cognition actualizes both the object's intelligibility (making it actually known) and the subject's ability to be informed (making in actually informed). Thus, in each case, the subject and object are joined by a single act -- leaving no space for a barrier or epistic gap.
The fundamental error here is reifying the act of perception. Phenomena are not things to be known, but means of knowing noumena. — Dfpolis
I am favouring that sympathetic reading, and furthermore I am confident that these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of what Kant was trying to say. — Wayfarer
Utterly incoherent? Really? Light doesn't have anything to do with it? — tim wood
No, it's not that. In your mind, you are arguing for a rational conclusion from a theistic perspective. — Wayfarer
Aquinas says that faith is a prerequisite, independently of what can be established by reason. — Wayfarer
Given that one accepts the articles of faith, then certainly reason and revelation are not in conflict. — Wayfarer
I think the element provided by faith is implicit in what you're saying — Wayfarer
If you look at the 'Analogy of the Divided Line' in the Republic, then there are different levels or kinds of knowledge (from here): — Wayfarer
But the main point is that there is an hierarchy of understanding. — Wayfarer
o the general idea is that we don't 'see things as they truly are' - the philosopher has to 'ascend' to that through the refinement of the understanding. — Wayfarer
It means you don't see the tree; you see the light. (And you never, ever, did see the tree.) Now, if you're a woodsman does this news make any difference to you? No. If on the other hand you're interested in what knowledge is and how you know it, and what you know, then it's a starting point. And by the way, if you think the tree is somehow the light, then why doesn't other light look like trees?It's common knowledge that you can't see things without light. But then the expression, "I see a tree", doesn't imply otherwise. So what is inaccurate about it? — Andrew M
The tree's action? Eh? I'm trying to read this closely, but the closer I get, the less sense it makes. Here is what I think you mean: that there is a one-to-one correspondence between your neural representation of the tree, and the particular tree you see, and not any other tree or anything else.When we do, we discover that the tree's action on me, mediated by light, is identically my neural representation of the tree. — Dfpolis
Here is what I think you mean: that there is a one-to-one correspondence between your neural representation of the tree, and the particular tree you see, and not any other tree or anything else. — tim wood
inasmuch as your representation of the tree is a representation, then the - your - representation is not the tree itself. — tim wood
Also inasmuch as it is not the tree itself, it differs entirely. — tim wood
You seem to be completely dismissive, of Kant, and apparently of the problems he perceived. — tim wood
The question is this: you have a representation that manifestly differs from the tree, in particulars and in its entirety. — tim wood
The question is about knowledge. — tim wood
If you look at my article, "Mind or Randomness in Evolution" (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution) — Dfpolis
(1) The object informing the subject is identically the subject being informed by the object. Because of this identity, there is never a gap to be bridged. I have put this in neurophysiological terms by pointing out that, in any act of perception, the object's modification of my sensory system is identically my sensory representation of the object. In other words, the one modification of my neural state belongs both to the object (as its action) and to me (as my state). — Dfpolis
So the general idea is that we don't 'see things as they truly are' - the philosopher has to 'ascend' to that through the refinement of the understanding.
— Wayfarer
I also agree here, provided that you admit that the little we do see can be quite real, even though it may not be the ultimate reality. — Dfpolis
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