Polidinamics simultaneity technology

Polidinamics simultaneity technology — Carlos Vitor

Care to expand?

Any takers?

How do you define "fact" and "thing"? Here's my definitions:
Fact: true proposition
Thing: an existent

So by my definitions, the statement is false. The world consists of things. Facts describe things, their properties, and relations between things.

The world is the totality of fact not things.
What doe this mean to you? — Posty McPostface

What are the facts about?
I can only see one answer.

What doe this mean to you? — Posty McPostface

What are the facts about?
I can only see one answer. — Sir2u

I would say it is an attempt to come to terms with modern physics; substance dissolves under the microscope into fields, probabilities, relations. Things are made of atoms, but atoms are not things. Process and relation are the new 'substances', and so 'atomism' becomes a theory of human understanding (logic) rather than a claim about the world.

I would say it is an attempt to come to terms with modern physics; substance dissolves under the microscope into fields, probabilities, relations. Things are made of atoms, but atoms are not things.
Process and relation are the new 'substances', and so 'atomism' becomes a theory of human understanding (logic) rather than a claim about the world. — unenlightened

This changes what is being talked about from the world itself to human understanding of it.

The statement should not say,

"The world is the totality of fact not things."

but,

"Our understanding of the world is the totality of the facts we have about it, not the things themselves."

We always come back to the same point, is the world real or is it a simulation we live in?

To accept that the world is real then one must have objects before one can obtain facts about them.

I am not sure about atoms not being things them selves, if you can smash and dismantle something it must be a thing. To say that they are not things because they are the basic blocks to build things with is akin to saying bricks are not things because they are just the basic parts of a house.

To say that they are not things because they are the basic blocks to build things with is akin to saying bricks are not things because they are just the basic parts of a house. — Sir2u

No, it's to say bricks aren't houses. but that is not my point. It is not a mere matter of classification, but the discovery that 'thinginess' as in having a definite size, shape, position, these are emergent properties, not fundamental ones. But perhaps I'm exaggerating W.'s engagement with the frontiers of physics.

"The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in fact both were right and both wrong; though the view of the ancients is clearer insofar as they have an acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained."
”
— Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.371-2

But perhaps you are right that his project with his 'atomic facts' is an attempt to reify thought, and hence his concern to dissolve or defuse solipsism.

But facts are things? Thing is the most general word in the English language

The original German is something like: Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.

I think that gets around the ambiguity in English.

For clarity, he does go on to further define fact. From The Tractatus:

2.0 What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic facts.

2.01 An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).

It is not a mere matter of classification, but the discovery that 'thinginess' as in having a definite size, shape, position, — unenlightened

Like Banno's red mug(or was it a cup). It had a definite size, shape, color but not position. He sometimes left in the kitchen sometimes on the porch. Because it had those characteristics it was Banno's red cup, but the characteristics themselves do not make the mug. There has to be an object to describe.

these are emergent properties, not fundamental ones. — unenlightened

I am not sure about this, I would say that it was fundamental for that cup(mug) to have those specific properties or it would not be Banno's red cup. And if he did not have a mug there would be no properties of it.

Like Banno's red mug(or was it a cup). It had a definite size, shape, color but not position. He sometimes left in the kitchen sometimes on the porch. Because it had those characteristics it was Banno's red cup, but the characteristics themselves do not make the mug. There has to be an object to describe. — Sir2u

Not according to the coordinate space between Banno and the cup. Or even panpsychism,

I would say it is an attempt to come to terms with modern physics; substance dissolves under the microscope into fields, probabilities, relations. Things are made of atoms, but atoms are not things. Process and relation are the new 'substances', and so 'atomism' becomes a theory of human understanding (logic) rather than a claim about the world. — unenlightened

I heard the next big thing in science is string theory. So, it might strings all the way down.

Not according to the coordinate space between Banno and the cup. Or even panpsychism, — Posty McPostface

That would be the subject of another discussion, but I think that most of us have heard enough about Banno's red cup for this lifetime. No offense meant there Banno.

I heard the next big thing in science is string theory. So, it might strings all the way down. — Posty McPostface

Or tie itself in knots.

Or tie itself in knots. — Sir2u

:lol:

The world is not a mere collection of things, but also consists in their relations to, and interactions with, one another. Those relations and interactions are states of affairs, which according to Wittgenstein, are synonymous with facts.

So, I don't read the statement as saying that the world is the totality of facts as opposed to things, but as asserting the inclusion of the relations and interactions along with the things. I think it also points to the fact that things are themselves concatenations of relations and interactions, and are only in a merely formal sense, identities that are transcendent of relations and interactions..

The world is not a mere collection of things, but also consists in their relations to, and interactions with, one another. Those relations and interactions are states of affairs, which according to Wittgenstein, are synonymous with facts.

So, I don't read the statement as saying that the world is the totality of facts as opposed to things, but as asserting the inclusion of the relations and interactions along with the things. I think it also points to the fact that things are themselves concatenations of relations and interactions, and are only in a merely formal sense, identities that are transcendent of relations and interactions.. — Janus

Yes, the early Wittgenstein defined objects as the substance of the world.

So for him were objects not constituted by "atomic facts"? I'm not really that familiar with Wittgenstein, so please excuse my ignorance.

So for him were objects not constituted by "atomic facts"? I'm not really that familiar with Wittgenstein, so please excuse my ignorance. — Janus

Atomic facts are constituted by objects that make up the substance in the world (or logical space if you prefer the original terminology).

Not by "objects" and their relations then?

Well yes, objects and their relations in logical space. Just that objects are an irreducible substance that comprises the world.

Compare "The world is the totality of fact not things" with

The limits of our language are the limits of our world.

Facts are odd things; they are both of language, and of the world. There is a way of understanding a fact that is not given in saying that fact, but shown in using it.

Facts are odd things; they are both of language, and of the world. There is a way of understanding a fact that is not given in saying that fact, but shown in using it. — Banno

Yes, that much I understand. I just am having difficulty with the Principle of Bipolarity present throughout the Tractatus.

Principle of Bipolarity — Posty McPostface

??

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4290/principle-of-bipolarity

So, objects are not reducible to, but transcendent of, their relations?

So, objects are not reducible to, but transcendent of, their relations? — Janus

I'm not sure if transcendent of their relations is the correct term. I'd say they constitute the world, and that's all.

According to the Principle of Bipolarity, you can have negative states of affairs. Which makes sense to me given that Wittgenstein argued passionately that you can't disprove an elephant in a room.

But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations.

But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations. — Janus

No, their relations are atomic facts. They themselves just are. This is part of the Tractarian ontology of "things"