That makes sense: for every positive state of affairs there is its negative counterpart. In the positive sense my identity consist in my being myself, and in its negative counterpart it consists in its not being anything else.

OK, but that still leaves the question as to how they could be anything at all apart from their relations.

OK, but that still leaves the question as to how they could be anything at all apart from their relations. — Janus

Yes, and hence the world is the totality and non-totality of facts not things.

Yes, the things in themselves do seem to have a strange, shadowy existence; and yet we seem not to be able to do without them.

Yes, the things in themselves do seem to have a strange, shadowy existence; and yet we seem not to be able to do without them. — Janus

It goes without saying that Wittgenstein was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer and Kant.

True that!

Is that all.

Is that all. — Banno

Well, yes how don't you see the Principle of Bipolarity as something significant?

The world isn't made up of things. The world is made up of a particular arrangement of things. Things don't tell us anything. So facts are the arrangement of things in a particular way. The world is the world because things are the way they are in a particular way - they form a picture, a particular picture. Propositions, according to the Tratatus, are pictures of these arrangements. The picture either correctly describes the world, or it doesn't.

Wittgenstein was heavily influenced by Russell and Frege, especially in terms of the Tractatus. There is some influence of Schopenhauer and Kant, but, at least from my studies, it's not a heavy influence. Early in Wittgenstein's life (very early, probably as a teen) he accepted Schopenhauer's idealism, but later (probably early to late 20's) in his life he rejects it.

What are your thoughts on the Principle of Bipolarity and Wittgenstein?

What are your thoughts on the Principle of Bipolarity and Wittgenstein? — Posty McPostface

I think it's a bit more complicated. Are there issues of bipolarity in Wittgenstein? Yes. I would say that ascribing a particular view of philosophy to Wittgenstein is a bit dangerous in terms of correctly understanding him. Also, when reading Wittgenstein it's best to not start with a particular interpretation in mind, look at him from many different views. If you look at him from a particular point of view, it's like looking at Mars through one telescope aimed at one particular area of Mars. It will give you some information, but not a complete or correct picture of Mars.

For some reason we love categorizing things, but especially people. He's this, or she's that, life is just much more complicated and diverse. I say generally resist this, in many of it's forms, especially when it comes to people.

One could make a good argument against bipolarity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.

Atomic facts are constituted by objects that make up the substance in the world (or logical space if you prefer the original terminology). — Posty McPostface

Keep in mind that objects, for Wittgenstein, aren't the same as things. Objects are simple, they are the simplest constituent part of a fact that occupy space, but nowhere does Wittgenstein give an example of an object. They are simply requirements of his logical analysis. They are not things like, apples, trees, cars, mountains, numbers, properties, etc.

It is a persuasive thought no?

It is a persuasive thought no? — Posty McPostface

If you're referring to bipolarity, my inclination is to say that it's not persuasive.

If you're referring to bipolarity, my inclination is to say that it's not persuasive. — Sam26

Have at the thread I started.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4290/principle-of-bipolarity

I can't keep up with all your threads. lol

I can't keep up with all your threads. lol — Sam26

Just random musings on my part. Nothing too serious. Be easy,

:wink:

The world isn't made up of things. The world is made up of a particular arrangement of things. Things don't tell us anything. So facts are the arrangement of things in a particular way. The world is the world because things are the way they are in a particular way — Sam26

So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture?

So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture? — Sir2u

Both, I think. Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would say that the objects exist in logical space and their representation is what can be made apparent through their respective configurations in terms of atomic facts.

So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture? — Sir2u

Pictures, in this model, are of facts, or the possibility of facts. It would seem that you have to have the facts, or the possibility of those facts in order to create the picture. What is in the picture is a possible form, that form either matches reality or it doesn't. You can't have the picture unless there is something to picture, so the picture isn't first.

It would seem that you have to have the facts, or the possibility of those facts in order to create the picture. — Sam26

You can't have the picture unless there is something to picture, so the picture isn't first. — Sam26

So objects are independent of their properties but the properties are dependent on the objects.

Both, I think. — Posty McPostface

But would there not be need of a set of facts in order to make something? Or is it possible for things to just appear?

So objects are independent of their properties but the properties are dependent on the objects. — Sir2u

I'm not sure I see the connection between what you're saying, and what I said. Are you talking about Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., the objects of the Tractatus? You seem to be talking about objects like apples, trees, persons, etc. Your question may still be valid, but I'm trying to get clear on what you mean by objects.

Are you talking about Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., the objects of the Tractatus? You seem to be talking about objects like apples, trees, persons, etc. Your question may still be valid, but I'm trying to get clear on what you mean by objects. — Sam26

Wittgenstein said, if I remember correctly from so long ago something about the world being described properly only when it is described down to its atomic components. So surely the whole of the world would be included. But I have not read him for a long time so I might be wrong.

Wittgenstein said, if I remember correctly from so long ago something about the world being described properly only when it is described down to its atomic components. So surely the whole of the world would be included. But I have not read him for a long time so I might be wrong. — Sir2u

Atomic facts are reflections of elementary propositions. Atomic facts can combine to form facts of any complexity, and as such, describe the world. So yes the whole of the world would be included.

But would there not be need of a set of facts in order to make something? Or is it possible for things to just appear? — Sir2u

I'm not sure, I suppose that one can have facts that are mind-dependent. I wouldn't assert that facts are mind-independent.

Objects are simple, they are the simplest constituent part of a fact that occupy space, but nowhere does Wittgenstein give an example of an object. They are simply requirements of his logical analysis. They are not things like, apples, trees, cars, mountains, numbers, properties, etc. — Sam26

So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc?

So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc? — Marchesk

Both. They aren't mutually exclusive.