I mean "things that humans can, in principle, describe without leaving out anything about them." — Michael Ossipoff

Which is the "complete" idea, but that idea is nonsense in my view.

We don't even have to get into the fact that the idea of "everything about x" is nonsense.

The mere fact that descriptions are sets of words, where what's described (unless it's a self-referential case of descriptions of words) is not (the same) words, makes nonsense of the idea re leaving versus not leaving something out.

Descriptions are sets of words that individuals take to tell something about, charactize in some way, etc. various things about something else. That's all they are.

Problem here is that the slipperiness of ice is logically entailed by knowing the physics and chemistry. — Marchesk

The problem with that is that there isn't actually any such logical entailment. That's only the case if you assume that the physical make-up is identical to the properties. It's absurd to say that it's logic that makes the physical make-up identical to the properties. Logic has no such empirical implications. (And this isn't even getting into the fact that logic is something we construct in any event--we can ignore that part.)

Of course, you could attempt to explain how you believe it's actually a logical implication.

I'm not suggesting this because I think we shouldn't assume that the physical make-up of ice is identical to the properties of the stuff in question, of course. In fact, I think that trying to think about it any other way is rather incoherent, simply because the entire notion of nonphysical existents is incoherent, but nevertheless, that the properties are identical to the physical stuff isn't at all a logical entailment. That's just nonsense that you're suggesting as some sort of arbitrary stipulation.

Yes, and that's why I said that even ordinary everyday experiential reality isn't completely describable.

But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about--everything that figures in that discussion--and a correspondence between those words and those elements of that limited discussion. The topic of such a discussion is completely describable.

Michael Ossipoff

Which is the "complete" idea, but that idea is nonsense in my view.

We don't even have to get into the fact that the idea of "everything about x" is nonsense.

The mere fact that descriptions are sets of words, where what's described (unless it's a self-referential case of descriptions of words) is not (the same) words, makes nonsense of the idea re leaving versus not leaving something out.

Descriptions are sets of words that individuals take to tell something about, charactize in some way, etc. various things about something else. That's all they are. — Terrapin Station

But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about- — Michael Ossipoff

What would be an example of that?

As for epiphenomenalism, I think it's a misguided idea.

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Yes, it’s nonsense.
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…as is the notion of a “philosophical zombie”.
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…as is the whole “Hard Problem Of Consciousness” or "Mind-Body Problem" that this thread is about.
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Humans are animals. Animals are biologically-originated purposefully-responsive devices. Which part of that don’t people understand?
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Consciousness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device sufficiently closely-related or similar to the speaker for hir (him/her) to feel kinship. (A chauvinistic definition to fit our arbitrary and chauvinistic feeling about what’s conscious.)
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We were all taught that in pre-secondary school (which has also been called junior-high, or middle-school). What we were taught about that was correct. Academic philosophers seem to have forgotten what they knew in pre-secondary school.
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Our experience is the experience of being an animal. It’s “what it’s like” to be an animal. Of course there’s that experience. …purposes, surroundings in the context of those purposes, and choices to make, based on purposes and surroundings. Of course each animal or other purposefully-responsive device has purposes and choices to make, whether it be a Roomba or you.
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Michael Ossipoff

But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about- — Michael Ossipoff


What would be an example of that? — Terrapin Station

Logic discussions.

MIchael Ossipoff

And what that's about is not determined by how people think of it, in your view?

And what that's about is not determined by how people think of it, in your view? — Terrapin Station

Yes, I'd say that. Some discussions like that are just about the relations among named propositions--in particular, the relations among their truths and falsities that are needed if a true-and-false proposition isn't permitted.

I've discussed why it's tautological that there can't be a true-and-false proposition. ..implying that there are no two mutually-contradictory facts.

Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions.

Someone here said that proving the truth of a logical proposition comes down to showing that it's a tautology. So, from what that person said, for example, showing the truth of proposition about an implication (an implication-proposition) amounts to showing that its consequent is just another way of saying its antecedent.

Michael Ossipoff

Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions. — Michael Ossipoff

What the heck would non-human aboutness be?

”Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions.” — Michael Ossipoff
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What the heck would non-human aboutness be?

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Good point. That’s why my metaphysics is Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism (as opposed to OSR).
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(I’m not saying that there aren’t hypothetical objective world-stories, in addition to hypothetical subjective experience-stories. But it’s the subjective experience-stories that are (tautologically) about our experience. The hypothetical objective world-stories have no relevance to us. Admittedly, someone could question the reality of those objective world-stories, except that even their abstract implications can, in principle, be evident to us and aren’t different in kind from the abstract-implications comprising our subjective stories.)
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Each of us is central and primary to our experience-story. …a hypothetical story about our experience, a story for, and centered on, each of us.
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“There are” the abstract facts of logic, in the limited sense that they can be mentioned and referred-to. What they’re about is abstract in the sense that you’ve referred to as non-human aboutness, independent of human feelings and impressions.
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You could say that even the abstract-facts are things in our experience and dependent on our experience. Of course, there’s a complementarity between the abstract-implications, the complex system of inter-referring abstract implications that is your experience-story, and you the experiencer and protagonist of that story.
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It’s all one big inter-referring mutually-complementary system that needn’t have any reality or existence in any context other than in its own inter-referring context.
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“Reality” and “Existence” are very misunderstood and misused words. Like “speed”, they’re only meaningful with-respect-to a frame-of-reference, a context.
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Something can be said to be real or existent (only) in and with-respect-to a context.
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There’s no need to say that this physical universe is real or existent in any in-principle-fully-describable context other than its own, and that of our lives. When you realize that, you realize that the Materialist is needlessly insisting on believing that this physical universe exists in some unspecified other, larger, context that’s part of the in-principle-fully-describable realm (…as it must be, because he also is convinced that there isn’t what’s not in-principle-fully-describable).
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(I use that awkward wording starting with “what’s…”, because I don’t want to say “something” or “anything” in reference to what’s not in-principle-fully-describable, because my definition of ‘thing’ includes in-principle-fully-describableness.)
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That unsupported belief in that unspecified larger context sounds to me like a religion believed in by the Materialist.
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When I say that, I should clarify that I consider myself religious too. I don’t disagree about a larger context, and I don’t specify it either. But I don’t say that it’s in-principle-fully-describable.
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And, differing with most other Theists (but not so much with the Gnostics), I suggest that this abstract-implications-comprised physical world of our experience, as the setting of our experience-story, wasn’t created from a higher level. As the protagonist of our experience-story, and the "Will-To-Life", we’re the reason for our life and therefore of our world. That complementarity is self-generated. As the Atheists argue (They’re right about that much), Benevolence wouldn’t and didn’t make there be this physical-world. (the World, but not this physical-world.)
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This reply has been a bit far-ranging, but one topic brings in another.
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Michael Ossipoff

I've made some edits to the last paragraph of my post before this one.

Michael Ossipoff

Say what?

Did any of that tell me what non-human aboutness is supposed to be?

Of course, you could attempt to explain how you believe it's actually a logical implication. — Terrapin Station

If you know all the physical and chemical properties of water, then there's no way for ice not to be slippery under the right environmental conditions. Therefore, conceiving of ice lacking slipperiness is to fail to fully take into account it's makeup.

We can't say the same thing for consciousness.

I think that trying to think about it any other way is rather incoherent, simply because the entire notion of nonphysical existents is incoherent, — Terrapin Station

Nevertheless, we have all sorts of concepts which aren't part of physics, so figuring out how they can be understood as physical is the challenge.

You're making an assertion, but you have to be able to back it up.

As for epiphenomenalism, I think it's a misguided idea. — SophistiCat

The zombie argument only makes sense if you believe epiphenomenalism is possible.

If you know all the physical and chemical properties of water, then there's no way for ice not to be slippery under the right environmental conditions. — Marchesk

What does that have to do with logical entailment? You're making a metaphysical statement there. You're not saying anything about logic.

The zombie argument only makes sense if you believe epiphenomenalism is possible. — JupiterJess

That's not the only possibility. Dualism, panpsychism, occasionalism are other possibilities.

Did any of that tell me what non-human aboutness is supposed to be? — Terrapin Station

It's your phrase. So, if I haven't answered your question, it's because I don't know exactly what you mean by it. Tell me what you mean by it, and I'll tell you what it is (or is supposed to be), if I can.

Michael Ossipoff

In other words, tell me which phrase of mine you're asking about when you ask what it's supposed to be.

Michael Ossipoff

What does that have to do with logical entailment? — Terrapin Station

There's no way for H20 not to have the properties of water when you take into account all of the physics and chemistry. Of course you can imagine a world where it's different by ignoring the physics and chemistry, just like we can imagine super heroes.

But that's not what Chalmers meant by conceivability.

C'mon, man--am I not typing English? What does that have to do with logical entailment?

You had said:

But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about- — Michael Ossipoff

Then you said that "logic discussions" would be an example.

I asked:

"And what that's about is not determined by how people think of it, in your view?"

To which you responded:

Yes, I'd say that . . . Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions. — Michael Ossipoff

So, we have your claim that there can be logic discussions where there is "indeed a word for everything that the discussion is about" AND your claim that "Human impressions and feelings aren't involved" in the above.

This implies that the words for everything that the discussion is about are determined by something other than how people think about it.

So, I asked you what the non-human source for what those discussions are about is.

The physics logically entails the properties of water, unless you think physics is either:

A. Not logical
B. Incomplete

Physics and logic are two different things. So, the properties of ice aren't actually logically entailed by physical facts. Rather, the properties of ice are identical to (not entailed by) physical facts ontologically.

In just the same way, the properties of mentality are identical to physical facts (re a subset of brain facts) ontologically.

"Physical facts" there isn't a reference to the science of physics, especially not as the contingent set of theories, laws, etc. as presented in physics textbooks, classrooms, etc. It's rather a reference to the type of ontological stuff we're talking about.

"Physical facts" there isn't a reference to the science of physics, especially not as the contingent set of theories, laws, etc. as presented in physics textbooks, classrooms, etc. It's rather a reference to the type of ontological stuff we're talking about. — Terrapin Station

So this ontological stuff is the world, or reality. And you wish to call it "physical". But it could have things not described or predicted by physics in it. Panpsychism, neutral monism, strong emergentism, non-supernatural dualism and epiphenomenalism are all consistent with this ontological stuff.

It's like Thales saying everything is water, someone pointing out that space isn't entailed by water, and Thales saying that he doesn't mean the study of water, but the actual ontological stuff, therefore it's not a problem to say space is made up of water.

Which is just word play. We could say the world is ontologically watery instead of physical, and it accomplishes the same thing.

Water and the study of water are different, right? But that doesn't imply that just any old thing is water. It's just that what water is isn't determined by the study of water. The study of water has to be able to focus on water to be the study of that particular "item" in the first place. If the study of it were what we were referring to by "water," then what we're referring to by "water" would be whatever we've decided to study and name "the study of water," which in that case could be just any old arbitrary thing.

So, I asked you what the non-human source for what those discussions are about is.

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How about my Slitheytoves example:
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If there were Slitheytoves and Jaberwockeys, and an attribute called “brillig-ness”, and if all Slithetytoves were brillig, and all Jaberwockeys were Slitheytoves, then all Jaberwockeys would be brillig.
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I don’t have any emotional reaction to Jaberwockeys, Slitheytoves or brillig-ness. But the above paragraph states a fact, whether or not you, I or anyone cares about it. …even without there being such things as Slitheytoves, Jaberwockeys or brillig-ness.
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That discussion, in that Slithetytoves paragraph isn’t about anything that exists in the context of our physical world, and it doesn’t need to be.
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Michael Ossipoff

I don’t have any emotional reaction to Jaberwockeys, Slitheytoves or brillig-ness. But the above paragraph states a fact, whether or not you, I or anyone cares about it. …even without there being such things as Slitheytoves, Jaberwockeys or brillig-ness. — Michael Ossipoff

And in your view the source of those facts is?

Also, by the way, what would you say that has to do with aboutness? X is about y?

And in your view the source of those facts is? — Terrapin Station

It's been said in these forums, and (though I'm not an authority) it seems right to me, that abstract logical facts are demonstrated by showing that they're tautologies. Certainly an implication-proposition could be proved by showing that its antecedent and consequent are just two wordings of the same proposition.

For example, the proposition:

"There isn't a true-and-false proposition."

...can be shown to be a tautology.

Tautologies don't need any proof. For example, the source of the truth of a tautological implication is the fact that it consists of two ways of wording the same proposition. (The above-stated proposition in quotes can be worded as an implication.)

Michael Ossipoff

Also, by the way, what would you say that has to do with aboutness? X is about y? — Terrapin Station

First, let me suggest an abbreviation:

I'd like to abbreviate "in-principle-completely-describable" as "ipcd".

Facts needn't be about anything that exists in some preferred context. Abstract implications can be about propositions that are about hypothetical things. ....things that are only in "if" clauses.

...and none of a system of inter-referring abstract implications about propositions about hypothetical things needs to exist in (or be about anything in) any context other than its own inter-referring context.

That's what my metaphysics discusses. I propose that there's no reason to believe that your experience of the ipcd aspects of your surroundings, the logical relations among the things and events of your surroundings, are other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things.

I suggest that experience is primary to all that, but the ipcd aspects of your experience have to be consistent, because there are no mutualiy-contradictory facts, because there are no true-and-false propositions.

That consistency-requirement is what brings logic into your experience. But I suggest that experience comes first. Inevitably, among all the abstract-implications and systems of them, there's one about the ipcd experience of someone who is you.

As I said, experience, and a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things, together comprise a complementary system, which is a logical system to the extent that experience of ipcd things must be consistent, for the reasons that I mentioned.

Existing only in their own contexts, such logical systems (with their built-in observer) are inevitable.

It needn't be a question of which came first, experience or the logical system of the ipcd aspects of experience-of-surroundings. They're complementary, part of a whole complementary inter-referring system that needn't be real or existent in any context other than its own.

Michael Ossipoff