I mean "things that humans can, in principle, describe without leaving out anything about them." — Michael Ossipoff
Problem here is that the slipperiness of ice is logically entailed by knowing the physics and chemistry. — Marchesk
Which is the "complete" idea, but that idea is nonsense in my view.
We don't even have to get into the fact that the idea of "everything about x" is nonsense.
The mere fact that descriptions are sets of words, where what's described (unless it's a self-referential case of descriptions of words) is not (the same) words, makes nonsense of the idea re leaving versus not leaving something out.
Descriptions are sets of words that individuals take to tell something about, charactize in some way, etc. various things about something else. That's all they are. — Terrapin Station
But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about- — Michael Ossipoff
.As for epiphenomenalism, I think it's a misguided idea.
But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about- — Michael Ossipoff
What would be an example of that? — Terrapin Station
And what that's about is not determined by how people think of it, in your view? — Terrapin Station
Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions. — Michael Ossipoff
.”Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
What the heck would non-human aboutness be?
Of course, you could attempt to explain how you believe it's actually a logical implication. — Terrapin Station
I think that trying to think about it any other way is rather incoherent, simply because the entire notion of nonphysical existents is incoherent, — Terrapin Station
As for epiphenomenalism, I think it's a misguided idea. — SophistiCat
If you know all the physical and chemical properties of water, then there's no way for ice not to be slippery under the right environmental conditions. — Marchesk
The zombie argument only makes sense if you believe epiphenomenalism is possible. — JupiterJess
Did any of that tell me what non-human aboutness is supposed to be? — Terrapin Station
What does that have to do with logical entailment? — Terrapin Station
But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about- — Michael Ossipoff
Yes, I'd say that . . . Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions. — Michael Ossipoff
"Physical facts" there isn't a reference to the science of physics, especially not as the contingent set of theories, laws, etc. as presented in physics textbooks, classrooms, etc. It's rather a reference to the type of ontological stuff we're talking about. — Terrapin Station
.So, I asked you what the non-human source for what those discussions are about is.
I don’t have any emotional reaction to Jaberwockeys, Slitheytoves or brillig-ness. But the above paragraph states a fact, whether or not you, I or anyone cares about it. …even without there being such things as Slitheytoves, Jaberwockeys or brillig-ness. — Michael Ossipoff
And in your view the source of those facts is? — Terrapin Station
Also, by the way, what would you say that has to do with aboutness? X is about y? — Terrapin Station
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