I have never heard of any axiom of free will in quantum mechanics. — m-theory
There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the “decision” by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already “knows” what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.
I think it is important to point out that no classical or modern theory gives us a good account of initial conditions of the past.
Not GR or the standard model.
If they did, then sure you could claim they were deterministic. — m-theory
But GR and the standard model do not predict the past initial conditions, we still cannot claim to know nor do we have a complete account of the initial conditions. — m-theory
Often the Free Will Axiom is called the "free will loophole", or the "free choice of detector orientations". — tom
She can sit there all day saying she shouldn't have had that last sip of coffee or she should have had the right fare ready for the bus but she did and she couldn't not have. — Barry Etheridge
You are misunderstanding Bell's statement. Bell's theorem is derived from the assumption of local hidden variables — Pierre-Normand
Assume that "X" refers to a real thing. Now assume that John defines "X" as being Y, that Jane defines "X" as being Z, and that the real thing referred to by "X" cannot be both Y and Z. In this context it makes sense to argue that either John or Jane are wrong in their account of what it means to be an X. John is wrong if the real thing referred to by "X" isn't Y and Jane is wrong if the real thing referred to by "X" isn't Z. — Michael
Now assume that "X" doesn't refer to a real thing. Does it make sense to argue that either John or Jane are wrong in their account of what it means to be an X? Given that there is no real thing referred to by "X", there is no fact of the matter. — Michael
Unless the term "free will" already refers to a real thing it doesn't seem to make sense to argue that one or the other is wrong in their account of what it means to have free will. The same is also true of the terms "choice" and "moral responsibility". — Michael
So if John defines "free will", "choice", and "moral responsibility" in such a way that they don't refer to real things, and if Jane defines "free will", "choice", and "moral responsibility" in such a way that they do refer to real things, what would John mean if he were to argue that Jane's account of what it means to have free will, choice, and moral responsibility are wrong? — Michael
It's certainly not the case that her account fails to describe the real things referred to by these terms. I — Michael
And if John were to say that Jane's "free will" isn't really free will, isn't he just saying that Jane's "free will" isn't what he (and, for the sake of argument, most others) mean by "free will"? If so, is this significant?
Also, I'm an incompatibilist, for example (and an incompatibilist who believes that there is free will). I can never make any sense of compatibilism unless someone is redefining the terms so that we're not even talking about the same thing any longer. — Terrapin Station
What are the axioms of Bell's Theorem? — tom
Bell's theorem just is the statement that the statistical predictions of QM are inconsistent with all local hidden variable theories. — Pierre-Normand
1. Freedom of choice. The freedom to choose which experiment to perform independently of the object to be measured. i.e. The Free Will of the Experimenter — tom
Since you refuse to provide the axioms of Bell's theorem, allow me:
1. Freedom of choice. The freedom to choose which experiment to perform independently of the object to be measured. i.e. The Free Will of the Experimenter
2. Measurement Independence. Future outcomes do not influence past settings - i.e. causality.
3. Locality.
4. Counterfactual Definiteness. — tom
I'm confused by this. Isn't Bell's theorem supposed to show that 3. and 4. cannot both be true? — Michael
So I'm right to be confused that these are all supposed to be axioms of the theory? — Michael
So I'm right to be confused with the claim that these are axioms of the theory? — Michael
Yes it is confusing because Bell's theorem isn't a theory but rather a statement of incompatibility between a set of assumptions. Physicists who endorse the empirical and theoretical validity of QM seldom endorse assumptions (3) and (4) in Tom's table. — Pierre-Normand
Quantum field theory is explicitly local. Copenhagen is local. Many Worlds is local. As a matter of fact it has been proved that QM is a local theory. No sane physicist gives up (3)(or 2)! — tom
I don't know how, but that's that the scientist in charge said it did. — Michael
The importance of the experiment you refer to, is that it closed two loopholes - i.e. two experimental difficulties were overcome. They were able to guarantee no-faster-than-light-communication (i.e. they closed the locality loophole) and they closed the "detection loophole", which is an experimental loophole relating to photons.
The experiment does not "support quantum nonlocality". — tom
“These tests have been done since the late ’70s but always in the way that additional assumptions were needed,” Dr. Hanson said. “Now we have confirmed that there is spooky action at distance.”
It does support non-locality, as Dr. Henson says: — Michael
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