You'd believe in God to the extent that you have some concept/understanding of God, and you'd be able to describe the concept/understanding that you believe. — Terrapin Station

You have more confidence in my descriptive abilities than I have! :wink:

Well, to the extent that you couldn't describe what you believe (in), it wouldn't .And much sense to say that you believe (in) it? "I believe in plabbetyblax." "What's that?" "I don't know. I can't even describe it to myself." We'd understandably think that person is maybe a bit nutty.

And yet we have many words - and "God" is a good example, but far from the only one - whose definition is general, at best, or downright vague. Why do you think this is? I'm not sure, but I think it is that we want such vague terms, because we find them convenient and useful. Often we want to conduct a discussion in general (i.e. somewhat vague) terms. For such discussions, vague and poorly-defined terms are the order of the day. :smile:

So no, I don't think I could give you a definition of God, as I understand Her, that you would find useful or adequate. Do I feel inadequate about this? No, I'm afraid not. Precision is more common in theory than it is in practice.

Describing things to other people in a manner that they're satisfied with is another issue entirely.

Is there ever a need to describe something to yourself? I don't think so. We only describe things "to other people" because we only need to describe them to others.

Whether there's a need to do it is irrelevant I think. The fact is that you could do this for whatever you believe (in), insofar as you believe it. That's all that I was saying. I wasn't making any claims about anyone else finding a description satisfactory, etc. That would depend on a whole host of psychological and social factors.

You'd believe in God to the extent that you have some concept/understanding of God, and you'd be able to describe the concept/understanding that you believe. — Terrapin Station

It's nice to be able to agree with you on something. This is actually related to what I was saying about how things exist. To say only that God exists without giving any content to God is to say nothing, really. Whether something exists is trivial apart from how it is supposed to exist (what it is.)

Some might object that God is beyond conception. I can only make sense of this if they mean their experience of God is emotional, sensual, or generally akin to the experience of music, art, and that aspect of communication with other human beings which is not conceptual (a smile exchanged,a hug.)
The only thing that troubles me with this approach is that often 'beyond conceptual' is still insisted upon in an essentially conceptual way, as something that is and isn't concept, mostly to escape the threat of their experience being subjective, since they often want to prove things about God. Not all such theists will grant that 'well, it just felt like a universally accessible and relevant experience.'

What I mean to say on this matter can be said briefly:

1) Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, other than in its own context (...in particular, in some absolute sense (whatever that would mean) as Materialists believe)?

2)...because, if not, then this physical world doesn't exist in any sense or context other than that in which exists the setting of your life-experience-story, a hypothetical system of inter-referring abstract implications about propositions about hypothetical things. ...which, too, exists and is real in its own context (if "exist" and "real" mean anything).

3)...in which case, what reason would there be to believe that this physical world is other than the setting in that hypothetical experience-story, which is an inevitable logical system. ...which needs no existence or reality other than in its own context?

Michael Ossipoff

1) Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, — Michael Ossipoff

Which is essentially asking whether it's possible to persuade someone of something when the person in question has psychological issues, where either they're delusional or they're stuck in an early stage of development, or they're so self-centered, completely incapable of empathy, etc., that to them it's as if only they exist, or for some reason they're just trying to be difficult. In most cases, probably not. That only tells us something about those folks' psychologies, however. It's certainly not the case that ontology somehow hinges on persuading difficult or troubled people of something.

I've flagged Terrapin Station's most recent post for two reasons:

1, It uses a falsified quote:

Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, other than in its own context (...in particular, in some absolute sense (whatever that would mean) as Materialists believe)? — Michael Ossipoff

...becomes:

Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, — Michael Ossipoff

2. After that, the message consists only of negative characterization of another poster...for having allegedly said what Terrapin falsely quoted.

Terrapin Station is a habitual repeat-offender who didn't learn anything from his recent message-deletion, and didn't wait long before doing the same thing again.

Michael Ossipoff

http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/conditions/finding-help-when-get-it-and-where-go

Let me clarify something that I said, and post a better reply to Terrapin Station:
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I’d said:
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What I mean to say on this matter can be said briefly:
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1) Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, other than in its own context (...in particular, in some absolute sense (whatever that would mean) as Materialists believe)?
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2)...because, if not, then this physical world doesn't exist in any sense or context other than that in which exists the setting of your life-experience-story, a hypothetical system of inter-referring abstract implications about propositions about hypothetical things. ...which, too, exists and is real in its own context (if "exist" and "real" mean anything).
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3)...in which case, what reason would there be to believe that this physical world is other than the setting in that hypothetical experience-story, which is an inevitable logical system. ...which needs no existence or reality other than in its own context?

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I’d like to clarify that a bit:
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Any meaning for “real” or “existent” is contextual only.
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To say that something in principle describable by humans has reality or existence other than that, is nonsense.
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The notion of non-contextual (absolute in some sense) reality or existence for describable things has resulted in much confusion and befuddlement in philosophy, over millennia, and up to the present.
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Someone questioned the meaning of a thing’s “reality or existence in its own context”.
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Fair enough. Neither “Real” nor “Existent” has a consensus metaphysical definition, and anyone would be hard-put to suggest usable definitions for them.
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That’s why I don’t claim “reality” or “existence” for anything describable. And, anyway, I agree with those who wouldn’t apply “exist” to anything else either.
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But (only) if you don’t have a quarrel with something being real and existent in its own context, then I won’t deny that this physical world is real and existent in its own context, and that of our lives.
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Sankara has been quoted as saying that the physical world is real, in the sense that, whatever reality or existence it does or doesn’t have, it’s part of Reality, which could be defined as “all that there is” …which of course includes such things as abstract-facts and other hypotheticals. I wouldn’t disagree with that.
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The bottom line is, then, that it depends on what you mean by “real” and “existent”. I make no claims, in that regard, for describable things.
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As, ourselves, part of this physical world, of course our perception of it is within its context, and that of our lives in it. If it had other existence or reality, how would we know it anyway?
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When Terrapin Station replied, he quoted me, but left out a meaning-determining part of the sentence, thereby dishonestly changing the sentence’s meaning—quoting me as saying:
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1) Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, — Michael Ossipoff

Terrapin Station then continued:

Which is essentially asking whether it's possible to persuade someone of something when the person in question has psychological issues

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Well, which one of us is habitually on the attack, and posting messages consisting only of attack, only about another poster, instead of about the topic. Aggression results from having issues.
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, where either they're delusional

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…like someone who thinks that the quote of me that Terrapin Station posted, above, means the same thing as the sentence that I’d actually posted? Or someone who thinks that a question (in a recent other thread) about the experiences of a dying person is answered by referring to the time after death, when that person has no experiences? :D
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or they're stuck in an early stage of development

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…such as an infantile aggressive stage?
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…troubled people…

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Aggression is a symptom of a troubled person.
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But have people noticed that the most erroneous people on the Internet always seem to also be the most loudly assertive, and, behaviorally, the most troubled, the most disturbed, and the most aggressive people, with the most (seemingly) angry behavior? I didn’t make that up, and, in fact psychologists have found that same correlation in general. It’s called the “Dunning-Kruger effect.
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Why are the most mistaken people also the most assertive, loud and arrogant? Dunning & Kruger, and others have offered some good explanations.
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First, here’s a link to the Wikipedia article about it. Below the link, I’ve quoted some highlights from the article.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
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In the field of psychology, the Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which people of low ability have illusory superiority and mistakenly assess their cognitive ability as greater than it is. The cognitive bias of illusory superiority comes from the inability of low-ability people to recognize their lack of ability. Without the self-awareness of metacognition, low-ability people cannot objectively evaluate their actual competence or incompetence.[1]
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As described by social psychologists David Dunning and Justin Kruger, the cognitive bias of illusory superiority results from an internal illusion in people of low ability
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The psychological phenomenon of illusory superiority was identified as a form of cognitive bias in Kruger and Dunning's 1999 study "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments".[1] The identification derived from the cognitive bias evident in the criminal case of McArthur Wheeler, who robbed banks with his face covered with lemon juice, which he believed would make it invisible to the surveillance cameras. This belief was based on his misunderstanding of the chemical properties of lemon juice as an invisible ink.[2]
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Other investigations of the phenomenon, such as "Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own Incompetence" (2003), indicate that much incorrect self-assessment of competence derives from the person's ignorance of a given activity's standards of performance.[3] Dunning and Kruger's research also indicates that training in a task, such as solving a logic puzzle, increases people's ability to accurately evaluate how good they are at it.[4]
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In Self-insight: Roadblocks and Detours on the Path to Knowing Thyself (2005), Dunning described the Dunning–Kruger effect as "the anosognosia of everyday life", referring to a neurological condition in which a disabled person either denies or seems unaware of his or her disability. He stated: "If you're incompetent, you can't know you're incompetent ... The skills you need to produce a right answer are exactly the skills you need to recognize what a right answer is."
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In testing alternative explanations for the cognitive bias of illusory superiority, the study Why the Unskilled are Unaware: Further Explorations of (Absent) Self-insight Among the Incompetent (2008) reached the same conclusions as previous studies of the Dunning–Kruger effect: that, in contrast to high performers, "poor performers do not learn from feedback suggesting a need to improve
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the naturalist Charles Darwin (1809–1882), who said, "Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge"
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Maybe these people can help someone who is suffering from the Dunning-Kruger effect:

http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/conditions/finding-help-when-get-it-and-where-go[/quote]

Michael Ossipoff

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1) Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, other than in its own context (...in particular, in some absolute sense (whatever that would mean) as Materialists believe)?
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2)...because, if not, then this physical world doesn't exist in any sense or context other than that in which exists the setting of your life-experience-story . . .

For one, this seems to amount to a belief that "If P can not be demonstrated, then not-P."

But why wouldn't you require that just as much for P="The physical world is not real"?

”1) Can anyone show that this physical world exists or is real, other than in its own context (...in particular, in some absolute sense (whatever that would mean) as Materialists believe)?
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2)...because, if not, then this physical world doesn't exist in any sense or context other than that in which exists the setting of your life-experience-story . . .”—Michael Ossipoff
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For one, this seems to amount to a belief that "If P can not be demonstrated, then not-P."
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But why wouldn't you require that just as much for P="The physical world is not real"?

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Yes, my wording didn’t express my meaning well. By “If not…”, I meant, “If this physical world doesn’t have reality or existence other than in in its own context”.
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I meant that the alternative to “This physical world exists and is real other than in its own context” is:
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“This physical world doesn’t have any kind of reality or existence other than, or more than, that of the hypothetical life-experience story that I’ve described, which consists of a complex system of relations and inter-reference among abstract implications about propositions about hypothetical things.”
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So let me repeat your questions:
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For one, this seems to amount to a belief that "If P can not be demonstrated, then not-P."
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But why wouldn't you require that just as much for P="The physical world is not real"?

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Contrary to the poor wording of mine that you quoted, which implied an unintended meaning, I’ve always emphasized that I can’t prove that this physical world doesn’t have the objective, fundamental, absolute, noncontextual existence that Materialists believe in. I’ve always emphasized that, because, by definition, unfalsifiable-propositions can’t be disproved, it’s impossible to prove any metaphysics, including mine.
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So what do I assert?
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That Materialism depends on an assumption and posits a brute fact. My metaphysics, Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, doesn’t.
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More than that, I also claim that Materialists can’t even say what they mean by the objective, absolute, noncontextual existence and reality that they claim for this physical world, and which would distinguish it from the physical world described by my metaphysics.
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I emphasize that I don’t claim any existence or reality (whatever that would mean) for abstract-implications and other hypotheticals, or anything else in principle describable* by humans. But an inter-referring system of them has that inter-reference and inter-relation, and my metaphysics doesn’t posit more than that.
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…as described by Michael Faraday in 1844 when he said that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world is other than the system of logical and mathematical relational-structure that is experimentally-observed.
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*(As I mean “describable”, something is describable iff there’s nothing about it that can’t, in principle, be described by humans. I express that distinction because it can’t be shown that all of Reality is describable by that definition.)
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Michael Ossipoff

We won't know what the mind is compared with the body until we die and our bodies dissolve or vaporize back into their basic chemical elements and compounds. In the meantime such speculation is rather inaccurate.

We won't know what the mind is compared with the body until we die and our bodies dissolve or vaporize back into their basic chemical elements and compounds. In the meantime such speculation is rather inaccurate. — hks

We don't know with logical certainty, but I don't agree that that amounts to not knowing. Why would we worry about logical certainty (especially when logic is something we've constructed in the first place and we've come up with a number of different constructions for it)?

We won't know what the mind is compared with the body... — hks

If we don't know that, it's because we've forgotten what was taught to us in pre-secondary school (also formerly called junior-high school, and, more recently, middle-school).

...until we die and our bodies dissolve or vaporize back into their basic chemical elements and compounds.

Of course, at that time we won't be at all, and so it's meaningless to speak of our knowing anything then.

Michael Ossipoff

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*(As I mean “describable”, something is describable iff there’s nothing about it that can’t, in principle, be described by humans. I express that distinction because it can’t be shown that all of Reality is describable by that definition.) — Michael Ossipoff

That wording is problematic, and doesn't say what I meant. I have to admit that it isn't easy to word the distinction that I've been trying to refer to.

Reality is unknowable. If someone says, "You can't be sure of that", then I answer, "If you can't be sure that Reality is knowable, then you don't know it, and you've admitted that Reality isn't reliably knowable. Speculation isn't knowledge.

In fact, it's obvious that, even everyday life, many experiences are indescribable. I've spoken of the example of the smell of mint, or the experience of stepping on a tack.

In metaphysics, I've meant to avoid speculative statements. ...to only say uncontroversial, obvious things that won't be disagreed-with. Facts and logic are things that are completely describable by humans, at least in principle.

That's why I preface many metaphysical statements with "...in the describable realm".

But defining "the describable realm", has been difficult. I can't just call it "Matters about which something be said", because I've said (suggested, not asserted) that Reality is benevolent. ...thereby saying something about Reality.

Maybe "Matters about which provable things can be said" would be a better way to say what I've meant by "the describable realm".

Or maybe "Matters of logic or the system of facts that relate experiences of the physical world."

Or maybe just "Matters of fact".

Those definitions of "the describable realm" are just tentative. Maybe it could be better worded.

Michael Ossipoff

Maybe "Matters of fact" should be replaced by "Matters of provable fact",

Michael Ossipoff

We disagree on a lot of that (and a !ot of stuff in general).

For one, I don't agree that knowledge requires any sort of certainty.

Re descriotions, in my view a description is any set of words that an individual takes as sufficient to bring to mind some features and/or relations of whatever is being described, so that the individual can picture the thing in question from some perspective, whether that's memory-based or purely imagination-based.

Maybe "Matters about which provable things can be said" would be a better way to say what I've meant by "the describable realm". — Michael Ossipoff

Maybe "Matters of fact" should be replaced by "Matters of provable fact" — Michael Ossipoff

[My highlighting.]

That introduces the thorny matter of proof. What constitutes proof? It can range from Objective proof, requiring conformance with that which actually is, to a much softer and less demanding 'proof'. I don't mean to derail or distract, but once you introduce the concept of proof, these things need to be considered....

I don't agree that knowledge requires any sort of certainty. — Terrapin Station

Well, uncertainty is a real and significant part of reality, as we humans perceive and understand it. So I suppose it follows that much (nearly all?) of what we consider 'knowledge' must be somewhat uncertain. But it can't usefully be uncertain to the extent that it can't be defined at all, even in a general sense. There is a spectrum here, from absolute certainty to no certainty at all, and the latter end of the spectrum isn't very useful to us.... But we do need to address the former end of the spectrum, where things are not known with absolute certainty, but where there is enough evidence to be convinced, if not certain. ... Don't we? :chin:

I'd say that a proposition is proved if it has been shown that it amounts to a tautology. In particular, a proposed implication is an implication if it can be shown that its consequent is just another way of saying its antecedent.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd say that a proposition is proved if it has been shown that it amounts to a tautology. — Michael Ossipoff

According to my dictionary (I checked :wink:), this means:

"I'd say that a proposition is proved if it has been shown that it is necessarily true."

This looks like the other definition of "tautology" in my dictionary: "useless repetition". Something is true if it's true. Hmm. :chin:

ETA: You are right to combine "proof" and "true"; they belong together in our thoughts. So I'm not being pedantic here, but only trying to understand what you have written, and what you might have meant by it. :chin: :chin: :chin:

a proposed implication is an implication if it can be shown that its consequent is just another way of saying its antecedent. — Michael Ossipoff

This confuses me more. I read this as saying that "a proposed implication is an implication if it can be shown that what results from it is the same as what came before it." I can't make sense of this, I'm afraid.

For one, I don't agree that knowledge requires any sort of certainty.

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Of course it goes without saying that there can be knowledge of what might be so, and of likelihoods or probabilities (objectively-calculated; or as felt by someone, maybe judged by known or felt outcome-values and hypothetical lotteries).
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Anyway, I’ve been saying all-along that it isn’t meaningful to assert, much less claim to prove, about the character or nature of the whole of Reality itself. When it comes to that, it isn’t knowledge—It’s impressions. And no one should say that your impression should be the same as theirs.
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A lot of people here agree with me on that.
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Re descriptions, in my view a description is any set of words that an individual takes as sufficient to bring to mind some features and/or relations of whatever is being described, so that the individual can picture the thing in question from some perspective, whether that's memory-based or purely imagination-based.

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You can’t tell someone what the smell of mint is like. For some experiences, you could make some rough comparisons only, to an experience they’ve had. Rough comparisons don’t tell someone what it’s like. They only tell someone some little bit about what it’s like.
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Anyway, because “description” can obviously be defined in various diverse ways, that’s why I specified a definition, to say what I meant by that word.
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But the word “describable” is problematic for expressing the distinction that I’ve been trying to express. I’m not satisfied with the definitions in my most recent post before this one, and it seems that the approach using the word “describable” isn’t helping.
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Other approaches that would be better:
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What I’ve been referring to as “the describable realm” means:
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The realm of contingent, interdependent, dependently-originated, things interdependently defined and related by logic and facts.
Or:
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The separate things, as opposed to the whole of Reality itself.
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(Buddhist writers sometimes use the term “dependent origination”. I don’t know how they mean it or use it in their metaphysics (s). I don’t know anything about Buddhist metaphysics(s), but that term is useful to make the distinction that I’ve been trying to express. Though I don’t know anything about Buddhist metaphysics, Buddhist writers have said nonmetaphysical things that are interesting, useful and helpful.)
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Michael Ossipoff

According to my dictionary (I checked :wink:), this means:
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"I'd say that a proposition is proved if it has been shown that it is necessarily true."

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You didn’t say what dictionary you were using. Merriam-Webster is the premier dictionary in the U.S. It defines “tautology” as “needless repetition of an idea, statement or word”.
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Of course a repetition of an idea, statement or word might not really be unnecessary if it isn’t immediately obvious that it’s a repetition, and its repetition-nature needs to be shown.
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That isn’t different from how I meant “tautology”.
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But yes, if it can be shown that a proposition is necessarily true, that could be called proof.
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This looks like the other definition of "tautology" in my dictionary: "useless repetition".

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Something is true if it's true. Hmm.

…and is proved if shown to be necessarily true.
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Say it that way if you want.
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ETA: You are right to combine "proof" and "true"

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Thank you.
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I won’t claim to know what “ETA” means. Estimated time of arrival?
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; they belong together in our thoughts. So I'm not being pedantic here, but only trying to understand what you have written, and what you might have meant by it.

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I meant only what I said. But I never refuse to answer questions about the meaning of particular specified words, sentences, phrases and terms.
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”a proposed implication is an implication if it can be shown that its consequent is just another way of saying its antecedent.” — Michael Ossipoff
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This confuses me more. I read this as saying that "a proposed implication is an implication if it can be shown that what results from it is the same as what came before it." I can't make sense of this, I'm afraid.

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That’s okay. We can agree to disagree about whether it means anything.
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As before, you can say it how you want to. But you seem to be saying that you’re re-wording it in a way that doesn’t mean anything to you.
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Speaking of re-wording, you could say that a proposed implication is an implication if its consequent can be shown to be a re-wording of its antecedent.
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I’m not quite sure which part of that you don’t understand.
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But, in general, regarding the inadequacy of words, of course words are inadequate--for example, given that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words. ...and the fact that it's impossible to tell someone what an experience is really like. (The example I've been using is the smell of mint.}

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Michael Ossipoff

I won’t claim to know what “ETA” means. Estimated time of arrival? — Michael Ossipoff

Sorry: "Edited To Add" :blush:

You can’t tell someone what the smell of mint is like. — Michael Ossipoff

No description is like what it's a description of.

No description is like what it's a description of. — Terrapin Station

Of course.

And maybe that's why it can't tell someone what an experience is really like.

Michael Ossipoff

As before, you can say it how you want to. But you seem to be saying that you’re re-wording it in a way that doesn’t mean anything to you.

Speaking of re-wording, you could say that a proposed implication is an implication if its consequent can be shown to be a re-wording of its antecedent. — Michael Ossipoff

I was having difficulty understanding your words, so I offered rewordings that demonstrated my understanding of them, for you to confirm or correct. Sadly, you just repeated the terms I found difficult, so neither of us gained anything.

Re descriptions, sure.

It also dismantles a criticism about any description that the description doesn't convey an experience of the thing it's describing, doesn't resemble the thing it's describing qualitatively. Those criticisms suggest that some descriptions can do such things, but no description can.