The second error is to suppose that a non-existent God can't have contradictory properties. Anything we think of that is non-existent is imaginary (by which I mean that we can conceive of it but it doesn't exist), and imaginary things can have contradictory properties (e.g. Meinong's round square, which is imaginary and is both round and not round); it's only things that are existent (i.e. real) that can't — Herg
Non-existent objects cannot be entertained unless you accept contradictory objects. — MindForged
Ehhh, unless you're a dialetheist like myself you cannot really run this sort of argument. Non-existent objects cannot be entertained unless you accept contradictory objects. But in doing so, I think you really have to accept that contradictory existent objects are possible as well, because in principle there doesn't seem to be a reason that the property of existence makes inconsistent properties unavailable. And that's a tougher thing to argue for, though there are arguments. — MindForged
To speak of a non-existent God is to pretend that there is a God — Herg
Evidently I didn't make myself clear. To speak of a non-existent God is to pretend that there is a God when there isn't. Since it's a pretence, it's not bound by the laws of logic. — Herg
Non-existent objects cannot be entertained unless you accept contradictory objects.
— MindForged
Could you explain that more? — Terrapin Station
And there doesn't seem to be a principled (non-question-begging) distinction between the consistent and the inconsistent objects that don't exist, — MindForged
they play the same theoretical role: explain how we make true assertions about things which don't exist.
Because the whole reason for adopting non-existent objects is to explain how we can say true things about objects that don't exist. — MindForged
If I say "Sherlock Holmes is the most famous detective", no one thinks I'm pretending Holmes exists. — MindForged
The principles of logic (or more properly, the principles of the logic I happen to adopt) do not cease to apply when dealing with fictions. Otherwise authors would never structure their stories or try to retcon earlier mistakes.
That's not about whether you're pretending, it's about why you're pretending. — Herg
It's true that fiction-writers usually follow the principles of logic, but that's merely because most of what fiction-writers want to do doesn't require them to depart from those rules. They can produce fiction that doesn't follow the rules of logic if they like: for example, there's a short story - I can't remember who by - in which the rules of mathematics are not determined until someone actually does the maths, and there are aliens who have done the maths on certain numbers before we have, and they have forced maths to work differently for those numbers from the way it works for the numbers we got to first; which, of course, is not logically possible. Existent objects, on the other hand, have to follow the rules of logic. — Herg
Incorrect because everyone knows that I'm not claiming nor at all pretending Holmes is real. — MindForged
The reason most (really, all) fiction writers attempt to keep their stories consistent is because otherwise their story doesn't make sense, even to them. Doing otherwise results in triviality, wherein the world doesn't cohere.
I am not saying (nor does anyone interpret me as saying) "Pretend Holmes exists and he his more famous than all other detectives". — MindForged
If you don't understand this that's because you don't think there are non-existent objects.
I think you are pretending that he is real without realising that that's what you are doing. You know that he isn't real, and yet you speak of him as if he were — Herg
The story I'm referring to is not trivial. It's quite a good story. The point is that logical laws, just like physical laws, can be disobeyed in a work of fiction, as long as the resulting narrative makes sufficient sense for the reader to follow it. — Herg
No, you're not saying 'pretend'; you're simply pretending. — Herg
No, there are no non-existent objects. To say that an object is non-existent is the same as saying that there is no such object. — Herg
It's true that the chief reason for proposing that there are non-existent objects is to explain how we speak truthfully about such things. — MindForged
It's true that the chief reason for proposing that there are non-existent objects is to explain how we speak truthfully about such things.
— MindForged
The reason that people present fictional things is almost never "to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things." For example, A. Conan Doyle didn't invent Sherlock Holmes to explain how we can speak truthfully about Sherlock Holmes. — Terrapin Station
You can say I'm pretending but I'm not. — MindForged
Which makes it quite difficult to explain how one can truthfully speak about non existent objects. After all, for the sentences about them to be true there must be something making them true. But on your view "existence" and "being" are the same thing so you've no way of explaining truths of the sort I mentioned before. — MindForged
It is both the case the Holmes is fictional and he is more famous than any other detective. You haven't at all addressed this other than to say I'm unwittingly assuming he is real despite directly saying he isn't. . — MindForged
Unreal things can have properties and relations with real things.
I assume that MindForged means that the chief reason philosophers propose non-existent objects is to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things — Herg
MindForged holds that we need there to be non-existent objects to explain how we can speak truthfully about them — Herg
So re (a), for example, we can say true or false things about Sherlock Holmes via looking at what Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes--it's something true or false about his imagining per se, and re (b), we can say something true or false about Sherlock Holmes a la, "About the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall, Sherlock Holmes would . . ." (keeping in mind that to my knowledge, no one has ever written a Holmes story about the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall) , via extrapolating from what Doyle and others (including ourselves) have imagined about Holmes, so that we're positing something consistent with that, though the imaginings of particular individuals will always be the final arbiter there. (As again, its simply true or false about their imagining.) — Terrapin Station
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