I don't agree that the ontological argument is sound. It's not even valid. The argument doesn't seem to understand the distinction between a conception and other sorts of things in the world, and even beside that, positing the properties that an ideal conception would have is not the same thing as positing that there is indeed such a conception (or indeed conceivable if there is presently no such conception).

It's similar to the use-mention distinction. We can imagine a thing to exist even if it doesn't exist.

I think there are two errors in TOA. The first is the assumption that a God who exists is greater than a God who doesn't exist. This is false, because 'greater than' denotes a quantitative difference, and the difference between the existent and the non-existent isn't quantitative.

The second error is to suppose that a non-existent God can't have contradictory properties. Anything we think of that is non-existent is imaginary (by which I mean that we can conceive of it but it doesn't exist), and imaginary things can have contradictory properties (e.g. Meinong's round square, which is imaginary and is both round and not round); it's only things that are existent (i.e. real) that can't.

Your argument Y fails for the same reasons. An existent argument A is not quantitatively greater than a non-existent (i.e. imaginary) argument A, and is therefore not greater at all; and a non-existent argument A, being imaginary and not real, can have contradictory properties, and therefore can be both the greatest conceivable argument and not the greatest conceivable argument.

The second error is to suppose that a non-existent God can't have contradictory properties. Anything we think of that is non-existent is imaginary (by which I mean that we can conceive of it but it doesn't exist), and imaginary things can have contradictory properties (e.g. Meinong's round square, which is imaginary and is both round and not round); it's only things that are existent (i.e. real) that can't — Herg

Ehhh, unless you're a dialetheist like myself you cannot really run this sort of argument. Non-existent objects cannot be entertained unless you accept contradictory objects. But in doing so, I think you really have to accept that contradictory existent objects are possible as well, because in principle there doesn't seem to be a reason that the property of existence makes inconsistent properties unavailable. And that's a tougher thing to argue for, though there are arguments.

Non-existent objects cannot be entertained unless you accept contradictory objects. — MindForged

Could you explain that more?

Ehhh, unless you're a dialetheist like myself you cannot really run this sort of argument. Non-existent objects cannot be entertained unless you accept contradictory objects. But in doing so, I think you really have to accept that contradictory existent objects are possible as well, because in principle there doesn't seem to be a reason that the property of existence makes inconsistent properties unavailable. And that's a tougher thing to argue for, though there are arguments. — MindForged

Evidently I didn't make myself clear. To speak of a non-existent God is to pretend that there is a God when there isn't. Since it's a pretence, it's not bound by the laws of logic.

I'm not a dialetheist. I would need you to find me an existent object with inconsistent properties before I could contemplate becoming one.

I don't think is a fallacy but a "error of method".

To speak of a non-existent God is to pretend that there is a God — Herg

I wouldn't say that you're necessarily "pretending that there is a God."

You could be referring to other folks' ideas and beliefs per se, or you could be thinking of God as a fictional character/something purely imaginary, etc.

Evidently I didn't make myself clear. To speak of a non-existent God is to pretend that there is a God when there isn't. Since it's a pretence, it's not bound by the laws of logic. — Herg

No, that doesn't ring true. If I say "Sherlock Holmes is the most famous detective", no one thinks I'm pretending Holmes exists. The principles of logic (or more properly, the principles of the logic I happen to adopt) do not cease to apply when dealing with fictions. Otherwise authors would never structure their stories or try to retcon earlier mistakes.

Non-existent objects cannot be entertained unless you accept contradictory objects.
— MindForged

Could you explain that more? — Terrapin Station

Sure. Lots of objects do not exist. The planet Vulcan, unicorns, maybe God. But there are an even stranger class of non-existent objects, the contradictory ones. The square-circle is surely a non-existent object, but to accept this means to accept that there are objects with inconsistent properties. And there doesn't seem to be a principled (non-question-begging) distinction between the consistent and the inconsistent objects that don't exist, they play the same theoretical role: explain how we make true assertions about things which don't exist. The square-circle is surely circular, surely a shape, etc.

And so it seems if you accept that there are non-existent objects you're committed to quite the ontology. But obviously you cannot adopt the Law of Non-contradiction if you accept this because you're committed to things like the non-existent square-circle. But then it gets even weirder since it's unclear why, if you accept this, why the property of existence rules out contradictory existent objects as well for you.

And there doesn't seem to be a principled (non-question-begging) distinction between the consistent and the inconsistent objects that don't exist, — MindForged

Let me just start there for a moment. Why wouldn't consistent/inconsistent be a principled, non-question-begging distinction?

Because:

they play the same theoretical role: explain how we make true assertions about things which don't exist.

If the reason why adopting such a view is to serve the above then it applies just the same to inconsistent non-existent objects. In which case recourse to Non-contradiction is just irrelevant. You'd have to just insist on the principle for no reason (or beg the question for it), and there'd be no explanation for why you stop there.

Why would it hinge on whether they play the same theoretical role in some manner though?

Because the whole reason for adopting non-existent objects is to explain how we can say true things about objects that don't exist. And this entails that we can speak truly of inconsistent objects of that variety, granting them a kind of being. In fact, Meinong himself accepted this as a consequence (even a virtue) of his view, saying that Non-contradiction didn't apply to non-existent objects.

If you don't accept that the purpose of this is to explain that then you can't really accept it to begin with (which is fine), at least unless you're willing to have a lot of ad hoc restrictions. Or as I said, unprincipled.

Because the whole reason for adopting non-existent objects is to explain how we can say true things about objects that don't exist. — MindForged

We don't "adopt" non-existent objects for fictions?

Usually that's synonymous with non-existent objects. They're adopted to explain something about fictions. But the explanation works just the same for the inconsistent fictions, so we either accept those or dispense with this theory.

In other words, "the whole reason for adopting non-existent objects is to explain how we can say true things about objects that don't exist" is false.

Another reason we can adopt non-existent objects is for fictions.

If I say "Sherlock Holmes is the most famous detective", no one thinks I'm pretending Holmes exists. — MindForged

That's not about whether you're pretending, it's about why you're pretending. There can be many reasons why you would do this. You could dress up as Holmes and pretend to be him for a fancy dress party, or you could pretend that he exists to fool a naive tourist to London, or, when you read a story about him, you pretend he exists while you're reading. That's exactly what fiction is - pretending that there are certain objects and writing stories about them. (I know about this, because I write novels, and that's exactly what I'm doing when I write them.)

The principles of logic (or more properly, the principles of the logic I happen to adopt) do not cease to apply when dealing with fictions. Otherwise authors would never structure their stories or try to retcon earlier mistakes.

It's true that fiction-writers usually follow the principles of logic, but that's merely because most of what fiction-writers want to do doesn't require them to depart from those rules. They can produce fiction that doesn't follow the rules of logic if they like: for example, there's a short story - I can't remember who by - in which the rules of mathematics are not determined until someone actually does the maths, and there are aliens who have done the maths on certain numbers before we have, and they have forced maths to work differently for those numbers from the way it works for the numbers we got to first; which, of course, is not logically possible. Existent objects, on the other hand, have to follow the rules of logic.

I really don't understand you. Fictions are non-existent objects. It's true that the chief reason for proposing that there are non-existent objects is to explain how we speak truthfully about such things. And given there are inconsistent such objects, refusing to extend the theory to them is without justification.

That's not about whether you're pretending, it's about why you're pretending. — Herg

Incorrect because everyone knows that I'm not claiming nor at all pretending Holmes is real. It's simply true that he's more famous than any living detective despite being a fictional character. I am not saying (nor does anyone interpret me as saying) "Pretend Holmes exists and he his more famous than all other detectives". If you don't understand this that's because you don't think there are non-existent objects. Holmes is purely fictional and yet that fictional entity is in fact the most famous detective. It's a true statement.

It's true that fiction-writers usually follow the principles of logic, but that's merely because most of what fiction-writers want to do doesn't require them to depart from those rules. They can produce fiction that doesn't follow the rules of logic if they like: for example, there's a short story - I can't remember who by - in which the rules of mathematics are not determined until someone actually does the maths, and there are aliens who have done the maths on certain numbers before we have, and they have forced maths to work differently for those numbers from the way it works for the numbers we got to first; which, of course, is not logically possible. Existent objects, on the other hand, have to follow the rules of logic. — Herg

This doesn't make sense. The reason most (really, all) fiction writers attempt to keep their stories consistent is because otherwise their story doesn't make sense, even to them. Doing otherwise results in triviality, wherein the world doesn't cohere. I'm not familiar with the story you mention.

Incorrect because everyone knows that I'm not claiming nor at all pretending Holmes is real. — MindForged

False, since 'everyone' includes me, and I don't know that. I think you are pretending that he is real without realising that that's what you are doing. You know that he isn't real, and yet you speak of him as if he were; that's what we all do when we speak of fictional characters while knowing that they're fictional; and that's pretending. Of course, some people may think, mistakenly, that Holmes is real; when those people talk about Holmes, they are not pretending that he is real. But you and I know better than that. We know that there is no such person as Holmes, and yet we talk about him as living in Baker Street, smoking a pipe, etc, things which only a real person could do. Since we attribute to him properties that could only be possessed by a real person, and we do this knowing that he is not real, it follows that we must be pretending that he is real.

The reason most (really, all) fiction writers attempt to keep their stories consistent is because otherwise their story doesn't make sense, even to them. Doing otherwise results in triviality, wherein the world doesn't cohere.

The story I'm referring to is not trivial. It's quite a good story. The point is that logical laws, just like physical laws, can be disobeyed in a work of fiction, as long as the resulting narrative makes sufficient sense for the reader to follow it.

I am not saying (nor does anyone interpret me as saying) "Pretend Holmes exists and he his more famous than all other detectives". — MindForged

No, you're not saying 'pretend'; you're simply pretending.

If you don't understand this that's because you don't think there are non-existent objects.

No, there are no non-existent objects. To say that an object is non-existent is the same as saying that there is no such object.

I think you are pretending that he is real without realising that that's what you are doing. You know that he isn't real, and yet you speak of him as if he were — Herg

I am not pretending he is real, I don't know where you're getting that. He is a fictional character and nonetheless I can say true things about him. It is both the case the Holmes is fictional and he is more famous than any other detective. You haven't at all addressed this other than to say I'm unwittingly assuming he is real despite directly saying he isn't. Unreal things can have properties and relations with real things.

The story I'm referring to is not trivial. It's quite a good story. The point is that logical laws, just like physical laws, can be disobeyed in a work of fiction, as long as the resulting narrative makes sufficient sense for the reader to follow it. — Herg

When I said "trivial" I was referring to the definition of trivial in formal logic: incoherency due to every sentence being a theorem. Fictions with contradictions are, in standard logic, reduced to triviality.

No, you're not saying 'pretend'; you're simply pretending. — Herg

You can say I'm pretending but I'm not.

No, there are no non-existent objects. To say that an object is non-existent is the same as saying that there is no such object. — Herg

Which makes it quite difficult to explain how one can truthfully speak about non existent objects. After all, for the sentences about them to be true there must be something making them true. But on your view "existence" and "being" are the same thing so you've no way of explaining truths of the sort I mentioned before.

It's true that the chief reason for proposing that there are non-existent objects is to explain how we speak truthfully about such things. — MindForged

The reason that people present fictional things is almost never "to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things." For example, A. Conan Doyle didn't invent Sherlock Holmes to explain how we can speak truthfully about Sherlock Holmes. He invented Sherlock Holmes because he enjoyed imagining a sublimely skilled but personally-flawed private detective. He enjoyed storytelling. He knew that good storytelling could help him earn a living. Etc.

Most non-existent things that people think about are in the guise of daydreaming/fantasizing, dreaming, creating fictions, etc. While maybe a very, very small minority of that is done "to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things," the vast majority of it isn't done for that reason. It's done because people enjoy daydreaming/fantasizing, they enjoy imagining things, they enjoy writing and reading made-up stories, and in the case of dreaming, it's simply a way that brains normally work.

It's true that the chief reason for proposing that there are non-existent objects is to explain how we speak truthfully about such things.
— MindForged

The reason that people present fictional things is almost never "to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things." For example, A. Conan Doyle didn't invent Sherlock Holmes to explain how we can speak truthfully about Sherlock Holmes. — Terrapin Station

I assume that MindForged means that the chief reason philosophers propose non-existent objects is to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things; it's clearly not why novelists present them.

The disagreement between MindForged and myself is about the status of non-existent objects as it is hypothesised by philosophers (not by novelists, who mostly probably don't think about it). MindForged holds that we need there to be non-existent objects to explain how we can speak truthfully about them; I disagree.

You can say I'm pretending but I'm not. — MindForged

It's easy to have the wrong idea about what you're doing when you think about non-existent objects. Both Meinong and Russell got it wrong. Russell thought that when he wrote 'the present King of France is bald', he was claiming, falsely, that there was a real present King of France. However, he was not; he was pretending that there was a real present King of France.

Which makes it quite difficult to explain how one can truthfully speak about non existent objects. After all, for the sentences about them to be true there must be something making them true. But on your view "existence" and "being" are the same thing so you've no way of explaining truths of the sort I mentioned before. — MindForged

If you say 'Sherlock Holmes is the world's greatest detective', this is not a true statement. We only pretend that it is true, just as we pretend that there is such an object as Sherlock Holmes.

I recommend that you read Nicholas Griffin's paper 'Rethinking Item Theory' in "Russell vs. Meinong: The Legacy of on Denoting" (though I'm afraid this book is rather expensive). Griffin nails non-existent objects. He explains that they exist, not in the real world, but only in what he calls 'contexts of supposition', i.e. we merely suppose that there are such objects. (I prefer the word 'pretence' to 'supposition', but really he and I mean the same thing.) In Griffin's scheme, 'Sherlock Holmes is the world's greatest detective' is true only in the context of supposition in which there is such an object as Sherlock Holmes. This amounts to the same thing as my claim that we only pretend that the statement is true.

What do you think about objects in dreams? If you dream about a horse, do you hold that there is a horse? I hold that there is not.

It is both the case the Holmes is fictional and he is more famous than any other detective. You haven't at all addressed this other than to say I'm unwittingly assuming he is real despite directly saying he isn't. . — MindForged

I've addressed it now, by quoting Griffin's theory in my preceding post.

Unreal things can have properties and relations with real things.

No. We can pretend or suppose that they do, but really they don't.

Reading my posts here yesterday, I realise that being referred to a very expensive book is probably just annoying. Apologies for that. I shall not do this sort of thing again.

I assume that MindForged means that the chief reason philosophers propose non-existent objects is to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things — Herg

That could be, especially historically, but what philosophers have historically said about nonexistent things is a bit of a pet peeve of mine, because I'm of the opinion that historically, they've said mostly stupid things in this regard, where they would have been much better off if they'd understood fiction, daydreaming, etc. better, and had a semantics and philosophy of language that didn't foolishly try to avoid psychologism.

MindForged holds that we need there to be non-existent objects to explain how we can speak truthfully about them — Herg

So the answer to something like that is very simple.

One major category of nonexistent objects (and actions, etc.) occur as something we imagine. The "nonexistent" adjective applies to the question of whether they also occur as something in the world external-to-minds. Speaking "truthfully" in this case is only a matter of (a) whether we're accurately reporting how someone was imagining whatever it is, or (b) whether we're getting right what would logically follow from what someone was imagining, per the ideas, concepts, they're employing, as they're employing them; however, when we're talking about someone's imaginings other than ourselves, qua their imaginings, they're always going to be the final arbiter.

So re (a), for example, we can say true or false things about Sherlock Holmes via looking at what Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes--it's something true or false about his imagining per se, and re (b), we can say something true or false about Sherlock Holmes a la, "About the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall, Sherlock Holmes would . . ." (keeping in mind that to my knowledge, no one has ever written a Holmes story about the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall) , via extrapolating from what Doyle and others (including ourselves) have imagined about Holmes, so that we're positing something consistent with that, though the imaginings of particular individuals will always be the final arbiter there. (As again, its simply true or false about their imagining.)

The other major category of nonexistent things, events, etc. is possible things and events, where "nonexistent" refers to the fact that they're possible but not actualized. The arbiter there is simply whether those things could happen given the facts of what the physical world is like, or what logic is like, etc. (There are different sorts of possibility--logical, metaphysical, practical/contingent-to-our-physical-universe, etc.)

There are also was-existent-but-no-longer-are-existent things, or historical things, and what makes a true statement there is, at least hypothetically, uncontroversial.

So re (a), for example, we can say true or false things about Sherlock Holmes via looking at what Doyle wrote about Sherlock Holmes--it's something true or false about his imagining per se, and re (b), we can say something true or false about Sherlock Holmes a la, "About the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall, Sherlock Holmes would . . ." (keeping in mind that to my knowledge, no one has ever written a Holmes story about the Brown Lady of Raynham Hall) , via extrapolating from what Doyle and others (including ourselves) have imagined about Holmes, so that we're positing something consistent with that, though the imaginings of particular individuals will always be the final arbiter there. (As again, its simply true or false about their imagining.) — Terrapin Station

That would only settle the truthfulness of statements about the properties of Holmes within the stories. The issue MindForged and I are discussing is the truthfulness of statements about Holmes in relation to the real world. MindForged says that Holmes is more famous than any other detective, meaning that he's more famous than any real detective. This seems prima facie to be true, and yet if there is no such object as Holmes, as I claim, then it looks as if it can't be true, because if there is no object, then there can be no properties of the object such as being famous.

You can't settle this issue by appealing to Conan Doyle, for an obvious reason: if Conan Doyle does say that Holmes is the most famous detective in the world (I don't know if he ever says this), what is it that would make him right? Obviously not the fact that he says it: he could be wrong. What would make it right is if more people in the real world had heard of Holmes than of any other detective (which is very likely to be the case). And that just throws us back to the problem MindForged is charging me with: how can more people have heard of Holmes than of any other detective if there's no such object as Holmes?

My answer is that people can hear of, and know about, objects that only exist in Griffin's contexts of supposition (or, as I put it, objects that we pretend exist). The reason this is possible is that not only can authors imagine objects when there are no such objects, they can also communicate with us via their books in such a way that we can then imagine similar objects. All that exists here are the author, the readers, and the means of communication (physical books). That's all you need for Holmes to have become the most famous detective in the world. You don't need nonexistent objects.

As I noted earlier, I myself write books. Some of my books have dragons in them. While it would be delightful to think that my tapping away on a keyboard has called dragons into being somewhere, I don't believe it for a moment. Hundreds and thousands of new characters are added each year to the pantheon of nonexistent objects as more and more books of fiction are published; if there are nonexistent objects corresponding to these characters, there must now be millions and millions of them. Where are they all? Why can neither our senses nor our scientific instruments detect them? No, away with these shadowy nonexistents. There's no need for them, and no justification for them.