Yeah, part of what I'd like to argue is that this kind of approach to things simply is idealism par excellence, and an insidious one at that, insofar as it couches itself in the language of the ‘physical’, despite being a metaphysical (in the pejorative sense) chimera through and through. It always amazes me that those who hew to this kind of view don’t recognise just how shot-through with theology it is. And I don’t mean this as a cheap-shot (like ‘oh science is just the new religion'), but in a properly philosophical key: it shares with theology its ‘emanative’ logic wherein, to botch Plotinus, everything flows from the One and returns to the One - and where the ‘flow’ is just so much detritus and debris. What you call reductive physicalism mirrors, exactly, ancient theological tropes and, from my perspective, is more or less indistinguishable from them. — StreetlightX

I am not bothered by distasteful associations (egad! Theology!) I believe that we should judge ideas on their own merit. Besides, in all likelihood, theological ideas get their inspiration from some of the same intuitions about nature that give rise to materialistic ideas. And those intuitions are realist at their core. I am convinced that, whatever ideology we outwardly proclaim, whatever stuff we say the world is made of and however it is parceled out, inwardly we all believe that much of the world is indifferent to our thoughts and desires. We have some leeway in how we choose to conceptualize it, but there are strong constraints on those conceptualizations that are not up to us to choose. And that is the only ontology that matters. We can quibble about whether chairs or wave-functions "really exist," but that's just semantics. What matters is that there is this recalcitrant something that we all have to acknowledge, on pain of undermining all our empirical knowledge.

Where I believe both the faithful and at times the materialists, especially philosophically less sophisticated scientists, sin again reason is in jumping to strong metaphysical commitments without proper warrant. But in resisting unwarranted metaphysical commitments we can only go so far in the opposite direction. We can allow for a plurality of conceptualizations, but we have to acknowledge that these conceptualizations are all subject to the same constraints. They are different maps of the same territory, and therefore they cannot be truly independent. Then the question legitimately arises: what is the nature of their interdependence?

Reductionism proposes a hierarchical structure of asymmetric dependence - by way of nomological reduction or supervenience (at the very least) - with the TOE at the top. This idea does have some empirical corroboration, but perhaps not enough. Above all, this should be treated as, at best, a provisional conclusion, not as an a priori metaphysical assumption, as often appears to be the case. Moreover, physicalist reductionism edges into the ethical territory when it deprecates non-fundamental conceptualizations, like for example the mind, as less than real, superfluous, causally inert - all the more reason for caution and skepticism.

As for (traditional Christian) theology and supernaturalism in general, it simply doesn't trust matter to behave (as @schopenhauer1 puts it) on its own. The First Cause, the Prime Mover - which you analogize with the TOE - has to be some anthropomorphic agent, which, unlike matter, is not entirely open to empirical examination.

In non Euclidean geometry, the parallel postulate is negated. This alters the understanding of a "plane" which is a two dimensional construct, from the Euclidean understanding of a plane. It does not change the definition of "line" (1d), it changes the way that one dimension is related to another dimension, as a plane. It is a different definition of "plane".

That one dimension may be related to another dimension through various means (different geometries), and the correct way has not been firmly established, supports my claim that there is a degree of unintelligibility to the relationship between one dimension and another.


The parrel postulate lead to an open ending to euclidian geometry, through non-euclidian, where the line can have multiple definitions as it is defined through multiple frameworks that are connected through eachother.

The line is subject to the fallacy of equivocation outside of any one framework.

No, as I explained earlier, an infinite number of 0d points cannot construct a 1d line. A segment of line is what lies between two points, the medium between points. There is a fundamental incompatibility between 0d and 1d which makes it impossible that a line is composed of points, it is composed of line segments which are marked by points. 0d provides absolutely no spatial extension, while 1d "line" implies spatial extension. Contrary to what you claim above, a line and a point are fundamentally incompatible and one cannot be reduced to the other.

It's not that I don't understand your argument, but that I reject it as invalid. A point marks a place on a line. A line is not made of points. That is your invalid assumption, and why I reject your argument.


You are not aware of what you are arguing:

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1293086/how-to-prove-that-a-straight-line-is-an-infinite-set-of-points

A thesaurus? Continuous means unbroken, uninterrupted, connected. A unit is an individual thing, bounded and complete. Therefore an interruption is implied between one unit an another. When you say that a "succession of units" is continuous, "continuous" is predicated of "succession". But that such a succession (the activity of one succeeding the other) is continuous is just an assertion. There is nothing inherent within a multitude of units to validate your claim of continuity. Nor is there anything inherent within the concept of succession to validate your claim that a succession is continuous. Therefore you have simply predicated "continuous" of "succession", for absolutely no reason, other than to produce an argument from this axiom. That's begging the question.



Infinite interruption is no longer interuption as it is not finite. All continuums, as infinite progressions and regression, are both infinite and one.

All axioms exist through argument, such as those founded in geometric axioms (which you are evidently ignorant of). Proof is structure, structures is the repitition of variables resulting in symmetry as unity.

Reread the argument I presented, you clear do not understand it, nor the axioms of geometry you are arguing.

You are not aware of what you are arguing:

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/1293086/how-to-prove-that-a-straight-line-is-an-infinite-set-of-points — eodnhoj7

The cited proof demonstrates that there are infinitely many points on a line. It does not prove that a line is composed of points. My argument is that a line is not composed of points, because a line is what exists between points. And my argument holds, despite the fact that there are infinitely many points on a line. This just means that a line is divisible into an infinite number of segments.

Reread the argument I presented, you clear do not understand it, nor the axioms of geometry you are arguing. — eodnhoj7

You've already presented your argument over and over, so many times, and I've explained why it is unsound. You make fundamental errors such as assuming that pi is a line, and that "linear" means that the thing referred to as linear is a line. You argue not from mathematical axioms, but from a misrepresentation of mathematical axioms. So your argumenta are completely nonsensical.

And those intuitions are realist at their core. I am convinced that, whatever ideology we outwardly proclaim, whatever stuff we say the world is made of and however it is parceled out, inwardly we all believe that much of the world is indifferent to our thoughts and desires. We have some leeway in how we choose to conceptualize it, but there are strong constraints on those conceptualizations that are not up to us to choose. And that is the only ontology that matters. We can quibble about whether chairs or wave-functions "really exist," but that's just semantics. What matters is that there is this recalcitrant something that we all have to acknowledge, on pain of undermining all our empirical knowledge. — SophistiCat

We might also look at the gap between conceptualizations and a more ordinary sense of speeding trucks that might crush us, holes we might fall into, ice that we might slip on...I suspect that (to some degree) this is the dominant 'model'(?) by which other models are judged ultimately.

We might also look at the gap between conceptualizations and a more ordinary sense of speeding trucks that might crush us, holes we might fall into, ice that we might slip on...I suspect that (to some degree) this is the dominant 'model'(?) by which other models are judged ultimately. — macrosoft

Look at your examples, they are all things which "might" happen. So we look at the world with a view to how we can prevent, or cause, identified future events. This does not jive with Sophisticat's "we all believe that much of the world is indifferent to our thoughts and desires".

It appears to me, like there is a deep inconsistency between how we actually live our lives, as if we can prevent or cause future events, and what you call the "dominant model", which produces a form of determinism. The problem being that we model "the world" as independent, "indifferent to our thoughts and desires", but this leaves us outside of the world, and renders the model incapable of representing how our thoughts and desires are actively changing the world. This is why our conceptualizations require that medium, "matter", as the indeterminate part of reality, bridging the gap of hypocrisy between our true perspective in which we act freely in the world influencing the future, and the dominant determinist model of the world.

Actually I made a continuous progressive argument, you keep repeating the same thing over and over again about it not being in mathematical axioms. In fact not only is it in mathematical axioms (line as infinite points), but these axioms are open to further expansion infinitely while each axiom is determined by the framework of proof which extends from it and not the axiom itself.


The line as "a injunctive of infinite points" observes the line as composed of infinite lines through these infinite points. The point is a continuum of further points through the line. The line and point alternate between eachother.

If the line is nor composed of points, but the line is composed of infinite further lines between points, the line is composed of points. You have no argument, you strictly do not understand what you are saying.

There is no misrepresentation of mathematical axioms, as what you have observed is a misrepresentation. You are pushing a belief system nothing more. All mathematical axioms are given structure by there corresponding proofs. A proof is merely the replication of mathematical axioms into a structure. The axioms only exist is a structure stems form them.

As observed in the link, there are infinite number of not just proofs for any mathematical system but these proofs as infinite must continue. Proof is continuity. Whatever finite defintion you are looking for is strictly multiple infinities.

Now relative to pi as a foundation of measurement. Pi can acts as a length of

Pi = c/d where c is equal to Pi and D is equal to one. The circufermance containing a number of lines equal to Pi observes not the circumferance as a length equal to Pi (and the circumferance is a length...Do you want sources?) But the number of diameters as Pi as 1 line in itself.


I am arguing from these axioms, as the proof is that these axioms must continually progress as there are infinite proofs for them. You are unaware of what you are arguing.




Pi as a length results in 1 as a function as stated above.

In fact not only is it in mathematical axioms (line as infinite points), but these axioms are open to further expansion infinitely while each axiom is determined by the framework of proof which extends from it and not the axiom itself. — eodnhoj7

A line is not composed of infinite points. There are infinite points on a line. Your premise is a misrepresentation, not a mathematical axiom.

The line as "a injunctive of infinite points" observes the line as composed of infinite lines through these infinite points. The point is a continuum of further points through the line. The line and point alternate between eachother — eodnhoj7

I don't know what you mean by "a injunctive", but the grammar is terrible, so I would be dubious of wherever you got that quote from, as unreliable in educative value.

If the line is nor composed of points, but the line is composed of infinite further lines between points, the line is composed of points. — eodnhoj7

This is blatant contradiction. "If the line is not composed of points, but... [then] the line is composed of points." That's nothing but nonsense contradiction.

Pi = c/d where c is equal to Pi and D is equal to one. The circufermance containing a number of lines equal to Pi observes not the circumferance as a length equal to Pi (and the circumferance is a length...Do you want sources?) But the number of diameters as Pi as 1 line in itself. — eodnhoj7

More nonsense. That the numerical value of pi could be given to a length, in no way indicates that pi is a length. That pi is a length is not an accepted axiom. The numerical value of length must be qualified with a unit of measurement. Accepted mathematical axioms clearly indicate that pi is not a unit of measurement

Look at your examples, they are all things which "might" happen. So we look at the world with a view to how we can prevent, or cause, identified future events. This does not jive with Sophisticat's "we all believe that much of the world is indifferent to our thoughts and desires". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see the problem. The ice isn't going to politely melt before I unthinkingly skate on it and break my arm. If I am fixing a roof and tumble off, the ground will not soften as I descend. Or at least I do not live with such expectations, however merely logically possible such things may be. At other times, it's my understanding that people did try to bribe or flatter something like nature. Nature was a personality, mysterious by ultimately 'like us' or a 'subject with feelings' in some way. The de-personalization of nature into a machine is the the ur-model upon which we project more sophisticated scientific models. And these models largely apply in terms of us deciding which goals are possible and how to obtain them --in the 'lifeworld' or the 'basic' 'model' that grounds other modelling in terms of care. Or so I reason.

1. A line is an infinite number of points, hence is an infinite number of lines.

The line as infinite points is the axiomatic definition of a line:

http://www.bing.com/search?q=the+line+is+an+infinite+number+of+points&qs=n&form=QBLH&sp=-1&pq=the+line+is+an+infinite+number+of+points&sc=1-40&sk=&cvid=C8ED297B32114AA2A7406E89721E7552

"The totality of the points comprising the line is in any case infinite."

"This can be proven rigorously, and it's not hard at all. Basically, between any two distinct points on a line there is a third point between these two points (between should not necessarily mean the mid-point on a straight path connecting the points, and this may get a bit tricky, but not too tricky).
"

You are not just wrong, but lying if you claim that is the common definition. Change my mind and provide a source.

On a side note:

It may be argued the line is a set, however this is not a common mathematical axiom, so don't bother saying it is not a mathematical axiom...I am fully aware of this point as well as all the other "points" you claim.

2. This is blatant contradiction. "If the line is not composed of points, but... [then] the line is composed of points." That's nothing but nonsense contradiction.

Its a contradiction because you misrepresented the argument and took the second portion out. Now you are lying.

If the line is not composed of points, but the line is composed of other lines, then the line must be composed of infinite points.

3. More nonsense. That the numerical value of pi could be given to a length, in no way indicates that pi is a length. That pi is a length is not an accepted axiom. The numerical value of length must be qualified with a unit of measurement. Accepted mathematical axioms clearly indicate that pi is not a unit of measurement


If pi is not a length, then neither is 1 units, 2 units, 3 units, etc. considering quantity is a unit.

The circumferance is a length:

http://www.bing.com/search?q=circumferance+is+a+length&qs=n&form=QBRE&sp=-1&pq=circumferance+is+a+length&sc=6-25&sk=&cvid=C1FA1FB6F46743FE9DD86E053CDFFA91

It also provides the foundation for the radian in trigonometry as a length:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radian



I rarely make ad-hominums any more, and I understand you do not have to agree with what I am saying, but between misquoting my argument, misquoting sources, and arguing foundations that are not just fake but are illogical I have one insult.

Now keep in mind, maybe I have been spoiled. Many of the people I have debated, even when they do not understand my argument or I point out deficiencies in theirs are generally kind or at least respectable. So maybe I had it easy as of late.

Not questioning the established authority is a form of deep cowardice not conducive to anyone who is a philosopher. Questioning does not necessitate either doubt or agreement, but rather an understanding a nature of the framework established.

So here is my insult, and you will never understand it:

"I hope you live a long life no different than who you are now."

1. A line is an infinite number of points, hence is an infinite number of lines.

The line as infinite points is the axiomatic definition of a line:

http://www.bing.com/search?q=the+line+is+an+infinite+number+of+points&qs=n&form=QBLH&sp=-1&pq=the+line+is+an+infinite+number+of+points&sc=1-40&sk=&cvid=C8ED297B32114AA2A7406E89721E7552 — eodnhoj7

Your cited reference clearly states a line "contains", and a line "has" an infinite number of points. It does not say a line "is" an infinite number of points, as you claim. Do you not recognize a distinction between container and contents, a difference between what something is and what something has?

Change my mind and provide a source. — eodnhoj7

Learn how to interpret instead of changing words to suit your purpose, then read your own sources.

If pi is not a length, then neither is 1 units, 2 units, 3 units, etc. considering quantity is a unit. — eodnhoj7

Right, now you're catching on. 1 unit, 2 units, 3units, etc., are not lengths. There must be a specified unit of length, like "metre", "foot", etc..

So here is my insult, and you will never understand it:

"I hope you live a long life no different than who you are now." — eodnhoj7

If you like me to continue, attacking your faulty arguments, I will. Are you finally noticing the usefulness of my attacks?

What attacks? I am building a play pen around a child for it to play in and figure itself out.

1.) "The totality of the points comprising the line is in any case infinite."

com·prise
[kəmˈprīz]
VERB

consist of; be made up of.
"the country comprises twenty states"
synonyms:
consist of · be made up of · be composed of · contain · take in · embrace · encompass · incorporate · include · involve · cover · comprehend
make up; constitute.

http://www.bing.com/search?q=comprise+definition&qs=n&form=QBLH&sp=-1&pq=comprise+definition&sc=8-19&sk=&cvid=8E4BF20B8D3C440A8BF6EAA80CDD05AF — eodnhoj7

Right, now you're catching on. 1 unit, 2 units, 3units, etc., are not lengths. There must be a specified unit of length, like "metre", "foot", etc..


2. Right, now you're catching on. 1 unit, 2 units, 3units, etc., are not lengths. There must be a specified unit of length, like "metre", "foot", etc..


A 1 foot is contained of 12 inches. It is 1 line composed of 12 lines. The number and line are inseperable.



3. You can keep flailing around all you want, I don't care either way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's Euclid's definitions from: http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/Books/Euclid/Elements.pdf

1. A point is that of which there is no part.
βʹ. Γραμμὴ δὲ μῆκος ἀπλατές. 2. And a line is a length without breadth.
γʹ. Γραμμῆς δὲ πέρατα σημεῖα. 3. And the extremities of a line are points.
δʹ. Εὐθεῖα γραμμή ἐστιν, ἥτις ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτῆς 4. A straight-line is (any) one which lies evenly with
σημείοις κεῖται. points on itself.

Notice, #3. The extremities of a line are points. And, #4, a straight line has "points on itself".

Whatever makes you think that there is an axiom which states that a line is comprised of points? You are dreaming!

The ice isn't going to politely melt before I unthinkingly skate on it and break my arm. If I am fixing a roof and tumble off, the ground will not soften as I descend. Or at least I do not live with such expectations, however merely logically possible such things may be. — macrosoft

The point is that you live acting in such a way as to prevent yourself from breaking your arm on the ice, and to prevent yourself from falling off the roof. Why did you want to go skating, or go on the roof in the first place? And how did you get onto that roof? Don't you know that you intentionally put yourself at risk by doing such things?

The point is that you live acting in such a way as to prevent yourself from breaking your arm on the ice, and to prevent yourself from falling off the roof. Why did you want to go skating, or go on the roof in the first place? And how did you get onto that roof? Don't you know that you intentionally put yourself at risk by doing such things? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how this matters. We take risks in pursuit of our goals. I think the point is whether we think nature is looking out for us our not. Perhaps the existential aspect of the scientific worldview is our faith in the inefficacy of prayer. If we decide to put on a new roof to keep the rain out, we take certain precautions (safety straps) because we don't expect the ground to suddenly become mud and break our fall.

I'd say that it's this concrete worldly context that mostly informs notions of objectivity. If we imagine the table made of particles/waves, we still vaguely imagine a table-shape. If we 'know better' or think about it more, we can abstract away not only this shape but even our mathematics and waves and particles as indeed just another layer of human significance 'projected' on 'something' --albeit problematically as we abstract away everything intelligible.

It occurs to me that the thing-in-itself is a kind of direction. Remove the 'subject' as much as possible, etc., starting with the sensual and proceeding to the intellectual. Trying to go all the way leads to absurdities. Does isolating a pure subject in the same way lead to absurdity?

Modern Math. So hyperbolic, elliptic, projective, affine, finite, differential, non-euclidian plane, and angle excess geometry are not real if I take only Euclids arguments?

So if I have infinite lines existing as one line, the line is not composed of infinite points?

To insist on the mediality of all things is to insist that all immidiacy must nonetheless be subject to a minimal medicacy: there is always the traction of time and space, the recalcitrance of matter to have to deal with (the Heraclitian maxim on nature's elusiveness must be read as a materialist maxim par excellence: 'Nature loves to hide'). — StreetlightX

In a word then, the materialist insists that the world is medial through and through: everything that is, has a density recalcitrant to all ideal(ized) first principles (arche) and immedial fantasies (God being among them). — StreetlightX

Illuminating OP. I just quoted some passages that especially spoke to me. I associate the 'traction of time' with the non-instanteity of meaning, the way a sentence/meaning needs time. Meaning itself is not immediate. There is also meaning's entanglement with its 'medium' (the written or spoken word.) We push out the air or scratch with a pencil or gently hammer on the keyboard. A perfect separation of meaning from its medium and its compression into an instant functions as a kind of goal, an impossibility that tempts us, perhaps to our benefit at times.

The 'density recalcitrant to all first principles' recalls something I was exploring in other thread, from a related if not identical angle. An analogy I like is theory trying to capture a set of positive measure in a set of zero measure (a conveniently countable set, say.) Our linguistic know-how is too rich, too flexible, too mostly-automatic to give a finite account of itself. Trapping meaning in an instant or imagining its complete independence from its medium seems like part of that impossible quest.

As for 'God,' I am open to sophisticated uses of this term. Is there an anti-metaphysical vision of God? An anti-theological vision of God? I don't know. Hegel felt the need to criticize vague notions (anti-notions?) of the absolute in his preface. Do you find it possible that one can use this term and be a materialist in your sense? I can imagine someone contemplating what it is that thrusts against traction and recalcitrance, which would seem to depend on some kind of movement against them. The incarnation myth comes to mind. Can incarnation symbolize materialism even? (I like following the mutation of the Christ image through certain German philosophers. A 'total' incarnation would leave nothing out-of-the-mess behind.)

The incarnation myth comes to mind. Can incarnation symbolize materialism even? — macrosoft

There have been interesting attempts to claim incarnation from a materialist perspective - Zizek and Virno come to mind - but I generally find the whole theological matrix to be compromised beyond repair. Short of constituting some clever thought-exercises for a bit of intellectual athleticism, I don't really see any reason to do so outside of that. We've had literally millenia of theological wrangling, and it would be nice to proceed with a bit of independence from that whole meilieu. Ray Brassier once put it nicely, if only just a little too strongly:

"I view this continuing philosophical fascination with monotheism as deeply pernicious and think a moratorium ought to be declared to prevent any further ‘God talk’ by philosophers. I do not think it mere coincidence that the critique of scientific rationality in much 20th century philosophy goes hand in hand with a revival of theological themes. Religion obviously satisfies deep-seated human needs, but it has been a cognitive catastrophe that has continually impeded epistemic progress — contrary to the pernicious revisionism that claims monotheism was always on the side of science and truth. Human knowledge has progressed in spite of religion, never because of it. Philosophers should simply have no truck with it." (source)

(Too strongly because I think the study of theology and its concepts can be very useful for triangulating one's position; one ought to know the enemy least one becomes them).

A perfect separation of meaning from its medium and its compression into an instant functions as a kind of goal, an impossibility that tempts us, perhaps to our benefit at times. — macrosoft

I largely agree with the rest, but I would be careful in characterizing the 'kind' of goal this would be. If the thesis of irreducible mediality is right, any such attempt at 'separation' would be detrimental, and not conducive to, well, anything whatsoever. As Derrida might have put it, the desire for pure presence is the desire for death.

So if I have infinite lines existing as one line, the line is not composed of infinite points? — eodnhoj7

Infinite lines being one line is contradictory, plain and simple. That a line is potentially divisible an infinite number of times, does not mean that the line exists as infinite lines. That would be contradiction, to say that at the same time, one line is many lines.

The points, which would distinguish the infinite number of shorter lines within the longer line, cannot function as a divisor of the longer line without annihilating the longer line through the act of division. It is impossible by way of contradiction, that the same thing is at the same time, one line and a multitude of lines. So either the points are functioning to divide the line, in which case there is no longer line only an infinity of short lines, or else the points are not "in" the line.

As I've explained to you, over and over, when we assume the existence of lines and points, we assume that the points are not "in" the line. You use an interpretation which is clearly contradictory, and produce a nonsense argument from that faulty interpretation.

If we decide to put on a new roof to keep the rain out, we take certain precautions (safety straps) because we don't expect the ground to suddenly become mud and break our fall. — macrosoft

When working on the roof, one uses safety straps to prevent oneself from falling off the roof. No one considers the possibility that the ground might suddenly become soft. So you are just throwing in a red herring here, an unreal, irrelevant thought. The motivating factor in putting on the safety straps is that we believe we can prevent an unwanted occurrence. Therefore we clearly believe that we can have influence over what happens in the future.

The issue is not whether nature "is looking out for us". The issue is to what extent we have control over nature. So for example, if we had absolute control over nature, nature would be whatever we want it to be. This is similar to the theological position, but the theological way recognizes human deficiency, and places something human-like (God), instead of human beings themselves, as having absolute control over nature. The opposite way, is the determinist way, which would say that nature has complete control over us. The two opposing ways, nature is what we want it to be, and nature forces us to be what we are, are both wrong, so we need a medium, a compromise.

I'd say that it's this concrete worldly context that mostly informs notions of objectivity. If we imagine the table made of particles/waves, we still vaguely imagine a table-shape. If we 'know better' or think about it more, we can abstract away not only this shape but even our mathematics and waves and particles as indeed just another layer of human significance 'projected' on 'something' --albeit problematically as we abstract away everything intelligible. — macrosoft

The problem here, is that the "scientific way", becomes the way of "we have absolute control over nature", because it develops the attitude that we can conceive of the table in anyway that we want. So long as the mathematics is correct, and the behaviour of the table is well predicted, then we can describe the table in any way at all. There is no such object as "the table" anymore, there is just this or that description of what is going on, and we choose the one we want. Therefore we view nature as being whatever we want it to be.

It occurs to me that the thing-in-itself is a kind of direction. Remove the 'subject' as much as possible, etc., starting with the sensual and proceeding to the intellectual. Trying to go all the way leads to absurdities. Does isolating a pure subject in the same way lead to absurdity? — macrosoft

Clearly, there are two distinct directions, from two distinct starting points. Each one gets enveloped in problems sending one frustrated toward the other way. But the real problem is in those starting points themselves, the subject and the object, they do not produce sound premises, so they must be dismissed altogether for something different.

As Derrida might have put it, the desire for pure presence is the desire for death. — StreetlightX

Here you approach the true medium, presence, or the present. This is the only real grounding for the concept "medium", validating it as a true concept, signifying something real, the medium between future and past, the two fundamental aspects of reality. Presentism reduces all to the medium. Then, by making the medium all there is, without the reality of the separated things, future and past, the medium itself becomes meaningless.

the point is not defined, except through the line. There is no strictly axiom for the point. A line composed of infinite lines is still one line. It is similar not the same to a set containing infinite numbers, an aleph number, or Cantors work in multiple infinities.

Actually 1/1/1...= 1. The line is its own standard of measurement, hence when it divides itself it is through itself.

Show me your source considering this, according to you is a universal axiom, other wise you are pushing your own theory (which is fine) but does not hold according to its own logic.

Provide a source.

There is no strictly axiom for the point. A line composed of infinite lines is still one line. It is similar not the same to a set containing infinite numbers, an aleph number, or Cantors work in multiple infinities. — eodnhoj7

One line cannot be a multitude of lines by way of contradiction. I explained this to you. If it is many lines it is not one line. if it is one line it is not many lines.

Show me your source considering this, according to you is a universal axiom, other wise you are pushing your own theory (which is fine) but does not hold according to its own logic.

Provide a source. — eodnhoj7

My reference is the law of non-contradiction. To say that one of some thing is at the same time a multitude of that very same thing, is contradictory. Is one person at the same time a multitude of persons? No, because this would be contradictory. Is one line, at the same time a multitude of lines? No, because this would be contradictory.

Therefore we clearly believe that we can have influence over what happens in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course. When did I imply otherwise? The point is that nature doesn't care. We have to submit to her blind regularity in order to master 'her.'

There is no such object as "the table" anymore, there is just this or that description of what is going on, and we choose the one we want. Therefore we view nature as being whatever we want it to be. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I see it, science is science exactly because it is constrained by reliable prediction and control. All the grandiose and complicated theories boil down to satisfaction in the life-world. Arbitrary description is what science filters out. Virtual entities are justified as part of a process that emerges from the life-world and returns to the life-world. Electrons are 'real' to the degree that they are part of a system that gets us what we want. Public utility is the implicit epistemology here, it seems to me.

Clearly, there are two distinct directions, from two distinct starting points. Each one gets enveloped in problems sending one frustrated toward the other way. But the real problem is in those starting points themselves, the subject and the object, they do not produce sound premises, so they must be dismissed altogether for something different. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. Traditional metaphysical approaches result in aporia. Some ignore them and soldier on, stubbornly attached to this or that terminology. My approach is to examine whether it is even possible to make our know-how explicit for ourselves. IMV the faith in atomic meaning is at the root of endless confusion. We impose a false notion on language in pursuit of the fantasy that we can and should do math with words. We don't look at the object with fresh eyes. We take a flawed approach for granted. But this is an old critique now, and hardly 'my' idea. I'm just catching up with the conversation. And this catching up with the conversation is not some discrete process. I'd say that meaning is 'continuous' or 'one,' and that it exists distributed over its own kind of historical time (with memory and project.)

There have been interesting attempts to claim incarnation from a materialist perspective - Zizek and Virno come to mind - but I generally find the whole theological matrix to be compromised beyond repair. — StreetlightX

I can understand that reaction, but your mention of 'matrix' alludes to what I had in mind. The mother is the mater is the matrix. While this kind of approach is suspiciously murky, I suspect that some 'Christian' thinkers were already articulating contemporary insights within the concepts and pictures available to them. I'm not sure how you feel about Heidegger, but he called himself 'really' a Christian theologian once in a letter. And then Hegel thought Luther was a leap forward in human consciousness. I'm thinking of the interior that is opened up by putting the Book in the hands of the individual for interpretation. Finally there is Nietzsche's eerie portrait of Christ that sounds quite a bit like Nietzsche himself. I'm coming from a perspective that thoughts are largely organized by emotionally charged pictures. The image of a particular human being (Christ or Socrates) suggests a unity of theory and embodied practice, ultimately grounded in and lit up by passion.

e. If the thesis of irreducible mediality is right, any such attempt at 'separation' would be detrimental, and not conducive to, well, anything whatsoever. As Derrida might have put it, the desire for pure presence is the desire for death. — StreetlightX

I take your point, but I suppose Nietzsche comes to mind along with Hegel. If we proceed by erring, it may be the impossible quest for death (an unrecognized goal) that pushes into a brighter kind of living in the long run. All of this is quite vague, of course.

So you are taking a separate stance from the mathematical community then, and it is your own logic?

Here is a mathematical proof that one number is equal to an infinite series of numbers:

3= 3-0,4-1,5-2,6-3,7-4,8-5,9-6...((n+3)-n)...infinity.

Or just

3= ((n+3)-n)

***"n" equals a number approaching infinity

You can replace the number 3 for any value but the statement will be the same.



In regards to the law of concontradiction:

1) A line composed of many lines (hence 0d points) is strictly

2) A person can be composed of a multitude of persons in reference to one person being various persons given a length of time defining that person.

A person may be one person around another person and be a different person in presence of another, with one common person connecting these various identities. Your argument is fail two take into account two distinct phenomena can exist at the same time in different respects.

3. In regards to the law of non contradiction:

A. P is defined by not P.

B. Not P exists if and only of there is P.

C. P is positive and negative where P exists as unified or in a gradient form as deficiency in P hence multiple Ps. Hence not P is an element of P.
***I may have to elaborate on this point.

I suspect that some 'Christian' thinkers were already articulating contemporary insights within the concepts and pictures available to them. — macrosoft

I don't doubt this at all. I just question the necessity of routing philosophy through the swamp of theology to get at the same insights. Deleuze has a wonderful line somewhere about how every theology, no matter how staunch, always ends up 'secreting' an atheism insofar as it always needs to secure the relavence of the otherworldly to this world at the end of the day; of how the illusions of transcendence all ultimately "recharge the plane of immanence with immanence itself", citing Pascal and Kierkegaard in particular as two examplars of those who explicitly realized this within the bounds of theology itself. Again, I think this may be interesting as far as it goes, but then, I'd be happy to burn the entire theological corpus for a page of good, original a-theological philosophy.

As an aside, with respect to Heidegger, he's the kind of figure I feel took two steps forward and then one back (and is all the more important to study because of it). He remains, for me, too mired within a phenomenological horizon that screams at every point to be broken out of; I'd trade most of what isn't B&T for a couple of chapters of Merleau-Ponty or Levinas without much hesitation.

Here is a mathematical proof that one number is equal to an infinite series of numbers: — eodnhoj7

"Equal" does not mean "is". "Equal" means equivalent to, while "is" means the very same as. I very much agree that one line of any length is "equal" to an infinity of smaller lines, being potentially divided an infinity of times, but this does not mean that one line is an infinity of lines. The former is a mathematical equation, the latter is a logical contradiction.

Do you recognize the difference between "is" and "is equal to"? For instance, "4" is equal to "2+2". But this does not mean that 4 is 2+2, nor does it mean that 4 is composed of 2+2. It means that 4 is equivalent to 2+2. Do you see that "4" is completely different in meaning from "2+2", and therefore we cannot say "4 is 2+2", despite the fact that the two are equal? Do you see that "one line" is completely different in meaning from "an infinity of lines", and therefore we cannot say "one line is an infinity of lines" despite the fact that the two are equal?

2) A person can be composed of a multitude of persons in reference to one person being various persons given a length of time defining that person.

A person may be one person around another person and be a different person in presence of another, with one common person connecting these various identities. Your argument is fail two take into account two distinct phenomena can exist at the same time in different respects. — eodnhoj7

As I explained, you can only perform this sophistry through equivocation. One person is only various persons when you use multiple definitions of "person". That's equivocation.

A. P is defined by not P. — eodnhoj7

No, P is not defined by not P. That's not a definition, as a definition gives meaning to P, saying what P signifies. If this were a definition, it would leave P completely without meaning, and that's not what a definition does, it gives meaning. Therefore P is not defined by not P.

The definitions you argue are correct under standard axioms of mathematics. The problem, as axioms, is that they are subject to a multitude of fallacies: authority, bandwagon, no true scotsman (pseudo fallacy for some), straw man (the axioms form a position not previously held), red herring (each axiom diverts to another axiom), etc.

The axioms are determined as true because of the arguments, as strucutures, which stem from them. These argument/structures, in turn are justified according to there symmetry with symmetry being the replication of certain qualities/quantities that show a common bond. — eodnhoj7

Mathematics is a science with its own accepted rules of expression. If you are not going to adhere to those rules, DON'T CALL IT MATHEMATICS! OR SCIENCE FOR THAT MATTER!!!

4)All straight lines are Pi — eodnhoj7

Pi as a line, varies in length with the circle however is always the same measurement. — eodnhoj7

5) The circle, through infinite Pi's observes the circle composed of infinite angles with these angles equivalent to degrees as a number much less than one approaching 0. — eodnhoj7

6) The line as a quantum angle — eodnhoj7

So a line between two points observes the alternation between being and nonbeing (void) — eodnhoj7

However if the line connects the points, it necessitates that through the line the points are directed towards eachother simultaneously and the line becomes non directional considering the points are directed towards eachother through eachother as eachother. — eodnhoj7

The negative dimensional line in turn is composed of infinite 1d points. — eodnhoj7

Void must be void of itself, so the 1d line observes the void of void or the 0d point dividing itself as infinity through the line. This 1d line is an inversion of the of both the 0d point through 0d point (or an inversion of inversion) and the -1 dimensional line. — eodnhoj7

The 0d point cancels itself out to units as multiplicity, but also Unity as pure directed movement. Nothing cancels itself out into pure being. — eodnhoj7

3) The line as composed of infinite points is composed of infinite lines, hence the line is composed of infinite circles as all lines exist as Pi. — eodnhoj7

4) The line is composed as infinite circles projecting, hence the line is equivalent not just to infinite points but infinite quantum circles as well. — eodnhoj7

5) Each line, as composed of infinite further lines, is composed of infinite "pi's" where the line as Pi is composed of further Pi's. Hence Pi is divided by an infinite number of Pi being divided by Pi. — eodnhoj7

Hence Pi dividing itself observes Pi as its own function of self-division conducive to 1 through the line where 1 is Pi as a function of perpetual self division.

f(x)= 3.14159→(x→∞)
............f(x)= (3.14159→(x→∞) =1
................f(x)= (3.14159→(x→∞)
.........................f(x)=... — eodnhoj7

4. The radius is half of the diameter.

5. Each radius in itself is a diameter, of another circle. — eodnhoj7

As the mutiplication/division of a length requires another length, Pi is a constant length of a line — eodnhoj7

Pi is a unit of length as one is a unit of length, with both being continuous. All lines as 1 unit of length observes Pi as a unit of length. — eodnhoj7

hence a line equivalent to Pi where Pi becomes a length. — eodnhoj7

So while pi = c/d or c/2r we are left with the circumferance being pi if the diameter is one infinity and the radius is 2 infinities as one infinite. — eodnhoj7

Pi is a length, not just a ratio and alternates with 1 as the foundation of length. — eodnhoj7

All lines are equivalent to Pi just as all lines are equivalent to one in themselves. — eodnhoj7

etc, etc



Since the above quoted information has no basis in any existing mathematical or scientific laws and even seems to contradict them, doesn't that mean it is your own (not yet universally recognised) invention or interpretation (call it what you may)?

Well, lets start with the laws of logic. I will start with the law of identity considering it is the foundation for the law of non-contradiction.



The laws of logic are subject to equivocation.

The law of Identity is written as "P is P" or "P equals P" with "is" and "equal" having multiple interpretations.

is- combining form
variants: or iso-

Definition of is- (Entry 4 of 4)

1 : equal : homogeneous : uniform isentropic

2 : isomeric isocyanate

3 : for or from different individuals of the same species isoagglutinin

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is

Now you can look at another source and get the same or similiar, but different, definition and in these respects we are left with equivocation as a problem in the laws.

So in regards to your statement "Equal" does not mean "is", you are performing sophistry which does not match up with the evidence with the evidence being the common perspectives of the community, which in itself leads to further fallacies. Evidence itself falls under certain fallacies in these respects.


The same occurs for the definition of what a line is as well as other axioms you are unaware of.

No, P is not defined by not P. That's not a definition, as a definition gives meaning to P, saying what P signifies. If this were a definition, it would leave P completely without meaning, and that's not what a definition does, it gives meaning. Therefore P is not defined by not P. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, P is not defined by not P. That's not a definition, as a definition gives meaning to P, saying what P signifies. If this were a definition, it would leave P completely without meaning, and that's not what a definition does, it gives meaning. Therefore P is not defined by not P. — Metaphysician Undercover

So The law of Non-Contradiction is not defined by the Law of Identity, and the Law of Identity is not defined by the Law of Non-Contradiction? The Law of Non-Contradiction does not exist through the Law of Identity and defines it? Each law does not define the other?


The Laws of Logic where written and developed by Aristotle. As such we used them based off of a fallacy of authority, as well as bandwagon, considering these laws do not work in modern logic due to there inability to deal with time in a proper manner.

The laws of logic are subject to equivocation. — eodnhoj7

So in regards to your statement "Equal" does not mean "is", you are performing sophistry which does not match up with the evidence with the evidence being the common perspectives of the community, which in itself leads to further fallacies. Evidence itself falls under certain fallacies in these respects. — eodnhoj7

Violations of the law of identity result in the informal logical fallacy known as equivocation...
In everyday language, violations of the law of identity introduce ambiguity into the discourse, making it difficult to form an interpretation at the desired level of specificity. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_identity).

Are you trying to imply that these violations comprise of or are derived from a law of logic? As you can see, they are expressly referred to as violations.

The Laws of Logic where written and developed by Aristotle. As such we used them based off of a fallacy of authority, as well as bandwagon, considering these laws do not work in modern logic due to there inability to deal with time in a proper manner. — eodnhoj7

The law was not developed by Aristotle. Though he made them popular through his literature, they were and have been in use prior to him and since. Philosophers do not adhere to them because Aristotle has any authority over them, but because these laws have been determined to represent logic and have the appropriate significance and utility in all their applications. That is, they are valid to philosophy.

So The law of Non-Contradiction is not defined by the Law of Identity, and the Law of Identity is not defined by the Law of Non-Contradiction? The Law of Non-Contradiction does not exist through the Law of Identity and defines it? Each law does not define the other? — eodnhoj7

The three laws of logic, as are commonly known, are corollaries of each other:
1. The Law of Identity.
2. The Law of Non-contradiction.
3. The Law of Excluded Middle.

By corollary is meant, each law naturally inferences the other.

@Metaphysician Undercover is right -

P is not defined by not P. — Metaphysician Undercover

Common language can only be acceptable if it renders the right context. For example, "he is not good" implies he is bad/evil (or any other synonym which maintains the intended meaning). However, in no formal sense does 'not good' offer a definition of 'good'. Informally, as in common use, they're still extensively exclusive and explicit.