The best I can come up with is, as you suggest, it is a small thing in the "big picture" -- a side effect that will be made up for in other ways. But, I claim no certainty here.
I said it, but that answer didn’t entirely satisfy me.
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Can major injury, misery and horror, followed by early death be “made up for”? — Michael Ossipoff
But would it even mean anything to say that what’s happening to those people is somehow later (if there’s reincarnation) “outweighed” or “cancelled-out”? How does that change anything when it’s happening to them? When it’s there, it’s there, and that isn’t a good thing. — Michael Ossipoff
Do you mean “Tough luck for the unfortunate war-maimed civilians, because what matters is the greatest good for the greatest number?” That doesn’t sound like a situation that Benevolence made there be. — Michael Ossipoff
It isn’t about anthropocentricity, because the same misfortunes happen to the other animals too. — Michael Ossipoff
Time is only within a physical world, a property of a physical world. — Michael Ossipoff
I’m talking about inevitable timeless logical relations and inter-reference among timeless abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff
So, within this physical universe, there are a number of laws that require the continuations that you referred to. — Michael Ossipoff
Those relations and inter-reference in those logical systems are inevitable in the same way as it’s an inevitable tautology that there’s no true-and-false proposition. — Michael Ossipoff
They are taking about the kind of intentionality a person has. So, I see the spiritual realm as the intentional realm. — Dfpolis
While it does not belong to the realm of physical objects, it can be and is an object of knowledge and reflection. — Dfpolis
I like this approach to the spiritual. It exists 'within.' — macrosoft
Right. And the 'object' of this knowledge and reflection might just be a 'how' of living, a way that cannot be fully formalized or publicly confirmed like the reading of a thermometer. — macrosoft
Where we might differ is that I don't see how God apart from this 'how' is central. — macrosoft
I am not sure exactly what you are driving at in this paragraph. I think what is of interest varies from person to person, and there is nothing wrong or regrettable in that. I do not see God as in any way apart from us. We are divine activities. (God holding us in being is identically us being held in being by God.) And, in mystical encounters, we become aware of this union. In the Eastern tradition, if is expressed in the central insight that Atman (the True Self) is Brahman (the Transcendent). We are all and only what God holds open to us. Still, we do not exhaust the reality that is God. — Dfpolis
I think you're confused here. Forms are not material objects that can be different because they are in different places. They are what informs matter. That information can be entire, as it is with the the material object, or partial, as it is in the mind of the knowing subject. — Dfpolis
Of course it is. It acts on my retina to form the image by which I see it. It acts on my eardrum so that I hear it, etc. These lines of action continue in the neural signals distributing the information to the brain's various processing centers which present the information of which I am aware. — Dfpolis
Why? When I mow the lawn, are all my capabilities revealed? Of course not. I am much more than a lawn mower. When things act, they reveal only part of the actuality, and forms are the actuality of a being. — Dfpolis
This is the reason I said you were confused above. There is no "part" that leaves. There is a form that informs both within the sphere we draw around the moon and with in us. — Dfpolis
Objects do change when we observe them. All observations are interactions, with action and reaction. We can usually ignore that fact because the changes to the object are negligible, but occasionally, as in quantum observations, they become pivotal. We could not see the moon were light not scattered off it. That light changes the moon, but in a small way we can ignore from a practical point of view. — Dfpolis
P1 is ambiguous. "Very same" can mean numerical identity, which is present in experiential cognition, or it can mean having the identical set of properties, which is not the case when only some notes of intelligibility are apprehended.
P2 is true if you mean that we do not apprehend all the notes of the object's intelligibility, but false if you mean that we are not informed by the numerically identical form that informs the object. We could not possibly know anything if one form informed the object, and a numerically different form informed our mind -- for then we would know the second form, not the from of the object.
C is a non sequitur. — Dfpolis
Abstractions are not generalizations. For example, there are deep ocean species that have only been seen once. Still, if another individual were observed, we would recognize that it was the same kind of creature as the first. Thus, only one individual is needed to abstract a universal concept. — Dfpolis
What accounts for the universality of concepts is the objective capacity (intelligibility) of many individuals to elicit the same concept. — Dfpolis
What I was driving at in the passage you weren't sure about was the [potential] priority of something other than concept and propositional truth when it comes to religion. — macrosoft
I can conceive an 'atheist' and a 'theist' being tuned in to the same hazy thing, merely with different words for it. — macrosoft
In Aristotle's philosophy "form" refers to "what a thing is". There are two distinct senses of "form". One is the essence of a thing, how we know a thing, and this is without the accidents which we do not observe. The other is the form of the thing in itself, the complete "what a thing is", including all aspect which are missed by us. In his physics, a thing consists of two aspects, the matter and the form. This form is complete with accidents. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what you mean by forms are "what informs matter". This is not Aristotelian, but more like Neo-Platonist, perhaps. — Metaphysician Undercover
I do not believe that the moon is acting on your retina when you see the moon. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Form" refers to actuality, what is actual, not "capabilities", what is potential. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the issue is the "form" that the moon has independently of the sphere we draw, and what exists within us. These two are really reducible to the same. The sphere we draw, is really within us. For Aristotle the object has a form which makes it the object which it is, independently of how we perceive it, and the sphere we draw. — Metaphysician Undercover
But whether or not that light is received into the eye of an observer on earth, has no effect on the moon. So simple observation, in itself, does not affect the object. — Metaphysician Undercover
The ambiguity of P1 is created by you, not me. I clearly mean numerical identity. You introduce ambiguity, suggesting a different meaning of "very same", in order to dismiss the argument by equivocation. The equivocation is yours, not mine, created with the intent to reject the argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your objection to p2, I cannot even understand because you are talking about informing this and that, which as I explained above, I don't understand this usage. We are talking about the form of the object, what the object is, not "informing the object" whatever you mean by that. — Metaphysician Undercover
Here is a good example of a non sequitur argument. Your conclusion here "only one individual is needed to abstract a universal concept", does not support your claim "abstractions are not generalizations". — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is that the generalization based on only one instance of occurrence is much more likely to be faulty, though it still is a generalization — Metaphysician Undercover
What accounts for the universality of concepts is the objective capacity (intelligibility) of many individuals to elicit the same concept. — Dfpolis
Huh? What is "objective capacity' supposed to mean? — Metaphysician Undercover
Essences are the foundation in reality for essential definitions. In De ente et essentia Aquinas explains that form and essence are different. As it would be an error to leave out a body's materiality in defining it, the essence of a material thing includes both its form and matter. — Dfpolis
It is certainly true that we do not know all that a thing is. Still, the object as known is not what Aristotle means by "form." — Dfpolis
Just as information is the reduction of possibility, so informing matter selects out of its possibilities the one it actually has. It does not mean that the form exists prior to matter being informed. — Dfpolis
If there were no moon, I would see no image of the moon. So, clearly the moon acts (via mediation) to form its image on my retina. — Dfpolis
You are confusing two kinds of potential here: the proximate potencies inherent in being the kind of thing a being is (which is its form), and the remote potential to stop being what it is, and become something else (which is its matter). The form of a thing is what it is now, defined by its present powers -- a living person, not a dead body; or an acorn, not an oak tree. What something is now is defined by all the things it can do now, even though it is not doing them. Thus, human beings are rational animals even when they are acting irrationally. — Dfpolis
Of course objects exist (or not) independently of how we think of them. My point about the sphere was that thinking of the moon only as that within the sphere does not mean that the moon is only within the sphere. It has a radiance of action that extends to everything it influences. The moon as an object with a tidy boundary is an abstraction. The real moon is that, and every effect it has. We can see this because if we remove the effects, say the tides, then we are no longer thinking of the moon as it is, but an abstraction that does not act like the real moon. Removing any effect diminishes the reality of the moon. — Dfpolis
That is because your idea of the moon is a circumscribed abstraction, not the real being with its web of interactions. — Dfpolis
This is a question about how to count. I count one form, you count two forms. Let me explain why there is one, not two forms. Clearly, there are two informed beings: the object and the subject. Does that mean that there are two forms? No! Why? Because the basis of the twoness is the different matter of the subject and the object. But, we are not talking about the informed matter of the object, or the informed matter in my brain, but about the form in abstraction from matter. — Dfpolis
Still, as the notes of comprehension we do have are identical with notes in the object, they (the notes we have) are one with those of the object. — Dfpolis
I think that is what Augustine was expressing in defining theology as "faith seeking understanding" (fide quaerens intellectum). — Dfpolis
Agreed. I think what a lot of atheists reject is not what I understand by "God." When they tell me what they reject, I often agree with them. — Dfpolis
I can conceive an 'atheist' and a 'theist' being tuned in to the same hazy thing, — macrosoft
In Aristotle though, quiddity is a sense of "form". Aristotle doesn't make the clear distinction between form and essence which you refer to in Aquinas. In Aristotle this is just two senses of "form". — Metaphysician Undercover
You ought to recognize that the word "essence" did not exist for Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover
‘Essence’ is the standard English translation of Aristotle’s curious phrase to ti ên einai, literally “the what it was to be” for a thing. This phrase so boggled his Roman translators that they coined the word essentia to render the entire phrase, and it is from this Latin word that ours derives. Aristotle also sometimes uses the shorter phrase to ti esti, literally “the what it is,” for approximately the same idea.) In his logical works, Aristotle links the notion of essence to that of definition (horismos)—“a definition is an account (logos) that signifies an essence” (Topics 102a3) — SEP: Aristotle's Metaphysics by S. Marc Cohen
And clearly there are many instances when "form" is used to indicate formula, or essence. — Metaphysician Undercover
I still don't understand how you can say that form informs matter without assuming separate forms. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wouldn't the possible forms which the matter chooses from, necessarily have separate existence? Otherwise that matter which is choosing, would already have all these different forms at once, and that's contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover
If there were no moon, I would see no image of the moon. So, clearly the moon acts (via mediation) to form its image on my retina. — Dfpolis
Your logic is faulty here. You do not have the required premise to say that if you see something, that thing is necessarily acting. — Metaphysician Undercover
The moon might be completely passive, with an active medium, and then it would be wrong to say that the moon acts. — Metaphysician Undercover
We describe a thing as "what it is", it's form — Metaphysician Undercover
So if you want to define a thing by "its present powers", then to account for its ability to act, which require a specific type of temporal relation, you need to refer to something other than "what it is". — Metaphysician Undercover
You're begging the question again, with your assumption that objects act, when really they might only be passive, acted on. — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, my assumptions concerning activity are not the same as your assumptions, but I think mine are more realistic. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is contrary to the fundamental laws of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
There are two beings, "the object and the subject". You are claiming that these two distinct beings have one and the same (numerically identical) form. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the very principle (the law of identity) which allows us to say that two distinct things have different matter, disallows us from saying that they have the same form — Metaphysician Undercover
It is only by the fact that they have different forms, that we can say that they have different matter. Matter is only distinguishable as this or that particular matter by its form, so you cannot say that the subject and object have different matter without respecting that they have different forms. So the subject and object can in no way share have same form. — Metaphysician Undercover
No note is a perfect, ideal, or absolute understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
This isn't the thread for it, but I think the idea that meaning significantly lives in individual words is still fairly dominant --which contributes to lots of uncharitable interpretation. — macrosoft
Yes, but this does not advance you case that the form of the object is not also partially in the knowing subject. — Dfpolis
Consider a piece of abstract art. It's form occurred first in the mind of the artist, then in the work. — Dfpolis
The artist takes material and informs it according to the intended form. — Dfpolis
The artist can give the stone whatever form is desired. — Dfpolis
Not the same form in the sense of having all the notes of intelligibility, but the same in the sense that they notes they do share are numerically one. — Dfpolis
Every instance of a note of intelligibility is an instance of the identical note or it would not be an instance. The instances (tokens) are different, but what they are instances of (their type) is identical. For example, the abstraction <humanity> is one, even though many individuals have humanity. — Dfpolis
How? Further, I do not see that the law of identity ("What ever is, is") enters into differentiating individuals. — Dfpolis
I can't agree with a word of this analysis. We can have two quite indistinguishable objects and still know that they are two, not one, in light of their relation to each other and to us. One is on the right, the other on the left. One is closer, the other further. — Dfpolis
Of course they would not be objects if they had no form. That is why they are countable, but the reason they aren't one is relational. — Dfpolis
What hazy thing do you have in mind? (I realize the answer will have to be hazy, by the way.) — Terrapin Station
In a word, something like a feeling that accompanies the doing of life. — macrosoft
Well, the point is that "form" in the sense of what is in the knowing subject is "form' in the sense of essence, and "form" in the sense of what is in the material object is a different meaning, of "form", including accidentals. Therefore your claim that the form of the object is the form in the knowing subject is nothing but equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover
But the form in the mind of the artist is not the same form as the form in the work. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is not the case that the artist takes the form out of the mind and puts it into the matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
The artist does not take the material and inform it with the form in the mind, the artist takes the material and changes the form which it has, to correspond with what's in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
See here is evidence of that very mistake. The artist cannot give the stone whatever form is desired, being limited by the form which the stone already has. — Metaphysician Undercover
The notes are not numerically one though, that's the point. Each note is different between the object and the mind, one having accidentals, the other not. — Metaphysician Undercover
Each note of intelligibility in the mind is an abstraction, therefore not the same as the intelligibility of the thing abstracted from. — Metaphysician Undercover
So in relation to your example, the "humanity" in me is not the same as the "humanity" in you because of the differences in accidentals. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Relational" is formal. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't think I have some more overarching/abstract "feeling that accompanies 'the doing of life'" (what's different about saying "The doing of life" so that we couldn't just say "living," for example?) — Terrapin Station
Re "serious" art, I hate any sort of distinction like that. Art is art. I hate hierarchies that people try to impose. — Terrapin Station
I have explained in detail why it is not an equivocation. Repeating your claims does not help. You need to show why the arguments I have made are unsound. — Dfpolis
Only to the extent that the work is poorly executed. To the extent that the work is well-done, it embodies the very form in the mind of its maker. — Dfpolis
The context was that the matter is proportionate and suitable to the desired form. — Dfpolis
OK. That may connect to some of our variations of perspective. To be clear, it's not about shaming jingles. It's about paying tribute to the feelings we are capable of as human beings. 'Stairway to Heaven' is itself a Stairway to Heaven if one is in the right mood for it. Sadie, Coltrane, Patti Smith, Warpaint, Bach, and others you might name are definitely offering something to me that this is not:I'd never use "transcendent" and especially not "authentic" to describe any artwork.
I don't think there's anything inferior about jingles, production music, etc.--and I've done some of both myself. — Terrapin Station
It's about paying tribute to the feelings we are capable of as human beings. — macrosoft
When we're talking about people reacting to music, visual works, etc. any arbitrary person could have any arbitrary response to any arbitrary work. So someone who does use "transcendent" to describe their aesthetic reaction to some works could feel that way about the Volkswagen fahrvergnugen jingle while they get basically nothing from Patti Smith — Terrapin Station
But we know from experience that there is a vague spectrum — macrosoft
My experience with people is actually that there's a really wide, really varied range of opinions about the same stuff, a range that doesn't at all resemble the consensus of communities like rateyourmusic users, or SteveHoffman regulars, or gearslutz regulars, etc., and each of those communities has very different consensuses, too. — Terrapin Station
Maybe I should lighten my thesis to this. I think individuals find some music more important than other music, and that they can grasp the idea of the continuum in this way. — macrosoft
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