I think Searle is just pointing at meaning. Such meaning generates problems because the fantasy is that one can create a explicit system that does not break down. We are trying to capture our capturing itself. We are tying to trap a mist in a spiderweb. This mist is trying to trap itself in a spiderweb . . . — macrosoft

I don't want to keep saying this, and I've mostly tried not to, because I hate harping on the same thing all the time, but pretty much anything you write, at least when it's more than 30-40 words or whatever, is something where the more I read it, the more I really haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about or "trying to say." I don't expect you to change your style because of this, but if the goal is to convey any ideas, to get folks to think in different ways, etc., it might be worth noting that at least for some of us, your approach isn't at all working.

I’ve read Philosophical Investigations and own a copy. Not forking out for a guidebook though. I’ll try and chip in when I can.

When you starting this? — I like sushi

I'm thinking today maybe. I still don't have a companion to use, so I might put it off until tomorrow or later.

Thanks for the help. I will pay for any potential guidebook out of my own pocket. No need to waste money.

I don't want to keep saying this, and I've mostly tried not to, because I hate harping on the same thing all the time, but pretty much anything you write, at least when it's more than 30-40 words or whatever, is something where the more I read it, the more I really haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about or "trying to say." I don't expect you to change your style because of this, but if the goal is to convey any ideas, to get folks to think in different ways, etc., it might be worth noting that at least for some of us, your approach isn't at all working. — Terrapin Station

Well, I understand him. I feel we're being a tad bit judgemental here. Sure, macrosoft can maybe engage in more atomistic approaches to language; but, it's an online forum, so no need to get pissy.

Just look up Marie McGinn on library.memoryoftheworld.org

Thanks a bunch. Will do!

John, thanks for the download but really thanks for the website.
I feel like a kid in front of a pile of leaves.

Well, I understand him. I feel we're being a tad bit judgemental here. Sure, macrosoft can maybe engage in more atomistic approaches to language; but, it's an online forum, so no need to get pissy. — Posty McPostface

Not trying to be pissy, just honest. Whether it has any value as feedback is another issue, but it's an honest reaction.

I want to inform that I won't be able to handle the managerial aspect of the reading group. My role here is only that of an orchestrator for it.

Anyone up for the job? — Posty McPostface

Still looking for a guide? A few words of advice, don't ask of the blind for a volunteer to lead the blind.

Well as long as it's constructive criticism, then criticise away.

Hmm, then I'm blind too. I don't have the qualifications of leading this reading group given the complexity of the material. Care to join us??

I don't want to keep saying this, and I've mostly tried not to, because I hate harping on the same thing all the time, but pretty much anything you write, at least when it's more than 30-40 words or whatever, is something where the more I read it, the more I really haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about or "trying to say." I don't expect you to change your style because of this, but if the goal is to convey any ideas, to get folks to think in different ways, etc., it might be worth noting that at least for some of us, your approach isn't at all working. — Terrapin Station

I've noticed that you don't really get where I am coming from. I really am trying to find the words. But you say you don't like Wittgenstein. And I don't know if you like Heidegger. And you are turned off by Hegel. Do you like Nietzsche? How about Feuerbach? I love German philosophy. The whole enterprise is haunted by organ music. It tries to grasp the whole situation. It tries to grab that grasping itself. If none of them speak to you, then I might just have no chance with you. I'm pretty much paraphrasing/synthesizing what I've learned from them. I will keep trying to find better words.

We're all blind, and Wittgenstein ensures that we proceed in this way, providing us with nothing in particular which we might see. So I'll follow, but I won't even pretend to lead because that would be the position of a fool.

Well, I understand him. I feel we're being a tad bit judgemental here. Sure, macrosoft can maybe engage in more atomistic approaches to language; but, it's an online forum, so no need to get pissy. — Posty McPostface

Thanks for the kind words, Posty. I really don't mind TS's honesty, since it wasn't rude.

I must correct you on one point. My approach is anti-atomistic to the extreme. Semantic holism is my jam.

My approach is anti-atomistic to the extreme. Semantic holism is my jam. — macrosoft

I think you'll need to outline the main tenants of that philosophy of language for Terrapin Station to understand what you mean by that.

We're all blind, and Wittgenstein ensures that we proceed in this way, providing us with nothing in particular which we might see. So I'll follow, but I won't even pretend to lead because that would be the position of a fool. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nice.

I'm just difficult. Even my favorite philosophers I disagree with more than 50% of the time.

Re continentalism, I really, really hate continental philosophers' style(s) of writing/approach to expressing their views--starting with Kant, at least. I don't always disagree with their views, but I just can't stand the way they write.

I like the analytic style a lot. So even when I don't agree with analytic philosophers (which is quite often if even my favorites have averages that look like MLB batting averages), I enjoy reading them much more than continental authors.

Glad you like it -- I guess the UN figured out it's a human right to control f through a ton of philosophy texts.

Metaphysicians can't lead reading groups on Wittgenstein anyhow, it would blow their cover.

My suggestion is that if you have someone lead the managerial aspects then you're good to go. It's better to take an egalitarian approach to interpreting Wittgenstein.

the more I read it, the more I really haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about or "trying to say." — Terrapin Station

Such meaning generates problems because the fantasy is that one can create a explicit system that does not break down. We are trying to capture our capturing itself. We are tying to trap a mist in a spiderweb. This mist is trying to trap itself in a spiderweb. This spiderweb is a small set of words ripped out of their living context and somewhat naively interpreted as little containers of exact meaning with which we can do 'math.' — macrosoft

I'm saying (in other words) : Meanings exist systematically. The semantic unit is not the individual word but rather the entire language which is mostly not present for consciousness as we use it. The 'spiderwebs' are theories of the subject and the object, for instance. They are theories about what it is for something to be true or for something to exist. Most accounts capture something about what it is to be true or for something to exist. But they tend to unravel as we zoom in on this or that term and find a weak point in the system. To make the system explicit and clear, we have to ignore that language is a living system of meaning.

We especially have to ignore the phenomenon of 'ur-knowledge.' This is what Wittgenstein is trying to talk about in OC. I don't know that I have hands when I reach for my coffee. I don't need to ask myself if I have hands. I am my hands. I also don't need to ask if anyone is really out there. I know this. Language is already in a pre-notion of the world. It is already directed at a pre-notion of the others who can understand me. Such phenomena are what explicit accounts of the subject, object, meaning, truth, and existence aim at. But explicit accounts often ignore these inconspicuous pre-notions, presupposing that only what is explicit is real. We might call approach this a visual, object-inspired approach. That which is real is like medium-sized dry goods. So we ourselves, if we are real, must be like rocks to which thinking is 'stapled on.' Meaning is air-gapped, somehow jumping through space to other brains. Reality is junk on which we must somehow project value. This approach does make sense if we try to zoom in from an atoms-and-void perspective, at least initially. But it is far from being problem-free or the only approach...

I'm just difficult. Even my favorite philosophers I don't agree with even 50% of the time. — Terrapin Station

I respect that. I concur.

Re continentalism, I really, really hate continental philosophers' style(s) of writing/approach to expressing their views--starting with Kant, at least. I don't always disagree with their views, but I just can't stand the way they write. — Terrapin Station

I hate lots of it. I have never really liked the more recent French philosophers in this regard. But late Wittgenstein is very clear, though he is saying something strange. Nietzsche is beautifully translated, IMO. Same with Feuerbach, the proto-Nietzsche.

Hegel can be clear at times. Heidegger becomes clear (and is very clear and thorough in his lectures.)

I like the analytic style a lot. So even when I don't agree with analytic philosophers (which is quite often if even my favorites have averages that look like MLB batting averages), I enjoy reading them much more than continental authors. — Terrapin Station

I don't know AP all that well. Does Rorty count? He is clear like Hume. Hume is another favorite.

Meanings exist systematically. The semantic unit is not the individual word but rather the entire language which is mostly not present for consciousness as we use it. — macrosoft

So this, for example, I think is obviously incorrect, especially the "not present for consciousness as we use it" part.

As soon as you get here, by the way:

The 'spiderwebs' are theories of the subject and the object, for instance. — macrosoft

I'm already wondering what you're talking about, because it seems to have little to do with your first sentence.

It makes sense that you're using a spiderweb metaphor, but it makes no sense to me that you seem to all of a sudden jumping to "theories of the subject and the object," not to mention that I wonder, "What 'theories' are you talking about," part of which is me wondering if you're using the term "theories" in anything at all resembling the sense of an overarching account intended to broadly explain some phenomenon, or if you're using that term as simply a "less boring/more 'poetic'" way to refer to something like a simple distinction of subjective/objective.

They are theories about what it is for something to be true or for something to exist. — macrosoft

And then this seems to be another non-sequiturish jump to me, because truth theories and basic ontology are two different things that don't have a necessary connection to a subjective/objective distinction, which didn't have any clear connection to a general philosophy of language focusing on semiotics and semantics.

. . . and so on.

What do you mean by that? — Posty McPostface

Have you looked into phenomenology? Grasping a phenomenon is just paying close attention to what experience is really like for you. It is trying to look 'around' the theories you already have about what it 'must' be. For instance, early Heidegger examines how we experience time and finds that physics time (which is modeled on space) doesn't fit with our experience. He is trying to make us aware of what we do almost automatically, of what we do without noticing we are doing. As far as I can tell, he invented 'deconstruction,' which is just trying to dismantle the stuff we think we know that gets in the way of a fresh look at what was there all along, even as we demanded proof for it.

One example is the 'solipsist' who visits this forum to tell us about his solipsism. He knows there are others as he tries to prove to them that maybe they aren't there. Or we can imagine the person who is trying to tell us there is no such thing as objective truth. They appeal to a pre-theoretical sense of 'objective truth' (some kind of vague truth-for-us) as they deny its possibility. What such arguments miss is the inexplicit 'knowledge' that makes them intelligible or worth pursuing.

But late Wittgenstein is very clear, though he is saying something strange. — macrosoft

Wittgenstein isn't exactly a continentalist, though. I agree that he's a weird fit for the analytic "school," but he makes much more sense to lump in with the analytics than the continentalists, especially given his association with the Vienna Circle (and Russell, etc.), which is hardcore analytic philosophy.

Wittgenstein isn't exactly a continentalist, though. I agree that he's a weird fit for the analytic "school," but he makes much more sense to lump in with the analytics than the continentalists, especially given his association with the Vienna Circle, which is hardcore analytic philosophy. — Terrapin Station

That's a good point. I guess I am lumping him with the continentals because of Groundless Grounds. He is making very Heideggerian points (and the reverse) at times. He does it all in a demystifying tone, like he is swatting a fly. Heidegger is grand and still believes in philosophy. But they are both pointing at a kind of ur-knowledge that can't be made perfectly explicit. To demystify this a bit, it's like the 'animal' foundation of thinking. We are mostly on auto-pilot, reacting to signs in the environment. We just 'do' understand language without and before giving an account of this. It's only when the flow is stopped by the theoretical gaze to question a single word that things get complicated.

So this, for example, I think is obviously incorrect, especially the "not present for consciousness as we use it" part. — Terrapin Station

I am saying something pretty safe here, I think. Is your ability to use English there as a whole in your RAM? Can you survey all of this linguistic know-how instantaneously in consciousness? I presume you roughly understood that last sentence. It was automatic.

if you're using that term as simply a "less boring/more 'poetic'" way to refer to something like a simple distinction of subjective/objective. — Terrapin Station

Such a distinction would only have meaning within a system of distinctions. Your view on the subject and the object is going to be entangled with related views. For instance, if we are air-gapped subjects, then meaning cannot be shared. Value cannot be 'somewhat' objective. We strive for coherent accounts. We can't do much at the atomic level.

And then this seems to be another non-sequiturish jump to me, because truth theories and basic ontology are two different things that don't have a necessary connection to a subjective/objective distinction, which didn't have any clear connection to a general philosophy of language focusing on semiotics and semantics.

. . . and so on. — Terrapin Station

Hmm. I'm surprised you say that, because I think such connections are clear. What is the subject? How does it exist? And what do we mean by this or that explication of the subject, or of truth? I am perhaps blind to my own semantic holism. It's obvious to me (at this point), which may lead me to present does-not-follows for your perspective. Ontology and epistemology are meaningful and therefore also involve semantics. A good 'spiderweb' is coherent and meaningful. We fix them up when they are not, so that we have to extend them. They are still not quite right. So we mess with them some more. What is this process?

Wittgenstein isn't exactly a continentalist, though. I agree that he's a weird fit for the analytic "school," but he makes much more sense to lump in with the analytics than the continentalists, especially given his association with the Vienna Circle, which is hardcore analytic philosophy. — Terrapin Station

I think of Wittgenstein as challenging both approaches. There is an impatience with playing dumb about calling for certain explanations and then saying "ah ha!, quid erat demonstratum" that appeals to me. Fool me once, etcetera.....

Differences in taste about kinds of explanations can be substantial barriers to dialogue.
Slab!

The term “meaning holism” is generally applied to views that treat the meanings of all of the words in a language as interdependent. Holism draws much of its appeal from the way in which the usage of all our words seems interconnected, and runs into many problems because the resultant view can seem to conflict with (among other things) the intuition that meanings are by and large shared and stable. — SEP

What's funny here is that 'meanings' continue to be talked about. The objects are that 'meanings' are shared and stable. I understand what is meant, but this still misses half of the point. The words don't have fixed, stable meanings apart from their living context. 'Meaning is one.' Roughly, the same words take on millions of so-called atomic meanings in millions of different contexts. Our semi-automatic ability to speak and hear is staggeringly sophisticated, just like a living cat. To miss this is to be blind to anything I am trying to say. Our theories of meaning are like the crayola sketches of a cat. Our 'use' or 'immersion' in meaning is like an actual cat in comparison.

Explicit accounts are like a 10-year old boy trying to make strong A.I. with a 9-volt, some wires ripped out of a toy truck, and a few Christmas-tree lights. I'm not saying that we shouldn't try. (I am trying in my own way to light up the question and task.) I am just saying look at the cat.

Have you looked into phenomenology? — macrosoft

Yes, I have. I like Husserl a lot. He got me into phenomenology. There's so much ambiguity that I see, everywhere around me, in regards to intentionality and affect. I don't know if you care to talk about this.



So, have you developed a meta-philosophy due to semantic-holism?

Yes, I have. I like Husserl a lot. He got me into phenomenology. There's so much ambiguity that I see, everywhere around me, in regards to intentionality and affect. I don't know if you care to talk about this. — Posty McPostface

I have mostly read about Husserl in the context of reading about Heidegger. I think Husserl (a mathematician too) focused on 'eternal' phenomena. Heidegger saw something like the historical component living in our perception and very much addressed affect ('attunement'). For Heidegger we are like care that is stretched in time between the future and the past. Think about driving a car or riding a bike. How does time exist for us? We have memory, action, and anticipation in a living unity. I anticipate in terms of what I remember. I remember in terms of what I anticipate. How actually does the present fit into this ? Is there a 'pure' present? Is there an 'instant' where we are all 'collected'? If we look at the clock, we are tempted to say yes. If we assume that clock time is 'real' time (despite having invented clocks because we care and wanted to organize our actions), then somehow the real must be perfectly present. Reality exists in the freeze-frame. But this is a metaphysical abstraction, a theory that may get in the way of the naked facts that we mostly don't notice. We don't notice simply because we are so good at ordinary things. We don't need to notice. The dancer doesn't notice she has legs. She is her legs. The philosopher doesn't notice semantic holism. He is this holism.

What about intent? How do you address that finiky problem?

What about intent? How do you address that finiky problem? — Posty McPostface

Intentionality? That is what is consciously 'lit up.' If we talk about consciousness, we feel forced by grammar to talk about consciousness of something. And indeed we are all familiar with focusing on something. Is that what you had in mind?