What is "transparent" use of words? — Terrapin Station

I refer to the way that words just pour out of us on the one hand and are immediately understood on the other. In most cases no effort is required. Language is not experienced as something 'in our way' that meaning has to be shoved through or sifted from. Language is the 'hammer' that vanishes in the hammering --suddenly becoming conspicuous when there's a problem. For instance, in philosophy language is radically conspicuous right now. Or rather what we are talking about (the transparency) is foregrounded by other words that we already understand and use like our hands reaching to turn a doorknob.

It's not a matter of translating words into other words per se. We could set up a machine to do that (a la the Chinese Room, say), but the machine wouldn't be doing meaning. — Terrapin Station

I agree with you here. The question is about the nature of subjective of meaning. It's not the juxtaposition of meaning cubes in one's mind.

Very simple sentences with nouns that bring images to one's mind are, admittedly, closer to this juxtaposition of meaning cubes. But high-level talking about talking manifests the complexity of the living relationship between the words in a sentence. Something like a cloud of meaning is generated by putting words together. It is not like a train of meaning crystals.

A 'form of life' is the way of living of an entire community. It's the way we talk, for one thing, — macrosoft

Hmm. but the "entire community" isn't a bunch of Stepford Wives. People talk in different ways in a community. Do you mean something like an abstracted average, a la "the average couple have 2.3 kids" (or whatever the number is exactly), or are we only focusing on normals to the exclusion of the weirdos (something I very much do not like doing), or?

Now we need to establish a direct relation between what is said and what is wanted, without reference to the medium of thought. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I see it, the attempt to really ground the entire system in this or that part is more or less doomed. Language is there like our lives. I mentioned grounding it in action, but this is really attempt to point at the dissolution of the word/action dichotomy. Let's think of waves, nods, winks, turn signals, words like 'hi.' We don't have clear propositional content on one side and mute action on another. These are extremes on a continuum.

As far as I can tell, there's just no way to squeeze this grasp/ground of how to be in a community of speakers and doers in one small aspect of that speaking-doing. This is the operating system that we look through like clean glass most of the time.

I refer to the way that words just pour out of us on the one hand and are immediately understood on the other. In most cases no effort is required. — macrosoft

But my theory accounts for that, despite the fact that I'm stressing that meaning is strictly a brain phenomenon.

Language is not experienced as something 'in our way' that meaning has to be shoved through or sifted from. — macrosoft

That's like one of those Heideggerian straw men. No one is suggesting as much.

I agree with you here. The question is about the nature of subjective of meaning. It's not the juxtaposition of meaning cubes in one's mind.

Very simple sentences with nouns that bring images to one's mind are, admittedly, closer to this juxtaposition of meaning cubes. But high-level talking about talking manifests the complexity of the living relationship between the words in a sentence. Something like a cloud of meaning is generated by putting words together. It is not like a train of meaning crystals. — macrosoft

Again, it would be a straw man to assume that I ever said anything like "it only works in cubes"

But my theory accounts for that, despite the fact that I'm stressing that meaning is strictly a brain phenomenon. — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying your theory is wrong. I'm just pointing out transparency.

That's like one of those Heideggerian straw men. No one is suggesting as much. — Terrapin Station

Again, just explaining 'transparency.' That entities can exist for us in this way seems worth noticing, given a tendency to think that only static, conspicuous entities are real.

As I see it, the attempt to really ground the entire system in this or that part is more or less doomed. — macrosoft

One thing I like to do is talk about the location of phenomena. In my view, the idea that there are any phenomena without a location is incoherent. The location might be pretty complex, and we might need to talk about a lot of different, sometimes separated locations functioning together, but there's still going to be a location. Nothing exists that has "no location."

Again, it would be a straw man to assume that I ever said anything like "it only works in cubes" — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying that that is your view. If you agree that the meaning in sentences is very un-cube-like, then that's something we can agree on and investigate. IMO, this is a big deal. If words don't trap meaning-cubes then we can't really do math with them except in very simple cases. We are thrust into a more complex interpretative situation.

I'm not saying your theory is wrong. I'm just pointing out transparency — macrosoft

Okay, but you're taking it to be evidence of public/shared/etc. meaning. It's not, because the phenomena in question are consistent with a theory of private/not-shared etc. meaning, too.

If you agree that the meaning in sentences is very un-cube-like, — macrosoft

I don't agree with that either as a universal generalization. What I'd say is that it depends on how a particular individual is thinking about it, and different individuals can think about it in very different ways.

If we say, as a universal generalization, that meaning in sentences is very un-cube-like then Joe might object with, "Hold on a minute! At least for sentences x, y and z, I think of meaning as extremely cube-like!"

One thing I like to do is talk about the location of phenomena. In my view, the idea that there are any phenomena without a location is incoherent. The location might be pretty complex, and we might need to talk about a lot of different, sometimes separated locations functioning together, but there's still going to be a location. Nothing exists that has "no location." — Terrapin Station

I can understand that leaning, but I think the movement of meaning itself is dynamic. It makes sense to put meaning in the head. I agree. But how does meaning exist in the head? If we explore our use of words, I don't think we can pin-point meaning in any particular word. Endings of sentences can point to their beginning. This is why time is a big deal for Heidegger. In some sense meaning-making is time.

but I think the movement of meaning itself is dynamic. — macrosoft

Definitely. I think everything is dynamic. Dynamic things have locations.

But how does meaning exist in the head? — macrosoft

As associations that individuals make, and different individuals can do this in very different ways.

I don't agree with that either as a universal generalization. What I'd say is that it depends on how a particular individual is thinking about it, and different individuals can think about it in very different ways.

If we say, as a universal generalization, that meaning in sentences is very un-cube-like then Joe might object with, "Hold on a minute! At least for sentences x, y and z, I think of meaning as extremely cube-like!" — Terrapin Station

I'd agree myself that in simple sentences it is fairly cube like. 'The sandwich is on the table.' Very simple sentences involving familiar objects suggests the cube-like-ness of meaning. The atomic view of meaning makes sense here. But complex sentences such as occur in our conversation right now are more sensibly interpreted in the light of holism.

As associations that individuals make, and different individuals can do this in very different ways. — Terrapin Station

I agree, but now we've shift to 'associations.' What or how is an association?

I'd agree that in simple sentences it is fairly cube like. 'The sandwich is on the table.' — macrosoft

I don't know if you're understanding me. I wouldn't say something like that either. Again, it depends on the individual in question. Different people can think about the same thing (the same sentence) in very different ways. We can't make a generalization about how meaning works for anything (that is, in terms of specifics, exact content, etc.) that would be spot-on, because it's always possible (even if it doesn't contingently obtain at some point in time) for some individual to think about it differently than what we proposed. It's also important to note that this wouldn't always (or maybe even most of the time or often) be apparent.

What or how is an association? — macrosoft

A type of inherently mental linking, implication, and the like.

A type of inherently mental linking, implication, and the like. — Terrapin Station

I agree. But see how we keep shifting from word to word. It's clear that no particular word is going to finally say it and contain the elemental meaning. This is that 'mental linking' trying to name itself. It can only do so by linking yet more words to those already being used.

We do not apprehend the “red,” “apple,” or “five” as separate concepts when they’re uttered in the manner given. — I like sushi

I read that line as saying we are not checking if the words correspond one to one to "objects" as they are represented in the Augustine quote. Their "separateness" is a different matter. The point of the statement being to observe the practice of "checking" in this matter to other possible ways to understand what is being said.
Wittgenstein is trying to get us to think about the matter as an assembly of habits.

gain, it depends on the individual in question. Different people can think about the same thing (the same sentence) in very different ways. We can't make a generalization about how meaning works for anything (that is, in terms of specifics, exact content, etc.) that would be spot-on, because it's always possible (even if it doesn't contingently obtain at some point in time) for some individual to think about it differently than what we proposed. — Terrapin Station

It's always possible that everyone but me is an android passing the Turing test, logically possible. But I'd say we just do act within a massive field of presuppositions as we speak. I think you are worrying too much about epistemology and not introspecting enough. If you like, just report your own experience and don't worry about that of others. We can't do a certain kind of science. Science is itself caught up in that same ambiguity.

I'd say that you write these posts with a profound 'faith' in their sufficient intelligibility. I work from these basic presuppositions that structure consciousness --using these same structures. It's not an exact science.

As associations that individuals make, and different individuals can do this in very different ways. — Terrapin Station

In which cubic millimeter of the brain does meaning live? Or does it exist as a mathematical point? At which exact instant does meaning live? I suggest that we have unwittingly projected physical science concepts on our experience of meaning so that its complexity is covered up.

And how would we know that others do so in different ways? How would we determine that? We presuppose some kind of overlap to talk about deviations from this overlap.

Okay, but you're taking it to be evidence of public/shared/etc. meaning. It's not, because the phenomena in question are consistent with a theory of private/not-shared etc. meaning, too. — Terrapin Station

I don't think you understand what I mean by 'shared meaning.' It's not a supernatural 'thing' in the world. We can just describe it as a structure of first-person experience. If I am talking to a computer who passes the Turing test, that doesn't mean I don't experience 'shared meaning.' The theory of shared meaning can still be true if there is only one more human being alive hanging out with androids without knowing it. It's a sense that accompanies speaking and writing. It is the realm of intelligibility.

A man survives a nuclear war in a bomb shelter. He fortunately has lots of books. He reads his favorite philosophers. He experiences the words in these books as the voice of a person. A language user is never 'alone' in a peculiar sense. They grasp themselves as individuals with a language that is inherently geared to world and a community. There's no way to prove this. I'm ultimately describing a result of introspection, a structure of my experience which involves the sense of its universality.
But this sense of universality is also that which has us interpreting fire hydrants and clouds as also there for other consciousnesses. Since we live by such intuitions, I think it's fine to work from them and with them. Or rather we are going to in any case, so no need to exclude their consideration from philosophy out of a fear of their vagueness or uncertainty.

It's clear that no particular word is going to finally say it and contain the elemental meaning. — macrosoft

Re "meaning"? If so, yes, that's obviously the case, because it's not a text string or sound or anything like that. Meaning is something inherently mental, and it can't be made into something else or third-person observed. You can third-person observe text strings and sounds. You can't third-person observe meaning. This is a major part of my point.

I think you are worrying too much about epistemology and not introspecting enough. — macrosoft

I'm not worrying about anything except perhaps people making universal proclamations that aren't right, that amount to telling other people that they're doing something that they're not in fact doing, or that amount to telling people that they're "wrong" merely for being unusual.

In which cubic millimeter of the brain does meaning live? Or does it exist as a mathematical point? At which exact instant does meaning live? — macrosoft

C'mon, man--are you being serious? These are kind of dumb questions that don't reflect that you understand what I'm saying very well. For example, re the comments I made earlier about locations. "In which cubic millimeter" would make it seem like either you didn't really read those comments, or you didn't at all understand them. If you're not being serious, let's be serious. If you can understand Heidegger, you should be able to understand the relatively simple stuff that I'm typing.

And how would we know that others do so in different ways? How would we determine that? — macrosoft

They tell us.

Do we know it with certainty? No. Of course not. But you shouldn't be worrying about certainty period.

I don't think you understand what I mean by 'shared meaning.' — macrosoft

I very well may not. For one, I have an expectation that if we're doing philosophy, people are using terms "literally"--that is, per one of their conventional definitions, unless they specify otherwise. So I take it that you literally mean "shared," so a la possessing the same thing (whether at the same time or one after the other), or a la the "show and tell" sense, etc.

Maybe you only mean something like what I'd call "understanding" or more colloquially, "feeling like you know what someone is saying/talking about" or whatever. That would be fine, but I'd prefer that we call it something other than a term that I believe is not the case in a "literal" sense.

Because that's what both wanting something and meaning are--mental phenomena — Terrapin Station

I don't think you'll get much out of this reading group by simply hewing to this position and then measuring everything in the PI against it. The point here is to understand what and why Witty says what he does, not contrast every section with Terrapin's pet theory of meaning. Nobody is here to engage with the latter.

Because that's what both wanting something and meaning are--mental phenomena — Terrapin Station


I don't think you'll get much out of this reading group by simply hewing to this position and then measuring everything in the PI against it. The point here is to understand what and why Witty says what he does, not contrast every section with Terrapin's pet theory of meaning. Nobody is here to engage with the latter. — StreetlightX

Haha!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IABRgZH12YA&feature=youtu.be

It would be useful to stick to the text. If people want to throw around their own theories I don’t think this is the place right?

Just saying ...

Just saying ... — I like sushi

And I agree. Where have we left off at?

Yes.
As per your suggestion, I am trying to focus on the first seven remarks

Some remarks on §1:

(1) "In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands."

One thing to keep in mind is that Wittgenstein will attempt to break this correlation:

word = object (= meaning)

In both directions. Not only will he try and show that words don't correlate to objects (which is relatively easy), but he will also try and show that 'words' themselves are not natural 'units' of meaning. In other words, he's not attempting to replace 'objects' with something else. He's trying to undermine the idea that one needs words to 'equate' to anything at all in order for meaning to be expressed ('meaning to be expressed' as distinct from 'for words to have meaning').

(2) "Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word ... the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself."

Just a quick orienting remark: pay close attention to Witty's focus on kinds (and 'sorts'). The notion of kinds of words, kinds of questions, sorts of things, plays a vital role in the PI. The attention to kinds is inseparable from his understanding of the role of grammar, which will because super important in later discussions.

(3) "Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere" (italics in original).

This ties back (forward?) into the comments I made about §19: note the distinction between 'act' and explanation: that explanations 'come to an end' in 'acts'. This will also be super important later, but for now, it's worth noting as an indicator of the importance of questions of regress (and putting a stop to it) that will rear their head all through the PI.