23. But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion,
question, and command?—There are countless kinds: countless different
kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And
this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new
types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into
existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a
rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form
of life.
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following
examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—
Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now,
this picture can be used to tell someone how he should stand, should
hold himself; or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular
man did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on. One might (using
the language of chemistry) call this picture a proposition-radical.
This will be how Frege thought of the "assumption".
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language
and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.
(Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.}

Here's a question, a point of interest. Does anyone disagree with what Wittgenstein is arguing, that it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension?

The argument might be put this way. To learn how to understand meaning requires learning some rules. However, there are multiple sets of rules, corresponding to the variety of different ways that words are used. Determining which set of rules is applicable, in a particular situation (context), is required to learn language. We cannot appeal to a "set of rules" for determining which set of rules, because we'd fall into infinite regress of needing to determine which set of rules is applicable. So the argument appears to be that this ability, the capacity to choose a particular set of rules as applicable in a particular context, cannot be taught through ostension, as a set of rules.

If I have represented the argument correctly, I would be interested to hear some opinions as to whether or not this is an acceptable position. I believe that Terrapin Station, for one, disagrees with the position.

It would be helpful to everyone if you referred to the text where you believe he makes this assertion.

Yeah, considering that rules are not yet discussed at this early stage, one is hard pressed to know what MU thinks he is talking about.

Anyway, with respect to ostension, the remarks so far in the PI have had nothing to do with if "we can learn language solely through ostension" or not - which in any case is a largely meaningless question.

Rather, the point of the early passages are to establish the differential nature of ostension (in contrast to a 'linear' understanding of ostension); i.e that the 'same' ostensive act (pointing at 'this', say), can play different roles depending on the use to which ostension is put. There is no one kind of thing that ostension always picks out, but always the possibility of a variety of kinds of things (or put differently: in principle, there is always the possibility of a one-to-many mapping between ostension and what is 'picked-out', and never a simple one-to-one mapping between them):

§6: "With different instruction the same ostensive teaching of these words would have effected a quite different understanding."
§28: "an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in any case."

The 'enemy' here is still Augustine, who can be read as still hewing to the one-to-one model of ostension. The question opened up by the differential nature of ostension, however, is this: given that ostension is just pointing, and that such pointing can refer to many different things, how can we know what an ostensive act is 'really' pointing to (If I point to a red pocket square, am I pointing out it's color? It's shape? Its fabric? Its texture? The fact that it is a pocket square? Something to wipe a stain with? All or some of the above in combination?). §29 onwards begins to address this question.

Sorry, I've jumped ahead a little bit, toward what I consider as the "conclusion" of this part of the text. He discusses very explicitly, the relationship between rules and the play of the game, at 31. He builds toward the "conclusion" at 32, 33, that if we learned language through ostensive learning, as described by Augustine, it would be necessary to already know a language in order to learn a language. At 32 he describes this as a foreigner learning a new language, and suggests that this is all that Augustine's description is good for.

Yeah, considering that rules are not yet discussed at this early stage, one is hard pressed to know what MU thinks he is talking about. — StreetlightX

I don't like to have to be nitpicky, but "rules" are implied by Wittgenstein whenever he refers to "games", as he clearly understands games as consisting of rules. This is quite evident from the very first page of the book

3... It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games.

At this point, #3, he explains that Augustine's description of language is descriptive of only a part of overall language use, as if when someone was asked to describe what a "game" consists of, they gave a description of what a "board game" consists of.

I do agree, that at this point it is not evident whether Wittgenstein believes that all games consist of rules, but he does consistently mention the word "game", and talks about various language games. This word, "game" implies through most forms of common use "rules". And the talk of various language games implies various sets of rules. So even when he is not mentioning "rules", nor does he explicitly state "all games consist of rules", rules are implicit in his mention of "games", due to the common understanding of the word "game".

Of course there is a way of using "game", if someone is "playing games with us", in which "rules" are not necessarily implied. But that's another issue, perhaps for later, as there is no evidence that Wittgenstein's use of language is a matter of him "playing games with us". That would be a form of deception.

I don't think you'll get much out of this reading group by simply hewing to this position and then measuring everything in the PI against it. The point here is to understand what and why Witty says what he does, not contrast every section with Terrapin's pet theory of meaning. Nobody is here to engage with the latter. — StreetlightX

What I aim to get out of it is to explain why Wittgenstein is wrong. Ideally that would help some other folks understand why he's wrong, but if people aren't interested, that's fine. They don't have to pay attention to me.

It would be useful to stick to the text. If people want to throw around their own theories I don’t think this is the place right? — I like sushi

I don't read any philosophy by being submissive to it, and I think it's bizarre that anyone would--it's completely against the whole spirit of philosophy. I read it critically, where I expect authors to say things that are accurate, well-supported, well-argued, etc. A lot of my activity as a reader is to enter into a dialogue with the text, and to offer challenges to it. That's what I'll be doing, and it's what I do as a matter of course when I read any philosophy.

Does anyone disagree with what Wittgenstein is arguing, that it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension? — Metaphysician Undercover

For me to agree or disagree we need to clarify just what learning amounts to. If learning is the idea of someone giving something to you wholesale, where you don't have to do anything in order to gain it (sometimes people seem to have that, or something close to it, in mind with "learning"), then no, I wouldn't disagree that it's impossible to learn language solely through ostension.

After all, on my view, it's impossible for anyone to third-person observe meaning, and any language isn't much of a language sans meaning.

If learning, however, includes the notion of figuring things out on one's own via deduction, contemplation, etc., in response to presentations that are made to one (which is what learning should imply in my view), then yes, I'd disagree that it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension.

No problem. I was referring to quoting another text. As you’ve pointed put the relevance for myself and others that’s great :)

For me to agree or disagree we need to clarify just what learning amounts to. If learning is the idea of someone giving something to you wholesale, where you don't have to do anything in order to gain it (sometimes people seem to have that, or something close to it, in mind with "learning"), then no, I wouldn't disagree that it's impossible to learn language solely through ostension. — Terrapin Station

Isn't it clear that learning is not a case of someone simply giving you something. This would make the learner completely passive, when surely the learner must be an active participant. If the learner is completely passive, then learning cannot be totally ostensive because nothing accounts for the learner's ability to receive what is given.

If learning, however, includes the notion of figuring things out on one's own via deduction, contemplation, etc., in response to presentations that are made to one (which is what learning should imply in my view), then yes, I'd disagree that it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension. — Terrapin Station

So this would be a more accurate description of learning, in my opinion, making the learner active. If the learner is active, in what you describe as sorts of thinking, then this accounts for the learner's ability to receive what the demonstrator is giving. But if this is the case, then is learning properly attributed to the ostensive activity, or to the thinking activity of the learner? And even if it requires both, isn't this just another way of saying that learning requires something more than simply ostensive demonstration? It requires active thought on the part of the learner as well. So even in this case it is impossible to learn language solely through ostension, because the right sort of thinking is also required.

Isn't it clear that learning is not a case of someone simply giving you something — Metaphysician Undercover

As I just said, "sometimes people seem to have that, or something close to it, in mind with 'learning'."

Re your second part, you then go on to treat "learning" as if it might refer to something completely passive, lol

Re your second part, you then go on to treat "learning" as if it might refer to something completely passive, lol — Terrapin Station

Are you serious? I guess not, judging by your use of "lol".

I don't see how we have such opposing conclusions. Let me make a simple deductive argument out of your premise concerning active participation, and you tell me how you disagree with the premises I propose. Learning a language requires active participation by the student. Active participation by the student is something other than ostensive demonstration. Therefore learning language requires something other than ostensive demonstration.

Or do I misunderstand what you are saying altogether?

Would you say that it's impossible to learn anything, regardless of how limited we make it, via ostension? For example, would you say that it's impossible to learn which coat your wife counts as her "cold weather casual coat" via ostension?

I would say that it is impossible to learn anything solely via ostension. Ostensive demonstration is an activity which is completely carried out by the instructor. And, as you indicated, learning requires active participation by the student in the form of different sorts of mental activity, thinking. If the sole means of learning is the ostensive activity, then the student is absolutely passive in the act of learning. So it would be a false description of what learning is, to refer simply to the ostensive activity, without accounting for the active participation of the student.

I believe that this is why Wittgenstein argues that St. Augustine's description of learning language through ostensive activity assumes that the student already knows a language. We have to account for the student's capacity to interpret the ostensive demonstrations, and if the student already has the capacity to interpret, then the student must already know a language.

I would say that it is impossible to learn anything solely via ostension — Metaphysician Undercover

So if we're defining things so that it's impossible to learn anything solely via ostension, why would we even ask the question in the first place re whether it's possible to learn a language via ostension?

The same thing would then also go for learning via demonstration, explanation, etc.

Of course, in that case, it would seem that maybe we're using an odd definition or description of the term "learn," because normally we'd say that we can learn some things via demonstration, via ostension, etc.

So if we're defining things so that it's impossible to learn anything solely via ostension, why would we even ask the question in the first place re whether it's possible to learn a language via ostension? — Terrapin Station

That observation wasn't brought up as a definition. Why anybody would ask the question is because there are experiences with language that do not seem to be about agreeing upon definitions before the talking begins. There is that language game but there are others.

Ugh, the question of 'weather it is possible or not to learn language only through ostension' is a pseudo-debate and should be dropped as having to do anything to do with the sections we are discussing. The question about ostension is one of intension, not extension - the nature of ostension and not its scope. At best, the latter is a derivitive and secondary issue, but it can't be discussed properly without first understanding what Witty is trying to say about the former.

So if we're defining things so that it's impossible to learn anything solely via ostension, why would we even ask the question in the first place re whether it's possible to learn a language via ostension? — Terrapin Station

The answer to that is quite obvious. Augustine had described language as being learned by ostension. So the question "is it possible to learn a language via ostension?" was asked, because the proposition that this is how language is learned was already made by Augustine. Wittgenstein was exploring the truth or falsity of this proposition, hence asking that question. He seems to have demonstrated that this is an incomplete description of how language is actually learned.

Of course, in that case, it would seem that maybe we're using an odd definition or description of the term "learn," because normally we'd say that we can learn some things via demonstration, via ostension, etc. — Terrapin Station

Sure we might say that we can learn some things, like language, through ostension, but as Wittgenstein demonstrates, this is a type of falsity because it is an incomplete description of how we actually learn those things.

Go back and take a look at #2, #3. Augustine's description of how we learn language is incomplete in a similar way to if a person who was asked to describe what a game is, described what a board game is. The description, of learning through ostension only captures a part of what learning a language is, but it doesn't capture the entirety of it.

Now consider this quote from #30:

One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be
capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?

This is the problem, if ostensive definition is a matter of assigning names to things, it is revealed that we must already know something in order to learn by ostension. So we cannot really capture the nature of learning, what the process of learning involves, by simply referring to ostension, because ostension requires that we already know something. Therefore ostension cannot account for the learning of this, what we already know which is required for ostensive learning. And this, what we already know prior to ostensive learning, plays a large role in learning language.

That observation wasn't brought up as a definition. — Valentinus

My tangent with Metaphysician Undercover involved clarifying a definition.

The answer to that is quite obvious. Augustine had described language as being learned by ostension. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you believe that Augustine would have said that learning implies being given something wholesale where the person receiving what was learned is entirely passive in the process?

This is the problem, if ostensive definition is a matter of assigning names to things, it is revealed that we must already know something in order to learn by ostension. So we cannot really capture the nature of learning, what the process of learning involves, by simply referring to ostension, because ostension requires that we already know something — Metaphysician Undercover

That's conflating the notion of knowing something with the idea of learning a language.

The differential nature of ostension leads to this question:

§30: "One has already to know (or be able to do) something before one can ask what something is called. But what does one have to know?"

- which in turn leads, once again, to the importance of kinds. In order for ostension to 'work', one must understand what kind of thing is being pointed out by means of ostension. §31 will employ a spatial metaphor, speaking about a "place" that must "already [be] prepared" in order for ostensive explanation to function effectively. Witty also refers to kinds as 'roles':

§30: "An ostensive definition explains the use a the meaning a of a word if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear." (my emphasis)

Two things are important to note here. First, the question of kinds (or roles, or 'places') are intimately related to use: §31: "[ostensive explanation] informs him of the use only if the place is already prepared": that is, only if the kind of thing being pointed out is understood 'in advance'. This, in turn, sheds vital light on what Witty means when he speaks of use: to know how to 'use' a gesture, is to know what kind of things it points out. The same holds, mutandis mutatis, for the use of words:

§31 "We may say: it only makes sense for someone to ask what something is called if he already knows how to make use of the name" (my emphasis)

This is the second important thing: the connection to sense. The idea is that ostension can only make sense when understood as picking out a kind of thing; contrapositively, ostension is senseless without an understanding of the kind of thing it is pointing out. This is one reason why the question: 'it is possible or not to learn language only through ostension?' is so wrong-headed: there is no such thing as 'only though ostension': either ostension is constitutively coupled with an understanding of kinds, or it no longer even makes sense to call something an ostensive act.

Sense, use, kinds. These concepts and the articulation between them can be said to be the themes that preside over these sections - if not the whole of the PI to come.

which in turn leads, once again, to the importance of kinds. In order for ostension to 'work', one must understand what kind of thing is being pointed out by means of ostension. — StreetlightX

I didn't get there yet (I think I only went through 25 above), but I don't agree that ostensive language-learning would involve anything like "correctly identifying kinds." Ostensive language-learning works via the learner simply assigning some mental association between what they take to be pointed to and the word in question. The learner will make adjustments to what they took to be pointed to in light of further behavior--including additional ostension. (And we could limit it to additional ostension.)

Ostensive language-learning works via the learner simply assigning some mental association between what they take to be pointed to and the word in question. — Terrapin Station

So tokens, rather than kinds, in your opinion? Or rather, singular, non-general(izable) things?

So tokens, rather than kinds, in your opinion? Or rather, singular, non-general(izable) things? — StreetlightX

First, I'm not saying that ostensive learning of language would amount to "correctly identifying" anything.

The learner might think about what's being ostensively presented in terms of kinds, or tokens, or non-generalizable particulars, or anything imaginable. That's just the point. How the learner interprets it is variable. And learners will typically make changes in how they interpret it as they gain new ostensive demonstrations, other new experiences, or think about it further, etc.

Do you believe that Augustine would have said that learning implies being given something wholesale where the person receiving what was learned is entirely passive in the process? — Terrapin Station

No, I believe that Wittgenstein most likely misrepresents Augustine's position, creating a straw man, though I haven't checked the context of that passage. It is a useful straw man though because many people believe that ostensive definition is the foundation of language, and Wittgenstein demonstrates that this is very likely not the case, as there are other elements required which could be more fundamental than ostension.

Notice that in the quoted passage from Augustine, he refers to the intention of the teachers, and that after he learns words, he can express his desires. What Augustine is missing here, and what leaves him open to Wittgenstein's attack, is the desire of the student to learn. This is the other half of the ostensive definition, the other thing required, as we have been discussing, which leaves ostension itself insufficient. One must have the desire to learn, as this is what inspires the student to engage in those necessary activities we discussed.

You'll see, following StreetlightX's analysis, that the learner's half of the ostensive equation, this desire to learn, manifests for Wittgenstein, as the capacity to differentiate kinds. But there is another whole side to this, which is the capacity to distinguish individuals. So we could use Wittgenstein's own analogy against his own position. The capacity to differentiate kinds is only a part of what one needs to know for ostensive learning, just like board games are only a part of what "games" are. Ultimately, I believe any such description needs to be replaced by the more appropriate "desire to know".

That's conflating the notion of knowing something with the idea of learning a language. — Terrapin Station

Don't you think that this is a valid conflation? To "know" something as commonly defined in epistemology requires language. If it is the case that it is required that we know something, in order to learn a language, then the common epistemological definition of "know" is incorrect and misleading.

No, I believe that Wittgenstein most likely misrepresents Augustine's position . . . — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that Augustine wouldn't say that learning implies being given something wholesale where the person receiving what was learned is entirely passive in the process. But also it would be odd if Wittgenstein thought that Augustine was saying that. As I mentioned, some people seem to talk about learning/teaching as if they see it as being given something wholesale where the person receiving what was learned is entirely passive in the process, but it strikes me as a weird (and kind of Aspieish) misunderstanding of what most folks have in mind with "learning"/"teaching".

Don't you think that this is a valid conflation? — Metaphysician Undercover

Haha. No, i wouldn't say that any conflation is valid. I don't see knowledge as requiring language, even if we're talking about propositional knowledge.

First, I'm not saying that ostensive learning of language would amount to "correctly identifying" anything. — Terrapin Station

The phrase "correctly identifying" has not so far been used by either me or the passages we're up to in the PI, so I'm not sure what you're responding to here, or why it's in quotes. As for this:

The learner might think about what's being ostensively presented in terms of kinds, or tokens, or non-generalizable particulars, or anything imaginable. That's just the point. — Terrapin Station

The problem is that ostension, by definition, is always demonstrative, and demonstratives are always of something. Pointing to 'this' is always demonstrative of something (else): X is an instance of [a color/shape/texture/size/etc]. It is demonstrative even if it simply is 'the thing I am talking about' (*point* "that is what I am talking about"; which can be read: "the role occupied by what I am talking about is that"). One would not be pointing otherwise. In other words, ostension is by definition inseparable from generality, regardless of what is 'imagined' (of what is 'thought about'). Witty even refers to the difference in kind between the grammar of imagination and meaning in the boxed note of §35, noting in particular that "It is only in a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the grammar of “to mean” does not resemble that of the expression “to imagine” and the like" (my emphasis).

[As a curious historical note, Hegel famously begins the Phenomenology by making this exact same point: that terms like 'this' and that' can only ever capture generality, and never singularity, as a matter of principle (although he draws somewhat different conclusions: "It is as a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is. What we say is: 'This', i.e. the universal This; or, 'it is', i.e. Being in general. Of course, we do not envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say. ... The same will be the case with the other form of the 'This', with 'Here'. ' Here' is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'. 'Here' itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the 'This' shows itself to be a mediated simplicity, or a universality." (Phenomenolgoy of Spirit, emphasis in original).