and this is strongly rigid. — Wallows

A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.(p.48)

Hey?

Neither Nixon nor the 37th president are necessarily existent - neither must exist in every possible world.

Let's go back to a few basics.

Something is essential if it exists or is true in every possible world.

Something is possible if it exists in at least some possible world.

Something is impossible if it cannot exist in any possible world.


Any disagreement?

Neither Nixon nor the 37th president are necessarily existent - neither must exist in every possible world. — Banno

OK, then I seem to be lost here.

Any disagreement? — Banno

Nope, makes perfect sense.

I think one of the aims here is that Kripke is forcing a wedge between proper names and any associated descriptions. But in attempting to understand the essence of something as related to a description - actual or necessary - runs up against this.

It is good to be confused, because Kripke is pointing to a bunch of confusions around the way we talk about modality.

The remainder of the book is his (start of a) solution.

Does Kripke talk about facts? Facts are nice and simple.

Something is essential if it exists or is true in every possible world. — Banno

Or every possible world we're examining. Say for Wallows, a tree in his front yard wouldn't be that tree unless it was oak.

We won't look at possible worlds where it's anything but oak. Oak is essential in that sense.

Is that right

Or every possible world we're examining. — frank

No. In every possible world.

Keep the bishop on the diagonals, Frank.

Is it a fact that someone else might have been president 37?

Is it a fact that someone else might have been president 37? — Banno

It's a fact that Nixon was the 37'th president of the US in our world. Does Kripke limit the scope of facthood to only our possible world? Isn't it a fact that water is H20 in every possible world?

It's a fact that Nixon was the 37'th president of the US in our world. — Wallows

But it's also a fact that he might not have been.

Does Kripke limit the scope of facthood to only our possible world? — Wallows

No - he takes the first order logic of facts and finds a way to use it to discuss possibility and necessity.

Isn't it a fact that water is H20 in every possible world? — Wallows

Let's see what he says later in the book. He hints at his answer around p. 52-53, talking about whether the parts of an individual are essential. But work needs to be done in order to see his answer. All he does at this stage is lave it as an open question:

Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object
by questions about its parts, we need not do so.

And after having gone over this again, we are back to the Metre Stick.

Do we move on to that again, or is there more here that needs settling?

Thanks for helping us out @Banno.

...the way we determine how long any stick is, is by holding it up agains S. We measure against S, and refer to that experience to determine the length of the new stick. That is, we use an a posteriori test.

But we can't do that in the case of S.

So our knowledge that S is one metre long is not a posteriori.

Hence, it is a priori.

And yet, S, that stick, might have been another length. It's length is contingent.

And the conclusion: that S is 1 metre long is an a priori, contingent truth. — Banno

A note about Kripke and essentialism:

According to a less extreme and correspondingly more popular form of essentialism, origin essentialism, an object could not have had a radically different origin than it in fact had. The view that a particular table could not have been originally made from completely different material than the material from which it was actually originally made and the view that a person could not have originated from a different sperm and egg than those from which he or she actually originated are both forms of origin essentialism. Origin essentialism has been defended by Kripke (1972/1980) — SEP on essentialism

Kripke imagines that when we use a rigid designator X, we zero in on the possible worlds in which X exists (with some exceptions.) So if Wallows is discussing the diseases which could have afflicted that oak tree, then Kripke would have no problem accepting that oakness is essential to the object Wallow is talking about.

Kripke imagines that when we use a rigid designator X, we zero in on the possible worlds in which X exists — frank

No; we specify them, we do not zero in.

Again, you choose to speak as if there were a kingdom of Possible Worlds, from which we might choose this one or that one. That's not how, at least for Kripke, it works. He sets out quite clearly that possible worlds come about as a result of our stipulations:

Generally, things aren't 'found out' about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated

__________________________

So if Wallows is discussing the diseases which could have afflicted that oak tree, then Kripke would have no problem accepting that oakness is essential to the object Wallow is talking about. — frank

This way of speaking is not so much wrong, as twisted. So:

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

Hence we ought insist that it is possible that the tree before us were not an oak.

SO perhaps at some point in reaching a diagnosis one might reconsider that the tree before us is indeed an oak. Perhaps the reason it is so difficult to diagnose is because it is a Dutch Elm.

I think one of the aims here is that Kripke is forcing a wedge between proper names and any associated descriptions. But in attempting to understand the essence of something as related to a description - actual or necessary - runs up against this.

It is good to be confused, because Kripke is pointing to a bunch of confusions around the way we talk about modality.

The remainder of the book is his (start of a) solution. — Banno

Since studying Naming and Necessity as part of an undergraduate course (so, obviously not an in-depth study) the problem I have always thought to be inherent in Kripke's notion of rigid designation is this: How do we know (apart from, and in the absence of, present ostention) who or what a name rigidly designates unless we rely on some (at least minimal) definite description to determine it?

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

Hence we ought insist that it is possible that the tree before us were not an oak. — Banno

Not if we know it's an oak tree and we're discussing what could have been in regard to "that oak tree."

I'm afraid I'm going to have to take your chess instructor's license.

Welcome.

So is the suggestion that, ostentation aside, some sort of definite description is needed for a name to pick out its referent?

So it would seem. If Kripke wants to say that names are not definite descriptions, well I think that much is trivially obvious; my name clearly says nothing about me at all, so it cannot by itself constitute a definite description.

But if he wants to say that names as rigid designators are somehow independent of definite descriptions, that they do not, so to speak, rely on definite descriptions in order to do their job of rigidly designating, well, that just seems, on the face of it, to be obviously false.

So in a 'possible world' scenario, how much information (definite description?) would be needed to establish that it is a counter-factually conditioned Banno that we are referring to, for example?

The rigid designator is the person's DNA :D

So it would seem. If Kripke wants to say that names are not definite descriptions, well I think that much is trivially obvious; my name clearly says nothing about me at all, so it cannot by itself constitute a definite description. — Janus

It seems from what we have read that you are right here.

But if he wants to say that names as rigid designators are somehow independent of definite descriptions, that they do not, so to speak, rely on definite descriptions in order to do their job of rigidly designating, well, that just seems, on the face of it, to be obviously false. — Janus

So what are we to make of the Donnellan examples, p.25 & n.? It is apparent that a discussion about a given individual can take place, with reasonable success, in the case where the definite description used to pick out the individual has failed, as per champaign man; and even where the description would have picked out the wrong individual.

And it is simple to make these cases modal: "The man over there drinking champaign seems happy, but might possibly not be", when the man we are discussion has water in his glass, while another man over there, who we are not discussing, does indeed have Champaign.

Of course there are many ways referring can succeed, or fail. @unenlightened is useful for pointing out such cases, and how the vagaries of language lead astray those who would lay down firm rules.

Which considerations, amongst others, lead me to reject the idea that the only way to ensure that a name refers is to attach it to a definite description.

So in a 'possible world' scenario, how much information (definite description?) would be needed to establish that it is a counter-factually conditioned Banno that we are referring to, for example? — Janus

None.

Firstly, Banno is a rigid designator. I am Banno in all possible worlds in which Banno exists.

Secondly, supposing that some amount of information, beyond the rigid designator, is needed to ensure you are talking about Banno is to fail to see what possible worlds are. Again, they are stipulated, not found.

DNA

SO you insist I respond. I wasn't going to bother.

Is your point of significance? If so, set it forth.

Because your thought remains opaque.

Kripke was into scientific essentialism so I would suppose that something like your unique DNA fingerprint would be considered a candidate for a rigid designator.

And it is simple to make these cases modal: "The man over there drinking champaign seems happy, but might possibly not be", when the man we are discussion has water in his glass, while another man over there, who we are not discussing, does indeed have Champaign. — Banno

Ah, but in that case we are relying on ostention, not on whether the man is drinking champagne. You thought the man is drinking champagne, but it turns out he is not. Which man? That man over there (pointing).

None.

Firstly, Banno is a rigid designator. I am Banno in all possible worlds in which Banno exists.

Secondly, supposing that some amount of information, beyond the rigid designator, is needed to ensure you are talking about Banno is to fail to see what possible worlds are. Again, they are stipulated, not found. — Banno

OK, you can stipulate that you are Banno in all possible worlds in which you exist. But how am I to know who Banno is in the first place absent some definite description unless you are already known to me face to face? You might say I know you as the Banno who posts on this forum, but that is a definite description. For all I know you might be a bot.

So, I say it is impossible even to stipulate that you are talking about some particular Banno (out of all the Bannos in the world) without some means of fixing the stipulation (which, again, would involve either ostention or specification [description]). I can't see any way around that.

Kripke was into scientific essentialism — schopenhauer1

How do you know that?

Ah, but in that case we are relying on ostention, not on whether the man is drinking champagne. You thought the man is drinking champagne, but it turns out he is not. Which man? That man over there (pointing). — Janus

But there was another man over there who was drinking champaign. So no, it does not rely on the "over there".

But how am I to know who Banno is in the first place absent some definite description unless you are already known to me face to face? — Janus

By stipulation. Banno might have red hair. I don't, but I might have.

You see, you already know who I am, without a definite description.

A child could not give a definite description of their friend, mark; and yet can say "what if mark is at the shops?"

SO, on examination, it simply is not true that a definite description is what is needed to set the referent for a name.