And knowledge-wise, what prohibits us from knowing necessary connection? A billard ball hits another at a particular velocity, etc., and the struck ball reacts with another particular velocity. The difference between knowing that that is a "regularity" and a "necessary connection" is? — Terrapin Station
Can you give an example of something that is metaphysically necessary? Something that 'must' be the case in all possible worlds? Or something that absolutely could not be the case? — Jamesk
The reason why Aristotelian dualism is more advanced, and therefore more appealing, than Cartesian dualism is that it divides reality between the more evident categories of actual and potential, active and passive, or being and becoming, rather than mind and matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
For causation to be necessary connection then when A happens B must also happen. When your first ball hits the second one, the second one must move and there is no proof of this being the case. — Jamesk
Aristotle's conception
Aristotle gives his most substantial account of the passive intellect (nous pathetikos) in De Anima (On the Soul), Book III, chapter 4. In Aristotle's philosophy of mind, the passive intellect "is what it is by becoming all things."[1] By this Aristotle means that the passive intellect can potentially become anything by receiving that thing's intelligible form. The active intellect (nous poietikos) is then required to illuminate the passive intellect to make the potential knowledge into knowledge in act, in the same way that light makes potential colors into actual colors. The analysis of this distinction is very brief, which has led to dispute as to what it means.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passive_intellect
Natures as inner principles of change and rest are contrasted with active powers or potentialities (dunameis), which are external principles of change and being at rest (Metaphysics 9.8, 1049b5–10), operative on the corresponding internal passive capacities or potentialities (dunameis again, Metaphysics 9.1, 1046a11–13). When a change, or a state of rest, is not natural, both the active and the passive potentiality need to be specified. Natures, then, in a way do double duty: once a nature is operative, neither a further active, nor a further passive capacity needs to be invoked. Even so, as will be clear from Aristotle’s discussion, this general thesis will require a host of qualifications.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/
So we're saying, without proof, that maybe it could be otherwise--maybe when A happens, B wouldn't have to happen, right? — Terrapin Station
I can agree that "substance" itself is a questionable term.First, we shouldn't assume that there is a "primary substance." Among other things, that (exact term) is linked to ideas that are pretty incoherent a la the Aristotelianism that some folks are seduced by around here.
If we're contrasting idealism with materialism, we're implying that idealism is positing stuff that isn't material. So obviously the difference would be that we're talking about material/physical stuff in the one case, and we're talking about immaterial/nonphysical stuff in the other case.
I've yet to encounter a notion of nonphysical stuff that's coherent, so I can't tell you much about what the properties of nonphysical stuff are supposed to be or how nonphysical stuff is supposed to function, but people who aren't physicalists assure me that they're not (just) positing physical stuff, they're positing something else (in addition if not instead) that's different than physical stuff.
We actually should be better cleaving terms like idealism, materialism, realism, etc., by the way, and specifying the historical contexts we're focusing on, since the conventional connotations of those terms have shifted over the years. — Terrapin Station
Exactly! Does this not imply that process is the "primary substance" (monism) and that matter and mind are simply different types of processes? Matter and mind are simply different arrangements of the "primary substance". "Process" and "information" are two terms I find useful in referring to that constant I just wrote about."Both mind and matter are processes" doesn't imply dualism. — Terrapin Station
I don't understand. Your mind is composed of your sensory representations. What is your mind without them? Ideas, knowledge, beliefs, language - all are composed of sensory representations. What use is a mind without senses? Starfish and jellyfish seem to have senses without mind (no central nervous system). Can mind exist without senses?I notice this, but that's something apprehended by my mind, not my senses. — Metaphysician Undercover
Everything you experience is in the past. Your mind is in the past. Your mind is always a process of memory (working memory). I think your notion of "mind" is incorrect and incoherent and is what is leading to your misunderstanding.I really don't think I can sense a similarity, because that requires an act of comparison, which is a mental activity. In your example there is a comparison with a prior time, and that requires memory. A difference on the other hand, is a relation between two things, so the difference itself, being a relation, is only one thing, and doesn't require a mental comparison to be perceived. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you can conceive it then it must be possible — Jamesk
I don't at all agree with that. What would be the support of it? — Terrapin Station
I meant metaphysically possible. That means possible in at least one possible world. I am not saying that I agree with this or the use of possible worlds for thought experiments. But in philosophy for some thing to be metaphysically necessary it must be so in all possible worlds. Seeing as we can only imagine these other worlds all we have as a tool is our conceptions. — Jamesk
I don't understand. Your mind is composed of your sensory representations. What is your mind without them? Ideas, knowledge, beliefs, language - all are composed of sensory representations. What use is a mind without senses? Starfish and jellyfish seem to have senses without mind (no central nervous system). Can mind exist without senses? — Harry Hindu
Everything you experience is in the past. Your mind is in the past. Your mind is always a process of memory (working memory). I think your notion of "mind" is incorrect and incoherent and is what is leading to your misunderstanding. — Harry Hindu
Like I said I also find it problematic. Can we move back to the original question? Assuming that neither of us can prove or disprove the others theory, which one does the job better? Belief in physics or belief in an ever active God? — Jamesk
Sensory representations" is only a part of what's in the mind. There are also memories and anticipations. I agree that it doesn't make sense to talk about a mind existing without senses, but it also doesn't make sense to say that a "mind is composed of sensory representations". — Metaphysician Undercover
As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images (such as a visual mental image of what your mother looks like, an auditory mental image of what your favorite song sounds like, a gustatory mental image of what pizza tastes like, and so forth); and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body (such as a visual experience of the computer in front of you, the auditory experience of the cars passing by on the street outside your window, the awareness you have of the position of your legs, etc.). — Edward Feser
And the other, crucial, ingredient, is reason. — Wayfarer
If it doesn't matter what we call the primary substance, then why the debate for the past 1000 years? — Harry Hindu
It seems to me that the debate stems from our preliminary assumption of dualism and is solved through the realization of monism. — Harry Hindu
I've yet to encounter a notion of nonphysical stuff that's coherent, so I can't tell you much about what the properties of nonphysical stuff are supposed to be or how nonphysical stuff is supposed to function, but people who aren't physicalists assure me that they're not (just) positing physical stuff, they're positing something else (in addition if not instead) that's different than physical stuff. — Terrapin Station
So such a notion is coherent, insofar as it is logically possible and imaginable. — Janus
People may be divided into two primary groups; those who have (or allow themselves to have) such feelings, imaginations and intuitions and those who don't. ... It's all pretty subjective really! — Janus
I think mind or spirit is usually imagined (to reverse Peirce's metaphor) as a kind of effete matter, an attenuated ineffectual matter that, because it is not governed by physical laws, cannot have physical effects. — Janus
I wouldn't expect to "find it" anywhere. — Janus
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