In the second quote he's complaining about the problems that arise from using descriptions. What seems to be contingent will turn out to be necessary.

In the second quote he's going to explain how that confusion can be resolved. — frank

He argues in favor of the first quote. He argues in favor of the second quote. The result is obvious self-contradiction unless there is a distinction to be drawn and maintained between objects and particulars.

Particulars are stipulated?

Yup. That must be the case...

If we rely entirely on definite descriptions for identity, we'll end up with an actualist's account: all known properties of an object are necessary.

This would mean all statements about alternate possibilities are false. Most statements of that sort aren't aiming to say something about the nature of the universe, though. Often they're just about logical possibility.

Kripke talks about rigid designators as a way to capture more clearly what we mean by such speech. It's not a philosophical device. He's only using jargon for something that didn't previously have a name.

So in your first quote, he's venturing away from total reliance on descriptions. He doesn't leave description behind entirely and doesn't leave us with a very clear idea where we should draw the line.

If... all known properties of an object are necessary.

This would mean all statements about alternate possibilities are false. — frank

Unsure how this addresses my last post. Nonetheless, it makes no sense to me.



If all known properties of an object are necessary, it would mean that all statements about alternative properties are about that which is not... necessary.

Most statements of that sort(possible worlds) aren't aiming to say something about the nature of the universe, though. Often they're just about logical possibility. — frank

I agree. What follows below is a bit off topic, my own take on a few things, and disagrees sharply with the convention grounding Kripke's thoughts in a few ways...

It is worth mention that possible world scenarios can consist of true statements. What makes these statements true matters. I'll say more about that momentarily...

In order to be logically possible, a statement must follow the rules of correct inference. Conclusions are statements that follow the rules of correct inference. Logically possible statements are conclusions that follow the rules of correct inference. Valid conclusions are logically possible.

True statements are existentially dependent upon truth. Some logically possible statements are false. Some logically possible statements are true. Therefore, logical possibility alone is insufficient for truth.

...

Kripke talks about rigid designators as a way to capture more clearly what we mean by such speech. It's not a philosophical device. He's only using jargon for something that didn't previously have a name.

So in your first quote, he's venturing away from total reliance on descriptions. He doesn't leave description behind entirely and doesn't leave us with a very clear idea where we should draw the line. — frank

Okay.

So, Kripke is summarizing what's going on when we talk about possible worlds. He's noting(and naming) the different kinds of designators as a means for pointing out some things that had not been pointed out in past. He ventures away from total reliance upon definite descriptions. I think I agree with him on that much...

If it is the case that we cannot stipulate particulars(at least some alternative circumstances), then there can be no possible worlds talk at all, for it is the particular alternative circumstances that make them what they are. Those are stipulated.

Clearly, as skirted around above, the identity of the object in question is not always dependent upon definite descriptions. However, it seems impossible to not use the same name. So, possible world talk happens. We all make some sense of it. Clearly this is because we do no entirely depend upon definite descriptions as a means of identifying the object we're talking about. However, we always use the same name...

Is that about right, on your understanding?

Sounds right to me.

So...

What is your take on what's most important for the reader to firmly grasp in lecture one? I'm almost certain that I'm missing something somewhere along the line...

That an identity is more than just some ideas about what a name means.

Your knowledge of identity comes from your involvement with a community that calls a particular by a certain name.

Your knowledge of identity comes from your involvement with a community that calls a particular by a certain name. — frank

Hmmm... "a particular"?

Particulars are stipulated though, right? Objects are named. Otherwise, the aforementioned self-contradiction...

You know Nixon in the actual world a posteriori. And it's true that we know him by his story. — frank

I wonder, could someone still use the name "Nixon", despite not knowing anything about him?

It just seems to me that if someone overheard you using the name "Nixon", and so came to ask "WhHo is Nixon?", that their question is about Nixon.

For me the question would be as to how alternative the story could be without Nixon ceasing to be Nixon. — Janus

SO let's have a look:

Suppose Nixon had had grey eyes. No problem? So the sentence "Suppose Nixon had had grey eyes" is about Nixon.

Suppose Nixon had not been elected President. Quite a few more things would have to change; someone else would have presumably been elected, and so on. But again, the sentence "Suppose Nixon had not been elected" is about Nixon.

Suppose Nixon had been a Woman. Again, quite a few other things might have to change in our freshly constructed possible world. What things? Whatever we like. After all it is our world. And again, the sentence "Suppose Nixon had been a woman" is about Nixon.

Suppose Nixon had been a golf ball. Now we are definitely pushing it. It seems difficult, impossible, even, to picture this possible world in any sort of coherent way.

But again, what is the sentence "Suppose Nixon had been a golf ball" about? It's about Nixon.

SO we might sit with the view that even were Nixon a golf ball, Nixon would be Nixon. Perhaps it's the conjuring of such an absurd possible world that is failing here, not the reference to Nixon.

Only proper names are rigid designators.

Indeed he was.

Not too shabby. I'm impressed by your brevity.

I don't see an argument pushing in this direction in the first lecture.

Are you jumping ahead?

don't see an argument pushing in this direction in the first lecture.

Are you jumping ahead? — Banno

I said:

That an identity is more than just some ideas about what a name means.

Your knowledge of identity comes from your involvement with a community that calls a particular by a certain name. — frank

His demonstrates the first sentence by pointing to aspects of the second.

Particulars are stipulated though, right? Objects are named. Otherwise, the aforementioned self-contradiction... — creativesoul

You are a particular human. Is that a stipulation in your view?

It just seems to me that if someone overheard you using the name "Nixon", and so came to ask "Who is Nixon?", that their question is about Nixon. — Banno

How do they know it's a "who" and not a "what"?

OK; "What is Nixon?"

Still about Nixon.

if they think it's a "what", then they're asking me how to use the word.

SO they are asking you how to use the word "Nixon". Ok, what is your answer?

Former president.

So... Their question was about Nixon.

Is "Nixon" the same thing as Nixon?

One is a word, the other a person.

Suppose they do know Nixon is a person. That is not a definite description. Thay ask "Who is Nixon?"; isn't their question about Nixon?

So a question about "Nixon" is not a question about Nixon.

They have to have some idea who Nixon is to ask a question about him.

They have to have some idea who Nixon is to ask a question about him. — frank

Perhaps; but they refer to Nixon without the benefit of a definite description, in order to ask who Nixon is.