What things are in a positive sense is always given in tangible terms; in terms of what the senses can grasp. So, it is no surprise that the idea of the non-physical cannot be given is such terms; if it could it would not be an idea of a non-physical thing. — Janus

So that's a big part of why it's incoherent. If we can't say anything about what a thing is, then it's hopelessly vague.

A non-physical thing might be everywhere or not, — Janus

So that really pins it down. lol

So that's a big part of why it's incoherent. If we can't say anything about what a thing is, then it's hopelessly vague.

A non-physical thing might be everywhere or not, — Janus


So that really pins it down. lol — Terrapin Station

A non-physical thing, for example an individual soul, would not be everywhere; whereas as an infinitely great non-physical thing, for example God, would be. I don't personally believe in God or individual souls, but I can see that the ideas are not incoherent, even though they must necessarily be vague.

To say something is vague is not the same as to say it is incoherent; but you don't want to acknowledge that, obviously. You acknowledge that it is only your opinion that such notions are incoherent; and that it is so on account of the fact that they are incoherent to you.

It should be no surprise then that you will not be convinced that they could be coherent for others, even though your subjectivist position demands that you acknowledge that they could be. So, I guess you'll never know.

Anyway, I've said what I have to say about it, so I won't repeat myself.

Of course all present memories have been laid down in the past and future memories may be laid down in the present or in the future. The present very quickly becomes the past. All this is obvious.
The distinction between a memory which is of the past and one which is not is a perfectly valid one, and you have provided no argument to convince me otherwise. (Crying "Shame on you" is not an argument). — Janus

This is all irrelevant to the point I was making to Harry, which was that memories are of things past, and anticipation is of things future. Harry wanted to deny this distinction saying that some memories are not of things past. It appeared like you were supporting Harry's claim that not all memories are of the past, with the division you were making, and your claim that some memories are only "trivially" of the past.

So, the fact that we can classify memories into all different sorts, all of them of the past, is irrelevant to the point I was making. Why bring it up?

I don't have any idea what "validating with reference to something physical" would even be referring to. — Terrapin Station

identity theory says the physical and the semantic are identical. Otherwise, what is identical to what?

It appeared like you were supporting Harry's claim that not all memories are of the past, with the division you were making, and your claim that some memories are only "trivially" of the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was supporting Harry's claim that not all memories are of the past. I wasn't, however, claiming that any memories are "trivially of the past", but rather that it is trivially true that all present memories have been acquired in the past, and that this does not entail that all memories are of the past.

The terminology used was "about the past", not "of the past". and I explained to you why all such memories are "about" the past here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/233608

Of course, if you now want to use "of the past", it makes little difference. "Of" means from, so if it's trivially true that all memories have been acquired in the past, then it is also trivially true that they are "of the past".

Sure, accuse me of "empty word play" again, but you are the one going around in circles, changing your terms attempting to find a way to deny the truth of what is obvious.

You said “constantly”, not me. — apokrisis

That's because if something isn't constantly changing/becoming, then they stop changing. There are no more change of thoughts, movement, etc. In other words, it ceases to exist. Your actuality (what it finally becomes) would actually be nothingness (non-existence).

Things that change, exist. Things that don't change, don't exist. In other words, everything that exists, exists in time.

isn't that what this thread is about, that physical vs. non-physical stuff. The point is, that when I consider a form which I remember, I believe that that form had a real physical existence, in the past. But when I consider a form which I anticipate in the future, I believe that this form does not have any real physical existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're confusing your forms (your sensory symbols) with what they represent. Your forms are neither physical nor non-physical. My point in this thread is that the non-physical vs. physical dichotomy is false. I've been explaining myself without using those terms. You should try it. Just talk about forms, not whether or not they are physical or not. You're making things more complicated than they need to be.

Your mother takes the same form in your memories of the past and in your predictions of the future, or else how could you say that you are remembering your mother, or predicting what your mother will do? You recognize your mother by the consistent forms you have for her (her appearance, her voice, her warm touch, her smell, etc.).

So I need a separation in my mind, a distinction between these two types of forms, the ones that I believe are directly related to physical existence, as having actual existence, and the ones that I believe are not directly related to physical existence, as having possible existence. The former are forms of actual things, and the latter are forms of possible things. — Metaphysician Undercover

The distinction comes in the action of recalling vs. not recalling. I know the difference between past and future, because I recall the past, not the future. The past is familiar. The future isn't. That is the distinction.

I don't see how that's possible. I, as a being with choice, am capable of influencing what occurs in the future. Therefore to the extend of my powers I will make sure that what occurs is good. However, due to things beyond my control bad things will happen. Bad things and good things will happen, therefore it is impossible that the future is neutral. — Metaphysician Undercover

Come on, MU. There are countless events occurring right now that have no bearing on your happiness or suffering. Get over yourself.

This is wrong. Reasoning is thinking. Therefore it is you who has things backward, not me. — Metaphysician Undercover

So then when people are unreasonable, they aren't thinking - there aren't any thoughts in their head?

AI has no "senses", therefore it has no sensations, nor sensory information. Information is patterns and AI creates patterns, therefore it creates information. Changes to patterns are a creation or destruction of information. — Metaphysician Undercover

A robot has senses. That is what I was talking about. If it has no senses, then information was programmed into the computer. The program is information. Our senses allow us to reprogram ourselves (learn).

:lol:

Glad to be of service.

Idealism that's not positing non-physical existents? — Terrapin Station

That's a hard question to answer. The non-physical existential claim. Idealism posits a non-material / mind dependency claim. Berkeley does struggle to justify spiritual substance- his equivalent to matter, as well as justifying spirits and God - his version of a substratum. He flip flops towards a position which he support with the same grounds he used to refute Locke's materialist thesis.

In his favour he never denies doing this and even points out hypocrisy just in case you missed it. The grounds he gives however are nowhere near as strong as his argument for refuting matter are.
Because he cannot explain the metaphysics of God any better than Locke can explain the metaphysics of materialism his foundation seems no stronger than Locke's.

I still think that for a true believer in an active God who also seeks scientific explanations for the world then Idealism has a certain appeal. Even for non-believers who are worried about science's unanswered questions it is very interesting.

In other words, it ceases to exist. — Harry Hindu

No. It reaches an equilibrium state where the continuing dynamic change ceases to make a general difference.

You would still call yourself actually you each morning even though, for instance, all your microtubules creating the cytoskeleton of your cells will have fallen apart and rebuilt a few times during the night.

Well, first, don't equate physicalism or materialism with being a Dennettian. Dennett and that ilk (the Churchlands, for example) are often considered eliminative materialists. Not all materialists are eliminative materialists.

I think that consciousness, and all mental phenomena in general, are physical/material, and no, i don't at all think that consciousness, qualia, etc. are an illusion. (Not to mention that the very idea of an illusion obtaining while not involving consciousness is incoherent.)

Re "explanations," are you talking about verbal (or lets say mathematical etc.) accounts of phenomena? — Terrapin Station

I’m taking a step back from your last post to me.

This isn’t so much to convince as it is an attempt to help you understand why physicalism can be incoherent to certain people, myself included.

Matter—hence, physical stuff—is commonly understood to be devoid of agency. By “agency” I intend the term’s commonly understood meaning of “ability to act on one’s own volition”. Metaphysically speaking, agency is neither randomness nor determinism. A billiard ball hit by another is, for example, therefore commonly understood to not have agency in how it behaves; it doesn’t decide where to go on account of its own volition but, instead, acts in deterministic manners. (By comparison, when humans and other animals are hit they will exhibit agency in their behaviors.) Matter, then, is commonly understood to be inanimate at all times—for it is devoid of agency.

If, on the other hand, one ascribes agency to matter, I then fail to see any metaphysical difference between the physicalism thus defined and the metaphysical position of animism—the latter being somewhat similar to panpsychism, an anima mundi, and so forth. But then, tmk, this would no longer be physicalism as it’s universally understood.

To sum up: Since physicalism proposes that everything is matter, and since matter is understood be devoid of agency, physicalism then upholds the complete absence of agency in the universe.

If physicalism is true, then all our awareness of agency—both personal and as it pertains to others—can only be considered an epiphenomenal illusion resulting from agency-devoid matter; more specifically, from agency-devoid brains.

Yet awareness is of itself inextricably converged with what we deem to be agency. It’s why we term living beings animate rather than inanimate—or a living brain animate and a dead brain inanimate.

As some in fact do argue, if everything is agency-devoid matter, then awareness itself can only be an illusion of animate being produced by inanimate matter—and would in truth not actually exist. This is argued not on grounds of what one is aware of but as an entailment of causal reasoning wherein the premise is that no agency can exist.

Top-down causation, after all, is a succinct means of addressing the agency of the whole over its parts. In this case, awareness’s agency over the structures of its brain; e.g., think in a certain way and one’s synapses will simultaneously, and in due measure, strengthen and become reinforced or decay and eventually vanish—this, obviously, within limits. Compliment this with awareness being itself resultant from bottom-up causation of neural interactions resulting in mind, and one does obtain a rough picture of awareness’s identity to its physical “substrata” of brain, for lack of better terms. Yet, because physicalism precludes the presence of agency, this very bottom-up + top-down approach to brain-mind relations would contradict the position of physicalism—for the bottom-up + top-down approach entails the presence of agency, i.e. of animate being, this rather than of strictly inanimate matter.

I venture that most would agree that it is awareness which ascribes truth values to all these conceptualizations and inferences. In other words, it is awareness that deems one conceptualization to be true and another one false. The faculty of so judging what is true and what is false being itself entwined with the agency of awareness.

Now, if the presence of awareness is an epistemic certainty, and if awareness entails agency (which—while intuitively true—is not that easy to philosophically evidence), this to me indicates that physicalism as just addressed is an erroneous conceptualization of reality.

So the issue here is not one of whether or not the earth beneath our feet is solid/material/physical on account of us perceiving it to so be, but one of how agency (or at least the illusion of agency) can come about if everything were to be agency-devoid matter, this as physicalism upholds.

Otherwise, without the presence of agency, one is for example left with the reality that all animate beings are actually inanimate.

I didn't say "You can't find an idea in a brain" though. You can find an idea in a brain, but from a third person perspective, it's not going to be the same as it is from a first-person perspective. — Terrapin Station

This difference is why theories of perception and understanding ever appeared. However much it can or cannot be said that things ultimately are one kind of thing or another, the ontology is only helpful as a way to understand the difference. Making it all physical is interesting but will that lead to a theory where the difference between first and third person is illuminated? To say nothing about that tricky second person.

Berkeley does provide an instrumentally better theory, if you are referring to defeating skepticism, as he recognizes and fixes a major issue with Locke’s theory. The difference between Berkeley and Locke’s theories are their views on primary and secondary qualities. Locke’s theory includes a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, as he asserted that primary qualities were mind-independent, and that secondary qualities were mind-dependent. Berkeley disagrees with Locke’s distinction, and asserts that both primary and secondary qualities are mind-dependent for several reasons. The first being that just as secondary qualities vary according to the state of the viewer’s senses, Berkeley states that so can primary qualities. Color, a secondary quality, can be said to differ depending upon the circumstances in which it is being looked at, for example if you put a white bed under a green beam, then the bed would appear green instead of the white that it would be seen as in other scenarios. In this same way, Berkeley gives the example of a primary quality, extension, and how it can vary depending upon the vantage point of the person who is observing it. If one is very far away, that person would consider the item as looking very small, whereas if the same person was closer to the object, they would state the opposite about the item.
Another reason that Berkeley gives for disagreeing with Locke is that the two classes of qualities, primary and secondary, are intertwined and cannot be separated. Berkeley (1710) puts this claim well saying, “In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.” (p.14) One could not imagine a colorless strawberry or feel a textureless banana, therefore, to assert that primary qualities such as extension, solidity, and number could exist externally without secondary qualities also being present are preposterous in Berkeley’s opinion. Berkeley designates both primary and secondary qualities as ideas, and asserts that ideas can only be like other ideas, that is only existing in the mind and not externally. Through this new classification of primary qualities, Berkeley fixes Locke’s logical discrepancy and presents an instrumentally better theory than Locke.
Berkeley’s view originates from the same empiricism that Locke’s does, but he does not rely on the same arguments he uses to refute Locke. Locke’s view is affected by these worries due to his inaction in taking his arguments to their furthest claims. Locke embraced empiricism, which is the theory that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience, yet Locke still thought of external objects as something whose existence could be known. The problem with this view, that Berkeley goes after, is that, if you cannot use any of the five human senses to detect matter, as those are mind-dependent secondary qualities, and you cannot use primary qualities to detect material objects, as Berkeley showed that those are also mind-dependent, then why would an empiricist believe anything exists? Considering that in the empiricist view the only way they believe knowledge is derived is through their senses, if they cannot obtain any sense-data about external objects, then they have no viable reasons to believe in these objects’ existence.
Berkeley’s attack on abstract objects does put a lot of pressure on materialism, as materialism relies heavily on human’s ability of abstraction and the stipulation that material objects are mind-independent. These are both claims that Berkeley attacks heavily. Though I will concede that Berkeley offers some persuasive arguments against materialism, I would claim that an exploration of the objections to idealism leads to the conclusion that Berkeley’s attack on materialism is not enough to utterly undermine it. Berkeley’s views as a whole overcomes Locke’s, but Berkeley’s overall argument faces powerful issues such as allusions to solipsism, his failure to show that objects are mental because they are known, and his misconception of the contradiction of perceived unperceived items are all major concerns for his argument as whole. Due to all of these issues I would claim that Berkeley’s argument is not sound and therefore does not undermine materialism.

Making it all physical is interesting but will that lead to a theory where the difference between first and third person is illuminated? — Valentinus

I don't know, but in my view, the goal isn't to lead to a theory. The goal is to have accurate views about what is. If an accurate view about what is doesn't lead to a theory, but an inaccurate view does, that doesn't make the inaccurate view better.

That's not to deny the utility of instrumentalism. But it doesn't make the instrumental approach better for anything other than making successful predictions or for applications for practical matters, just in case the instrumental approach in question can do this. It's important in those cases not to reify the instrumental theory, and it's important to not theory worship. Both of those things are big dangers, because there are personality types that are both attracted to instrumental theories and that tend to reify and worship them. (The personality type best suited to being an engineer is one of the prime examples.)

No. It reaches an equilibrium state where the continuing dynamic change ceases to make a general difference. — apokrisis

...a general difference to what?

You would still call yourself actually you each morning even though, for instance, all your microtubules creating the cytoskeleton of your cells will have fallen apart and rebuilt a few times during the night. — apokrisis

You have a "Ship of Theseus" problem there.

Apo, my friend, there are no actualities. Change is the only constant. Change is what allows you to know you exist (I think therefore I am). Thinking is change in your mind. If there were no change, there would be no thinking - no existing.

wonderful post. I wasn't asking whether immaerialism succeeds in undermining materialism though. You say that Berkeley provides an instrumentally better theory but we need to support this statement. The major weakness in Locke is his statement about matter that 'it is something I know not what'.Berkeley is accusing Locke of not being sufficiently empirical in building a theory on something not understood such as matter.

Locke as you rightly point out is afflicted by worries over this problem, Berkeley uses it to trip him up and yet Berkeley has no worries about the metaphysics of spiritual substance and minds. He apparently doesn't need the explain what they are and how they exist, merely what they do.

He argues that our relation to minds and God is more intimate and accessible that it is with matter. We can have notions of these things without ideas of them, but come on George, you do not justify this.

Instrumentalism makes a heavy claim on Okham's razor and for sure to a strong believer God is a simpler theory than materialism, but only if you leave out any metaphysics of God.
Another problem is his reverting back to the Cartesian methods which caused the impasse that Locke was trying to overcome.

Idealism posits a non-material / mind dependency claim. — Jamesk

This essentially equates to solipsism - that mind is all there is, or that mind is really the world. All idealism does is redefine what the world is. Why continue to use the term, "mind"?

You're confusing your forms (your sensory symbols) with what they represent. Your forms are neither physical nor non-physical. My point in this thread is that the non-physical vs. physical dichotomy is false. I've been explaining myself without using those terms. You should try it. Just talk about forms, not whether or not they are physical or not. You're making things more complicated than they need to be. — Harry Hindu

No I'm not confusing these, I simply believe that there are physical forms which I sense. I also believe that the physical vs. non-physical dichotomy is not a good one. That's what I was arguing when you engaged me.

Your mother takes the same form in your memories of the past and in your predictions of the future, or else how could you say that you are remembering your mother, or predicting what your mother will do? You recognize your mother by the consistent forms you have for her (her appearance, her voice, her warm touch, her smell, etc.). — Harry Hindu

This is not true. I'm going to see my mother today, and I think about how she was last time I saw her, and I think about how she will be this time. My mother does not have the same form in my memories and anticipations, because I know she will not be the same. You say that I am over complicating things, but I am not, you are over simplifying. Reality is such that things change. And, they change at the present as time passes. Therefore I must respect this in my thoughts about things like my mother, she will not be the same as the last time I saw her. You, in your desire to simplify things, appear to have no respect for this aspect of reality. Representing a complex reality as simple, is a mistake, it's misunderstanding.

So then when people are unreasonable, they aren't thinking - there aren't any thoughts in their head? — Harry Hindu

"Reasoning is thinking" does not mean that all thinking is reasoning. I hate it when people make ludicrous conclusions from my statements like that, it makes me think that I am talking to an imbecile.

A robot has senses. — Harry Hindu

A robot is not a sentient being, so you are using "sense" in a different way, and arguing by equivocation.

The major weakness in Locke is his statement about matter that 'it is something I know not what' — Jamesk

The whole problem there is the ridiculousness of for some reason taking matter (or substance) to somehow "underlie" things like roof tiles and trees, but to not itself be properties, forms (not in the platonic sense--in the sense of things like shape/extension), etc.

This essentially equates to solipsism - that mind is all there is, or that mind is really the world. All idealism does is redefine what the world is. Why continue to use the term, "mind"? — Harry Hindu

Yeah, that's a very good question, actually. It's not clear why an idealist would parse something like a tree as mind/an idea in the first place rather than just being "a tree" as its own ontic whatever-it-is (which maybe they'd prefer to just leave unanalyzed). It seems like saying that a tree is an idea, is something mental, or anything like that makes a lot of assumptions that would be difficult to support without implying realism.

Yes. Idealism is basically anthropomorphism.

No I'm not confusing these, I simply believe that there are physical forms which I sense. I also believe that the physical vs. non-physical dichotomy is not a good one. That's what I was arguing when you engaged me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then why do you continue to use the terms if they aren't "good"? What do YOU mean by the term, "physical"? I think it would be more useful to me, because it would be easier for me to understand, if you made the distinction between things in your mind as opposed to things outside of your mind when you write your posts. Remember though, that both types of things have causal influences on each other. They interact.

This is not true. I'm going to see my mother today, and I think about how she was last time I saw her, and I think about how she will be this time. My mother does not have the same form in my memories and anticipations, because I know she will not be the same. You say that I am over complicating things, but I am not, you are over simplifying. Reality is such that things change. And, they change at the present as time passes. Therefore I must respect this in my thoughts about things like my mother, she will not be the same as the last time I saw her. You, in your desire to simplify things, appear to have no respect for this aspect of reality. Representing a complex reality as simple, is a mistake, it's misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then how do you know you're thinking about your mother in the past or future, or even seeing her in the near-present? Of course she's not wearing the same clothes and may have her hair different and be wearing different perfume, etc. But there obviously is a constant there, or else you'd never be able to recognize her. That is what I'm talking about. Those constant forms that allow you to recognize things (compare forms for similarities).

"Reasoning is thinking" does not mean that all thinking is reasoning. I hate it when people make ludicrous conclusions from my statements like that, it makes me think that I am talking to an imbecile. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we already came to an agreement here anyway. Information is needed to reason, or think, or else what would you be thinking or reasoning about?

A robot is not a sentient being, so you are using "sense" in a different way, and arguing by equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "sentient"? Are you a direct or an indirect realist?

Sometimes I wonder if it's not kind of a consequence of people who "think too much" in this regard: maybe there are some people who never are simply aware of a tree, say, but instead they always think about it--they think about what it is (including the name "tree"), they think about how they parse the color, the shape, etc. And so on. They never basically have an "empty mind" where they just experience things. If that were the case, then it would make more sense how maybe everything would seem like an idea to those folks, because they can't experience anything without having ideas about it.

If you experience things without having any ideas about them, AND you don't buy the realist picture of there being things in the world that are independent of you, with you being a human body situated in that realist world etc., then it wouldn't make any sense to think of the phenomenally appearing tree that it's an idea, something mental, etc. rather than "just being a tree" (not with the term attached (or any terms), etc.--but I have to type it somehow)

Solipsism is the risk that Descartes also ran, but Berkeley is firm on their being other minds.

The whole problem there is the ridiculousness of for some reason taking matter (or substance) to somehow "underlie" things like roof tiles and trees, but to not itself be properties, forms (not in the platonic sense--in the sense of things like shape/extension), etc — Terrapin Station

In philosophy we need to be amazed by all of our ideas. The vulgar take matter to be properties in its self, as philosophers we want to know why this is the case.

In philosophy we need to be amazed by all of our ideas. — Jamesk

Haha--why would you need to be "amazed" by all of your ideas?

Re "why something is the case," you can never answer that, ultimately, because you just need to ask it for all of your answers, too. You'd just keep pushing the questions back until you give up and say something like "it just is," or "it's a brute fact," etc.

That fact is that it's obviously incoherent and wrong to try to separate matter from form and properties.

Then why do you continue to use the terms if they aren't "good"? What do YOU mean by the term, "physical"? I think it would be more useful to me, because it would be easier for me to understand, if you made the distinction between things in your mind as opposed to things outside of your mind when you write your posts. Remember though, that both types of things have causal influences on each other. They interact. — Harry Hindu

I thought I was making that distinction clear. I think your apparent obfuscation was pretense.

Then how do you know you're thinking about your mother in the past or future, or even seeing her in the near-present? — Harry Hindu

We've been through this, one is memory, the other anticipation. I remember how my mother was, and I anticipate how she will be. Where's the problem? If you have difficulty distinguishing between your memories of something, and your anticipations concerning that thing, then I think you have some serious issues as a human being.

But there obviously is a constant there, or else you'd never be able to recognize her. That is what I'm talking about. Those constant forms that allow you to recognize things (compare forms for similarities). — Harry Hindu

Yes, there is a constant. But the constant is distinct from the memories, and distinct from the anticipations. It appears to have been created within my mind as a means of relating the memories to the anticipations. I don't really understand the constant, do you? To me, it doesn't seem to be a form at all, it's material. That's how I understand matter, under the Aristotelian conception, it's the constant, the thing which does not change. It's not a form though, it's matter.

I think we already came to an agreement here anyway. Information is needed to reason, or think, or else what would you be thinking or reasoning about? — Harry Hindu

Well, I don't think we really agreed. You seem to think that there can be no mind without information. I think that the mind creates information, and can therefore be prior to information, creating its own information.

That fact is that it's obviously incoherent and wrong to try to separate matter from form and properties. — Terrapin Station

That is what Locke proposed, the separation of matter from substratum, primary qualities from secondary and that is what Berkeley objected to.

Science still lacks perfect explanations for form and properties, science itself holds the ridiculous notion that matter is supported by a substratum even today. So your complaint is justified but not only against philosophy.