How much does the Theory of Relativity weigh, and where is it located?

Physical things aren't limited to things you can weigh. You don't think that you can weigh wind, do you? But hopefully you also do not think that wind isn't physical.

It's weird that people have these toddler-caliber understandings of things that they use to frame arguments on, especially when they're otherwise supposed to be working at the apex of intellectualism a la philosophy.

The theory of relativity is located at the brains of the individuals who are thinking about it.

You don't think that you can weigh wind, do you? — Terrapin Station

Of course you can. Wind has velocity, it exerts force, You measure it with a meter. Name me a 'physical thing' which has no location and no mass.

The theory of relativity is located at the brains of the individuals — Terrapin Station

But that's a category error. Such things as numbers, theories, and so on, only exist as ideas. Sure they're represented physically, but the sign is not the same as what is signified. A theory, a number, an idea, the plot for a book, isn't literally 'located in the brain', any more than the characters in movies are 'located inside' the film or television shows 'located inside' television.

's weird that people have these toddler-caliber understandings of things — Terrapin Station

No matter how often it is pointed out to you! :razz:

It does sound incredible, but it is exactly that incredulity that Hylas, the sceptic in his dialogue, brings to Philonious, only to see all his apparently sensible objections refuted. — Wayfarer

Is that really such an impressive feat in light of the consideration that Berkeley was the puppet master pulling all the strings behind the scenes? He wasn't exactly going to refute his own arguments, was he?

It’s a customary practice in philosophy to pose arguments in the form of dialogue between contesting views. The fact of using that technique is not impressive but the detail and rigour of Berkeley’s arguments are, in my view. Especially against those who simply declare that Berkeley ‘must be wrong’.

The notion that there is matter out there being sensed, is just an idea created by the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ha! Classic. How many years have passed by since the old days, and people are still making the same unintentionally hilarious claims. If you're talking about a notion, then yes, it doesn't matter about the particulars, by definition, whatever you're talking about, from matter to meringue pie, it's going to be an idea created by the mind. That's what a notion is, for Pete's sake! :lol:

It’s a customary practice in philosophy to pose arguments in the form of dialogue between contesting views. — Wayfarer

Oh, is it? I did not know that. I thought that Plato was a Pokémon or something.

The fact of using that technique is not impressive but the detail and rigour of Berkeley’s arguments are, in my view. Especially against those who simply declare that Berkeley ‘must be wrong’. — Wayfarer

Although, that Berkeley must be wrong is a good place to start, in my opinion. I mean, he is wrong, after all. And when it comes down to it, being right tops having an impressive argument, at least in my book.

So no doubt you think he was refuted by Samuel Johnson, then.

Some people just don't seem to be able to grasp the obvious. Because it's obvious they dismiss it as if it's irrelevant to any serious discussion about the nature of reality.

So no doubt you think he was refuted by Samuel Johnson, then. — Wayfarer

Actually no, but I do think that his response was not only humorous, but effective on a level that the likes of Berkeley could not have come close to reaching with his philosophy.

Some people just don't seem to be able to grasp the obvious. Because it's obvious they dismiss it as if it's irrelevant to any serious discussion about the nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I quoted of you is both: obvious and irrelevant. And I doubt that many others will have failed to grasp this. Do you disagree? Because it's not much different to saying something like, say, "The feeling of anger is an emotion". You do see the problem, right? We already know that a feeling is an emotion. Statements like that don't do anything. And, what's worse, it misses the point, namely that the aim of the game is to score a goal without cheating, so to speak. If you start by speaking about a notion, then that's cheating, because it's setting yourself up so that you can't possibly lose. But as a result of your cheating, your attempt can be rightly dismissed.

How much does the Theory of Relativity weigh...? — Wayfarer

This is the type of mistake in thinking that dualism causes.

This is like asking what duration is water? You're asking for an improper measurement of a thing.

Measurements are comparisons between like things. Time is a comparison between the movement of a clock's hands, the rotation of the Earth, or the revolution of the Earth around the Sun and some other change. Length is a comparison between a meter stick and some other length.

So how would we measure an idea? By comparing it to other ideas. The Theory of Relativity has held up quite well for a century and has brought about an astounding array of new technology since it's inception. It's impact is enormous compared to other ideas.

How much does the Theory of Relativity weigh...?
— Wayfarer
This is the type of mistake in thinking that dualism causes. — Harry Hindu

In actual fact, it was a slightly tongue-in-cheek response to Terrapin's contention that 'ideas are physical'.

t's impact is enormous compared to other ideas. — Harry Hindu

Of course, but that is not the point at issue.

You are all missing the point (well most of you anyway). Destroying the thesis of materialism is easy. Berkeley just applies a sophisticated form of Cartesian doubt and 'poof' materialism crumbles away. Hume does the same thing afterwards aimed at all forms of knowledge.

The theory that Berkeley replaces materialism with does seem to be 'better' than Descartes at least in instrumental terms. It also competes with Locke's theory and if you accept God then it is also 'better' instrumentally.

The weakness I am trying to expose is Berkeley's reliance on the same 'insufficient empiricism' he accuses Locke of using, Berkeley admits this but says that his 'notions' of minds and God are immediate to us in a way that matter is not.

Is he right?

Is that really such an impressive feat in light of the consideration that Berkeley was the puppet master pulling all the strings behind the scenes? He wasn't exactly going to refute his own arguments, was he? — S

In fact he debates every possible weakness in his argument and overcomes each one (not always satisfactorily). Find one objection to his theory that he hasn't already discussed.
His prose are masterful, only bested by Hume IMO. For much of the dialogues he actually gets Hylas to defend the refutation of matter, it really is a very clever piece of writing.

His prose are masterful, only bested by Hume IMO. For much of the dialogues he actually gets Hylas to defend the refutation of matter, it really is a very clever piece of writing. — Jamesk

My reply to this will be much the same as my reply to Wayfarer. Masterful prose? Perhaps. A very clever piece of writing? May well be. But are the key arguments plausible? No. What's more important? Are you a truth seeker or something akin to an admirer of exotic artifacts?

My reply to this will be much the same as my reply to Wayfarer. Masterful prose? Perhaps. A very clever piece of writing? May well be. But are the key arguments plausible? No. What's more important? Are you a truth seeker or something akin to an admirer of exotic artifacts? — S

His key arguments are as plausible as materialism and just as well supported. That is the problem, he cannot provide better support that materialism has, he basically uses the same support that he demolished in materialism.

Please take some time and actually read his theory and dialogues before engaging in a meaningful discussion about them.

Berkeley admits this but says that his 'notions' of minds and God are immediate to us in a way that matter is not.

Is he right? — Jamesk

Is reality partially made of questions? To that degree, he has a point. Any description or name of the real that forgets the question and its own naming seems forgetful.

A certain vague dualism may dominate all talk to the contrary. We treat people and things differently. We don't feel bad about kicking a rock. We are quite interested at times in how another 'object' sees the world and perhaps questions it in a way that changes the basic project of our life. To me we are 'primarily' in a vast of world of things and others who also see these things and others. If we drop any part of this (however we might slap 'mind' or 'matter' on the rocks we can kick), our own participation in philosophy becomes unintelligible. What are we talking about and who are we talking to? Maybe the rock is a 'piece' of the overlapping or distributed subject, whatever that means, or the manifestation of some non-mind substrate, whatever that means. But we will find ourselves distinguishing between the pieces of the subject that we can talk to and the pieces we can kick, an ontology based on how we can treat and what we want from beings. (The move from rocks through germs and insects and up to mammals in our sympathy looks like a continuum.)

There is a basic problem with Newton's assertion of the independent, absolute existence of matter, force, space and time. Berkeley picks up on this abstraction of ideas that allows such ideas. For these things to have an absolute existence and for us to be able to understand it entails being able to conceive of a material object without secondary qualities. To conceive of a force with out anything to act on, to consider space without there being something in it and time without of lives passing by.

These are things that we cannot really do, we can form an abstract idea of a tree but it is not separate as Locke proposes. We imagine a tree from memory and 'mute' out the other details. So we take the tree in our back yard and try to forget when and where and how it is. We cannot actually conceive of that tree's existence independently of our minds.

Beautifully expressed. I agree. The idea of mind-independent existence falls apart in some sense. But I also think the thought of the subject depends upon objects-in-common or individual-independent entities.

IMV, it's useful to look behind the proposed metaphysical names of these 'socially' real objects to the fundamental structure of communication. What does philosophy presuppose as philosophy? And is presupposition even the right word? Are we talking about a basic or pre-theoretical structure of experience as among things and others? These 'things' can be thought of as concepts or the opposite of concept (the 'noncept' of mind-independence), but what is the structure beneath the debate that makes the debate possible? To debate reality is to assume something in common with others with whom one debates. It makes no sense to debate the nature of that which is not mutually grasped as important, as in-some-sense real and talk-about-able. And unless we are always only talking about other debaters (which I can't make sense of), we are talking about non-persons, things of some kind, be they rocks mistaken for ideas or idea mistaken for rocks.

In short we live (as we theorize) a 'pre-theory' that makes theory possible/intelligible in world with others containing things that can be talked about (including the strange notion of that world itself and all the others as grounded in a fragile, functioning brain. --itself grounded in that world with the others.) Arguably this structure is far more important than any metaphysical terms fastened to its 'nodes.' The 'we' precedes any theory of the 'I,' even as the individual human body among other bodys makes this 'we.' 'We' is made of you and you and you and lives like a distributed ghost across bodies, faces, and voices. The enworlded community finds itself only through its members, who find themselves in an enworlded community.

We can only do philosophy from the first person perspective. We can never independently observe ourselves and so we cannot 'step outside' of this perspective that traps us. All you ever experience from objects is the idea of the object, never the thing in itself.

The debate here is whether materialism as a theory has a stronger foundation that immaterialism. If we can prove this as so then we don't need to worry about our acceptance of the theory. If it turns out that the argument against materialism is more robust than the one in favour of it, we can be justified in searching deeper.

You accidentally quoted me as saying your response.

fixed

Thanks. I am writing a reply. Great issue.

We can never independently observe ourselves and so we cannot 'step outside' of this perspective that traps us. — Jamesk

I understand what you mean, but I think we are something like a movement against this bias, directed at an ideal community that makes truth valuable and intelligible in some sense. To think that we are trapped in a perspective is already a move against that perspective from outside that perspective in some sense.

All you ever experience from objects is the idea of the object, never the thing in itself. — Jamesk

While there are good reasons to think this way, it's still a metaphysical construction. Hegel and FIchte both made fascinating critiques of this proposed origin or law of thinking. The thing-in-itself is one more thought that wants to point beyond itself. So now we have two thing-in-itself entities. Our idea and what it points to. But then we have three, because the second thing-it-self is an object of consciousness too. I'm not trying to take a dogmatic position here but only mention some problems with that as a foundational thought. From another perspective I very much believe in only partially known objects. Such objects make conversation possible, it seems to me. Perhaps the 'thing-in-itself' is something like the dark of the future, the unsaid, the potentially-experienced projected as a paradoxical entity. It is something like a basic structure. I see the front of the house and 'know' that it has a back. I know that you in the back yard are seeing the same thing, but some other aspect of it. Is the thing-in-itself a kind of public unity of possible and actual experience?

Of course you can. Wind has velocity, it exerts force, You measure it with a meter. Name me a 'physical thing' which has no location and no mass. — Wayfarer

So velocity is weight in your understanding?

The debate here is whether materialism as a theory has a stronger foundation that immaterialism. — Jamesk

Well I will leave off if others want to keep on that level, but I think the problem can also be dissolved or transformed by looking at a deeper structure. What does it mean to have a stronger foundation? It's hard not to think in terms of what an ideal community believes (what our community ought to believe.) And it's something we ought to believe about the stuff that's already here, in which we live and from where we speak in the first place. What does it mean to name it 'matter' or 'mind' in this context? What are we deciding exactly? If everything is 'matter,' then matter is the kind of thing that talks about itself. If everything is 'mind', then mind sometimes acts like a tree fallen across the road when we have somewhere to be, a tree that 'you' with your truck can move out of the way for me, a tree that we don't feel bad about sawing in half.

But that's a category error. — Wayfarer

I've already explained why it's not a category error. What did I say? I don't want to have to keep explaining the same thing over and over to the same people. I want them to at least be able to understand and remember what my view is. So let's see if you can recall any of my responses to you saying the same thing again and again.

In actual fact, it was a slightly tongue-in-cheek response to Terrapin's contention that 'ideas are physical'. — Wayfarer

In other words, your response wasn't an argument against what Terrapin said. It was useless.

Of course, but that is not the point at issue. — Wayfarer

The point was that you didn't say anything useful.

Materialism is 'the doctrine that nothing exists except matter and its movements and modifications.'
Matter is 'a physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit.' So a materialist would seem to understand 'mind and spirit' as a movement of modification of matter.

Fair enough. But what has really been said? 'Mind and spirit' are 'really' just modification of 'matter.' But then matter is so mind-like that materialism loses it charge.

Idealism asserts 'that reality, or reality as humans can know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial. ' Also, 'idealism believes consciousness and mind to be the origin of the material world and aims to explain the existing world according to these principles.'

Fair enough. But what is consciousness made of? Experiences of 'matter' and other 'consciousnesses' it seems. 'In' a world that makes it possible (or 'is' it) even as it makes the world possible. ' The concepts of mind and matter seem to depend on one another. To make either side absolute is to destroy the master word at the moment of its institution. And it would also seem to be a strategic ignoring of who and why we have such a distinction in the fist place, in a quest for 'the night in which all cows are black.'