The analysis would be very different if a person were to approach the text assuming it to be a statement of 'the way things are' to if a person were to approach it as a normative statement of 'you should look at things this way (even though other ways are perfectly possible)'. In the former case, one can critique the text by arguing 'no, things are not that way, here's an example', but in the other, one would critique the text by saying 'looking at things this (other) way has the following use/value'. — Ciaran
The early points about the role of ostension, for example, seem to hinge entirely on an assumption that Wittgenstein was solely attempting to knock down some kind of straw man version of Augustine's argument which later sections make it clear (to me anyway) that he was not. — Ciaran
Could you provide an example? e.g. by saying more about this: — Luke
The extraction of language from it's context that Wittgenstein is showing cannot be fruitful is not something that the general population do, it is not a thing which the uneducated need to be taught about so that they can become more knowledgeable, it is something that experts do to manufacture the very body of knowledge about which they are expert.
But that's just my interpretation. — Ciaran
Wittgenstein wrote about grammar long before he wrote the PI, so his ideas of grammar are important to the text. — Sam26
Not at all. If Wittgenstein had intended, in these first sections, to simply lay out the problems, and if those problems were simply the linguistic ones that have been listed thus far, then what on earth would have prevented him from simply listing then clearly enough to remove the ambiguity. — Ciaran
If, however, you want to follow through the absolutely fascinating insights Wittgenstein has on the nature of enquiry, the pitfalls of certainty and the fragility of the conclusions drawn therefrom, then this is the book for you. — Ciaran
At this point, Witty has nowhere linked grammar with rules (not saying there aren't any, but you're preempting, so your objection doesn't make sense). — StreetlightX
One point of interest here is that §49 answers a question posed back in §26, where Witty writes that "One can call [naming] a preparation for the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?". It's here, in §49, that Witty answers this question: "Naming is a preparation for describing". — StreetlightX
That's correct, and the point being, yours and Sam's discussion of grammar is out of place, not relevant to the text, and actually quite distractive. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you see the premise stated at 43? Meaning is use. If Wittgenstein is to give meaning to his work, his goal here must be to demonstrate usage. To simply list a number of problems does not give the meaning that demonstrating them does. That's why his method is to proceed from one example to the next. — Metaphysician Undercover
But Witty has talked about grammar. — StreetlightX
Streetlight you are correct to point out the relationship between all of this and epistemology. I think grammar should be seen as having the role of governing the moves within language-games, as opposed to the actual moves. An actual move may or may not conform to the rules of grammar. It follows from this that a correct move is in conformity with the grammatical rules. If we extend this analogy to epistemology, epistemology is simply a move in a language-game governed by the grammar in social contexts. — Sam26
I do not think that Witty has used that term though — Metaphysician Undercover
Heh, I'm basically doing one subsection a night, and at this rate, it ought to take about two years or so lol. But hopefully not every section will demand commentary. — StreetlightX
But we determined that in Witty's usage, rules are not necessary for games. Likewise, to me "grammar" usually implies "rules which govern language use". You seem to be using this word to refer simply to "language use" in general, a broad sense without regard for rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
And who cares what preconceived notions you bring to the table? As with your initial confusion about 'games', they were irrelevant then, and they remain irrelevant now. — StreetlightX
Thanks John Doe, I prefer an explanation over StreelightX's derision. The last quote is actually 38 rather than 35. — Metaphysician Undercover
I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is already part of a language game; and that hence the theory presented in §1 is incomplete.
The text at the point we are up to now is looking at another supposed basis for language, simples or atoms or whatever. Again, it is being shown that to name a simple is already to engage in a language game. And hence, again, the theory that language has its basis in simples is incomplete.
Having read ahead a bit, I would say that so it goes, until it is pointed out that there is a way of understanding a rule that is not given by articulating the rule, but shown in following the rule.
And this is why doing trumps saying, use trumps meaning. — Banno
Off you go, then. — Banno
I just gotta say that what is introduced in §1 is the theory that ostension is the basis of language; that what follows shows that ostension is already part of a language game; and that hence the theory presented in §1 is incomplete. — Banno
§29: "Perhaps someone will say, "two" can be ostensively defined only in this way: "The number is called 'two'. For the word "number" here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before that ostensive definition can be understood."
Here, I take it he's merely making explicit what he has been doing in these opening sections -- starting to challenge what we might call the typical picture of what grammar is and how it functions. — John Doe
What do you mean by this? — Ciaran
Why do you think that Wittgenstein presents such a theory? If his goal is to actually discuss language acquisition and use, why has he chosen a half-developed theory from 600 years which no-one even believes any more. Do you think perhaps he was unaware of Piaget's, Thorndike's or Watson's theories on language acquisition, all popular at the time and nothing like Augustine's. Perhaps you could give a rough sketch of what you think popular opinion about language acquisition was at the time Wittgenstein wrote PI with a few sources. It might help to understand where you're coming from with this interpretation. — Ciaran
who cares whether Witty got Augustine right, or if it really does represent some commonly held view. — StreetlightX
Augustine is a foil to develop a point, and can be treated as that without loss. — StreetlightX
Irrelavent point. — StreetlightX
Actually, I've found the critique in this forums quite helpful in developing ideas. — Banno
And what you have to say might well be interesting — Banno
perhaps you might make your question about Augustin relevant by pointing to some relevance. — Banno
I think its a mistake to treat it as a book about language in any academic sense — Ciaran
Rather, the point of the early passages are to establish the differential nature of ostension (in contrast to a 'linear' understanding of ostension); i.e that the 'same' ostensive act (pointing at 'this', say), can play different roles depending on the use to which ostension is put. There is no one kind of thing that ostension always picks out, but always the possibility of a variety of kinds of things (or put differently: in principle, there is always the possibility of a one-to-many mapping between ostension and what is 'picked-out', and never a simple one-to-one mapping between them): — StreetlightX
See my response to StreetlightX above, basically I think its a mistake to treat it as a book about language in any academic sense — Ciaran
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.