Yeah, but how did we get to the point of "understanding too much" in the first place if we didn't already start from a deconstructed state and then built it all up? — Harry Hindu

That's a good point. It's an interesting project, considering how 'matter' became 'conscious' (or however one wants to frame it.)

We seem to have two origins. We can use language to contemplate the origin of language. Then the origin of language would exist for or within language. A Mobius strip comes to mind.

The presence of culture and other human beings dominated our development and has a huge impact in developing our established norms - like there are human beings and I'm one of them. — Harry Hindu

I agree completely.

The very notion of the real seems to involve what is true for us and not just me. — sign

There's a traditional sense (a la scholasticism for example) of "real" that's basically the same as "objective ," but that's a bad idea, because it discounts an d basically dismisses personal, psychological phenomena.

The mystery is why that would be the assumption. We could go through how communication works on my view step by step if you're interested, but that will probably take some time and it's a significant enough tangent that we should probably start another thread on it if you're interested. — Terrapin Station

I suspect that your theory of communication will eventually have to get around to addressing something like public meaning or inter-subjectivity, even if it eschews those terms. It's not so much that I pretend to have an explanation for what is going on. I would like to bring it to attention, make it more vivid.

There's a traditional sense (a la scholasticism for example) of "real" that's basically the same as "objective ," but that's a bad idea, because it discounts an d basically dismisses personal, psychological phenomena. — Terrapin Station

I relate to that. But one can embrace the reality of a fantasy. A community can believe that one of its members had a dream about giraffes. Roughly, anything in intelligible is a being or has being, or so one might say. Then further categorizations can establish visibility or access.

Those vibrations are intelligible. — sign

Obviously. Because people think about them, assign meanings to them, etc.

Roughly speaking, an image of what we might and should do is somehow repeated in the mind of the listener — sign

That's so rough that it's inaccurate. You're not literally passing any sort of mental content, just catalyzing the same.

It seems, by the way, like we're just going to keep doing the same dance over and over. You're going to keep asserting "shared" meaning and I'll keep pointing out that it's not actually shared, and then you'll respond where you talk about shared meaning again, and then I'll point out that it's not actually shared again, etc.

I suspect that your theory of communication will eventually have to get around to addressing something like public meaning or inter-subjectivity, even if it eschews those terms — sign

In other words, you'd probably call something "public meaning" that I'd say isn't actually meaning? That could be.

That question particular strikes me as bizarre. Objectivity in no way hinges on us. The objective world would be there just the same if life had never started. — Terrapin Station

There is much to recommend this view, but it is a metaphysical position. It's one way to define the objective.

Objectivity is a philosophical concept of being true independently from individual subjectivity caused by perception, emotions, or imagination. A proposition is considered to have objective truth when its truth conditions are met without bias caused by a sentient subject. Scientific objectivity refers to the ability to judge without partiality or external influence, sometimes used synonymously with neutrality. — Wiki

The essence of objectivity seems to be true-for-us-and-not-just-me. The notion of the physical seems to fit this ideal perfectly. But I don't think the physical exhausts the objective. As Husserl might add, we should consider in what way logic and math exist objectively. Arguably, reducing the objective to the physical simply ignores part of experience and offers therefore an only partial account of the situation.

but it is a metaphysical position. — sign

Obviously it's a metaphysical position, yes.

The essence of objectivity seems to be true-for-us-and-not-just-me. The notion of the physical seems to fit this ideal perfectly. But I don't think the physical exhausts the objective. As Husserl might add, we should consider in what way logic and math exist objectively. Arguably, reducing the objective to the physical simply ignores part of experience and offers therefore an only partial account of the situation. — sign

I don't agree with any sentence there, but I don't know if it's worth it to spell out why I disagree with all of it. (Because are you really interested in my view per se? Are you even paying much attention to it? Will it have any impact on you? I doubt it.)

You're going to keep asserting "shared" meaning and I'll keep pointing out that it's not actually shared, and then you'll respond where you talk about shared meaning again, and then I'll point out that it's not actually shared again, etc. — Terrapin Station

And I'll keep pointing out that I'm not attached to any terminology but interested in something that makes this conversation possible. I'm quite OK with the idea of the sounds and letters being 'physically' meaningless on their way from one skull to another.

It all hinges on this 'actually,' the specification of this actually. I take that you are saying that matter is not mind, that the signs are dead. And of course in some sense I agree. But the very concept of the 'subject alone with meaning' who uses 'dead signs' is itself a product of these publicly used signs in some sense. I'm saying let's loosen up some of our fundamental assumptions. Insights about language are going to reverberate all through our metaphysical positions. If, for instance, language was fundamentally ambiguous (never perfectly clear), then we could never have a perfectly clear or transmittable theory of the real.

I take that you are saying that matter is not mind, — sign

No, I'm not saying that at all. Some matter is obviously mind on my view. I'm a physicalist, an identity theorist.

But the very concept of the 'subject alone with meaning' is itself a product of these publicly used signs in some sense. — sign

All concepts are the result of individual thought.

I don't agree with any sentence there, — Terrapin Station

So you don't find it true for us but only for me? Or you don't find it true for you? If it's only not true for you and that's the issue, then we aren't really doing philosophy in some sense. We are just gossiping about preferences. The projection of our opinions of being worthy as being acted on as truths seems pretty fundamental to me.

No, I'm not saying that at all. Some matter is obviously mind on my view. I'm a physicalist, an identity theorist. — Terrapin Station

Well we probably can find more agreement than you think, then. I have the sense that you understand me to be saying some more outlandish than is the case. The German idealists were identity theorists (maybe in a different way than you), and I think they were on to something. The problem may largely be about jargon and background.

All concepts are the result of individual thought. — Terrapin Station

I see the truth of this statement, what it gets right. Let me make that clear. But I'd add that this individual only actually exists in a particular community, having been raised in a form of life and at least one language. So the individual is largely constituted by his community. To rip out an isolated subject is like ripping a wolf out of its environment, the things it eats, etc. A wolf only makes sense in its total context and a subject only makes sense as part of a community. Brains have evolved to interact with other brains through language. This is arguably what is most human about the human. The single brain can of course be contemplated, but this is an abstraction that risks throwing away the 'essence' of the human brain as a node in a network. Individual personality is itself in some sense a product of a thought of this network, even if from a physical point of view we can see that individual brain encased in its own skull.

So you don't find it true for us but only for me? Or you don't find it true for you? I — sign

My truth theory (which I'm pretty sure I gave you in detail a few weeks ago) has truth as a subjective judgment, but that's rooted in (though obviously not the same as past the roots) the standard analytic way of looking at truth and its relationship to propositions. That's a big tangent to get into and we're already way off topic.

The more important thing here is that "'true' for everyone" overlooks perspectivalism, the fact that no two perspectives or reference frames/reference points are going to be the same, a fortiori because they necessarily have different spatial orientations.

The more important thing here is that "'true' for everyone" overlooks perspectivalism, the fact that no two perspectives or reference frames/reference points are going to be the same, a fortiori because they necessarily have different spatial orientations. — Terrapin Station

Yes, I agree that no two perspectives are going to be the same. I'd say that true-for-everyone is a kind of ideal that we strive toward, an ideal that requires abstraction from individual perspectives to something like what they all have in common or usefully overlap.

One problem with this is that there isn't anything that's not a particular. That's not to say that there are not abstract or general concepts (types, universals, whatever we want to call them), but concepts are particular events (or series/"sets" of events) in our particular brains. When you take a universal term to refer to a "real abstract," all that it's really referring to is a very vague, particular idea of a "real abstract," in your particular head, at a particular time. — Terrapin Station

I know, you said this already. But this doesn't account for how you can say that the song Kashmir is music. If each of these ideas "the song Kashmir", and "music", are particulars, they are clearly distinct particulars and therefore to say "the song Kashmir is music" is to violate the law of identity.

Outside of that, as has been pointed out to you many times- -and not just by me--"tree" refers to a universal just as much as "matter" does. Neither is a "proper name.". So it's not as if you have a doctrine that one only senses things picked out by non-universal terms. — Terrapin Station

I know, we've been through this already as well. But when I refer to "the tree outside my window", I am talking about a particular. We do not use "matter" in this way, it never refers to a particular. Do you understand this? I can say "that tree", "that chair", etc., and this refers to a particular sensible thing, but if I say "that matter" it does not refer to a particular thing.

But I'd add that this individual only actually exists in a particular community, having been raised in a form of life and at least one language. So the individual is largely constituted by his community. To rip out an isolated subject is like ripping a wolf out of its environment, the things it eats, etc. A wolf only makes sense in its total context and a subject only makes sense as part of a community. Brains have evolved to interact with other brains through language. This is arguably what is most human about the human. — sign

I look at it like this. Say that there's a particular kind of mold that only grows inside refrigerators when they're running. I don't know if that's true--I don't think it is, but let's just imagine that it is. Well, you could say, "Those refrigerators, that mold, only exists due to a particular community, having been designed and build blah blah blah" Yeah, that would be true, but nevertheless, there's a kind of mold that ONLY occurs inside running refrigerators. It doesn't occur outside of those refrigerators, or when they're not running. Pointing that out isn't claiming that the refrigerators aren't designed and built in social contexts, etc.

And if every time you talked about that mold, someone felt the need to interject, "But ultimately that mold can only exist in a social context, because you need a society that has ideas and builds refrigerators and blah blah blah," that would be very annoying.

The single brain can of course be contemplated, but this is an abstraction — sign

An abstraction? Why would you say it's an abstraction?

Yes, I agree that no two perspectives are going to be the same. I'd say that true-for-everyone is a kind of ideal that we strive toward, an ideal that requires abstraction from individual perspectives to something like what they all have in common or usefully overlap. — sign

I don't see shooting for something that isn't true as an ideal there. The ideal (in my view) would be to get people to realize/acknowledge perspectivalism.

If each of these ideas "the song Kashmir", and "music", are particulars, — Metaphysician Undercover

When I talk about sensing or experiencing "Kashmir" and music, I'm not talking about ideas.

We do not use "matter" in this way, it never refers to a particular — Metaphysician Undercover

I always refer to particulars by "matter."

Objectivity in no way hinges on us. The objective world would be there just the same if life had never started. — Terrapin Station

This is not actually the case.

That was very persuasive.

Good! Anything else to discuss, or are we done.

We could diagnose you.

You say that the 'objective world' exists irrespective of whether anyone is around to observe it. I say not. Why? Because the very image of the 'objective world' that you're referring to, contains an implicit reference from the human perspective. You can picture the vast empty cosmos, planets coursing in their orbits, the formation of stars, and so on. But that is a picture that exists from a perspective, and containing a time-scale and distance-scale within which it is meaningful. Absent those elements of a framework within which that judgement is made, what can be said 'to exist' at all? That 'empty universe' is still something that is dependent on there being an observing mind.

Furthermore, something like this has been shown by physics itself.

The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers. Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time looses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'.

(Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271)

Worth watching this interview:

When I talk about sensing or experiencing "Kashmir" and music, I'm not talking about ideas. — Terrapin Station

Right, but when you say "the song Kashmir is music", you are talking about ideas.

always refer to particulars by "matter." — Terrapin Station

I didn't say "particulars", I said "a particular". No one uses "matter" to refer to a particular object, not even you. If someone did, no one would know which particular object was being referred to, so such talk would be pointless.

Right, but when you say "the song Kashmir is music", you are talking about ideas. — Metaphysician Undercover

No I'm not. I'm talking about objective events, objective sounds.

I didn't say "particulars", I said "a particular". No one uses "matter" to refer to a particular object, not even you. If someone did, no one would know which particular object was being referred to, — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would we be talking about how people use language? That's not the topic.

Worth watching this interview: — Wayfarer

Good example of reifying mathematics.(Which I see has led him to focusing on nonsense like "multiverse" theory, string theory, etc.)

An abstraction? Why would you say it's an abstraction? — Terrapin Station

The single brain, grasped as a distinct object, is already an interpretation that plucks it out of the human body as a hole. And that human body is an abstraction, too. To really describe the nature of one thing is to be led to its relationships with every other thing. Concepts are inter-related. To explain one thing exhaustively is to explain everything. Since thinking is often about the skillful ignoring of purpose-irrelevant relationships, the systematicity of concept doesn't come up much.

The ideal (in my view) would be to get people to realize/acknowledge perspectivalism. — Terrapin Station

Is this not an attempt to impose your perspective (perspectivalism) as precisely a truth beyond mere perspective? The impossibility of objectivity as objectivity itself?

The single brain, grasped as a distinct object, — sign

Why would you be talking about "grasping" something?