If the meaning of "one metre" is the length of the stick, then it makes no sense to ask if the stick is one metre long.
But it makes sense to ask if the stick is one metre long.
Therefor, the meaning of "one metre" is not the length of the stick. — Banno
A paradigm is more like a type than a token, if that helps. — Luke
This is how I understand paradigms also. It seems to me, if one "pulls out" the focus a bit to look at the whole section, the theme is consistently that things are neither this way nor that, but rather a variety of ways united only by the fact that the use serves some function in a game. — Isaac
Wittgenstein mentions how we can tell when a speaker, even of a foreign language, has made an error by their attitude. — Isaac
We could say that the meaning of a word is maintained by the act of checking for signs of error in its use. All the while you bring the builder an object in response to 'slab!' which he appears satisfied with, you may be content that you have the meaning of 'slab!' in that language game. The moment he rejects what you bring with a frown, you return to the pile and pick a different object, you must have mistaken the meaning of 'slab!'. — Isaac
I think we ought to pay close attention to this section because it seems to be strained, uneasy, as if Witty is manufacturing, creating something to cover over a problem. In reality, usually the person making a mistake does not know where the mistake is being made, and therefore the mistake cannot be exposed in this way. The person will need to be corrected by someone who knows. What is the case though, is that the person who is unsure of the ;language will have an overall attitude of uncertainty when speaking, but this does not expose particular errors as is implied here. — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to be interpreting the person making the 'slip of the tounge' as the one trying to learn the rules. — Isaac
the observer cannot reliably determine when an error is made, simply by observing the actions of the speaker who makes the error, as is suggested by Witty. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well this is the problem isn't it? Where do we find an example or a sample of a type? — Metaphysician Undercover
An object is not itself a type, and therefore cannot provide such an example. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is where I disagree. I don't think Wittgenstein is suggesting this at all. I think you may have added a 'simply' into your paraphrasing which Wittgenstein did not himself put in there. Nowhere in the aphorism does Wittgenstein suggest the process is simple. Nor do I think he could reasonably have meant as much. — Isaac
But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players' mistakes and correct play?—There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language.
He must himself know full well how long it takes and so could not possibly have been under the illusion that each individual error reveals to us a rule. — Isaac
Everywhere. — Luke
This is what is pointed at during an ostensive defintion: a typical example or examples. — Luke
Ha, ha, I hope that's a joke — Metaphysician Undercover
This chart might be said to take over here the role that memory and association play in other cases.
My argument is that in most cases there are no such characteristic signs in the actions of the player who makes the mistake, as Wittgenstein's example suggests. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure what other roles there could be; perhaps there are different roles when using the chart for elements vs. complexes. However, perhaps just noting that the chart (and therefore a rule) can have more than one role is sufficient..? — Luke
I don't think Wittgenstein is talking about different roles for the chart. He's talking about different roles for whatever it is we see as the paradigm. He's saying that, here, it is used as part of the game, a thing we do is to read off the chart, other places it is used as a means of teaching the rules, in others players simply deduce the rule by observing others play. — Isaac
If we call such a chart the expression of a rule of the language-game, it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game may have very different roles in the game.
You seem to have jumped ahead to §54. He doesn't mention paradigms at §53 (but maybe we also disagree on the meaning of 'paradigm'?). — Luke
I must admit that I find this obscure. Firstly, note that W considers the (whole) chart (or "such a chart") to be the expression of a rule of the language-game, rather than the individual signs or associations contained within it. In terms of its various roles, we can glean from Wittgenstein's example that the chart is used for the different roles of encoding signs and translating signs when describing complexes. I'm not sure what other roles there could be; perhaps there are different roles when using the chart for elements vs. complexes. However, perhaps just noting that the chart (and therefore a rule) can have more than one role is sufficient..? — Luke
Consider that the same rule may be expressed in various different ways. The table is only one way of expressing the rule. The table replaces the role of "memory and association". The various ways that the same rule may be expressed, are an indication of, or actually are, the various roles that the rule has in the game. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein doesn't claim that the observation of some characteristic sign is the only means by which a student might learn the rules of the game, nor that it is the most common, it's just an example. An argument against this would have to consist of a demonstration that such signs were never given, otherwise, it's a perfectly valid example of the sorts of ways of someone could learn the rules of a game without being directly taught. — Isaac
The point is that the example is not a good example, and therefore does not properly exemplify the matter which is being referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is an example of how a person learning the rules of a game in this way, simply by observation, without being taught, might distinguish mistakes from correct play. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since the example requires that the player making the mistake recognizes one's own mistake when it is made, and this is usually not the case when someone makes a mistake, it is based in an unrealistic representation of "making a mistake". — Metaphysician Undercover
First, how do you know it is "usually not the case" that when a player makes a mistake they do not themselves recognise it. This sounds like an empirical conclusion. Do you have any studies to back this up with? — Isaac
If it is possible that a player genuinely not know they've made a mistake, and this is the case most of the time, then it follows that this would be the case for most of the players at any given time. — Isaac
If there's a rule that most of the players at any given time are not aware of, then where is that rule kept? — Isaac
I've played many games, and I've made mistakes in relation to the rules. I've also observed others making such mistakes. When I make a mistake, it is because I did not know, or did not understand the rule. So when the mistake is made I do not know or do not understand the rule. Therefore I do not recognize that a mistake was made, and so I do not make any indications in my actions that a mistake was made (as in W's example), because I do not know that a mistake was. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the observer doesn't determine that a mistake was made, from the actions of the player who makes the mistake, but from whatever else it is that occurs which would make the player making the mistake recognize that a mistake was made. — Metaphysician Undercover
Notwithstanding that, I'm not seeing how what you're saying is not covered by "the player's responses". I don't have the text with me so you may need to correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure it's plural and so would be talking about the responses of all the players as a whole. — Isaac
Again I don't think Wittgenstein is in any way ruling this out, he's just also including the possibility of the player knowing themselves. Consider running offside in football. The player may not have intended to break the rule, but they only need look around to see that they have. — Isaac
But none of this is relevant to the point and I don't want to get sidetracked. I'd rather just say yes, Wittgenstein chose a bad example. It doesn't change anything about the point he's making.
The point I see that you are leading toward is clearly relevant to the private language argument and if we're to keep this process on track (I'm guessing that's the aim, yes?) then we'd better leave that discussion for when we get there. — Isaac
One learns the game by watching how others play it. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the way the game is played - like a natural law governing the play.
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