If the meaning of "one metre" is the length of the stick, then it makes no sense to ask if the stick is one metre long.

But it makes sense to ask if the stick is one metre long.

Therefor, the meaning of "one metre" is not the length of the stick. — Banno

But what if the meaning of "one metre" is the length of the stick? :joke:

Then perhaps the length of your garden shed changes with the temperature in Paris.

I just thought it was an unusual argument.

Nope, still not getting where the 'muddle' is. Wittgenstein says that it does not make sense to ask, of our paradigms in language games, whether they exist or not, whether they are true or not. That's what he's arguing. He gives some examples of the sorts of things a single paradigm might be to show how non-sensical it would be (the metre stick, the sepia sample...). He then goes on to say (in the discussion about Moses) that of course in the real world we rarely do have a simple single paradigm, but rather a series of props, any one of which might be kicked out from under us without effect. But the point he now makes is that this extra layer of complexity does not change the conclusion drawn from the artificially simple examples, that it is non-sensical to ask such question of paradigms in language games.

To say that such and such a thing is the paradigm for a particular language game is not the point here, I don't think.

So all I see Kripke doing (and I don't think he actually claims to be doing otherwise) is describing just the sort of process of props one might use to be sure what "1 metre" is means (his "baptism and then subsequent referral). Wittgenstein, however, was using the imaginary language game where the Paris stick was used as the sole paradigm for games involving the expression" 1 metre" as an example of what a single paradigm game might look like.

So I don't think the one position really opposes the other at all.

A paradigm is more like a type than a token, if that helps. — Luke

Well this is the problem isn't it? Where do we find an example or a sample of a type? An object is not itself a type, and therefore cannot provide such an example. And Wittgenstein avoids the spiritual (something mental, such as the example of type is in the mind), by saying that memory is insufficient, so what is the paradigm which exemplifies the type?

This is how I understand paradigms also. It seems to me, if one "pulls out" the focus a bit to look at the whole section, the theme is consistently that things are neither this way nor that, but rather a variety of ways united only by the fact that the use serves some function in a game. — Isaac

Irony at its best. Wittgenstein says to understand this subject we need to look closer. But to understand what he is saying we really need to pull back and look at the whole book.

Wittgenstein mentions how we can tell when a speaker, even of a foreign language, has made an error by their attitude. — Isaac

I think we ought to pay close attention to this section because it seems to be strained, uneasy, as if Witty is manufacturing, creating something to cover over a problem. In reality, usually the person making a mistake does not know where the mistake is being made, and therefore the mistake cannot be exposed in this way. The person will need to be corrected by someone who knows. What is the case though, is that the person who is unsure of the ;language will have an overall attitude of uncertainty when speaking, but this does not expose particular errors as is implied here.

This discussion is at 54, and it is a continuation of what was said at 31, which was the subject of a lengthy discussion between Terrapin Station and I. Notice that Witty outlines two distinct ways of playing a game "according to a distinct rule". In the first way, the person is given a rule, and given practise in applying it. In the other way, the person observes, and learns rules through observation. In the latter way, we could say that the person produces the rule through inductive reasoning. Notice Witty's reference "like a natural law governing the play".

Here we have a distinction between a prescriptive rule, and a descriptive rule. In the former the person is given the rule and instructed to play in this way. In the latter, the person observes, induces the rule, and joins into the play. Now, in the latter case, when the person is trying to induce a descriptive rule, there is the issue of how does the person know when the observed play is following "the rule". So Witty proceeds to discuss how the observer might intuit, from the play of the players, when an error is made. This is problematic.

I believe that the true resolution to this problem is to be found through an analysis which is slightly different, more thorough. Witty does not maintain a true division between these two ways of playing according to a rule. In the latter case, the inductive rule, he assumes that the observed players are following prescriptive rules. This is a conflation of the distinct parts in the analysis. So when the observer sets about the task of inducing "the rule" it is assumed that there is a correct prescriptive rule which the players are following. But if the rules really are descriptive and induced, then there is no such prescriptive rule which the players are following. The rules are produced from induction, following the play.

Now the judgement of error is completely in the hands of the observer. The observer must exclude play which is inconsistent as not conducive to the production of a rule. So the comment quoted above is really irrelevant because it implies that the player knows when a rule is broken. But if the rule is not prescriptive, the player actually never knows when a rule is broken, because this is solely a matter of judgement by the observer who judges whether the play is consistent with the play of others.

We could say that the meaning of a word is maintained by the act of checking for signs of error in its use. All the while you bring the builder an object in response to 'slab!' which he appears satisfied with, you may be content that you have the meaning of 'slab!' in that language game. The moment he rejects what you bring with a frown, you return to the pile and pick a different object, you must have mistaken the meaning of 'slab!'. — Isaac

Yes, this is the point, error must always be judged by the observer. Your action is inconsistent with the action of the others (where the action of the others is the paradigm), therefore your action is in error (outside the inductive rule). In this way we can completely remove the inclination to assume a prescriptive rule, which the player believes oneself ought to follow.

I think we ought to pay close attention to this section because it seems to be strained, uneasy, as if Witty is manufacturing, creating something to cover over a problem. In reality, usually the person making a mistake does not know where the mistake is being made, and therefore the mistake cannot be exposed in this way. The person will need to be corrected by someone who knows. What is the case though, is that the person who is unsure of the ;language will have an overall attitude of uncertainty when speaking, but this does not expose particular errors as is implied here. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's interesting that you've looked at it this way round. You seem to be interpreting the person making the 'slip of the tounge' as the one trying to learn the rules. I always read it the other way around, the person listening is the one trying to learn the rules. They do not yet know to what each word refers (in this game), but, Wittgenstein is saying, they can still tell the difference between a rule-abiding play and a mistake. He's not, I don't think, suggesting that there is some single flawless algorithm for doing this, but rather a series of inadequate, partial methods which, put together over years, provide a sufficient knowledge to be getting on with.

Again we find the recurring theme. There is no single method, no flawless 'master key', just a rough hashing together of various approaches which sort of get the job done.

You seem to be interpreting the person making the 'slip of the tounge' as the one trying to learn the rules. — Isaac

No, I interpret as you do, the person making the slip of the tongue is being observed by the person trying to learn the rules. The point I wanted to make is that the observer cannot reliably determine when an error is made, simply by observing the actions of the speaker who makes the error, as is suggested by Witty. In most cases an error is like an honest mistake, and the speaker does not know when an error is made. And sometimes the speaker may be acting deceptively (cheating), so the failing to abide by the rule is hidden. Therefore the observer cannot adequately determine from the behaviour of the speaker, when an error is made.

That is why I see this description as lacking, and so I offered a more thorough analysis which would make a complete separation between descriptive rules and prescriptive rules. Then we can describe the fundamental and preparative language-games (the games required that one might build the capacity to understand prescriptive rules) as if there are no prescriptive rules at all. The observer distinguishes consistency and inconsistency of the particular moves in the game, in relation to other moves. Consistency in many moves is conducive to a descriptive, or inductive law or rule, which becomes the paradigm.

However, under this analysis the issue of a "wrong" or "incorrect" move becomes problematic. These words tend to imply that the person has acted outside of a prescriptive rule, what one ought to do. Now I have removed the prescriptive rule altogether, and I have no basis for designating any particular move as wrong or incorrect, only that the move appears to be inconsistent with other moves. Can I say that a move is "wrong" just because it is inconsistent with the moves of others?

the observer cannot reliably determine when an error is made, simply by observing the actions of the speaker who makes the error, as is suggested by Witty. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is where I disagree. I don't think Wittgenstein is suggesting this at all. I think you may have added a 'simply' into your paraphrasing which Wittgenstein did not himself put in there. Nowhere in the aphorism does Wittgenstein suggest the process is simple. Nor do I think he could reasonably have meant as much. Wittgenstein learnt his native language as well as English. He must himself know full well how long it takes and so could not possibly have been under the illusion that each individual error reveals to us a rule.

I imagine it more like a long process, maybe on one occasion, the player is, as you say, cheating. Well, on that occasion we gain no insight, in fact we are deceived. But on another occasion we might observe a similar action being taken with signs of rule breaking (maybe other players spot the cheat and become frustrated). Eventually, after enough such occasions we will pick up the rules.

This is not to say we'd have a complete rule-book, just one that is sufficient. I think this is the meaning of Wittgenstein's later remarks about the sufficiency of signposts. We just keep refining our understanding of the rules as and when we see (by use) that our understanding is insufficient.

The point is, which goes onto the public meaning sections, that there need not be some repository of what is 'right' in order to keep this system going, just a sufficient volume of users all trying to copy each other.

Well this is the problem isn't it? Where do we find an example or a sample of a type? — Metaphysician Undercover

Everywhere.

An object is not itself a type, and therefore cannot provide such an example. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, but an object can be an example or a sample of a type.

Perhaps a dictionary definition will help:

paradigm
/ˈparədʌɪm/
noun
1. a typical example or pattern of something; a pattern or model.

This is what is pointed at during an ostensive defintion: a typical example or examples.

This is where I disagree. I don't think Wittgenstein is suggesting this at all. I think you may have added a 'simply' into your paraphrasing which Wittgenstein did not himself put in there. Nowhere in the aphorism does Wittgenstein suggest the process is simple. Nor do I think he could reasonably have meant as much. — Isaac

This is what he says:

But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players' mistakes and correct play?—There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language.

My argument is that in most cases there are no such characteristic signs in the actions of the player who makes the mistake, as Wittgenstein's example suggests.. What I suggested as an alternative is that the observer would distinguish correct moves from mistakes on a basis of consistency. A correct move is one which is consistent with other moves. A mistake is an inconsistent move. So the observer produces laws of observation, inductive laws of description, as Wittgenstein suggests with "—like a natural law governing the play.——", and a move which is inconsistent with the inductive rule is designated as a mistake. In this way we do not have to appeal to "characteristic signs in the players' actions", as a means of determining mistakes. As I see this to be a faulty way to determine such mistakes. An honest mistake will very often not display such characteristics, and an act of deception will most likely not.

He must himself know full well how long it takes and so could not possibly have been under the illusion that each individual error reveals to us a rule. — Isaac

This is not the issue. It is not a matter of mistakes revealing the rules. The person is observing the players, and learning the rules of the game through observations of the play. What is at issue is how the observer would distinguish correct play from mistaken play. It is not a case of mistakes revealing a rule, but a case of mistakes obscuring the rules. So in order for the observer to learn the rules, there must be a method whereby incorrect play is excluded as not supportive of the rule.

I find Wittgenstein's example to be insufficient. He implies with the example, that the person making the mistake will give us some indication that a mistake has been made, but this generally is not the case. However, he does say that there would be signs in the players' (plural) behaviour, and this would include one player correcting another player. This seems to be what would occur if one player makes an error and does not follow the rule, another player would offer a correction. For some reason though Wittgenstein does not describe this, nor use this in his example.

Everywhere. — Luke

As soon as you point to a type, I'll believe that you've found an example of a type..

This is what is pointed at during an ostensive defintion: a typical example or examples. — Luke

A typical example is not an example of a type, that's the problem. A typical example is a representation of the type, therefore it is not actually a type so it cannot be an example of a type. Where would we find an example of a type?

A typical example is not an example of a type — Metaphysician Undercover

It literally is.

Ha, ha, I hope that's a joke. But just in case it's not meant as a joke, it's clearly not the case that "a typical example" is the same thing as "an example of a type". This is very evident because "example" is the subject, and "typical" is the predicate in "typical example". When I ask for an example of a type, "type" is the subject. Obviously, "typical example", and "example of a type" do not mean the same thing. In one case "typical" is the predicate while "example is the subject.. In the other case "type" is the subject and I am asking for an example of a type. So I am not asking for an example which is typical, I am asking for an example of a type.

Here are some examples. Let's say that "length" is an example of a type. There's a metre stick. How is that stick an example of the type, "length"? Or, let's say that "colour" is an example of a type. How is a red thing an example of the type "colour"? Suppose we have a red thing, a green thing, and a blue thing, similar to the squares in W's example, how are these differently coloured squares an example of the type which is "colour"?

Ha, ha, I hope that's a joke — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly what do you think the root word of typ-ical is?

The root is irrelevant, what is relevant is how the words are used. Luke doesn't seem to recognize the difference between using "typical" as a predicate, an adjective modifying the noun "example", and using "type" as a subject, in which case "type" is a noun. Looking for an example of a type is to look for an example of this thing which is called a type, and this is completely different from looking for an example which is typical.

:roll:

§53. W here treats language game (48) as though it were in a foreign language that we are trying to understand. He states that there are "a variety of cases" in which we would consider that a sign in the game was being used to represent a particular colour or coloured square. W cites two examples in which we would make such a consideration. The first is if we knew that the users of language game (48) had been taught the use of the signs in a particular way. The second is if the relationship between the colours and their representative signs was compiled in a chart, and where the chart might be used to settle disputes.

W suggests that we can imagine a chart like this being used as "a tool in the use of the language", and gives an example in which its users each carry a copy of the chart in order to encode and translate signs. W explains how the chart could be used to describe a complex, where a user "looks up each element of the complex in it and passes from this to the sign", and then the person to whom the sign is given uses their own chart to translate the sign "into a picture of coloured squares".

This chart might be said to take over here the role that memory and association play in other cases.

W then observes parenthetically that "We don’t usually carry out the order “Bring me a red flower” by looking up the colour red in a colour chart and then bringing a flower of the colour that we find in the chart; but when it is a question of choosing or mixing a particular shade of red, we do sometimes make use of a sample or chart."

This reminds us of the strange behaviour of the shopkeeper at §1 who uses a chart/table to look up the colour red.

W ends the section by stating: "If we call such a chart the expression of a rule of the language-game, it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game may have very different roles in the game."

I must admit that I find this obscure. Firstly, note that W considers the (whole) chart (or "such a chart") to be the expression of a rule of the language-game, rather than the individual signs or associations contained within it. In terms of its various roles, we can glean from Wittgenstein's example that the chart is used for the different roles of encoding signs and translating signs when describing complexes. I'm not sure what other roles there could be; perhaps there are different roles when using the chart for elements vs. complexes. However, perhaps just noting that the chart (and therefore a rule) can have more than one role is sufficient..?

[n.b. I've switched to using the 4th edition (2009). Earlier versions will have table instead of chart.]

My argument is that in most cases there are no such characteristic signs in the actions of the player who makes the mistake, as Wittgenstein's example suggests. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I hopefully made clear in my response, I don't see how this is an argument in respect of the text we're discussing.

Wittgenstein doesn't claim that the observation of some characteristic sign is the only means by which a student might learn the rules of the game, nor that it is the most common, it's just an example. An argument against this would have to consist of a demonstration that such signs were never given, otherwise, it's a perfectly valid example of the sorts of ways of someone could learn the rules of a game without being directly taught.

This is a point that seems to keep getting missed here, Wittgenstein is abundantly clear (at 109 I think, I don't have the text with me) that this is not an empirical investigation.

So, we can say that we can recognise the errors in game play by the signs other players give. This is something which we already know that can be "marshalled" to the problem. But as soon as you start getting into what is "mostly" done (which approach is used most often) then you're getting into empirical data. The answer to such a question is not something we know as individuals. It would require a study and so is no longer a matter for philosophy.

I'm not sure what other roles there could be; perhaps there are different roles when using the chart for elements vs. complexes. However, perhaps just noting that the chart (and therefore a rule) can have more than one role is sufficient..? — Luke

I don't think Wittgenstein is talking about different roles for the chart. He's talking about different roles for whatever it is we see as the paradigm. He's saying that, here, it is used as part of the game, a thing we do is to read off the chart, other places it is used as a means of teaching the rules, in others players simply deduce the rule by observing others play.

I don't think Wittgenstein is talking about different roles for the chart. He's talking about different roles for whatever it is we see as the paradigm. He's saying that, here, it is used as part of the game, a thing we do is to read off the chart, other places it is used as a means of teaching the rules, in others players simply deduce the rule by observing others play. — Isaac

Thanks Isaac, but unfortunately I'm not satisfied with that explanation. You seem to have jumped ahead to §54. He doesn't mention paradigms at §53 (but maybe we also disagree on the meaning of 'paradigm'?). He says:

If we call such a chart the expression of a rule of the language-game, it can be said that what we call a rule of a language-game may have very different roles in the game.

He actually says that a rule may have very different roles in the game. I'm having trouble imagining how this works. He indicates that if we consider the chart as an expression of a rule, then this somehow demonstrates that a rule can have different roles in the game. This seems to imply that the chart also has different roles in the game. But what are those different roles for the chart?

You seem to have jumped ahead to §54. He doesn't mention paradigms at §53 (but maybe we also disagree on the meaning of 'paradigm'?). — Luke

I don't think it is possible to analyse the book aphorism by aphorism. Wittgenstein develops thoughts often in three parts. First he will set up what he sees as a way we might be fooled into thinking we can 'discover' some fact by analysis. Second he presents a series of ways in which the problem can be looked at which show the first way to be nonsense, then he relates the exercise to his theme for that section.

So here, the target is the idea that a rule must come to be learnt by some single determined process. He lays this out using the metaphor about the mouse springing from grey rags (as ever though, his main target is the philosophy itself, as I think he is quite explicit about in that aphorism). He goes on to show, by using examples, that it is not this simple, that no single categorisation or general structure can define the way rules come about or are learned that is more simple than a description of such. This he relates to the theme here. That philosophy has no further facts to discover, that here is nothing more to do than 'describe' to eliminate questions that might arise from our desire to find some general rule.

I must admit that I find this obscure. Firstly, note that W considers the (whole) chart (or "such a chart") to be the expression of a rule of the language-game, rather than the individual signs or associations contained within it. In terms of its various roles, we can glean from Wittgenstein's example that the chart is used for the different roles of encoding signs and translating signs when describing complexes. I'm not sure what other roles there could be; perhaps there are different roles when using the chart for elements vs. complexes. However, perhaps just noting that the chart (and therefore a rule) can have more than one role is sufficient..? — Luke

Consider that the same rule may be expressed in various different ways. The table is only one way of expressing the rule. The table replaces the role of "memory and association". The various ways that the same rule may be expressed, are an indication of, or actually are, the various roles that the rule has in the game.

Consider that the same rule may be expressed in various different ways. The table is only one way of expressing the rule. The table replaces the role of "memory and association". The various ways that the same rule may be expressed, are an indication of, or actually are, the various roles that the rule has in the game. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that seems to make more sense. Thanks.

That's the lead into 54 in which he discusses different ways in which it may be said that a game is played according to a rule. That's the subject Isaac and I have been discussing.

Wittgenstein doesn't claim that the observation of some characteristic sign is the only means by which a student might learn the rules of the game, nor that it is the most common, it's just an example. An argument against this would have to consist of a demonstration that such signs were never given, otherwise, it's a perfectly valid example of the sorts of ways of someone could learn the rules of a game without being directly taught. — Isaac

The point is that the example is not a good example, and therefore does not properly exemplify the matter which is being referred to. First, you have not represented the example properly here. It is not an "example of the sorts of ways of someone could learn the rules of a game without being directly taught". It is an example of how a person learning the rules of a game in this way, simply by observation, without being taught, might distinguish mistakes from correct play. Since the example requires that the player making the mistake recognizes one's own mistake when it is made, and this is usually not the case when someone makes a mistake, it is based in an unrealistic representation of "making a mistake". Therefore it is not a "perfectly valid example".

The point is that the example is not a good example, and therefore does not properly exemplify the matter which is being referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does if you see the matter being referred to as 'the method of philosophical inquiry', not 'a study of the way people learn rules', but these are just different interpretations of the text as a whole. I think that I'm arguing that the expression works for what I understand as its purpose and you're arguing that it does not for what you see as its purpose. Perhaps a full-blown discussion about the purpose of the section is beyond the scope of the thread.

It is an example of how a person learning the rules of a game in this way, simply by observation, without being taught, might distinguish mistakes from correct play. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed, but as above, under my interpretation of the purpose of the example, this doesn't really change my conclusion.

Since the example requires that the player making the mistake recognizes one's own mistake when it is made, and this is usually not the case when someone makes a mistake, it is based in an unrealistic representation of "making a mistake". — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a couple of issues worth picking up here.

First, how do you know it is "usually not the case" that when a player makes a mistake they do not themselves recognise it. This sounds like an empirical conclusion. Do you have any studies to back this up with?

Second, I think you're edging towards a view of rules that is very much outside of what Wittgenstein is trying to establish. If it is possible that a player genuinely not know they've made a mistake, and this is the case most of the time, then it follows that this would be the case for most of the players at any given time. If there's a rule that most of the players at any given time are not aware of, then where is that rule kept?

First, how do you know it is "usually not the case" that when a player makes a mistake they do not themselves recognise it. This sounds like an empirical conclusion. Do you have any studies to back this up with? — Isaac

I've played many games, and I've made mistakes in relation to the rules. I've also observed others making such mistakes. When I make a mistake, it is because I did not know, or did not understand the rule. So when the mistake is made I do not know or do not understand the rule. Therefore I do not recognize that a mistake was made, and so I do not make any indications in my actions that a mistake was made (as in W's example), because I do not know that a mistake was. What is required is that another player point out to me that a mistake was made. For some reason, Witty does not exemplify this.

If it is possible that a player genuinely not know they've made a mistake, and this is the case most of the time, then it follows that this would be the case for most of the players at any given time. — Isaac

Isn't that what "making a mistake" is though, not knowing that you were making a mistake? If you knew that it was a mistake, you would not proceed in that action which constitutes "the mistake". So it is impossible that the person making the mistake knows, at the time of making the mistake, that it is a mistake, because this contradicts the nature of "mistake". So, after making the mistake, if the person is to recognize that a mistake has been made, something must occur to bring to that person's attention, the fact that a mistake has been made.

Now consider the observer, trying to learn the rules from observation of the play. The observer is going to recognize that a mistake has been made by the same means that the player making the mistake recognizes that a mistake was made. So the observer doesn't determine that a mistake was made, from the actions of the player who makes the mistake, but from whatever else it is that occurs which would make the player making the mistake recognize that a mistake was made.

If there's a rule that most of the players at any given time are not aware of, then where is that rule kept? — Isaac

Right, I think that this is an issue which will arise. What if there's a rule that only one of the player is aware of, a private rule? As I tried to outline in my earlier posts in this discussion with you, we can avoid that problem by making a clean separation between prescriptive and descriptive rules. If, all the rules of the game are learned through observation as we've been discussing, the rules are purely descriptive. There is no such thing as a prescriptive rule, what one ought to do in this type of game, the one that is learned purely through observation. Therefore, such a "rule" which is known only to one or a few players, is not a rule at all, by this definition of 'rule" because it cannot be observed as a rule. The activities of this one, or very few players, which you describe as players who are aware of a rule that the others are not aware of, are actually exceptions to the rules, and are therefore mistakes.

I've played many games, and I've made mistakes in relation to the rules. I've also observed others making such mistakes. When I make a mistake, it is because I did not know, or did not understand the rule. So when the mistake is made I do not know or do not understand the rule. Therefore I do not recognize that a mistake was made, and so I do not make any indications in my actions that a mistake was made (as in W's example), because I do not know that a mistake was. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm rather fond of Vaughan Williams, and whenever I hear his music I feel good. I wouldn't presume that I therefore know how everyone else is feeling in response. That's what I mean by saying your claim sounds empirical. If all we're trying to work out is whether people tend, more often than not, to recognise their own mistakes or whether they need them pointing out, then we'd better just ask a load of people, perhaps a few surveys, a controlled study. I can't think why we'd sit in our armchairs and guess.

Notwithstanding that, I'm not seeing how what you're saying is not covered by "the player's responses". I don't have the text with me so you may need to correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure it's plural and so would be talking about the responses of all the players as a whole.

So the observer doesn't determine that a mistake was made, from the actions of the player who makes the mistake, but from whatever else it is that occurs which would make the player making the mistake recognize that a mistake was made. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again I don't think Wittgenstein is in any way ruling this out, he's just also including the possibility of the player knowing themselves. Consider running offside in football. The player may not have intended to break the rule, but they only need look around to see that they have.

But none of this is relevant to the point and I don't want to get sidetracked. I'd rather just say yes, Wittgenstein chose a bad example. It doesn't change anything about the point he's making.

The point I see that you are leading toward is clearly relevant to the private language argument and if we're to keep this process on track (I'm guessing that's the aim, yes?) then we'd better leave that discussion for when we get there.

Notwithstanding that, I'm not seeing how what you're saying is not covered by "the player's responses". I don't have the text with me so you may need to correct me if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure it's plural and so would be talking about the responses of all the players as a whole. — Isaac

Yes it's plural, and that's exactly what I said earlier, "the players' responses" indicates a multitude of players. In my experience of observing games, and playing games, when one person steps outside the bounds of the rules (makes a mistake), that individual is corrected by the others playing the game. This is the obvious example of how an observer of the game would know when a player makes a mistake, that player is corrected by the other players. So, the issue, I wonder why Witty does not use this obvious example, and instead opts for an obscure example, which in my opinion (for the reasons explained) is not a good example. Why does Witty not state the obvious, the observer knows when a player makes a mistake because that player is corrected by the others?

Again I don't think Wittgenstein is in any way ruling this out, he's just also including the possibility of the player knowing themselves. Consider running offside in football. The player may not have intended to break the rule, but they only need look around to see that they have. — Isaac

But running offside in football is not making a mistake, it's a perfectly acceptable play, the players do it all the time and they know when they are doing it. They also know that it puts an end to the play, that's the rule. If the player kept running, as if the play was not ended, that might be a mistake, the player didn't know he stepped offside. However, there is also the possibility that the player knew, and then continuing on with the play is an attempt to cheat.

The issue here is what qualifies as making a mistake. that's what Witty asks at 51 "what is the criterion by which this is a mistake?". This is what Luke was getting hung up on at 53, what constitutes "the rule", because the same rule maybe expressed in different ways, and therefore it may play different roles in the game. So which expression of the rule, or role, do we turn to in determining when there is a mistake? We cannot say that there has been a mistake unless we know what the rule is. You think stepping offside in football is a mistake, according to your expression of the rule, I think that this is not a mistake, but continuing to play after stepping offside is a mistake according to my expression of the rule..

But none of this is relevant to the point and I don't want to get sidetracked. I'd rather just say yes, Wittgenstein chose a bad example. It doesn't change anything about the point he's making.

The point I see that you are leading toward is clearly relevant to the private language argument and if we're to keep this process on track (I'm guessing that's the aim, yes?) then we'd better leave that discussion for when we get there. — Isaac

I agree that we're going off track, but the point to stress is that the question hasn't really been answered yet, by Wittgenstein, what constitutes making a mistake.

§54. W asks us to consider cases "where we say that a game is played according to a particular rule". W states that the rule might be used to help to teach someone how to play a game; or the rule could be "a tool of the game itself". Or the rule might not be taught or written down or expressed at all, except via its expression in the play of the game.

One learns the game by watching how others play it. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the way the game is played - like a natural law governing the play.

W asks how an observer can distinguish between "the players' mistakes and correct play" in this case. He answers his question:"There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour". As an example of this, W asks us to consider the characteristic behaviour of somebody correcting themselves when they make a slip of the tongue. W states that this is recognisable even if we don't know the person's language.

My translation (Anscombe) reads "definite rule" rather than "particular rule".

As I said in my previous post, I'm now using the 4th edition.