The semantics of possible world discourse is established by virtue of how we use the relevant terms in the actual world. The actual world does not consist entirely of descriptions. Possible worlds always do. Some possible world scenarios consist of true descriptions, some do not. Which one a possible world consists of is determined solely by virtue of what's happened and/or is happening in the actual world. To hold otherwise is to conflate validity with truth.

So, we refer by ostension and/or description. — creativesoul

Yes, that is precisely what I have been arguing. But, we also refer by designation and the fixing of designation is dependent upon ostention and/ or description. I think perhaps what Kripke wants to argue is that description is also dependent on designation (we must name things before we can describe them, we must name the descriptive attributes themselves) whereas designation can be independent of description, by depending only on ostention, when the named (designated) entity is present.

Hey, @Snakes Alive, @Pierre-Normand, @andrewk, and @Banno

I found an enlightening text specifically in regards to Kripke's NN and the de re/de dicto distinction. Let me know what you guys think about it. It's a brief and very good text.

Here you go.

Thanks – I've actually read that paper, believe it or not (I used to be interested in the semantics of names).

I'm sympathetic to the view that names do not exhibit this distinction, as Kripke predicts, due to their being rigid designators. The effects described have to do with independent mechanisms, though articulating exactly what they are is somewhat difficult. I doubt they have anything to do with names specifically.

Are you a philosophy grad student? Sorry, I had to ask due to my inferiority complex on this forum of not being a formally trained philosopher but an auto-didactic.

@Banno

This paper delves into the meter-rule. Let me know if you find it of any use.

Nope.

The Queen. around p.112.

In some possible world, the Queen was the daughter of the Trumans.

But, says Kripke, that is not a case in which Elizabeth was the daughter of the Trumans, but instead a case in which some other person, the Truman's daughter, took on the characteristics that in the actual world are associated with Elizabeth.

The method Kripke is using here is worth setting out. When the characteristics of same individual are strained by our stipulations to the point where credulity breaks, he suggests we look to the possibility that what we have is a distinct individual.

Especially in cases where the origin of the individual is called into question.

if a material object has its origin
from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any other matter.(P.114(n)

Hence there is a sort of inheritance of individuality...

If B is made from A, and C from D, in no possible world is B the very same as C. SO part of the grammar Kripke is proposing is that if two things have distinct beginnings, then they are distinct in every possible world.

That seems intuitively pretty obvious from the extensional nature of his approach to modality.

In addition to the principle that the origill of an object is essential to it,
another principle suggested is that the substance of which it is made is essential. (p.114(n))

If B is made from A, then in every possible world B is made from A; To propose that B might have been made from D would be contradictory; yet instead one might propose that some B might never have existed, but that instead there was another individual - B' - which was made from D.

AT some stage folk differentiated between pyrites and gold. Presumably they looked at the stuff in the sheep's wool, and separated out the dense, lustrous, rounded bits from the lighter, shiny, pointed bits. Did they change the meaning of "gold" to discount pyrites? Or did they discover that gold is lustrous and rounded, while this other stuff isn't? Was gold always lustrous and rounded, even before folk noticed?

Might the Thylacine have been a type of dog?

Might the Thylacine have been a type of dog? — Banno

Could have been in the same way a red panda is a type of panda.

And how is that? That they have a common ancestor?

All mammals have a common ancestor. Giant pandas and red pandas are just both called pandas.

Giant and red pandas are both Arctoidea.

Giant Pandas are bears; Red Pandas are Musteloidea, along with skunks and weasels.

So is a weasel a panda, too?

So is a weasel a panda, too? — Banno

I don't think so.

Why not? Is there a reason?

Why not? Is there a reason? — Banno

This is why they killed Socrates. Questions like this.

Yeah.

Better to say that the Thylacine could never have been a dog, because dogs are not marsupials. Despite the similarity in appearance, it's not a dog.

In no possible world is there a marsupial dog.

SO someone takes a dog and uses CRISPR to add a pouch to its offspring.

That's not a marsupial. It's a dog with a pouch.

So could Nixon have been a robot?

Does Kripke treat kinds differently to individuals?

He says that it is not the case that cats could turn out to be robots. That if it turned out that cats were automata, we should say that what we had thought to be cats were not cats, but robots. (p.125-6).

TO be a cat is necessarily to be an animal.

SO if it turned out that the fellow we thought to be Nixon was actually an automata, then we were wrong to think he was Nixon.

SO Kripke is claiming:

Once we know that cats are animals, then it is not possible that cats not be animals; and, once we know Nixon is human, it is not possible that Nixon not be human.

Once we know Nixon won the election, it's not possible he didn't win it?

No. The important part is something like the origin or cause of the individual's having that property. A Nixon who had not won the election could still be a Nixon; a "Nixon" so-called that was not human could not be our Nixon.

Or something like that.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/240807
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/240808

Yes, I read it. I mentioned before that Kripke claims Nixon couldn't have been a golf ball. Now I'm asking why not.

Seems you might have been right with regards to your exegesis.

So, we refer by ostension and/or description.
— creativesoul

Yes, that is precisely what I have been arguing... — Janus

I think that you and I hold very similar views regarding several different aspects of this topic. Even during the objections I didn't see that much difference aside from you presenting a view that kept existential dependency in the forefront of thought, whereas I have not been consistent regarding that.

I began my considerations by carefully thinking about what we're doing when positing hypothetical scenarios(possible world scenarios) involving proper nouns, because that is Kripke's ground/justification.

...we also refer by designation and the fixing of designation is dependent upon ostention and/or description... — Janus

Let me see if I understand this part(the notion of designation) according to your position. I'm assuming, based what's written in the above quote, that you're argument/position here goes something like this...

Some successful reference is by designation. All designation is dependent upon the fixing of designation. All fixing of designation is dependent upon ostension and/or description. Therefore, all reference by designation is dependent upon ostension and/or description.

Given that...

The notions of designation and fixing the designation cannot be equivalent to ostension and/or description. This holds because you agreed that we successfully refer with both ostension and/or description, and made a point to say that we "also refer" by designation. This clearly implies a remarkable (ontological?)distinction between successful reference by ostension and/or description and successful reference by designation.

If all reference by designation is dependent upon ostension and/or description, and there is a remarkable difference between successful reference by ostension and/or description and successful reference by designation, then it only follows that not all ostension and/or description includes(or is) designation. So, cases of successful reference by designation are more complex, and thus they must include something aside from just ostension and/or description. This additional element, part, feature, etc. must also be something that neither ostension nor description is dependent upon. Neither can include it. Furthermore, this extra bit must be something that neither can account for.

So...

What is that additional something that all designation has that no other successful reference by ostension and/or description does? I mean what does reference by designation include that reference by ostension and/or description does not?

...I think perhaps what Kripke wants to argue is that description is also dependent on designation (we must name things before we can describe them, we must name the descriptive attributes themselves) whereas designation can be independent of description, by depending only on ostention, when the named (designated) entity is present. — Janus

Keeping in mind that Kripke said early on that the term designator is one that can be used to cover both, names and descriptions.

When one holds that description is dependent upon designation, and descriptions are one kind of designator(names are the other), then one must also hold that at least one kind of designator(description) is dependent upon designation. It only follows that designation is not description. This seems compatible/coherent so far...

If designation can be independent of description, and all designation is dependent upon a designator, then it would only follow that some designators are not descriptions. Again, that's no problem as far as I can see. I mean, it's perfectly consistent with what I've understood about Kripke's terminological framework. Both names and descriptions are designators.

Do you find it lacking somehow?

Could Nixon be a golf ball?

"Could Nixon have been a golf ball" is still about Nixon. Even if the answer is "No".