Sure, the actual world is a possible world. — Banno

All possible worlds, according to Kripke, consist of stipulated alternative circumstances. The actual world does not.

Can you give me some more? A reference? — Banno

Look back in the preface. Should be on page 19.

Also, look back at your Katworld example. Do you notice that it points toward internalism?

Of course common naming of kinds and attributes is necessary for description, but proper naming is not. — Janus

The above is about existential dependency. I do not think that you understand what Kripke is getting at. I think that understanding what Kripke is getting at is itself existentially dependent upon drawing and maintaining the distinction between "necessary" as the term is used in modal discourse and something's being necessary for another thing's existence(existential dependency).

I do not think that you're keeping that much in mind.

And as for proper names being rigid designators 'The man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' is as much a rigid designator as 'Donald Trump' because the latter must be shorthand for ' The man who was named 'Donald Trump' at such and such a time and date.' There could be many other individuals named 'Donald Trump', so the name alone would not seem to be a rigid designator. — Janus

I'm in agreement with the hairy man on this one. I do not think that you've given due attention to the bits of Kripke's lectures that deal with these objections you're levying. I'll attempt to clearly explain this here and now.

Kripke begins these lectures(ignoring the introduction) by pointing out what we're doing when positing possible world scenarios(hypotheticals) while using proper nouns. Kripke notes that these hypothetical scenarios always include usage of the proper noun accompanied by and/or placed into some alternative set of circumstances. He further notes that our doing this does not stop us from knowing who(or what) we're talking about. That's what's going on when positing hypotheticals with proper nouns.

The important - dare I say crucial - consideration here(by my lights anyway) is that that part of Kripke's account is not about hypothetical scenarios. Rather, it's about actual world scenarios and what's going on within them. Thus, a valid objection to that can only be showing otherwise. Kripke uses what's going on in this world when we posit possible world scenarios with proper nouns as justificatory ground. The only objection capable of diminishing the brute strength of Kripke's justificatory ground would be one providing a possible world scenario using a proper noun that shows his account to be in error.

So, as this all pertains to your criticism above...

"The man who was president at such and such a time and date" picks a unique individual out of this world just as well as "Nixon" does. However, the reason your criticism falls flat on it's face here is due to the fact that "the man who was president and such and such a time and date" is not an example of a possible world scenario using a proper noun. That is precisely what grounds Kripke's discourse here.

Furthermore...

Kripke calls both names and descriptions "designators". The difference between "rigid" designators and "non-rigid" designators is that the former retains the ability for successful reference in all possible world scenarios using proper nouns whereas the latter does not.

Because there are better fish to fry in the third lecture. — Banno

There is no need to fry the best fish.

You see what I did there?

:brow:

Kripke's notion of "rigid designator" includes proper nouns used within possible world scenarios, and excludes description used within possible world scenarios. Kripke's ground for that is how we use proper nouns and descriptions within possible world scenarios.

:wink:

All knowledge of elemental constituents is existentially dependent upon naming practices. Not all elemental constituents are. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon naming practices. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon our knowledge of them. That which is existentially dependent upon neither naming practice nor our knowledge cannot consist of either. Some elemental constituents consist of neither name nor knowledge.

You say that they were, in this possible world, cutting up cats. On what basis are you able to say that it was cats that they were cutting up? Is it because they called what they were cutting up 'cats'? Or was it because what they were cutting up looked identical to cats? Or something else? — Janus

And again you want to go off on a fucking tangent. Answer the question for yourself. — Banno

How can I answer it myself when I don't know what you mean by 'cats' in you imaginary scenario. Were they just ordinary domestic cats being cut up? Are there wild cats and big cats in your scenario? Are they also machines? Are there mammals in your scenario which are not machines?

Whether or not they would still be called cats depends on so many details about this "possible world' you have very inadequately imagined!

I do not think that you're keeping that much in mind. — creativesoul

And you haven't explained what you think the distinction is.

The rest of what you say does nothing to explain why definite descriptions cannot designate rigidly as proper names do. All possible world discourse depends on the actual world because this is where the discourse happens. And this, of course includes naming. So, as I see it possible world discourse does not help that much to illuminate the semantics involved in our practices of ostention, description and designation.

I'm open to being convinced otherwise, but I haven't seen any decent arguments yet. And those who seem to pride themselves on being most familiar with Kripke's thought seem to be unwilling or unable to answer what I understand to be the hard questions, or alternatively to show just why they are not significant questions at all, which is instead merely baldly asserted.

The main point for me is that if definite descriptions can rigidly designate, then the purportedly semantically significant distinction between names and descriptions dissolves.

The important - dare I say crucial - consideration here(by my lights anyway) is that that part of Kripke's account is not about hypothetical scenarios. Rather, it's about actual world scenarios and what's going on within them. Thus, a valid objection to that can only be showing otherwise. Kripke uses what's going on in this world when we posit possible world scenarios with proper nouns as justificatory ground. The only objection capable of diminishing the brute strength of Kripke's justificatory ground would be one providing a possible world scenario using a proper noun that shows his account to be in error. — creativesoul

I'd like to say a bit more here...

What Kripke says about our use of proper nouns and/or descriptions as a means for hypothetical discourse is true. That is what makes it such strong justificatory ground. The strength of justificatory ground is determined(on my view at least) by virtue of it's being true. There is no better standard.

However, I realize that some people may rationally infer that I'm talking about something other than that. I'm not. I'm not commenting upon it's scope.

Definite descriptions can be rigid designators, and Kripke acknowledges this. However, ordinary descriptions used in natural languages are typically not. — Snakes Alive

Well, if this is true then as @Pierre-Normand said earlier, I am not disagreeing with Kripke at all. If this is so it makes my exchanges with @Banno seem puzzling! He has not made it clear (perhaps he cannot) what he thinks I am mistaken about.

I'm going to wait a bit prior to replying to you. I implore you to re-read the post that you're replying to.

Kripke begins these lectures(ignoring the introduction) by pointing out what we're doing when positing possible world scenarios(hypotheticals) while using proper nouns — creativesoul

At least in the early part of the lectures, Kripke doesn't appear to address hypotheticals, which are events that, for all we know, may happen in the future of this world. Indeed, Kripke tends to only use the word 'hypothetical' in relation to 'hypothetical languages', which is something different altogether. Rather, Kripke is concerned with counterfactuals, which are events that we believe did not happen in this world, such as the loss of the 1968 election by Nixon.

If he were only talking about hypotheticals it would be uncontroversial that we know who we are talking about. For instance, if he were to imagine a world in which Nixon's skeleton is dug up in the year 2020 and put in a museum, there would be no confusion about the skeleton to which he was referring.

But as soon as we move from hypotheticals to counterfactuals, the certainty disappears. Change any thing, however slight, of past events in the world, and statements such as "B did X at time T", where person B is a person that was in our actual world at time T, become uncertain at best, and empty of meaning at worst. What we can say is "imagine a world that was the same as this in every respect and, up to time T has a one-to-one correspondence of objects and events in that world to objects and events in this, except that, at time T, the object in that world that corresponded to the object B in our world at time T, did X instead of the Y that the object in our world did at that time".

I think the term 'imaginary world' is much more appropriate than 'possible world' for such cases, because those worlds are not possible in the sense of being accessible from this one, starting at the time where we are now. We would have to change the past to get there (and doing so generates ambiguity in any reference to an object at a time later than that at which the change is imagined to occur). In contrast, the term 'possible worlds' is fine for hypotheticals, because one can get to such worlds without having to change the past.

"The man who was president at such and such a time and date" picks a unique individual out of this world just as well as "Nixon" does. However, the reason your criticism falls flat on it's face here is due to the fact that "the man who was president and such and such a time and date" is not an example of a possible world scenario using a proper noun. That is precisely what grounds Kripke's discourse here. — creativesoul

I don't agree with this because Nixon (any Nixon) is 'a man called Nixon in this world'. What enables us to pick a particular Nixon out from all the others (apart from being able to recognize his appearance)?

Look Janus...

Offer up a possible world scenario using both proper names and descriptions.

Then we can look to see if what you say about Kripke's position rings true. That offering is the only acceptable form of criticism, for possible world scenarios involving both proper names and descriptions are precisely what Kripke is talking about.

Got one?

Try to come up with one using your own description "the president of the United States at such and such time"...

Show me how we can use it along with a proper name as a means for setting out some possible world in order to see that Kripke is wrong. That would require the definite description maintaining our ability to successfully refer to the referent of the name, in addition to our also seeing that we can change the proper name within possible world scenarios and still successfully pick out the referent.

Another irrelevant comment.

I've told you I don't agree with what you wrote, and why. If you disagree with my reasons for disagreement then explain why, explain just what's wrong with those reasons. Answer the question or tell me why it is a misguided question. It should be as simple as that.

If you can't do that then you're just pissin' in the wind...

Kripke begins these lectures(ignoring the introduction) by pointing out what we're doing when positing possible world scenarios(hypotheticals) while using proper nouns
— creativesoul
At least in the early part of the lectures, Kripke doesn't appear to address hypotheticals, which are events that, for all we know, may happen in the future of this world. Indeed, Kripke tends to only use the word 'hypothetical' in relation to 'hypothetical languages', which is something different altogether. Rather, Kripke is concerned with counterfactuals.. — andrewk

Well, I'm going off of what Kripke wrote about stipulating the circumstances thereof. Those can be either true or false with respect to the actual world, whereas counterfactuals cannot be true. So...

You're being a twit.

I've told you I don't agree with what you wrote... — Janus

Kripke is talking about possible world scenarios involving both proper names and descriptions.

Agree or disagree?

I'm going to spoon feed you... ok widdle guy?

C'mon...

You can do it.

You're being a twit. — creativesoul

Typically when you can't offer any cogent response you resort to insult. So, I've lost all interest in this exchange.

Mirror mirror...

:roll:

Anyone can look and judge for themselves what's taken place here.

Kripke is claiming that during possible world discourse using both proper names and descriptions, that we can change the description while retaining the ability for successful reference but we cannot change the proper name while maintaining that ability. There are no examples to the contrary.

It follows from that that we've the strongest possible justificatory ground for concluding that description is not necessary for successful reference within possible world discourse involving both proper names and descriptions.

It says nothing at all about what is or is not necessary for us to begin such possible world discourse(about what it takes to successfully pick the individual out of this world)...

Thus...

You're shooting at the wrong target.

He agrees that both are necessary for picking some objects out of this world. At least, his notion of designator allows for that because it covers both. His notions of being rigid and/or non-rigid are determined by whether or not the designator in question is capable of successful reference without the other within a possible world scenario involving proper names and descriptions after the referent has already been picked out of this world.

That's the best I can do...

Quid pro quo?

'if a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had its origin in any other matter.'(p. 114)

Hence there is a sort of inheritance of individuality...

If B is made from A, and C from D, in no possible world is B the very same as C. SO part of the grammar Kripke is proposing is that if two things have distinct beginnings, then they are distinct in every possible world.

That seems intuitively pretty obvious from the extensional nature of his approach to modality. — Banno

I'm ok with that.

"In addition to the principle that the origill of an object is essential to it,
another principle suggested is that the substance of which it is made is essential."(p. 114)

If B is made from A, then in every possible world B is made from A; To propose that B might have been made from D would be contradictory; yet instead one might propose that some B might never have existed, but that instead there was another individual - B' - which was made from D. — Banno

This one doesn't sit as well...

Help me out, if you would...

:smile:

Wait, I think I understand...

Instead B may have never existed(the B made from A), but rather there is another individual with the same namesake made from something other than A.

What good is that?

Ah! That's the basis of the cats in KatWorld. Cool.

What follows from the fact that we can imagine such things?

So... — creativesoul

What comes after the ellipsis?

So, I'm not sure that his focus was upon counterfactuals exclusively. Rather, I took his notion of possible world scenarios to be one of a much more minimalist criterion, which makes more sense if he aims at gathering all of the different versions that he wants to target 'under one roof', so to speak.

That we're not inside the actual world? The actual world is like a history book. Napoleon isn't really in there. — frank

p.18-20 and n.

Seems to me that this is an admonition for philosophers not to make too much of possible worlds. Not to pose "questions whose meaningfulness is not supported by our original intuitions"; not to over-endow their possible worlds. "A practical description of the extent to which the 'counterfactual situation' differs in the relevant way from the actual facts is sufficient".

His target here seems to me to be those who fuss about transworld identification.

So in saying that the "actual world", as used in modal discussion, is not the world around us, he is pointing out that "actual world" here is used as a piece in modal games, no different to any other possible world. Hence when he says "the possible but not actual worlds are not phantom duplicates of the 'world' in this other sense", the other sense is that of a world of "the enormous scattered object that surrounds us".

He's saying that we ought not overcook the cake.

So after that I will maintain two things. Firstly, that the modal world in which we live is no different in ontology* to any other modal world. And secondly, that the modal world in which we live is one of many possible worlds; to think otherwise would be to imply that our world is not possible.

That is, to play modal games we just pretend that our world is one of many possible worlds.

(*Edit: that's going to be misread. Someone will say "but the actual world has a completely different ontology - it's real!" - or some such. Yes, it does. Perhaps it will help to imagine folk in some possible world thinking "damn, wish we were in the actual world, instead of just a possible world...")

I think that there's actually much to be uncovered by virtue of our teasing out some nuance here. Particularly, there's much packed up into the notion of "alternative circumstances"...

You've skirted around it...

...counterfactuals, which are events that we believe did not happen in this world... — andrewk

I have a problem with this notion of counterfactual. I argued several pages back strongly against it. Events that we believe did not happen in this world are not always counter to fact. They are always counter to belief.

It is also the case that we stipulate circumstances that we do believe to be true of this world within possible world scenarios.

My cat goes missing in the actual world...

We think through all the different circumstances that could have caused that event. Each set of alternative circumstances constitutes being it's own possible world if all possible worlds consist of stipulated circumstances. The one we believe may or may not be true. Whether or not it is so is not determined by our belief. Rather, it is determined by the actual events.

Instead B may have never existed(the B made from A), but rather there is another individual with the same namesake made from something other than A. — creativesoul

Yep.

So in saying that the "actual world", as used in modal discussion, is not the world around us, he is pointing out that "actual world" here is used as a piece in modal games, no different to any other possible world. Hence when he says "the possible but not actual worlds are not phantom duplicates of the 'world' in this other sense", the other sense is that of a world of "the enormous scattered object that surrounds us".

He's saying that we ought not overcook the cake.

So after that I will maintain two things. Firstly, that the modal world in which we live is no different in ontology to any other modal world. And secondly, that the modal world in which we live is one of many possible worlds; to think otherwise would be to imply that our world is not possible. — Banno

Ooooh... :yikes:

Hmmmm...

That doesn't seem to follow from anything I've read thus far...

That is, to play modal games we just pretend that our world is one of many possible worlds.

That's not as frightening a claim...

It follows from that that we've the strongest possible justificatory ground for concluding that description is not necessary for successful reference within possible world discourse involving both proper names and descriptions. — creativesoul

So, if you start describing a possible world scenario involving someone called 'Donald Trump', how do I know which Donald Trump (assuming there are more than one) you are referring to without the benefit of any definite description?

What you say seems, on the face of it at least, to be self-contradictory. You seem to be saying that description is not necessary for discourse involving both proper names and description. How can I make sense of such a statement?

Making sense of what I said first requires at least an accurate account thereof. Start there. I'm not interested in defending your misrepresentation of what I said to you...

Kripke is talking about possible world scenarios involving both proper names and descriptions.

Agree?