If you're continuing on the bishop notion... all bishops become queens, unless it is not one of theirs, then they become pawns.

If your remark is about whether or not a discussion of true/false belief is too far off track... well... I'm trying to make sure I have a good grasp upon what Kripke is not claiming...

:wink:

I don't know, but it seems to me that he's doing very little aside from pointing out the facts. I mean, I'm very impressed by the first two lectures. The more I read, and the more I watch folk like you put his stuff into actual practice, the more impressed I become with his method.

Something else just occurred to me...

The notions of reference/identity that Kripke's targeting seem to be the ones that claim and/or lead to claiming that all reference depends upon definite description. A criticism of those is rightfully applicable to the purported problems with identity across possible worlds as well.

That's killing several birds with one stone.

And of course, the ambiguity regarding the notion of "depends upon" is proving to be much fodder as well. I've been playing around with the consequences following from different versions, as well as different versions of "necessary" and the interplay between the different combinations thereof. Interesting results. Could be very powerful justificatory ground. May already be, and I've just begun to recognize that much.

Seems that Kripke was at pains promoting intuition as adequate ground for certain notions. What counts as being necessary seems a fantastic candidate for that.

No I acknowledged that DDs are more or less definite. Read again and discover the facts about what I wrote. (Of course it is taken as read that "over there" in this context connotes 'in Europe's, and also implicit is that the country is names Albania. So a country over there named Albania is in fact a description definite enough to pick out just the one country that satisfies it.

Besides, I just wanted to explain how and that why I believe that your charge of irrelevance was unfounded. That's been done. — creativesoul

With that correction in italics, your post appears very reasonable.

No I acknowledged that DDs are more or less definite. — Janus

No???

The charge was that you are equivocating with your terminological use of "definite descriptions"...

You've neglected to draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between definite descriptions and one's that are not definite. The proof of this is the thread itself. The above quote overtly denies equivocating and then goes on to describe what you're doing. The description itself satisfies what counts as equivocating.

So, charged with abusing an otherwise perfectly intelligible notion like "definite description", you answer "No" in the same sentence that is also admitting to satisfying it's criterion. That is to compound the abuse by adding the term "no" to the term "definite description".

That's a performative contradiction is it not andrewk? I mean, you've been invoking the speech act theorists.

Furthermore, the abuse is even further compounded by how the term "acknowledged" is used. "Definite description" is a pre-conceived notion. Kripke invokes it. No one here determines the criterion for what counts as a definite description. That has already been determined.

Definite descriptions are always definite. What makes them so is that they are - purportedly - both necessary and sufficient for picking a unique object out of the world to the exclusion of all others. That is what makes them different from those that are not.

There is no "more or less". They either meet the criterion or they do not. One cannot acknowledge that definite descriptions(as invoked by Kripke) are more or less definite, anymore than one can acknowledge that a square is more or less a rectangle with four sides of equal length. Some of your 'less definite' ones look more like triangles.

One can acknowledge that they have been using the term in such a way. That would be to admit of equivocation. Equivocation is shown by and/or results in self contradiction, as well as the kind of incoherency that renders the otherwise perfectly intelligible notion of "definite description" virtually meaningless.

So, are you mistaken or is this a deliberate attempt at muddying the waters?

Whatever, of course I believe that. It's also true.

Not equivocation, rather allowing for the obvious fact that descriptions can be more or less definite. It's not black and white and there may even be disagreement in particular cases as to whether a definite desciption is "necessary and sufficient" to pick out just one entity or not. Your qualification "purportedly" acknowledges this.

If you know it's true, should be able to prove that. You cannot, so it makes no sense to say "It's also true" unless you prefix it by "I believe that...". But if you do that, it adds nothing to the previous sentence. So it's best to stop at "Of course I believe that."

So, I hope we can lay down the topic of definite descriptions to rest, and simply say that under certain circumstances definite descriptions are or can be essential in maintaining or designating an object among many others that might obfusticate the referent, by a name. Accepting this proposition kind of solves a lot of issues that have been talked about in my opinion.

If someone were to ask, where is Hesus in Spanish, the referent might be ambiguous as it's a very common name in Latin America. But, had I said where is the Son of God? Then, I believe the issue disappears despite there being no name that would designate such an entity or person.

Not equivocation, rather allowing for the fact that descriptions can obviously be more or less definite. It's not black and white and there may be disagreement in particular cases as to whether a definite desciption is "necessary and sufficient" to pick out just one entity. Your qualification "purportedly" acknowledges this. — Janus

My qualification "purportedly" acknowledges that I may not agree with the pre-conceived notion's criterion. It is the criterion none-the-less. A description either satisfies the criterion or it does not. If it does then it is a DD. If it does not, then it is not.

Triangles are not more or less squares...

"Some country over there" is not a DD. Calling it such is equivocating the term DD.

If you know it's true, should be able to prove that. — andrewk

Rubbish. There are all sorts of statements that I know are true but cannot be proven by any means. Formal logical proofs cover even less.

There's a bit of irony here. I've been charged with invoking a notion "successful reference" that is purportedly moot and irrelevant to N&N as a result of not being mentioned, by one who is using the notion of definite description - which is mentioned and used within N&N - in a way that is both moot and irrelevant to the way it's used in N&N...

:snicker:

Banno's charge of abuse holds good. It's certainly been 'proven' true by the facts.

All cases of successful reference are existentially dependent upon fixing the referent. A referent is fixed via naming practice(initial baptism), description, and/or both.

Not all cases of successful reference include description(definite or otherwise).

All successful reference is existentially dependent upon that which not all successful reference includes. That which all successful reference is existentially dependent upon is not equivalent to that which all successful reference includes.

If what counts as "necessary" for successful reference is determined solely by virtue of existential dependency, and not all examples of successful reference include that which it is existentially dependent upon, then it only follows that successful reference need not include that which is necessary for it's own existence.

If what counts as "necessary" for successful reference is determined solely by virtue of what's included in specific cases thereof, and successful reference does not always include that which it is existentially dependent upon, then it only follows that successful reference need not include that which it is existentially dependent upon.

How's that for intuitive?

Are you serious?

So it's like this: the descriptivist claims that a description (or cluster of descriptions) is shorthand for a name and so is synonymous.

The Modal Argument is simple: descriptivism fails because descriptions aren't usually synonymous with names because they're usually contingent properties.

Since Albania didn't have to be called that, it's a contingent property of Albania.

Read N+N from pg 53-75.

"Some country over there" is not a DD. Calling it such is equivocating the term DD. — creativesoul

It depends on context. 'Some country over there' is a definite general description of European countries (in the context of this discussion 'Europe' is implicit in 'over there'). 'The country over there called Albania' or even just 'The country called Albania' is a definite description, if there is no other country called Albania.

The Modal Argument is simple: descriptivism fails because descriptions aren't usually synonymous with names because they're usually contingent properties.

Since Albania didn't have to be called that, it's a contingent property of Albania. — frank

I look at it differently; I see the name 'Donald Trump', in the absence of any context at all to be synonymous with 'A man called Donald Trump'. Once we have some descriptive or ostensive context, that is we are given a description of a particular man called Donald Trump, or we have him pointed out to us when we are in his presence, or we are shown a photograph, then in that context the name refers to just one man: 'the man called Donald Trump'.

Of course the country called Albania did not have to be called Albania, or even be recognized as a geographical region, all of that is contingent. But once a geographical region has been defined in terms of latitudinal, longitudinal and topographical boundaries and so on and named Albania, that definition which can be given as a more or less precise description distinguishes it more or less definitely from all other geographical regions. And that description as pertaining to the actual world can then be used modally, to talk about counterfactual or 'possible world' scenarios.

There are all sorts of statements that I know are true but cannot be proven by any means. — creativesoul

What would be an example of such a statement?

Can someone "successfully refer" to some entity if they have absolutely no idea at all what that entity is? You might say, in a case where someone hears others speaking about Albania, and has no idea what Albania refers to (that is, whether it refers to a country, a cleaning product, a person, a pet, a brand of toaster or whatever) that when they ask "Who or what is Albania?" they are successfully referring to Albania.

I think that would be wrong-headed, because I think the question being asked is "Who or what is being referred to by the name 'Albania'?", and looking at it this way no particular entity is being referred to, rather a description of whatever entity is being referred to, sufficient to define it, is being requested.

The Modal Argument is simple: descriptivism fails because descriptions aren't usually synonymous with names because they're usually contingent properties.

Since Albania didn't have to be called that, it's a contingent property of Albania. — frank

I covered that issue in this post.

I'll expand on it here in the hope of bridging the gap.

A DD is applicable at a point in time. To include 'was POTUS' in a DD of Nixon would be invalid in 1940 but valid in 1980. When we wish to consider counterfactuals in relation to event E at time T3, that concerns object X, we choose time T2 that is before T3 but after the beginning of X (T1).

Next we select a DD that would have been valid at T2 and uniquely identifies X at that time.

We then consider the set of possible worlds that branched from this one at time T2. Those are our counterfactuals concerning X and E.

All properties of the DD that we used for X are necessary in that set of possible worlds because they were valid at T2 and everything that was true at T2 in this world is true in all the other worlds.

In the case of an event in Albania, say the opening of its borders, we backtrack to a time T2 before that event, and find a DD that was valid at that time. If T2 is before the country was named Albania, we cannot use 'The country named Albania' as a DD in this counterfactual exercise. However, if the event is the opening of its borders (eg the counterfactual might be 'If Albania had not opened its borders, would it still be communist?'), that was after adopting the name Albania, so the name is necessary, not contingent. If the event is earlier, we'd need to use a different DD such as 'the region bounded by ... mountains, ... rivers and the Mediterranean sea'.

Summary: arguments against DDs that don't take account of their period of validity are invalid.

Summary: arguments against DDs that don't take account of their time stamp are invalid. — andrewk

This is a very nice and clear statement and completely in accordance with my view.

But once a geographical region has been defined in terms of latitudinal, longitudinal and topographical boundaries and so on and named Albania, that definition which can be given as a more or less precise description distinguishes it more or less definitely from all other geographical region — Janus

Yet it doesn't perform the role the descriptivist says it must.

Summary: arguments against DDs that don't take account of their period of validity are invalid. — andrewk

But it was never a necessary property.

I'm getting the impression this discussion isnt valuable to any of us.

Yep.

It depends on context. — Janus

No, it really doesn't. The definition is "The x such that δ(x)"

Notice the "The"? That's there because a definite description picks out an individual. "That country over there" might count as a definite description; "some country over there" never will. Even if you try to twist the context to make it so.

You are just wrong on this.

"Who or what is being referred to by the name 'Albania'?", and looking at it this way no particular entity is being referred to, — Janus

If the question is parsed as "Who or what is being referred to by the name 'Albania'", then what answer will suffice? What answer is correct?

Not "Some country in northern Europe". That is certainly wrong. "A country bordering Greece" might well be sufficient. despite not being a definite description.

Now, since the question has a correct answer, then the question must have referred to something. That is, the question is clearly about Albania, and hence a correct answer will also be about Albania.

Again, you are just wrong.

I'm getting the impression this discussion isn't valuable to any of us. — frank

Indeed.

I'd like to move on to the topic of consciousness, from the end of N&N. This is for me the most interesting part, since I think that Kripke goes quite wrong. But the incessant misdirected discussion of descriptions has doubtless chased away those who have some idea of what is going in N&N.

It pisses me off.

But it was never a necessary property. — frank

Yeah. Introducing time is just another tangent, taking us away from the point of the book.

But it was never a necessary property. — frank

It is necessary in the collection of possible worlds being considered, which is those that split from this at time T2 that is between the naming of the country and the opening of its borders. That's why the question of 'accessibility' of worlds is important. The name 'Albania' is a necessary property of the country in the set of all worlds that are accessible in this particular counterfactual. For a different counterfactual, there would be a different splitting time, and the name may not be a necessary property in the set of accessible worlds for that counterfactual.

To consider a counterfactual and the associated set of possible worlds without taking account of the properties that held at the splitting point can lead only to confusion.

On the other hand, if one wants to argue that the splitting point is irrelevant then those worlds have nothing to do with this one and there is no basis at all for saying that an object in one of those worlds 'is' or "isn't" the 'same' object as in this world. It is only the state at the splitting point that connects the different versions of the object.

I'd like to move on to the topic of consciousness, from the end of N&N. — Banno

Cool. Let's do that.


You're straying again from the descriptivist's claims. Are you interested in starting a different thread?

I'm getting the impression this discussion isn't valuable to any of us. — frank

I can only speak for myself, but it's been valuable for me.

My prior impression, based only really on the text and secondary sources, was that Kripke's purported demonstration of the failure of descriptivism fails itself, and that his causal theory was of no interest because it is too laden down with arcane metaphysical baggage.

Having the opportunity to discuss it with some real-life Kripke enthusiasts, as well as sceptics, has done two things - on the one hand given me a better sense of just where the attempted demolition of descriptivism fails, and on the other, made me appreciate some of the aims of Kripke's positive program, and the features of his causal theory that some philosophers find attractive.

I think it's essential to make a distinction between the negative and positive parts of N&N. The positive parts set out his causal theory, which is an admirable thing to do. It's a theory with some very nice aspects, and there's room for plenty of different theories of language (as previously stated, my favourite is Wittgenstein's). The negative side essentially says 'and all other theories are wrong'. I have plenty of sympathy for the positive side, and none at all for the negative side. The discussion only keeps getting dragged back to the negative side when people fail to distinguish between the attack on descriptivism and the outlining of the causal theory.

If people only want to focus on the latter, that's great. I probably won't have much to say about it, but will enjoy reading and thinking about it. But every time there's a 'that's why DDs don't work' or 'that's why descriptivism is wrong' comment, that takes the discussion off topic, if the topic is examination of the causal theory.

You're straying again from the descriptivist's claims — frank

No, I am straying from the claims that Kripke attributes to descriptivists. Kripke doesn't get to rule on what those claims are. I have said from the start that Kripke misrepresents the descriptivist position.

Shall we drop discussion of the attack on descriptivism and focus only on Kripke's positive program?