So you want to claim that "A country called Albania which borders Greece" is not a definite description? Your reasoning? Why should I "accept it and move on" unless I see valid reasons for thinking it is not?

As a matter of terminology, descriptions with an indefinite article like 'a' are called indefinite descriptions. Descriptions with a definite article like 'the' are called definite descriptions.

As to their semantic values, definite descriptions de jure pick out a single individual: so if there are two salient cats, or none, the cat appears to fail to refer. Indefinite descriptions are not like this: one can say a cat is in the room regardless of how many salient cats there are, and as long as there's at least one, the sentence is apparently true, and a cat looks not necessarily to refer to any individual in particular.

Even if there happens to be only one country called Albania bordering Greece, 'a country called Albania bordering Greece' is not semantically a definite description, since the fact that there is one such is contingent. If in another possible world there are two such countries, then the description will not pick out some one of them at that world, nor will it fail to refer: it will simply again result in true statements as long as there is at least one such country.

Thus, in our two-Albania world, 'the country called Albania bordering Greece sued for peace' might sound odd, since there are two satisfying the descriptive material, and the description purports to pick out the unique individual that does. However, 'a country called Albania bordering Greece sued for peace' is just true, so long as one of the two really did sue for peace. It doesn't matter which one.

As a matter of terminology, descriptions with an indefinite article like 'a' are called indefinite descriptions. Descriptions with a definite article like 'the' are called definite descriptions. — Snakes Alive

OK, I can see that is true from a purely abstract terminological point of view.

But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world, and since there is only one country called Albania bordering Greece, and in fact only one country called Albania: "A country called Albania that borders Greece" and even "a country called Albania" picks out just one entity and thus should be considered to be a definite description.

The same thing applies when you say that 'Donald Trump' is a rigid designator (leaving aside for the sake of the argument the objection that the name does not pick out just one entity if more than one person is called Donald Trump); it is only contingently so because the man named Donald Trump was named Donald Trump.

But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world, and since there is only one country called Albania bordering Greece, and in fact only one country called Albania: "A country called Albania that borders Greece" and even "a country called Albania" picks out just one entity and thus should be considered to be a definite description. — Janus

Read the rest of the post.

The same thing applies when you say that 'Donald Trump' is a rigid designator (leaving aside for the sake of the argument the objection that the name does not pick out just one entity if more than one person is called Donald Trump); it is only contingently so because the man named Donald Trump was named Donald Trump. — Janus

No. 'Donald Trump' picking out Donald Trump is not contingent on his being named so in another world. We can entertain counterfactuals to the effect of If Trump had been named Stephenson..., and in these we entertain possibilities in which Trump has another name, using the name 'Trump' to refer to him in those alternative possibilities.

Read the rest of the post. — Snakes Alive

That is not a counterargument

No. 'Donald Trump' picking out Donald Trump is not contingent on his being named so in another world. — Snakes Alive

I didn't say it was; I said it was contingent upon the man named Donald Trump being so named in this world. All reference in counterfactual discourse is established by reference to the actual world; and this goes equally for names as it does definite descriptions. The name 'Donald Trump' is shorthand for 'an entity named Donald Trump' or 'the entity named Donald Trump' (in case there is only one such entity).

I could name my car 'Donald Trump' if I wished to. In the case where multiple entities are named the same, then further qualifications (descriptions) are required to establish which of those entities is being referred to (except in ostensive contexts as I have already acknowledged many times).

.

I didn't say it was; I said it was contingent upon the man named Donald Trump being so named in this world. — Janus

Yeah, so? That's a trivial fact. How does that mean the name isn't a rigid designator?

All reference in counterfactual discourse is established by reference to the actual world; and this goes equally for names as it does definite descriptions. — Janus

No, it doesn't. If we say if the South successfully split from the Union, the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century would have governed a smaller territory. Here the definite description does not depend in any way upon who was the president of the United States at which time in the actual world – only in the counterfactual scenario.

I could name my car 'Donald Trump' if I wished to. In the case where multiple entities are named the same, then further qualifications (descriptions) are required to establish which of those entities is being referred to (except in ostensive contexts as I have already acknowledged many times). — Janus

This is simply irrelevant. Yes you could name anything anything you wanted. So what? The name, as it is actually used, based on the actual naming convention, rigidly designates.

that A is necessarily the same thing as B.

Now A is a pain, and hence necessarily a pain.. — Banno

Equivocation of the term "necessarily"?

Let's see...

The first use joins two variables with unknown value. The second does not.

Yep.

If we say if the South successfully split from the Union, the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century would have governed a smaller territory. Here the definite description does not depend in any way upon who was the president of the United States at which time in the actual world – only in the counterfactual scenario. — Snakes Alive

Yes, I think that, rather than 'all refs in counterfactuals are fixed in this world' it is 'all refs in counterfactuals that are rigid designators across the set of possible worlds under consideration are fixed in this world'.

The key for a rigid designator is that it picks out a unique individual at the time in which the possible worlds split for the counterfactual, and hence it continues to pick out corresponding versions of that unique individual in each of the possible worlds after the splitting time.

'POTUS at end of 19th C' is not a rigid designator for a counterfactual that splits in 1863, whereas 'The man named Richard Milhouse Nixon who was VPOTUS under Eisenhower' is a rigid designator for a counterfactual that splits in 1967, and 'The country called Albania' is a rigid designator for any counterfactual that splits at any time between when people first started calling it Albania and the present.

I think it would be hard to specify a concise rule for which designators in a counterfactual must be rigid. But I also suspect that in any given counterfactual, it will be easy to point out which designators of interest have to be rigid.

That is not how it works. Expressions are not rigid designators 'for' a particular sentence. Even if it were, having to specify for each sentence on a case by case basis whether it was or not makes the semantic theory useless, since you've basically given up on a compositional account of how the words in the sentence contribute to its meaning.

In other words, if you have to throw up your hands and say that 'they are rigid, except when they aren't,' you don't have a theory.

if you have to throw up your hands and say that 'they are rigid, except when they aren't,' you don't have a theory. — Snakes Alive

Fair enough. And thank you. I like a stimulating challenge. Perhaps my last post was a little lazy.

Let's see then. How about this:

A DD is a rigid designator in a counterfactual that splits at time T2, iff it picks out a unique object X in the real world, based only on events that have occurred up to T2.

Note that the rigidity can be assessed by looking only at this world and the split time for the counterfactual. It is not necessary to look at the other possible worlds to determine rigidity.

With this definition, in the counterfactual:

'If the South successfully split from the Union, the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century would have governed a smaller territory.'

the DD 'the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century' is not rigid because the split must occur before the end of 1865, and it is not possible to pick out in 1865 the winner of the last POTUS election in the 19th century (unless we assume superdeterminism, in which case a can of worms large enough to derail all existing theories of reference is opened).

But in the counterfactual:

'I wonder whether, if the man called Richard Milhouse Nixon, who contested the 1968 POTUS election as the Republican candidate, had lost that election, he would have given up politics and joined the circus'

the DD 'the man called Richard Milhouse Nixon, who contested the 1968 POTUS election as the Republican candidate' is rigid because the split must occur after Nixon was nominated the Republican candidate, and the DD picks him out uniquely at any time from then on.

That seems to work.

PS Thinking about this and the last few posts has helped me realise that Kripke's notion of rigidity is quite useful. I had previously not seen the point of it. So score one for Kripke.

This doesn't work, because in your example, the description is still not rigid. We might imagine a counterfactual scenario where another man named Nixon won the 1968 election, in which case we'd be referring to him using the counterfactual.

We can create the appropriate context easily within a discourse, for example by first saying, 'what if some other guy with the same name won the 1968 election under the same circumstances, etc.? I wonder whether...'

I've said it before, but clearly it needs repeating:

But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world — Janus

All reference in counterfactual discourse is established by reference to the actual world; — Janus

The latter is true, by virtue of the fact that is countered, but the former is false; not all possible worlds are counterfactual.

It is possible, even probable (if the Good Lord spares me), that I will go shopping tomorrow. I might go to Asda, or I might go to Aldi. Until tomorrow, which possible world will be actual is unknowable. The actual world of tomorrow is on equal footing with any (other) possible world of tomorrow - until tomorrow.

Can I say that "I" rigidly designates unenlightened here? That is, if @Banno tomorrow says "I didn't go shopping", that is irrelevant. Such is context; even in the possible world where the Good Lord does not spare me, it is unenlightened and not Banno who is not spared, and thus does not go shopping.

Did we already cover the water/H20 identity?

Kripke's rejection of the pain/C-fiber-stimulation identity is related to that.

This doesn't work, because in your example, the description is still not rigid. We might imagine a counterfactual scenario where another man named Nixon won the 1968 election, in which case we'd be referring to him using the counterfactual. — Snakes Alive

No, because the referent of the DD was the Republican candidate. If the Dem candidate was named Peter Nixon, or even Richard Milhouse Nixon, that person would not be the referent of the DD.

But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world — Janus

the former is false; not all possible worlds are counterfactual. — unenlightened

I think DDs in hypotheticals are covered by the same method as DDs in counterfactuals, and the splitting time for the possible worlds becomes the present, rather than some date prior to a fact that is being countered.

Consider the hypothetical:

'I wonder whether unenlightened will go to Asda tomorrow'

If I were to think this (although I always thought of you as more of a Waitrose person :razz: ) I would associate the name unenlightened with a DD like:

'The member of TPF that was an admin on the old forum, has a knack for composing pithy, memorable sayings that find their way onto the TPF facebook page, likes Krishnamurti and, despite his enormous literacy and intelligence, has worked as a janitor'.

That fixes the ref to you in this world and is the same across the ensemble of alternative possible worlds that are under consideration when we contemplate if you will go shopping tomorrow.

No, because the referent of the DD was the Republican candidate. If the Dem candidate was named Peter Nixon, or even Richard Milhouse Nixon, that person would not be the referent of the DD. — andrewk

I'm talking about an alternate world in which the Republican candidate had that name, but was not the same man that actually won the election.

If you mean the Rep candidate was a different Richard Milhouse Nixon, then that world is not accessible in this counterfactual because the change occurs before the split. If you want to consider a situation where our Nixon was not the 1968 Rep candidate, that's a different counterfactual, hence a different set of possible worlds and a different DD will be needed.

lol

Because you said so?

No, because that's how possible worlds work

What the fuck are you talking about

If you have a coherent, polite question to ask I will be happy to answer it.

I see we've moved on to tone policing. That's a good sign.

If you have a coherent, polite question to ask I will be happy to answer it. — andrewk

You are the one who isn't making sense.

In what way?

Kripke's view is that there's a set of all possible worlds. That set has as its members every way the world could be. Each member is along the lines of saying "It is possible that..."

If you want to start with your own intuitions and base modal language on them, you can, just as Lewis did, but you have to present your comments with that in mind. Otherwise we'll think you're trying to present Kripke's view and getting it wrong.

I did. Lost in the fog of Janus' posts.

I'm quite amazed that we haven't had to resort to interpretations or companions for this reading group.

Hmm, Quote is not working again. It's so intermittent.

Kripke's view is that there's a set of all possible worlds. That set has as its members every way the world could be. Each member is along the lines of saying "It is possible that..."

Do you have a ref for that? A problem with N&N is that it's very verbose and lacks clear, concise definitions. Which is one of the reasons it is so open to many different interpretations. A bit like Kant's CPR.

The genesis of this sub-thread was a comment by Janus about the use of DDs and when they rigidly designate. The response - I forget by whom - was that that was somehow inconsistent, and a possible counterexample was provided. To say that a response to that is not consistent with the way Kripke likes to do things misses the mark. The accusation was that the statement about DDs fails tout court, not just when playing by Kripke's rules.

If one wants to demolish descriptivism, one has to do it by rules and definitions that are generally accepted, not by rules that are only applicable within Kripke's theory.

That's why it's so important to distinguish between the positive and negative cases. In the positive case, Kripke is proposing a view of the world, and is free to set whatever rules he likes, as long as it is comprehensible and internally consistent. But the negative case - the attack on descriptivism - needs to play by rules and definitions that would be accepted by any philosopher, in phil of language or modal logic generally.

It has been suggested above that the positive and negative cases are inextricably intertwined. I don't agree. The motivation for the direction the positive case takes may lie in the things Kripke doesn't like about descriptivism. But that doesn't mean that the internal consistency or comprehensibility of his causal theory rely in any way on the success of his negative case.

A problem with N&N is that it's very verbose and lacks clear, concise definitions. — andrewk

Seriously?

I'm bowing out of this thread because of your insistence on derailing it.