Naming and necessity Lecture Three.

fdrake

I don't know what it would mean for the theory I discussed to be substance based. I haven't even seen the word in the bits of the book I've read.

fdrake

↪frank

O rly? Can you give me an example of a definite description which is not linguistic?

frank

Question about the opening lines of lecture three:

Are identity statements about names? Or is it that when we say X=Y, we're talking about an object's being identical to itself?

frank

O rly? Can you give me an example of a definite description which is not linguistic? — fdrake

Pointing.

fdrake

↪frank

That's not a definite description. 'The X such that F'.... F = pointing...

frank

"Kripke’s picture of naming, in fact, is that in every case a name is introduced by a procedure that can be thought of as reference-fixing – either by description or, what can be thought of as a special case of the former, ostension – and then the name is passed on from speaker to speaker..."

This is from Noonan's book Kripke.

schopenhauer1

↪fdrake

Well, it’s not descriptive based, and I saw Banno connecting with idea of substance so I assumed that Kripke was making some sort of case that rigid designators are substance based rather than description based. If you think that’s not the case, can you show me what he is trying to say?

fdrake

↪frank

How does this work? 'The X such that Y pointed to it at t'? how does that make pointing a definite description? Edit: moreover, why would pointing be required to be equivalent to or induce a definite description in order to vouchsafe reference using it?

Anyway, this is super tangential. The more relevant question would be whether perceptions or states of know-how are amenable to the form 'The X such that F'?.

frank

↪fdrake

Ostension is a special kind of describing. Whether you accept that or not, Kripke accepts either ostension or a verbal description for the sake of reference fixing. This was covered in the early days of the other thread.

Where are you in lecture 3?

fdrake

Whether you accept that or not, Kripke accepts either ostension or a verbal description for the sake of reference fixing. — frank

I don't think he's actually argued that ostension is a type of description, but he considers that it might be (eg. in footnote 42 in lecture 2). In footnote 33 he even opposes the two in the Neptune example - since its reference was fixed through calculations involving gravity -, 'as opposed to ostension'.

It's strange to me that you are treating ostension as a non-linguistic type of description rather than simply a non-verbal or written one. The distinction matters. So the real issues at stake are whether a causal chain suffices to explain the semantic value of names or whether a richer, informational structure which is embedded in a causal chain is required.

So when I challenged you to find a type of description which is not linguistic, I was trying to highlight the distinction between the account I was discussing and a descriptive theory, one that says incidents of reference fixing or the semantic value of names require descriptions or equivalence to descriptions are at least necessary for vouchsafing reference. The point being that it's possible to give a non-descriptive account of the semantic value of names but nevertheless disagree with Kripke about the specifics.

fdrake

@Banno @frank, though if you want this thread to remain focussed on exegesis rather than derailed through argument and bickering, I'll leave until then.

frank

↪fdrake

So your theory is that the successful use of proper names is supported by an informational structure? A structure that could be described by physics?

Banno and I are both interested in the theory of mind stuff at the end of lecture 3. I see the on-ramp for it as the concept of the necessary a posteriori. The background is Hume, Kant, Frege, Russell, Searle, and Strawson. In the wings are all the answers to Kripke positive and negative.

The recurring theme with Kripke is externalism. Externalism is sometimes a draw for the more materialistically inclined, but I think Kripke's form has the personal perspective thoroughly embedded, so it will tend to be disappointing for those looking to eliminate something.

The question is: how to discuss it? The last thread ended up being sort of star shaped and devolved into bickering over things people are supposed to know before they start reading N&N. And maybe that reflects the nature of the topic in some ways.

Thoughts?

fdrake

by an informational structure? A structure that could be described by physics? — frank

I gave examples of perceptions and competences as things which can facilitate successful reference, they provide information about the referent which distinguishes them from other things, but not necessarily through the means of any statement, description (definite or no), or even using language at all.

These informational constraints can apply to 'initial baptisms' as much as they can apply to name use further down the causal chain. However, those further down the causal chain can piggyback the name/object relation of successful reference on those who have had an informational state/cache which allows them to make such a distinction or disambiguation. In those cases, while ultimately dependent on information which contributes to the semantic value of the name which distinguishes the referent sufficiently well, we can trust the identification as deriving from such an informational state and make do with that trust and our intentions to successfully refer.

frank

↪fdrake

How is this counter to Kripke's view?

schopenhauer1

↪fdrake

Hello? Not sure if you saw last reply.

fdrake

↪frank

The distinction as (I think) the author sees it is, as I stated in this first post, that Kripke's account is that the name-object relation imbued in a naming practice in Kripke's theory consists of a causal chain which is insensitive or not dependent on information about the referent. The first post consists of 3 arguments that seek to highlight how the causal chain must also be a chain of information/communication and is thus information sensitive.

These remarks are intended to intervene in Banno's exegesis here:

Rather, in so far as the referent of a proper name is fixed at all, it is by what Kripke calls causal chains, but what I might call shared use. — Banno

by highlighting a wrinkle in the equality between causal chains and shared use which is suggested in the quote. Kripke's causal chains are information insensitive, Luntley notes that it is required that they are information/knowledge sensitive in several ways, and fills the holes in Kripke's theory that Luntley highlighted with a knowledge-based account that patches them up.

fdrake

↪schopenhauer1

I did. I just don't care to speculate as I don't see the relevance.

schopenhauer1

↪fdrake

A bit dismissive being it’s a pretty substantive point but so be it.

fdrake

↪schopenhauer1

If I understood what you meant, perhaps by asking your question more precisely and portraying its motivating context, I'd be more likely to be able to say something interesting.

schopenhauer1

↪fdrake

Kripke is against trying to equate a rigid designator as a definite description. Why? In all possible worlds, descriptions can be mutable- able to be changed, and the reference still stands. Thus, what would count as a rigid designator? Well, mere properties wouldn't work as that is a definite description. What is left? Well, he gave the example of H20 being necessary to water. In all possible worlds, any property or description glides off as necessary to water, but H20 will always remain. But what is H20? Its a substance. Thus, there is some residue, some "thing", some substance that is, that is necessary to individuate kinds and individuals in all possible worlds.

fdrake

↪schopenhauer1

Kripke is against trying to equate a rigid designator as a definite description. — schopenhauer1

That's exactly the opposite conclusion than the one he wants to draw. He presents a couple of arguments against the idea that the semantic value of names must be definite descriptions, which were covered in the previous thread and lectures.

some out of order exegesis which should probably be ignored as it would ruin the flow of the thread even more

The strategy he uses is to try to show that names behave in ways descriptions do not. Specifically, names interact with the modality of possibility (and later necessity) differently.

One way he highlights this is to consider the statement:

(A) "Benjamin Franklin is the man who invented bifocals", let's assume that this provides a complete account of the semantic value of the name 'Benjamin Franklin'. Now, 'Benjamin Franklin' should behave the same as 'the man who invented bifocals', they are stipulated to mean the same, and this is stipulated to be a definite description.

Now consider three other statements about Benjamin Franklin.

(B) "Possibly, Benjamin Franklin was not the first postmaster general of the USA"
(B2) "Benjamin Franklin possibly was not the first postmaster general of the USA"
(C) "The inventor of bifocals possibly was not the first postmaster general of the USA"

Keeping track of the subject of the sentences, (B) and (B2) have the same subject, Benjamin Franklin, and thus they must. The subject of (C) however does not have to be Benjamin Franklin, stipulating a world where the inventor of bifocals was not Benjamin Franklin. The big distinction is that changing the location of 'possibly' between (B) and (B2) does not change the subject, where as it absolutely would in (C) - we only ensure reference to our desired Benjamin Franklin when evaluating in our actual world. By contrast, the name Benjamin Franklin refers stably over all possible worlds. This stability of reference over possible words is called 'rigid designation', and Kripke has attempted to show why descriptions don't have this property whereas names do!

Nevertheless, descriptions can be used in 'reference fixing' behaviour, whereby we institute the use of a name to refer to an object, which Kripke refers to an initial baptism (by some means, possibly a description or ostension, or perhaps other methods). The impact is that while a description can be used in reference fixing behaviour, that description does not provide the complete account of the semantic value of a name. As Kripke puts it, paraphrased, 'providing a description to a name (during an initial baptism) is not giving a synonym of it, it is rather fixing the reference'.

I should note that the exegesis here is based mostly on 'Truth, World, Content' by Muntley rather than Naming and Necessity itself.

schopenhauer1

That's exactly the opposite conclusion than the one he wants to draw. He presents a couple of arguments against the idea that the semantic value of names must be definite descriptions, which were covered in the previous thread and lectures. — fdrake

How is that exactly the opposite? I said he was AGAINST the idea that rigid designators are definite descriptions.

fdrake

↪schopenhauer1

I misread you then. Sorry.

Banno

↪fdrake

I'm not at all keen on what might be called Kripke's theory of reference. But then, I don't think he is either. He just posits it as an alternative. My view would be equally loose, along the lines that if we get away with a reference, then it worked. Providing a theory that explains how proper names or kind-names work in every possible case strikes me as a non-starter. And if you push further I will go back to there being ways of referring that are not set out by a rule, but exemplified in the doing - Wittgenstein.

Importantly, it's not directly relevant here to set out a theory of reference. This thread was set up to escape the unending interference of @Janus, so that a discussion of the ideas of the third lecture could take place. I would be quite happy to participate in another thread on theories of reference, but I think we have enough good stuff here with Kinds.

That is, I don't wish to discourage you from participating, but I'd like to take the reference stuff as read, at least here.

Cheers.

fdrake

That is, I don't wish to discourage you from participating, but I'd like to take the reference stuff as read, at least here. — Banno

My interests in engaging with your exegesis were in clearing up my thoughts on rigid designators and the causal theory of reference, rather than actually doing real scholarship on the book. As these concerns are largely orthogonal to yours, and you're doing the majority of the heavy lifting, I'll buzz off.

I'll be floating around like a bad smell anyway. Silent but deadly.

Banno

Then is it substance based? And what does that even mean? — schopenhauer1

I guess that's not a bad interpretation from a non-analytic perspective. I guess that sounds patronising - tough.

Substance is not a term that an analytic philosopher would happily use. Kripke does talk in terms of the necessity of the origin of certain individuals. His table, for example, could only have been made from that certain piece of wood, and if it had been made from some other piece of wood, it would be a different table.

While his account for him is metaphysical, I'm reading him as providing rules for modal discourse - a grammar, in the broader sense.

So I guess you might read him as saying that the substance an individual is made of is essential to that individual.

I would think of that as too broad, though. For example a waterfall is an individual that does not always consist of the same substance.

I'm not sure how to work this in to the discussion of kinds.

Banno

↪fdrake

See PM

Banno

A. Water is H20.
B. If we aren't completely deluded, water is H20. — frank

I'm just not sure about the "not deluded"part. I'd like more on that. it's in the text, indirectly, but I hadn't paid it much mind, so I may have missed something.

there's a tendency hereabouts to make an idealist move from what is the case to what we know is the case. I think that move sucks; or to be more polite, is more a rhetorical device than a philosophical clarification. I have read Kripke as talking about what is the case, or might be the case, rather than what we believe or know.

So, am I wrong?

Banno

Are identity statements about names? Or is it that when we say X=Y, we're talking about an object's being identical to itself? — frank

At some place - and forgive me for not finding the reference - Kripke is quite explicit in saying that identity is about individuals, not names. He criticises and rejects the suggestion that X=Y might be about names.

The argument, from memory, is something like that while Hesperus is Phosphorus, and that's a fact about Venus, "Hesperus" is not "Phosphorus" - the names are quite distinct.

I'm using the convention of putting names treated as word in quotes.

frank

there's a tendency hereabouts to make an idealist move from what is the case to what we know is the case. I think that move sucks; or to be more polite, is more a rhetorical device than a philosophical clarification. I have read Kripke as talking about what is the case, or might be the case, rather than what we believe or know. — Banno

He isn't trying to build a staircase to the existence of knowledge, if that's what you mean. But the issue of knowledge is important in N&N.

He would say that the inventor of the rules of chess knew those rules a priori. The rules were passed from person to person and eventually everybody who knows the rules, knows them a posteriori.

Some philosophers would say that if one learns the rules a posteriori, that means the rules are contingent. And of course, it seems obvious that the rules of chess could have been different.

But is that true? Would that really be chess if the rules were different? Or would it be some other game?

Maybe not that case, but similar cases involving names: Kripke says the concept of rigid designation and possible worlds will help produce the right answer. The perception of the speaker ends up being highlighted, though, not shuffled under a rug.

Naming and necessity Lecture Three.

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