The usual explication of these two and the distinction between them is that the a priori statement is universally and necessarily so. — tim wood
And a posteriori statements, of course, require access to some experience - they could be so or not so, depending on the verdict of that experience. — tim wood
Hence, not all necessary facts are synthetic. — Banno
"It" is not something we discovered. "It" is not a posteriori. Nor synthetic. As to the discovery itself, that is not water.That water is H₂O is something we discovered - it is a posteriori, and synthetic. — Banno
have to be more than a little careful in matching Kant against certain modern discoveries. — tim wood
Not too sure what you are saying. That water is H₂O is surely not a priori? — Banno
OK - is, that H₂O is water, a priori? I wouldn't have thought so. Analytic, necessary - but a posteriori. — Banno
Kripke or no, modern science or no, because water is a real object “All water is H2O” is an empirical judgement, hence synthetic, and from the proposition, the predicates of hydrogen and of oxygen absolutely cannot be derived from merely the subject “water”, hence, still synthetic. — Mww
I suppose Kant to be among the smartest people who ever lived. I believe he is credited with first supposing the existence of galaxies, almost two hundred years before confirmation. And different from Aristotle and prior to Descartes and following, because Kant was one of not very many minds aware, inevitably painfully, even tragically aware - as Newton was, although without Newton's ego and psychological problems - of the extent of the possibilities of what could be known, and even possibly suspecting how near, although for him unreachable, much of that knowledge was.Wouldn’t Herr Kant freak — Mww
implies that what is verified by observation/experience, is with respect to the quality of the verification, the same as what is "verified" by logic. — tim wood
The empirical "judgement" that water is h2o, were that final, would imply there is water that is not h20, or that water might not be water. — tim wood
I assume that your sentence, if completed, would say that Kant's insights are rendered moot if not wrong, historical curiosities. If so, then in this we differ. And if we do, please make your case. To do it, you have to move Kant not only from territory he never attempted to occupy, but also from that region of epistemology he did claim, and in my opinion conclusively and permanently, even if not for all time comprehensively, in manner very like Newtonian physics and Galilean relativity.Then along comes GR, and the synthetic a priori judgement of all geometric properties goes right square..... — Mww
In other words, synthetic a priori metaphysical concepts are the pre-conditions of all experience. Hence, Kant distinguishes between the world as experience it (the world as it is experienced given the application of said concepts) and the world as it is independent of our experience. — philosophy
But let's consider something easier-the question of the
yellowness of gold. Could we discover that gold was not in
fact yellow? Suppose an optical illusion were prevalent, due to
peculiar properties of the atmosphere in South Africa and
Russia and certain other areas where gold mines are common.
Suppose there were an optical illusion which made the substance
appear to be yellow; but, in fact, once the peculiar
properties of the atmosphere were removed, we would see
that it is actually blue. Maybe a demon even corrupted the
vision of all those entering the gold mines (obviously their
souls were already corrupt), and thus made them believe that
this substance was yellow, though it is not. Would there on
this basis be an announcement in the newspapers : 'It has
turned out that there is no gold. Gold does not exist. What
we took to be gold is not in fact gold.' ? Just imagine the world
financial crisis under these conditions ! Here we have an undreamt
of source of shakiness in the monetary system.
It seems to me that there would be no such announcement.
On the contrary, what would be announced would be that
though it appeared that gold was yellow, in fact gold has
turned out not to be yellow, but blue. The reason is, I think,
that we use 'gold' as a term for a certain kind of thing. Others
have discovered this kind of thing and we have heard of it.
We thus as part of a community of speakers have a certain
connection between ourselves and a certain kind of thing. The
kind of thing is thought to have certain identifying marks. Some
of these marks may not really be true of gold. We might discover that we are wrong about them. Further, there might be a substance which has all the identifying marks we commonly
attributed to gold and used to identify it in the first
place, but which is not the same kind of thing, which is not
the same substance. We would say of such a thing that though
it has all the appearances we initially used to identify gold, it is
not gold. Such a thing is, for example, as we well know, iron
pyrites or fool's gold. This is not another kind of gold. It's a
completely different thing which to the uninitiated person
looks just like the substance which we discovered and called
gold. We can say this not because we have changed the meaning
of the term gold, and thrown in some other criteria which
distinguished gold from pyrites. It seems to me that that's not
true. On the contrary, we discovered that certain properties
were true of gold in addition to the initial identifying marks
by which we identified it. These properties, then, being
characteristic of gold and not true of iron pyrites, show that
the fool's gold is not in fact gold.
But Tim said:First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure Understanding and pure reason.
Reverting to the definitions of my youth, that the a priori are necessarily and universally so, then it follows that water, being just H2O, is so a priori.
The discovery that water is H2O is a different topic. All discoveries are empirical, aren't they? But the thing, fact, truth, discovered, as a thing, fact, truth.... I suspect you can complete, already have completed, this line of thought. — tim wood
Necessary Vs. contingent: it's necessary if it is true in all possible worlds; otherwise, it's contingent. This is where I would expect Tim and I to disagree. — Banno
Hence: synthetic a priori: two distinct ideas that are associated without looking around. — Banno
Please allow me to try.I find this hard to reconcile. — Banno
First thing that might cause confusion is the addition of necessary and contingent. — schopenhauer1
(for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary)
Water, a compound substance, on the other hand, doesn’t have to be H2O necessarily. — Mww
So, is being a priori the very same thing as being necessary? Or is it rather that all a priori things, amongst others, are necessary? — Banno
That water is H₂O is something we discovered - it is a posteriori, and synthetic.
Kripke shows that, that water is H₂O is true in all possible situations; that is, if we discover or stipulate a substance that is phenomenologically the same as water, but with some alternate chemical structure, it is not water.
Since it water is H₂O is true in all possible situations, it is necessary.
So, that water is H₂O is a necessary, a posteriori fact. Necessary but synthetic.
Hence, not all necessary facts are synthetic. — Banno
if we discover or stipulate a substance that is phenomenologically the same as water, but with some alternate chemical structure, it is not water. — Banno
What are we talking about when we talk about necessary, a-posteriori facts? And what does it have to do with Kant? — csalisbury
It didn't have to be H20 before it was named thus, but once someone used it as a name for water, it became a necessary truth "after the fact". — schopenhauer1
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