I think that would be an excellent idea. The way I read PI is rather like a geologist taking temperature readings from inside a volcano and finding that they do not match the account of volcanology currently being used to provide warnings to the small town at its foot.

The temperature readings themselves (the account of language use in the first section) is meant to be rather mundane, not something anyone should have much trouble agreeing with. I don't think Wittgenstein intended to be saying anything too controversial by pointing out that the grocer does not consult a colour chart, or that we would not play poker when told to "show the children a game", or that we can understand the instruction "stand roughly there". What is controversial is that this mundane understanding of the way language works is not in accord with the way it is treated in Philosophy.

So yes, I do get a bit frustrated at what I see as a long discussion about how thermometers work (to return to my metaphor) when I don't see anything there that any rational person could disagree with. 72, where we're currently at, is a classic example. @Luke has just accurately laid out what Wittgenstein means by this example, but what is there to disagree with about it? I mean what possible other way could any intelligent person think about such cases?

The trouble is that Wittgenstein is also not extracting a set of rules for how to do philosophy. Thus it's very hard in an abstract manner to say "... and this is what Wittgenstein means us to take from this example" and proceed to provide a neat list of methodological consequences. It's a marshalling of facts to help find our way around whatever philosophical problems we may be stuck in.

Anyway, rambling and probably unwanted rant aside, I mean to simply say that I think what you suggest is a good idea.

Regarding it, I think that Banno has already hinted at what I would say. The 'person' in a biological sense, might well be the collection of cells, but the confusion which arises from taking a discovery which applies to the 'person' in that context and applying it to the 'person' in a completely different context can be resolved by recognising that this is simply not what we mean by 'person' here.

I also think that Wittgenstein's reminders about how we talk about names can be helpful here. When we say "John is..." what we mean by 'John' is no single thing, but rather a collection of props such that if only one of them is taken away (the majority of John's cells) we have no problem remaining clear about to whom we refer.

Should I stop posting? I thought the point of this discussion was in the title.

Should I stop posting? I thought the point of this discussion was in the title. — Luke

Not at all, why would you think that? I'm only expressing my personal view of a useful/interesting interpretation exercise in the light of StreetlightX's suggestion. I think your exegesis is very accurate in its rephrasing of the examples Wittgenstein gives, and anyone struggling to understand the example may find your phrasing more approachable than Wittgenstein's, but I don't think many scholars consider the meaning of 72 to be that we should now have a clearer understanding of how humans learn colours as a result of Wittgenstein's investigation. It's not a developmental psychology textbook.

I think we're supposed to already know how humans learn colours (in a vague sense). As I said, what other understanding of the subject in 72 could any intelligent person have? Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to that which we should already know to show how this knowledge is being ignored in philosophical puzzles, how the move to universalism is belied by what we already know to be the case if we only stop to think about it.

As to the point of the discussion being in the title, the title is '... reading it together'. I'm not sure that really implies anything particularly restrictive about what we should discuss other than that it should have something to do with the book.

Not at all, why would you think that? — Isaac

I got that impression from your expressed dissatisfaction with the point of this discussion on several occasions throughout the thread, including when you referred to it as "onanistic scholasticism" and told us it wasn't for you. Then, in your previous post, you singled me out as an example of how, in your opinion, this type of section-by-section exegesis we've been doing is not worthwhile. You know, you could always just start another discussion...

I'm not denying that's my opinion. I'm questioning why that would make you feel obliged to stop posting (or that I should start another thread for that matter). Are we not allowed differences of opinion on the matter, even robust ones?

So yes, I do get a bit frustrated at what I see as a long discussion about how thermometers work (to return to my metaphor) when I don't see anything there that any rational person could disagree with. 72, where we're currently at, is a classic example. Luke has just accurately laid out what Wittgenstein means by this example, but what is there to disagree with about it? I mean what possible other way could any intelligent person think about such cases? — Isaac

But Wittgenstein lays out little problems, in almost every section, one after the other, and often suggests resolutions. And there is a problem at 72, which Luke exposes very nicely. The first two examples have the very same colour called "yellow ochre". The last example has different colours, with the same name "blue". So what he is demonstrating is that this is not the way that we learn colours, because we learn to apply the same names, "blue" for example, to distinctly different shades of colour. It is not a case of learning what the things have in common, that's the point here.

Look what he says at 73 when he talks about comparing colours to those on a table. He says "this comparison may mislead in many ways". The problem being that the one word, "blue" refers to many different shades of colour. "Which shade is the 'sample in my mind' of the colour green—the sample of what is common to all shades of green?" And he introduces "shape" to the problem as well, to demonstrate that the issue is complex. We are not only talking about things with different colours, but different shapes and different colours. He suggested that it is possible that there are "general samples", "schema", but asks how we would recognize it as a general example rather than as a particular instance. The suggested answer is that "this in turn resides in the way the samples are used."

So he has laid out a problem at 72. How do we learn to apply the same word "blue" to multiple different shades of colour? It cannot be a case of pointing to different samples and seeing what they have in common, like the ochre-yellow, because they do not have a common colour. So he suggests that it is in "the way the samples are used". Then proceeding to 74, he begins to discuss the difference between seeing a sample as a sample in a "general" way, and seeing the sample in a "particular" way.

The first two examples have the very same colour called "yellow ochre". The last example has different colours, with the same name "blue". So what he is demonstrating is that this is not the way that we learn colours, because we learn to apply the same names, "blue" for example, to distinctly different shades of colour. It is not a case of learning what the things have in common, that's the point here. — Metaphysician Undercover

But who thought we did learn colours like that. Did you? It's not a puzzle in the least... unless you are looking for a general rule, which is exactly the sort of philosophical muddle Wittgenstein is trying to resolve. Look at 74 where Wittgenstein explains that, of course people can get the meaning of the shape of a leaf as a sample, as opposed to the shape of a leaf as a particular. We have no trouble with this, nor would anyone describing our actions literally in this case describe them otherwise. The only problem here is the tendency in philosophy to try nonetheless to lever our experience into a straightjacket of some universal theory. The revelation is not that we treat things this way, it's that we should ever try to devise theories which presume we do not.

But who thought we did learn colours like that. Did you? — Isaac

Personally, I never gave it any thought, so this is all new to me. As far as I know, maybe that's what people thought.

It's not a puzzle in the least... — Isaac

It's clearly a puzzle, if you want to know how people learn colours, unless you already know how people learn colours, which I do not.

unless you are looking for a general rule, which is exactly the sort of philosophical muddle Wittgenstein is trying to resolve. — Isaac

How are you going to know how people learn colours, unless you know it as a general rule? If every individual learns colours in a different, and unique way, then there is no such thing as "how people learn colours". But then we could not say that people know their colours, unless it were somehow innate. Since Wittgenstein is clearly interested in how people learn colours, then its absolutely false to say that he is trying to avoid the philosophical muddle of the general rule. The "general rule" which is the product of inductive reasoning, and fundamental to description, is exactly what Wittgenstein is interested in.

We have no trouble with this, nor would anyone describing our actions literally in this case describe them otherwise. — Isaac

What do you mean "we have no trouble with this"? That's exactly what Wittgenstein is demonstrating, the trouble with this. All you are doing is claiming "I have no problem distinguishing blue from green, so why are you making an issue out of this?" But where does the "we" come from in "we have no trouble with this", when someone else is showing the trouble with it?

74 ... Of course, there is such a thing as seeing in this way or that; and there are also cases where whoever sees a sample like this will in general use it in this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way.

It's clearly a puzzle, if you want to know how people learn colours, — Metaphysician Undercover

If you want to know how people learn colours then you'd be well advised to simply observe people learning colours. It's an empirical investigation, it can't be carried out from the armchair.

"The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have known since long."

In 90-93 Wittgenstein lays out fairly clearly the
that this is not an empirical investigation, that we do not 'discover' new facts hidden behind the analysis.

How are you going to know how people learn colours, unless you know it as a general rule? — Metaphysician Undercover

By describing the ways people learn colours. Again, we're not conducting an empirical investigation. We're marshaling that which we already know so as not to be taken in by philosophical puzzles which are just the result of a desire to universalise or in some other way ignore context.

What do you mean "we have no trouble with this"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean we deal with the situation quite comfortably all the time. It serves no purpose to say "there's something queer going on here" when doing it is the simplest thing, all we're having trouble with is saying what it is that we're doing, and that is a pseudo problem, it may just not be sayable.

you want to know how people learn colours then you'd be well advised to simply observe people learning colours. It's an empirical investigation, it can't be carried out from the armchair. — Isaac

But this is clearly incorrect, and that's the problem. There are relevant factors, innate within the human mind, things we're born with, instinctual, which cannot be observed. Therefore, if we wish to understand how people learn colours, we must take the observations, reason out what is missing from the observations, which is still necessary for the learning process, and this we can posit as the innate, or instinctual factors. So what is required is a very thorough analysis of the various factors, and this is what Wittgenstein is trying to give us. Allowing any faulty assumptions will throw the whole investigation askew.

Here's an example. Let's assume that we naturally, instinctually, distinguish different shades of colour. Now we have a whole range of different shades. But we have some shades which we call "blue" and some shades which we call "green". You might conclude that we draw an arbitrary boundary, these shades are blue, those shades are green, with some sort of boundary between. However, then we would have the problem which Sam26 referred to, some shades one group of people would call blue, while another group might call green, because the boundary is arbitrary, and there's really no way to say that one group is right and the other wrong.

But what if the original assumption is wrong? What if we do not instinctually notice different shades, what if what we instinctually notice is that some shades appear to be the same? So, for example, I notice one shade, and later a slightly different shade, but I recognize them as the same. I call them both "blue" because I see them as the same, though they are really different. If this is the case, then the "boundary" is created in a completely different way from the way described above. The boundary is not an arbitrary division between a range of different shades, the boundary is the limits to what we perceive as the same.

The two assumptions in the example are opposed. One assumes that what we instinctually notice is differences, the other assumes that what we instinctually notice is things being the same. Whichever assumption you go by, completely changes your perspective on boundaries, in relation to the opposing assumption. In reality, it's probably very complex, we instinctually notice both. But if some of us notice one more than the other, or notice sameness in some categories,, and difference in others, then the way that we relate to the different boundaries is going to be very different from one person to the next.

I mean we deal with the situation quite comfortably all the time. It serves no purpose to say "there's something queer going on here" when doing it is the simplest thing, all we're having trouble with is saying what it is that we're doing, and that is a pseudo problem, it may just not be sayable. — Isaac

It's not a pseudo problem. How and why we respect, and disrespect, boundaries, is a very real issue. As I indicated to Sam26, the issue goes far beyond the rules of language.

I'm not denying that's my opinion. I'm questioning why that would make you feel obliged to stop posting (or that I should start another thread for that matter). — Isaac

Because what I and several others have happily been doing on this thread for the past 28 pages is what you want to change. I take it that you want me to stop posting because I've mainly been doing the type of explication that you want to end.

On the other hand, a new discussion would give you the chance to discuss exactly what you'd like to discuss, and we could continue this one without you trying to dictate a change.

Because what I and several others have happily been doing on this thread for the past 28 pages is what you want to change. — Luke

Not agreeing with it and wanting it to change are two entirely different things. I'm perfectly glad you've had a good time doing what you've been doing. You crack on. It's often something I personally find quite annoying, but that's OK because I'm not compelled to read it. I might well voice an opinion on it, if I think it's relevant, which, given that the book we're reading is basically about metaphilosophy, I think it is. But luckily you're not compelled to read that either.

I only made a couple of posts because Sam and StreetlightX made a couple of comments I found interesting. If they go nowhere, I'll duck out again and you can get back to your work of saying what Wittgenstein said but in slightly different words.

Not agreeing with it and wanting it to change are two entirely different things. — Isaac

So you don't want it to change?

I only made a couple of posts because Sam and StreetlightX made a couple of comments I found interesting. If they go nowhere, I'll duck out again and you can get back to your work of saying what Wittgenstein said but in slightly different words. — Isaac

Personally, I find that attempting to summarise what I think Wittgenstein is saying in each section gives me a better understanding of the text. I could probably do that on my own, but I doubt that I would have the same motivation to do so if I wasn't reading/summarising the work along with others. I'm also interested in finding points of disagreement, and discovering other's views on things that I might not have thought about myself.

What do you mean by "properly determined"? — Luke

If I said "stand there", I would be referring to the particular spot that I want you to stand at, because that's the nature of standing, to be at a particular spot, standing. We are always standing at a spot, not at an area, so that's what "stand there" refers to, a spot, not an area. If I add "roughly", to say "stand roughly there", it does not change the meaning of "stand there" such that I am now telling you to stand at an area rather than at a spot, it just means that I am not fussy about the particular spot where you stand, and therefore I have not bothered to properly determine the precise spot where I want you to stand. That's what I mean by "properly determined". "Stand roughly there" refers to a spot where you will stand if you carry out that instruction, but I have not properly determined that spot, leaving you a multitude of possible spots where you could stand and still be said to have carried out the instruction..

If I add "roughly", to say "stand roughly there", it does not change the meaning of "stand there" such that I am now telling you to stand at an area rather than at a spot, it just means that I am not fussy about the particular spot where you stand, and therefore I have not bothered to properly determine the precise spot where I want you to stand. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is similar to the person who gives the order to Wittgenstein to teach the children a game - they do not "properly determine" or draw a boundary around what type of game to teach the children at first (i.e. they do not tell him to exclude gambilng games), but this does not change the meaning of "game". In your words, it just means they are "not fussy about the particular" game. The further instruction not to teach them a gambling game acts as a rigid boundary, or a more specific definition, for this special purpose.

It seems like this thread is just an argument with MU.

So what? I have some spare time. I find the book extremely interesting. And I like to be an active participant in discussing it.

This is similar to the person who gives the order to Wittgenstein to teach the children a game - they do not "properly determine" or draw a boundary around what type of game to teach the children at first (i.e. they do not tell him to exclude gambilng games), but this does not change the meaning of "game". In your words, it just means they are "not fussy about the particular" game. The further instruction not to teach them a gambling game acts as a rigid boundary, or a more specific definition, for this special purpose. — Luke

I think I see your point, but isn't it kind of an inverted version. In the one case, "teach the children a game" is wide open, unbounded, referring to anything which could be construed as a game, until it's restricted by "anything except gambling". In the other case, "stand there" is completely restricted to the precise point where I want you to stand at, until it is unrestricted by adding "roughly". In the one case the qualification "except gambling" is used to restrict, and in the other case the qualification "roughly" is used to release a restriction already implied.

I think I see your point, but isn't it kind of an inverted version. In the one case, "teach the children a game" is wide open, unbounded, referring to anything which could be construed as a game, until it's restricted by "anything except gambling". — Metaphysician Undercover

Likewise, "stand roughly there" is wide open, unbounded, referring to anything which could be construed as (roughly) "there", until it gets restricted by (a more specific) there.

Returning to your question at the top of the page, there is no contradiction in giving the order "stand roughly there"; this does not signify both a bounded and unbounded area. As I stated earlier, it has some definition even though it is not "everywhere" defined. The use of the word "there" in this example is not completely without definition. Maybe think of it as a comparison between a loosely bounded and a more definitely bounded area, or perhaps an area of "blurred edges" vs. an area of "sharp edges".

I don't think "stand roughly there" refers to an area at all. It refers to a spot, "there", the spot where I want you to stand. But the speaker who says that, has improperly determined the spot by saying "roughly", thereby allowing many possible spots. For the reasons I have given.

There are relevant factors, innate within the human mind, things we're born with, instinctual, which cannot be observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

If they cannot be observed (nor their consequences) then how can you know this? You're begging the question by presuming we're born with some instinctual understanding and so not being satisfied until you have found it.

Allowing any faulty assumptions will throw the whole investigation askew — Metaphysician Undercover

And how do you know they are faulty. What test are you applying here?

Let's assume that we naturally, instinctually, distinguish different shades of colour. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't even know what this means, but I'm presuming for the time being that you mean we have the biological equipment to provide our brain with such distinctions of hue and luminescence.

However, then we would have the problem which Sam26 referred to, some shades one group of people would call blue, while another group might call green, because the boundary is arbitrary, and there's really no way to say that one group is right and the other wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why on earth is this a problem? What aspects of human life has been so manifestly spoiled by the fact that not everyone agrees where blue ends and green starts?

I really don't understand the rest of your post I'm afraid. It seems to be speculating about the different ways we might perceive colour. I can recommend a number of textbooks which go into the ocular mechanisms and how they work if you're interested, but I'm not sure how you think you might resolve such a question just by thinking about it.

I'm also interested in finding points of disagreement, and discovering other's views on things that I might not have thought about myself. — Luke

Yes, only the only people who have recently presented views on the meaning of the text outside of the standard Hacker interpretation you're using have been either instructed to go and start another thread elsewhere or basically dismissed as 'wrong' and 'misreading', so I'm struggling to understand exactly what level of "points of disagreement" and "other views on things" you'd like to see as part of this thread. I'm sure there's some level there that you'd find amenable, but at the moment it just reads like a group of people all collectively paraphrasing Hacker and a couple of peripheral comments to the contrary being roundly ignored, scolded for their 'wrongness' or told to go elsewhere. I'm not seeing the interest in different views you're referring to.

It seems like this thread is just an argument with MU. — Sam26

Yes, it is rather frustrating, but to be fair he's the only one engaging in a discussion so it's hardly surprising is it?

I mean, there's only four basic ways to interpret the PI - doctrinal (which is basically MU's approach, though I've never heard such an extreme version of it before), elucidatory (which the bulk of commentators already seem to agree on - great, but then there's little to discuss), therapeutic (I prefer methodological, but 'therapeutic' seems to be the term most understood), or just plain wrong (as in Wittgenstein literally did not say that).

Unless there's going to be some entertainment of the alternative interpretations, or perhaps applications of the elucidatory approach, there's not going to be that much to actually discuss is there? If you take away the argument with MU, all you have left is a paraphrasing of Hacker and a couple of stray esoteric comments trying to widen the discussion which go nowhere because no one responds to them.

I think the problem is we've got a thread made up of three teachers and no students. This is a public forum made up of literally anyone in the world. We've done well to limit the topic to philosophy (the forum), and then a particular book (the PI). I think if you also want to narrow that down further to the exact type of discussion you have in mind, you may well be asking the impossible.

If they cannot be observed (nor their consequences) then how can you know this? You're begging the question by presuming we're born with some instinctual understanding and so not being satisfied until you have found it. — Isaac

I didn't say their consequences cannot be observed, clearly they are, as the person learns. Learning is the consequence. To deny that there are instinctual factors involved in learning would be ridiculous. Could you teach a rock? Even if you consider the way that an AI computer learns, that computer must be pre-configured in a very specific way to be able to learn. To dismiss the instinctual factors involved in learning, as irrelevant to the process of learning, would be completely ridiculous. Call that "begging the question" if you like, but if it comes down to having to justify what is extremely obvious, I'd prefer to just beg the question.

And how do you know they are faulty. What test are you applying here? — Isaac

The test is analysis, that's the purpose of the thorough analysis in Wittgenstein's process, which you are wont to ignore. The analysis is to root out any faulty assumptions. If you simply believe that there are no faulty assumptions in this field, or that if there are any, we will never be able to identify them, then sure, the analytical process appears meaningless to you.

But you seem to hold the obviously faulty assumption that instinctual factors are not relevant to the learning process. And since these factors are not in themselves observable, only effects of them are observable in confluence with the observable aspects of the learning process, there are many other faulty assumptions which people hold, concerning the instinctual factors of the learning process. One such faulty assumption, is that we, as human beings, all instinctually "see things" in the same way. Read 74 closely, and don't simply ignore that fact, or dismiss it as irrelevant.

Why on earth is this a problem? What aspects of human life has been so manifestly spoiled by the fact that not everyone agrees where blue ends and green starts? — Isaac

As I told Sam, distinguishing correct from incorrect is a moral issue; "moral" being defined as concerned with the distinction between right and wrong. If we as human beings, cannot even find a way to agree on the simple question of the boundary between blue and green, how do you think we could find a way to agree on more important moral issues, which hold things that we believe to be important, at stake?

I mean, there's only four basic ways to interpret the PI — Isaac

Spoken in true hypocrisy, from the person who says that the general rule, and universalization, are what Wittgenstein wants us to avoid.

I mean, there's only four basic ways to interpret the PI — Isaac

If one reads the text based on some theory of how it is to be interpreted then what one will see is not the PI but another text: “The PI According to X”. This is a problem that is more prevalent in academia then one might think. One does not read Plato or Aristotle but Plato or Aristotle according to X. In many cases the author is not even read and questionable claims repeated from one generation to the next. The secondary literature takes on a life of its own. The primary source is relegated to secondary status as the focus shifts from Wittgenstein to what X and Y have said about Wittgenstein.

As far as I am concerned there is only one way to interpret a text, any text, and that is by a careful and persistent effort to understand what the author is saying. Others who are more familiar with the text may be helpful, but it should never be too far from mind that they may simply be wrong.

From the preface:

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. — PI

If one reads the text based on some theory of how it is to be interpreted then what one will see is not the PI but another text: “The PI According to X”. — Fooloso4

Nice sentiment but I'm afraid decades of teaching have made me much too cynical to believe it. Everyone reads every text looking to find support for the thing they already believe to be the case at the outset. The interesting thing happens when students who hold themselves to relatively high standards read a text with this intention and find it so overwhelmingly and convincingly contradictory that they adopt, at least in part, the new approach. I think this is what happened for a time with the PI, but it didn't last. Now just about every group of philosophers wants to claim Wittgenstein as their own.

As far as I am concerned there is only one way to interpret a text, any text, and that is by a careful and persistent effort to understand what the author is saying. — Fooloso4

This seems to directly contradict the quote you placed beneath it. What Wittgenstein is really saying is far less important than that which what you think he's saying has made you think.

Nice sentiment but I'm afraid decades of teaching have made me much too cynical to believe it. — Isaac

The way I was trained and the way I taught was via primary texts. This approach does not appeal to everyone. It is difficult and slow going. It too has its limits. We are all in need of good teachers, ones who can teach us how to read, how to interpret, how to connect the dots and read between the lines. It is both analytic and synthetic. This, in my opinion, should be the role of secondary materials. At each step they return us to the text, to what is said here and here and here, how they go together or seem to contradict each other, and how the can be reconciled, how together they help shed light on the whole.

Everyone reads every text looking to find support for the thing they already believe to be the case at the outset. — Isaac

Of course we do not approach a text without presuppositions, but that does not mean that everyone reads in order to find support for what they believe. If I believe that an author has something to teach me then I am not looking for confirmation but open myself to disruption. This is something that I learned at the beginning reading one of Plato’s dialogues. I thought that if I were there I could win the argument. But I soon found that my beliefs were not as obviously true or defensible as I had assumed. None of this would have happened if instead of reading Plato I was reading about Plato.

As far as I am concerned there is only one way to interpret a text, any text, and that is by a careful and persistent effort to understand what the author is saying.
— Fooloso4

This seems to directly contradict the quote you placed beneath it. What Wittgenstein is really saying is far less important than what it is that you think he's saying has made you think. — Isaac

The quote:

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. — PI Preface

Interpretative reading is a mode of thinking. If I am to understand him I must think along with him. Again, this is not something one would learn from a reliance on secondary sources that provide ready made conclusions that spare you the trouble of thinking. It is not information gathering. It is wrestling with the text - Why would he say this? Is this what he means? What support can I find that this is what he means? Does that seem right? What has led him to say that? What support does he offer? How does this all fit together and what light does this provide for the whole?

While it sometimes happens that something an author says stimulates thoughts that go in a direction different than the author’s, it can also be the case that that direction is one the author is attempting to steer you away from. In my opinion, if an author is worth reading carefully then what he is really saying is far more important than what it is that I think he's saying. We can, however, never be certain that we have got it right. What he has made me think may or may not be important, but I think that too many of us too often put far too great importance on what we think. This is something that W.’s mirror is intended to help us see. Socrates’ maieutics helped his interlocutors deliver their windeggs, but they often valued them none the less because they were their own.

Everyone reads every text looking to find support for the thing they already believe to be the case at the outset. — Isaac

Another one of your faulty assumptions. You should take heed of what you claim is Wittgenstein's purpose, and quit with the pathetic generalizations.

We are all in need of good teachers, ones who can teach us how to read, how to interpret, how to connect the dots and read between the lines. It is both analytic and synthetic. — Fooloso4

And how do we know they are 'good' in the absence of having what they say concur with what we already believe (or arrive somewhere we unexpectedly find ourselves comforted by)? What other measure would you use, surely not something as vacuous as 'truth'?

If I believe that an author has something to teach me then I am not looking for confirmation but open myself to disruption. — Fooloso4

So if you don't approach a text with such expectations as I describe, what justification do you have for the belief that an author has something to teach you? Do you think that justification lies outside of your expectations and biases?

But I soon found that my beliefs were not as obviously true or defensible as I had assumed. — Fooloso4

How did you 'find' this? What sensation caused you to doubt your original beliefs, not their lack of concordance with 'truth' surely (not in Plato at least), for if you already knew what 'truth' was so as to be able to make the comparison you would not have needed to read Plato.

Interpretative reading is a mode of thinking. If I am to understand him I must think along with him. Again, this is not something one would learn from a reliance on secondary sources that provide ready made conclusions that spare you the trouble of thinking. It is not information gathering. It is wrestling with the text - Why would he say this? Is this what he means? What support can I find that this is what he means? Does that seem right? What has led him to say that? What support does he offer? How does this all fit together and what light does this provide for the whole? — Fooloso4

Yes, but it is a mode of historical thinking, biographical thinking, not necessarily philosophical thinking. Is this what he means? - how could you ever possibly know and what philosophical difference would the answer make? What support can I find that this is what he means? - again, what philosophical difference would it make if you could not. Is Kripke's obviously faulty paraphrasing any less philosophy for the fact that he misrepresented Wittgenstein? Does that seem right? - again, what possible measure could you use to answer this question, how would you tell the difference between an understanding which was accurate but of flawed philosophy, and an understanding which was inaccurate?

If you give even a cursory glance over the secondary literature, you will see that intelligent, well-respected academics have been able to answer all of your questions in just about every conceivable way and virtually none of them agree, leaving you free to choose whichever answer satisfies you. So what are you going to base that choice on if not your existing beliefs?

In my opinion, if an author is worth reading carefully then what he is really saying is far more important than what it is that I think he's saying. — Fooloso4

Again, I would ask you how you are making the judgement that the author is worth reading outside of your pre-existing beliefs about what is of value?


I'm not suggesting in any sense that students should rely on secondary texts. In fact, I'd probably advise the opposite, but only so that they can interrogate the primary text, put it to use, see how their philosophical problems look through its lens, not to just dryly try to derive that which has already been derived. We teach our children calculus so that they can apply it, we don't get them to work it out themselves from scratch.

Another one of your faulty assumptions. You should take heed of what you claim is Wittgenstein's purpose, and quit with the pathetic generalizations. — Metaphysician Undercover

It was rhetoric... Oh and I should have added those who read so that they can sound supercilious when talking about related subjects, I forgot about them.

Does no one ever read to learn something in your reality?