Yes, follows Kant, who said that the metaphysical is a priori. — Pussycat

Kant did not reject metaphysics, he rejected a priori metaphysics. God and the soul were for Kant matters of faith. W. too rejects a priori metaphysics.

So, the metaphysical self cannot be taken to be the subject who experiences, as you said earlier, that is what I've been trying to tell you! — Pussycat

I will be posting my reading of section 5 later today. We can discuss it then.

What are you talking about? Metaphysics is not divided into a priori and non-a priori, it is a priori only, part of its definition. Saying non-a priori metaphysics is like saying circular square.

The metaphysical questions of God, soul, and world that are not rejected by Kant.

The existence of God cannot be proven a priori but that did not lead Kant to deny the existence of God. It cuts both ways, it cannot be proven that God does not exist either. This leaves space for faith. As he famously said in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason:

I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith. — Kant

5.133
All deductions are made a priori.
5.134
One elementary proposition cannot be deduced form another.
5.135
There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136
There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361
We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.
5.1362
The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference.—The connexion between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity. — T

Wittgenstein affirms the freedom of the will. It is not in the world. It is at the limit.

5.541
At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in another in a different way.
Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as ‘A believes that p is the case’ and A has the thought p’, etc.
For if these are considered superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object A.
(And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)

5.542
It is clear, however, that ‘A believes that p’, ‘A has the thought p’, and ‘A says p’ are of the form ‘“p” says p’: and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.

5.5421
This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul. — T

W. is not denying the existence of the soul but a particular concept of the soul as an object in the world containing or possessing thoughts, beliefs, etc.

5.5423
To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are combined in such and such a way.
This perhaps explains that the figure can be seen in two ways as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different
facts.
(If I fix my eyes first on the corners a and only glance at b, a appears in front and b behind, and vice versa.) — T

The cube can be perceived in two different ways - with a in front and with b in front. Thus we really see two different facts. It is then not simply a matter of the configuration of objects that establish the facts, but the way in which we see them.

5.55
We now have to answer a priori the question about all the possible forms of elementary propositions.
Elementary propositions consist of names. Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different meanings, we are also unable to give the composition of elementary propositions. — T

This is a linguistic limit in so far as we cannot name all the different simply objects, but it is also an epistemological limit since we cannot identify or say what those objects are.

5.6
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. — T

What is the significance of his shift from language and the world to “my language” and “my world”? The self cannot be found in the world. It can play no part in logical relationships, and propositions about it are nonsense. My world and my language do not connote a relationship between facts or objects.

My language means not simply English or German but the way in which I represent reality.

5.61
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. — T

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world.

5.62
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. — T

In what way does the limits of language show that the world is my world? Suppose someone were to reject W.’s claim saying: “There must be more to my world”, to which the response would be: “What more is there”? And of course no answer could be given. If an answer could be given, whatever is said would be within that limit. I take this to be a form of skepticism. He is not denying that there may be more than I can say or think but that it is nonsense to say this because it does not point to anything. It does not mark a limit to the world or to language but to my world and the language I understand. But the same is true for all of us.

Solipsism - solus "alone" and ipse "self”. That language which alone I understand, is that language which solus ipse is understood. If there is a language I do not understand then even though the propositions are in proper logical order to picture reality, they are for me without sense (sinnlos) because I do not know what state of affairs they represent. They cannot represent if they cannot be understood.

5.621

The world and life are one.
5.63
I am my world. (The microcosm.) — T

The world is all that is the case (1). The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. This is the point of the cube having two facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. A picture is a fact. (2.141)The facts of the world include the representation of facts.

5.631
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.—

5.632
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world. — T

“It alone could not be mentioned”, solus ipse. The I (ipse) alone (solus) that writes the book is not something that is found in the book.

5.633
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. — T

The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world.

That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.

5.634
This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori. — T

What is the connection between the metaphysical subject and the contingency of facts?

5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. — T

The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be.

5.641
There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject,
the limit—not a part of the world. — T

My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits.

Sorry man, but this "a priori metaphysics" of yours got me laughing, and now I can't stop! :lol:

You are confusing an epistemological distinction - a priori and a posteriori with an ontological distinction - in terms of the Tractatus, what is and is not part of the world of factual relations. Metaphysics as a science is not what the science attempts to address, the objects of metaphysics - in this case, God, soul, and world. Kant rejects the idea of a metaphysical science of God, soul, and world, but does not reject the idea of metaphysical reality - the existence of God, soul, and world.

The error is evident when you say:

Yes, follows Kant, who said that the metaphysical is a priori. — Pussycat

Kant does not say that “the metaphysical” is a priori, he says that there can be no a priori knowledge of the metaphysical claims of the antinomies, claims about God, soul, and world.

In addition, you are ignoring two different kinds of experience - our experience of things in the world and ethical/aesthetic experience:

Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and æsthetics are one.) — T 6.421

The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy. — T 6.43

But that discussion is yet to come.

Meanwhile you have completely ignored my discussion of 5.

Meanwhile you have completely ignored my discussion of 5. — Fooloso4

Please distill your thoughts. I can't gather them all in one coherent fashion,

I am attempting to follow the Tractatus step by. What W. presents is already a distillation, which I have further reduced to a set of quotes followed by my own brief comments. In what follows I will first restate those comments and then tie it all together.

Free will.

The soul is not part of the natural world.

The “I” plays a role in determining the facts.

There is a limit to knowledge based on the fact that we cannot identify or name all of the simple objects.

“My language” means not simply English or German but the way in which I represent reality.

There is a relationship between the “I” which is not a part of the world it represents factually.

Solipsism: The “I” alone (solus "alone" and ipse "self”) is a limit of the world, the limit of what I can say and think. This is not a fixed limit, since it is always possible to learn something new, but a limit nonetheless. We cannot step out beyond ourselves.

The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. My world, the microcosm, is the world as I represent it.

“It alone could not be mentioned”, solus ipse. The I (ipse) alone (solus) that writes the book (The World as I found it) is not something that is found in the book. The I is a limit of the world.

The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world. That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.

The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be.

My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits.


The self or I or soul or subject is free. It is not a part of the world. The world is for each of us mine - my world, the world as I perceive it, the world as I represent it in my language, the world as I live it. The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. This limit marks a form of skepticism.

It's just that I got the impression from you that you are lacking some basic knowledge in philosophy, when you utter things like "a priori metaphysics". I think that to disguise this blunder, you later said that you meant by that what is usually called "traditional metaphysics", the inquiry into the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and free will. But noone, as far as I can tell, would use and had actually used the term "a priori metaphysics" to describe this, this is just you, trying not to lose face, like they say. Because metaphysics is all a priori, so saying "a priori metaphysics" is like saying "round circle" or "unmarried bachelor". So, this leads me to believe that you know nothing, or very little, about metaphysics, or philosophy for that matter, and you are just doing guess work here. I mean, I could be wrong, it's a know fact after all that I've been wrong before, but this is my current impression, what can I say. Therefore I am sorry, but I won't be discussing anything more with you, not before you you do a bit of studying first at least, to get the basic philosophical concepts cleared out.

It's just that I got the impression from you that you are lacking some basic knowledge in philosophy, when you utter things like "a priori metaphysics". — Pussycat

Your impression is wrong, very wrong. I do not generally discuss my education or credentials in the forums because I prefer that the arguments be evaluated on their own merit.

I think that to disguise this blunder, you later said that you meant by that what is usually called "traditional metaphysics", the inquiry into the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and free will. — Pussycat

If you look back over the discussion you will find that you asked:

What is the metaphysical, to you, I mean? — Pussycat

To which I responded:

I think that Wittgenstein's use follows that of Kant. The metaphysical refers to questions of God, soul, and world. They are not objects in the world and thus cannot be known by the natural sciences or by experience of things in the world. Nor can they be known a priori. — Fooloso4

The issue here is not metaphysics as a philosophical discipline or science but specific questions or concerns of metaphysics - the metaphysical questions of God, soul, and world. Kant did not reject the questions of metaphysics, he rejected a priori solutions to these questions. Pure reason, that is, a priori reason, reaches an impasse as the antinomies show. This means that there can no a priori science of metaphysics. It does not mean there can be no God or soul but that such things are not within the purview of a science. They are for Kant matters of faith not knowledge.

On one reading of the Tractatus they are to be disregarded as nonsense. What I am claiming is that although they are nonsense in that they do not represent things in the world, they are not to be dismissed, they are what matters.

So, this leads me to believe that you know nothing, or very little, about metaphysics, or philosophy for that matter, and you are just doing guess work here. — Pussycat

Believe whatever you want about me, but pay attention to the text. Where does the text contradict anything I have said about it? Where have I made a false step?

Therefore I am sorry, but I won't be discussing anything more with you, not before you you do a bit of studying first at least, to get the basic philosophical concepts cleared out. — Pussycat

That is uninformed, condescending, and evasive. The real problem here is that if my analysis is right then some of your basic claims about the text are wrong. And so, instead of addressing my analysis you create a smokescreen.

No, he seems to know what he is talking about. "A priori metaphysics" is somewhat superfluous and I'm still not sure what purpose was it suppose to serve.

Free will.

The soul is not part of the natural world. — Fooloso4

These are concepts that Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly talk about in the Tractatus... Are you inferring them from what has been said contrasted to what hasn't been said?

Solipsism: The “I” alone (solus "alone" and ipse "self”) is a limit of the world, the limit of what I can say and think. This is not a fixed limit, since it is always possible to learn something new, but a limit nonetheless. We cannot step out beyond ourselves. — Fooloso4

Yes, I think so. But, it's just redundant to state a limit where none can be drawn, no?

The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. My world, the microcosm, is the world as I represent it. — Fooloso4

Not true, the facts of science are indisputable.

The subject is metaphysical because it is not a part of the physical world. Propositions about it are nonsense, for it does not represent anything in the world. That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented. — Fooloso4

The subject may not represent itself; but, that is irrelevant. The form is the same.

The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be. — Fooloso4

I disagree. I think that whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. That we cannot talk about the "metaphysical subject" doesn't mean it doesn't exist in the world.

My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits. — Fooloso4

Yes, but, the world came first. I cannot doubt you don't have a beetle if you say it exists.

The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. This limit marks a form of skepticism. — Fooloso4

Yes and no, because if we are to talk about the logical space of the first person, then yes, the limits of your world are one and the same as the limits of the actual world. But, you can always tell me you have a beetle if I can't see one.

These are concepts that Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly talk about in the Tractatus... — Wallows

Sorry to interrupt but yes, he does. According to the index:

free will, 5.1362
soul, 5.5421, 5.641, 6.4312

I disagree. I think that whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. That we cannot talk about the "metaphysical subject" doesn't mean it doesn't exist in the world. — Wallows

Then you disagree with Wittgenstein. As quoted by Fooloso4 above:

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world—not a part of it. — Tractatus 5.641

Ah, I see. But, then if the metaphysical self doesn't reside in the world, then where does it reside then?

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.

Interesting. But the metaphysical self is then transcendental?

So, this leads me to believe that you know nothing, or very little, about metaphysics, or philosophy for that matter, and you are just doing guess work here.
— Pussycat

Believe whatever you want about me, but pay attention to the text. Where does the text contradict anything I have said about it? Where have I made a false step?

Therefore I am sorry, but I won't be discussing anything more with you, not before you you do a bit of studying first at least, to get the basic philosophical concepts cleared out.
— Pussycat

That is uninformed, condescending, and evasive. The real problem here is that if my analysis is right then some of your basic claims about the text are wrong. And so, instead of addressing my analysis you create a smokescreen. — Fooloso4

A quiet, considered response. No matter anyone's qualifications or experience, the least anyone can do is show respect. Fooloso4 listens and responds patiently and carefully.
Keeping it on track.

No, he seems to know what he is talking about. "A priori metaphysics" is somewhat superfluous and I'm still not sure what purpose was it suppose to serve. — Wallows

Because W. does not treat God and soul a priori. I will have more to say on this in #6 of the Tractatus.

These are concepts that Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly talk about in the Tractatus... Are you inferring them from what has been said contrasted to what hasn't been said? — Wallows

He does. I quoted them above.

Yes, I think so. But, it's just redundant to state a limit where none can be drawn, no? — Wallows

The most important limit he points to is the limit of my world. He need not trace the boundary of that limit in order to point to the fact that there is a limit. He denies that there can be knowledge of the whole. He is in that sense a skeptic. (There are various forms of skepticism.) He is not denying the possibility of knowledge but of knowledge of the whole. Compare the systematic philosophy of Spinoza and Hegel.

Not true, the facts of science are indisputable. — Wallows

It is not a denial of science. The two dimensional drawing of the cube yields two different facts. These facts are not independent of the subject who looks at it one way and then the other and sees the fact that looked at one way a is in front and the other that b is in front. The same set of lines yields two different facts, but those facts are dependent on the subject. (5.5423)

The subject may not represent itself; but, that is irrelevant. The form is the
same. — Wallows

The logical form that underlies the facts and propositions is the same. The subject is neither one of those facts and so cannot be represented in a proposition. The subject’s relation to the world is not a logical one. More on this in # 6.

I disagree. I think that whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. That we cannot talk about the "metaphysical subject" doesn't mean it doesn't exist in the world. — Wallows

The metaphysical subject does exist, it is not, however, in the world. The eye that sees the world does not see itself in the world.

Yes, but, the world came first. — Wallows

Right. And that is what is meant when I say that the limits of my world are not the limits of the world. There is more to the world than to my limited world. He is in this way a skeptic, but not in the modern sense. It is rather in the way that Socrates is - knowing that there are things he does not know, that my limits are not the limits of all that is.

Interesting. But the metaphysical self is then transcendental? — Wallows

It depends on what you mean by transcendental. If used in the sense of what goes beyond certain limits then yes. For Kant transcendental means the conditions for the possibilities of experience. W. says that two things are transcendental - logic (6.13) and ethics/aesthetics (6.421). I will have more to say on this when I get to 6.

Please read my post on 5 (the one you said was incoherent. I assure you that it is not). It is mostly direct quotes from the text and addresses all of the questions you raised.

The logical form that underlies the facts and propositions is the same. The subject is neither one of those facts and so cannot be represented in a proposition. The subject’s relation to the world is not a logical one. More on this in # 6. — Fooloso4

Then what can be said about the subject at all if it forms cannot be depicted? A subject cannot represent itself; but, to another person or even "God", his or her form is apparent in behavior or mannerisms or characteristics. Or to put this another way, "traits" cannot be modeled but observed.

Please read my post on 5 (the one you said was incoherent. I assure you that it is not). It is mostly direct quotes from the text and addresses all of the questions you raised. — Fooloso4

I never said your posts are incoherent. I wouldn't dare to say that to a grad student which I assume you are. I merely, am asking if what you're saying can be expanded on instead of having to use the Tractatus as punchlines. The work is easy to use as a means to end a sentence; but, I hope we can delve more deeply into the metaphysical self and its relation to the world through the logical form in logical space.

Pirsig is very hot on the dynamic/static distinction in relation to 'quality'. It's complicated, and a bit off topic.

the TLP is two dimensional. But, that's how language seems to operate.
— Posty McPostface

Well there you have it, language is two dimensional, but it operates - and operates recursively, and that makes it dynamic. So there is TLP, the last word in philosophy, and the fact that the limits of expression have been expressed extends the limits of expression, so that they cease to be the limits, though there are still limits. ( I'm struggling at my own limits of expression here, but if I can make this understandable, then it becomes possible to explore further again.) Looking at the picture of language as a picture, I see something that has been unclear, become clear. So my world has changed.

I might have a go at a separate thread if I can find the right levers... I think I'm talking about transformations of insight - awakenings. — unenlightened

[ Apologies for interrupting the current flow a little. I've just taken a look at previous contributions and found this. At one time I was interested in Pirsig and his concept of 'Quality' from his 'Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance'. Did you start a separate thread on it ? Not too sure how dynamic/static aspects fit in to the picture ? What did you mean by the part I emphasised in holds? ]

Then what can be said about the subject at all if it forms cannot be depicted? — Wallows

There are some things that can be said relating to the will, which I will address, but it is more about what is seen, what is experienced. The saying/showing distinction can obscure this since showing is dependent upon seeing. And this is why all of this leads to silence.

A subject cannot represent itself — Wallows

Right, just as the eye sees but in seeing does not see itself, the subject represents but does not represent itself.

I never said your posts are incoherent. — Wallows

You said:

Please distill your thoughts. I can't gather them all in one coherent fashion, — Wallows

A bit off putting since I spent a good deal of time and effort combing through the Tractatus trying to show the rungs of the ladder.

I wouldn't dare to say that to a grad student which I assume you are. — Wallows

It has been a long time since I was a graduate student. If I was still in school I would not have time for this.

The work is easy to use as a means to end a sentence; but, I hope we can delve more deeply into the metaphysical self and its relation to the world through the logical form in logical space. — Wallows

Everything has been leading up to doing just that. I am mirroring Wittgenstein's approach, climbing the rungs of the ladder.

It has been a long time since I was a graduate student. If I was still in school I would not have time for this. — Fooloso4

Cheers.

:up:

I'm referring back to this.

This, I think, is what the Tractatus is doing. — me

Obviously, this picture is distorted and impossible. But the distortion and impossibility accurately depicts what philosophy is always trying to do, which is to encompass the world in thought. It does this by self-reference: A man is looking at a picture in a gallery that as you follow it turns out to be a picture of the same man looking at the same picture in the same gallery. 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one can make a picture'. 'The observer is the observed.' Escher is often concerned with the limits of depiction, with how two dimensions can try to represent three, but never quite makes it into the third dimension.

Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world.
Logic is transcendental. — T 6.13

Transcendental, as the term is used here, means both what transcends or is not contained within and, in the Kantian sense, the condition for the possibility of knowledge - of language, of representation of the world. Logic is the scaffolding (6.124). W. differs from Kant, however, in that for W. there is no need for a transcendental subject as a condition for knowledge.

6.3
And outside logic all is accident.
6.36311
It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.
6.37
There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.371
The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
6.372
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.
And in fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained. — T

That the world is as it is is accidental. That things are as they are is not because that is how they must be. It could have been otherwise. There is nothing that causes things to be as they are in any absolute sense. No necessity that the sun will rise tomorrow. The view of the ancients - God and fate is clearer in so far as they acknowledged a terminus, that is, we cannot go further than saying how things are. Why they are as they are and not some other way yields no answer.

The world is independent of my will. — T 6.373

It is because there is no necessity, no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened, that my will cannot determine what will happen.

Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility. — T 6.375

The laws of nature are not logically necessary laws and thus not immutable. The fact that something violates the laws of nature does not mean it is not possible for such a thing to occur if it not logically impossible for it to occur.

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world. — T 6.41

W. is using the term ‘sense’ (Sinn) here in different way than he had been using it. Prior to this sense referred to propositions and they had a sense insofar as they pointed to a state of affairs (4.022). Here he is not referring to propositional sense, for the sense of the world has nothing to do with the facts of the world. The facts of the world are accidental, and thus have no value.

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. — T 6.42

There are no propositions about value. If one attempted to put the non-propositional sense of the world into words the proposition would be senseless (sinnlos). The value of the world is experiential.

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) — T 6.421

The ethical is not within the facts of the world, it is the condition for the possibility of knowledge of the world in terms of value and meaning.

The connection between the self and the world is via the will.


6.422

When an ethical law of the form, ‘Thou shalt . . . ’ is laid down, one’s first thought is, ‘And what if I do not do it?’ It is clear, however,that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms.
So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant.—At least those consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.423
It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.
And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.
6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — T

The exercise of the will does not determine what happens in the world. There is no logical, that is to say, necessary connection between what I do and what happens. The effect of the exercise of the will is on the subject. The world as a whole is different for the happy man and the unhappy man.

In the Notebooks 1914-1916 says a bit more about the happy man:

Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)
Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — Notebooks

He asks:

How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world (NB 13.8.16) — Notebooks

And answers:

The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world. To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate (NB 13.8.16)

I can only make myself independent of the world - and so in a sense master it - by renouncing any influence on happenings (NB 11.6.16) — Notebooks

Happiness requires that I not be dependent on a world that is independent of my will.

So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end. — T 6.431

He does not mean that he believed that when he dies there would be no one and nothing left to read his work. The end of the world is for each of us the end of my world, for that is the world alone that I experience, solus ipse.

Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.
If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.
Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits. — T 6.4311

Here we see another sense of the importance of limits for W., or in this case of what is without limits.

Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
(It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.) — T 6.4312

The question of the immortality of the soul is of no importance to W.

A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the face of death. Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy. For life in the present there is no death. (NB 8.7.16) — Notebooks

How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. — T 6.432

One sense of this might be with regard to the problem of evil and the claim that if there is evil there cannot be a benevolent God. He is saying that the former has no bearing on the latter. Another sense is made explicit: God does not reveal himself in the world. We can know nothing of God by looking at the world.

6.4321
The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.
6.44
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. — T

It in not how the world is that is mystical, but that it is. In “A Lecture on Ethics” W. describes the ethical experience par excellence as follows:

I wonder at the existence of the world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as “how extraordinary that anything should exist” or “how extraordinary that the world should exist” (Philosophical Occasions, p. 41) — Philosophical Occasions

Such phrases he points out, are nonsense, but what they attempt to express, the experience, is meaningful.

6.45
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.

6.522
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical. — T

The proper connection for W. between ethics and aesthetics is not with regard to modes of expression but with regard to a way of looking at things:

The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis, and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion between between art and ethics.

The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. (NB 7.10.16) — Notebooks

Drawing the limits of the world has not only a semantic but an ethical importance as well. To view the world sub specie aeterni as a limited whole is to view the world in independence from it. To see that the world is my world is not simply to see how logic limits the world from inside through language, but to see how ethics enters the world from outside through my will.

6.53

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.

6.54
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical,
when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. — T

The central point here is not the distinction between what we cannot say but can only show, it is a matter of what shows itself, what can be seen if we look at things in the right way. The meaning of the world is something experiential, something mystical, something transcendent, something ecstatic - (exstasis, to stand outside of or beyond).

Most questions and propositions of
the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand
the logic of our language.
(They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good
is more or less identical than the Beautiful.)

But later on...

(Ethics and æsthetics are one.)

So is the Good - ethics - more or less identical than the Beautiful - æsthetics??

Impressive analysis.

Thanks.

@Fooloso4,

What do you think about Proposition's 6.5 and 6.53?

6.5

For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.
The riddle does not exist.

If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.

====
6.53

The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other -- he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy -- but it would be the only strictly correct method.

I might put it this way: if logic is the transcendent condition for language then what is the transcendental condition for silence? The answer is ethics. Ethics is not about questions and answers or riddles, it is about the will and experience. It is about what one sees when he looks at the world in the right way, sub specie aeterni.

Philosophy sets boundaries. The boundaries of language exclude the metaphysical, but this is not a rejection of the metaphysical but rather means that the metaphysical is misunderstood and only leads to nonsense if one attempts to treat it as if it were within the bounds of language. Thus the right method of philosophy leads to silence about such things. There are not known discursively but experientially.

No, he seems to know what he is talking about. "A priori metaphysics" is somewhat superfluous and I'm still not sure what purpose was it suppose to serve. — Wallows

So you see now its purpose?

So you see now its purpose? — Pussycat

Not yet. @Fooloso4 care to expand on "a priori metaphysics"?