I'm taking it that you aren't thinking of "more important" as "they like it/value it a lot more," but something else? — Terrapin Station
.”The best I can come up with is, as you suggest, it is a small thing in the "big picture" -- a side effect that will be made up for in other ways. But, I claim no certainty here.”--Dfopolis
.
“I said it, but that answer didn’t entirely satisfy me.”
.
Can major injury, misery and horror, followed by early death be “made up for”? “— Michael Ossipoff
.
If you believe in some form of eternal bliss.
.”But would it even mean anything to say that what’s happening to those people is somehow later (if there’s reincarnation) “outweighed” or “cancelled-out”? How does that change anything when it’s happening to them? When it’s there, it’s there, and that isn’t a good thing. “— Michael Ossipoff
.
I have never understood how reincarnation makes sense. How can one be the same person/being
., when there is no physical or intentional continuity between the old and the new self?
.What does make moral sense to me is the idea that death is not the end
., so that this life is the birth pain of a new stage of existence.
.What I mean is that each kind of being has its own good
., and we need to bear that in mind if we are thinking objectively. As a matter of belief, supported by probable reason, I think that the good are rewarded and the evil punished, not by divine fiat, but by the ontological structure of reality.
.What do I mean by that? In a context in which love means willing the good of the beloved, morally good acts are loving acts, and morally evil acts are unloving acts.
.As God necessarily wills the good of His creatures, God is identically love.
.Those who live a life of love, necessarily have an intentionality that will lead them to a life of bliss (a life intentionally linked to God).
.Those who live an unloving life will also find what they have chosen: a life of eternal alienation and frustration of their natural end. These final states trivialize any suffering that has come before.
.”It isn’t about anthropocentricity, because the same misfortunes happen to the other animals too.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I take the unpopular view that the reactions of creatures without intellect and will are fully explained by their mechanics and they are aware of nothing. In saying this, I am not saying that humans are the only creatures with intellect and will, even on this planet.
.Logical relations have no actual existence apart from the minds that think them. Independently of such minds, they are only possible, not actual. So, they have no being of their own to persist.
.”So, within this physical universe, there are a number of laws that require the continuations that you referred to.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Yes, there are. I address this exact question in my paper. These laws are not self-conserving. For example, the law of conservation of mass-energy conserves mass-energy, not itself. So there has to be a meta-law conserving it. To avoid an infinite regress of meta-meta-meta-...laws, we must come to a self-conserving law, God.
.”Those relations and inter-reference in those logical systems are inevitable in the same way as it’s an inevitable tautology that there’s no true-and-false proposition. — Michael Ossipoff
.
The fact that we use observed data to decide questions shows that this is not the case.
This conversation between you and Terrapin Station interests me, in that I had to learn how to listen to some music while others felt like I had been expecting it without knowing that I did. I have become leery of a lot of comparisons because my primary goal is the experience without qualification. A desire for immersion.
So, many of the things I value most highly are avoided most of the time because I am not ready for them. I need a grammar lesson for some things but I cut it off if interferes with my exposure to it. — Valentinus
We don't need to frame philosophy in terms of propositions that eschew a poetic charge. — macrosoft
Eventually things are timelessly better, and I agree on that. But I’m just saying that, at the time when the horrors are happening, that’s still pretty bad, isn’t it? And it likely seems like a long time. I’m saying that Benevolence wouldn’t and didn’t make there be that. — Michael Ossipoff
I have never understood how reincarnation makes sense. How can one be the same person/being
You won’t be the same person in every regard, but you will still be you, because there’s continuity of experience, as I answer about directly below. — Michael Ossipoff
Among the infinity of hypothetical experience-stories, there’s one whose protagonist and his experience are the same as you and your experience at that time. — Michael Ossipoff
, when there is no physical or intentional continuity between the old and the new self?
But there is intentional continuity. There’s continuity of experience. And there isn’t a new self.
...
Though you’re unconscious at that time, you still have subconscious perceptions of need, want, inclination, predisposition, future-orientation and Will-to-Life. …like someone who is in (some part of) a life. — Michael Ossipoff
you can’t claim any proof that it has some kind of absolute, noncontextual, context-independent reality. — Michael Ossipoff
Such a hypothetical story has the requirement of consistency. That requirement is satisfied if the continuation of your experience is consistent with your current experience, including your subconscious feelings. — Michael Ossipoff
If that sounds like something made up, or unsupportedly believed-in, I’ll just say that reincarnation is a natural and expected consequence of my Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff
If there’s a reason why you’re in a life, and if, at the end of this life, that reason remains, then what does that suggest? It suggests that you’ll again be in a life. — Michael Ossipoff
So, among that infinity of abstract logical systems, one of those, with suitable renaming of its things, has a description that is the same as a description of the experience of someone who is just like you — Michael Ossipoff
I claim that, among the things of the describable realm, there’s no such thing as absolute-existence. — Michael Ossipoff
That person/story-protagonist, and that person’s “Will-to-Life” is a necessary complementary part of that hypothetical life-experience-story. — Michael Ossipoff
Because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts, consistency is the requirement of your experience-story. So, the physical world that is the setting of that life-experience story will of course be one that is consistent with the person that you are. — Michael Ossipoff
At the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life, if there weren’t reincarnation) of course there’s sleep, — Michael Ossipoff
What I mean is that each kind of being has its own good
But there’s temporary unnecessary experience of suffering. — Michael Ossipoff
just as there logically can’t be a true-and-false proposition, so there logically couldn’t not be the abstract facts that comprise our hypothetical life-experience-stories. — Michael Ossipoff
“unloving” is an understatement for the worst people — Michael Ossipoff
It’s more meaningful, definable and philosophically-supportable, to speak of us as purposefully-responsive devices. — Michael Ossipoff
I emphasize that I don’t claim any existence for them. As I said:
.
I’m talking about inevitable timeless logical relations and inter-reference among timeless abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff
The physical laws, and the things that they describe, are figments of logic, and, as such, need no explanation. — Michael Ossipoff
I suggest that God didn’t create us, didn’t and doesn’t make there be the inevitable apparent worldly-lives, but, rather, made there be overall good, with the apparent worldly lives as good as possible under their inevitable circumstances. — Michael Ossipoff
We use observed data to determine “physical” facts within the logical/mathematical relational structure of our experience-stories.
.
That doesn’t mean that the whole experience-story is other than a hypothetical story, consisting of the relational-structure among a hypothetical complex system of inter-referring abstract-implications about propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff
.”Eventually things are timelessly better, and I agree on that. But I’m just saying that, at the time when the horrors are happening, that’s still pretty bad, isn’t it? And it likely seems like a long time. I’m saying that Benevolence wouldn’t and didn’t make there be that.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I agree on the pain. As I said, I don't see God as the author of moral evil
.…, but moral agents who can choose evil acts. As for physical evils, yes, it is a problem, but the Gnostic solution does not work.
.”I have never understood how reincarnation makes sense. How can one be the same person/being”
.
“You won’t be the same person in every regard, but you will still be you, because there’s continuity of experience, as I answer about directly below.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
But, I have no continuity of experience with a former life. If I did, I would agree that reincarnation is real.”
.”Among the infinity of hypothetical experience-stories, there’s one whose protagonist and his experience are the same as you and your experience at that time.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Hypotheticals have no cognitive value beyond being notions to consider and test.
.If they are confirmed, they have practical value, but no intrinsic certainty.
.On the other hand, my life, and everyone else's, is an experiential reality.
.”…, when there is no physical or intentional continuity between the old and the new self?”--Dfopolis
.
“But there is intentional continuity. There’s continuity of experience. And there isn’t a new self
.
[...]
.
Though you’re unconscious at that time, you still have subconscious perceptions of need, want, inclination, predisposition, future-orientation and Will-to-Life. …like someone who is in (some part of) a life.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I do not see either innate or learned inclinations, etc., as evidence of a former life.
.”…you can’t claim any proof that it [this physical universe] has some kind of absolute, noncontextual, context-independent reality.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I am happy to agree that reality is contextual.
.The difference between what I judge to be real and what is merely hypothetical, is that the real acts (directly or indirectly) on me, while that there is no reason to think the merely hypothetical does.
.”Such a hypothetical story has the requirement of consistency. That requirement is satisfied if the continuation of your experience is consistent with your current experience, including your subconscious feelings.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
No, it is not.
.There is nothing inconsistent in rejecting previous lives.
.”If that sounds like something made up, or unsupportedly believed-in, I’ll just say that reincarnation is a natural and expected consequence of my Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism metaphysics.” — Michael Ossipoff
How does that help convince others who do not agree with your metaphysics?
.”If there’s a reason why you’re in a life, and if, at the end of this life, that reason remains, then what does that suggest? It suggests that you’ll again be in a life.” — Michael Ossipoff
That I am who I am, is no reason for me to have other lives.
.Also, there is no separate "me." I am a single, unified being (body and soul). If I survive death, it will not be the whole of me that survives, but only my subjectivity -- my intentional core.
.The reason I am who I am is that I was created a unique person
.”So, among that infinity of abstract logical systems, one of those, with suitable renaming of its things, has a description that is the same as a description of the experience of someone who is just like you” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Yes, and I know that one [abstract logical system] is real because I experience it.
.The overwhelming majority of the others are completely unparsimonious
.…and irrelevant.
.Why create this vast structure
., when experiential reality is ever so much more compact and relevant?
.”I claim that, among the things of the describable realm, there’s no such thing as absolute-existence.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
You may claim whatever you like, but the rest of us need evidence and analysis.
.”That person/story-protagonist, and that person’s “Will-to-Life” is a necessary complementary part of that hypothetical life-experience-story.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Think about this. Our “Will-to-Life” cannot be the reason we are alive because, absent life, we can't will anything.
.Also, as evidenced by suicide, many people do not have a “Will-to-Life."
.”Because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts, consistency is the requirement of your experience-story. So, the physical world that is the setting of that life-experience story will of course be one that is consistent with the person that you are.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I think you have this backward. Consistence is not a requirement
., but a consequence of the nature of reality
.…reality, of being. No putative thing can both be and not be at one and the same time in one and the same way.
.On the other hand, hypotheticals, as mental constructs, can have implicit inconsistencies.
.We can imagine living in a world with slightly different physical constants, but, as the physics behind the fine tuning argument shows, such a world would not support our life.
What else would you expect if, as the body shuts down at death, reincarnation doesn’t occur?”At the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life, if there weren’t reincarnation) of course there’s sleep”, — Michael Ossipoff
.
How do you know?
.Mystics claim that there is an experiential state of non-empirical awareness that is not sleep.
.”What I mean is that each kind of being has its own good”--Dfopolis
.
“But there’s temporary unnecessary experience of suffering.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Pain is not evil in itself. It is a warning that something is wrong and a motivation to take corrective action, and so good in itself.
.”…just as there logically can’t be a true-and-false proposition, so there logically couldn’t not be the abstract facts that comprise our hypothetical life-experience-stories.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I have no idea what this means.
.”It’s more meaningful, definable and philosophically-supportable, to speak of us as purposefully-responsive devices.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Doing so ignores our experience of being subjects
.…,which is how we know we are conscious.
.”I emphasize that I don’t claim any existence for them. As I said:
.
.
I’m talking about inevitable timeless logical relations and inter-reference among timeless abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff
.
But, there are no relations except existential relations.
.”The physical laws, and the things that they describe, are figments of logic, and, as such, need no explanation.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Not quite. The laws of physics are not fictions, but describe an aspect of reality.
.They are approximate descriptions of laws observed to be operative in nature…
.…, and so quite real.
.It is continued operation of the laws of/in nature that requires an explanation.
.”I suggest that God didn’t create us, didn’t and doesn’t make there be the inevitable apparent worldly-lives, but, rather, made there be overall good, with the apparent worldly lives as good as possible under their inevitable circumstances.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Sound reasoning requires that God sustain the continuing existence of all finite being.
.This is the classical creatio contunuo. So, your solution does not work.
.”We use observed data to determine “physical” facts within the logical/mathematical relational structure of our experience-stories.
.
That doesn’t mean that the whole experience-story is other than a hypothetical story, consisting of the relational-structure among a hypothetical complex system of inter-referring abstract-implications about propositions about hypothetical things.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Of course it means exactly that it is more than hypothetical. Once we observe a reality, it ceases to be merely hypothetical.
And you’ve agreed that this physical universe needn’t exist or be real in any context other than its own. — Michael Ossipoff
Every fact about this physical world corresponds to part of an “If”. …to a proposition that is part of an abstract implication. — Michael Ossipoff
.“And you’ve agreed that this physical universe needn’t exist or be real in any context other than its own.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I do not know what this means.
.The existence of the universe has no a priori necessity, so, it is contingent.
.A posteriori, it is necessary.
.The universe is what we abstract logic and its relations from. Thus, it has priority over logic. In other words, if there were no universe, there would be no logical relations because logic would not exist.
.”Every fact about this physical world corresponds to part of an “If”. …to a proposition that is part of an abstract implication.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Yes, but our experience of the events comes first, then we abstract the relation, and finally find other instances of the same relation.
.The question is one of the order of dependence. In that order, logic comes after the physical universe.
Then you shouldn’t have agreed to it. — Michael Ossipoff
Anyway, which part of “needn’t exist or be real in any context other than its own” don’t you understand? — Michael Ossipoff
But yes, if you don’t know what “real” and “exist” mean, don’t feel bad — Michael Ossipoff
We definitely agree about the questionable-ness and dubiousness of the meaning of “real” and “exist”. — Michael Ossipoff
A posteriori, it is necessary.
Well, it’s necessary component of your life-experience story, of which you and your physical surroundings are the two complementary parts. So yes. — Michael Ossipoff
I don’t make any claim about logic “existing”, whatever that would mean. — Michael Ossipoff
Though you aren’t a Materialist proper, you, along with the Materialists, believe that this physical universe is fundamental, prior and primary with respect to the logically-interdependent realm. It’s a Materialist belief, though you aren’t entirely a Materialist. — Michael Ossipoff
starting with “If there were experience of a life…”, the starting antecedent in the logically-interdependent realm. — Michael Ossipoff
The question is one of the order of dependence. In that order, logic comes after the physical universe.
.
I get that that’s the belief of you and the Materialists. You believe that this physical universe has some kind of unspecified precedence, priority, primary-ness in the logically-interdependent realm. — Michael Ossipoff
.”Then you shouldn’t have agreed to it.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I don't think I did.
.”…you can’t claim any proof that it has some kind of absolute, noncontextual, context-independent reality.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I am happy to agree that reality is contextual.
.The difference between what I judge to be real and what is merely hypothetical, is that the real acts (directly or indirectly) on me, while that there is no reason to think the merely hypothetical does. That is a manifest difference.
.”Anyway, which part of “needn’t exist or be real in any context other than its own” don’t you understand?” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I have no idea what the limitation "any context other than its own" means. Obviously, if we exclude the datum of actual existence, we have no basis for talking about actual existence, but that hardly seems fruitful
.”But yes, if you don’t know what “real” and “exist” mean, don’t feel bad” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I have a good idea of what it means to exist. To exist is to be able to act in some, in any, way. Whatever can act necessarily exists, and what cannot act cannot act to make its existence known. If a putative thing can not act in any way, it is indistinguishable from nothing, and so is nothing. Clearly acting on us in experience is acting, so whatever acts on us exists, and is not merely hypothetical.
.”We definitely agree about the questionable-ness and dubiousness of the meaning of “real” and “exist”.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
No we do not.
.”Well, it’s necessary component of your life-experience story, of which you and your physical surroundings are the two complementary parts. So yes. “— Michael Ossipoff
.
While not denying that I have a life-experience story, "story" is an ambiguous term, for stories can be real or fictional.
.As life experience involves inter-actions, it necessarily places us in touch with existents, which alone are capable of acting.
”I don’t make any claim about logic “existing”, whatever that would mean.” — Michael Ossipoff
..
It's your call to make or not make claims, as it is mine. Logic exists, not as a separate being, but as a set of mental norms, in the minds of rational agents.
.”Though you aren’t a Materialist proper, you, along with the Materialists, believe that this physical universe is fundamental, prior and primary with respect to the logically-interdependent realm. It’s a Materialist belief, though you aren’t entirely a Materialist.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
No, that is not my position. I hold that the universe has a derivative, dependent and participatory existence -- deriving its existence, on a continuing basis, from God Who alone is "fundamental, prior and primary with respect to the logically-interdependent realm" (creatio continuo).
.”…starting with “If there were experience of a life…”, the starting antecedent in the logically-interdependent realm. “— Michael Ossipoff
.
Since there is the experience, we are no longer dealing with a hypothetical.
.Once the antecedent is affirmed, the conclusion is categorical by the modus ponens.
.The question is one of the order of dependence. In that order, logic comes after the physical universe.
.I’d said:
.
”I get that that’s the belief of you and the Materialists. You believe that this physical universe has some kind of unspecified precedence, priority, primary-ness in the logically-interdependent realm.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
I think you are mis-reading me. Logic is a human tool, existing in human minds, and abstracted from the nature of being as found in the experienced universe
., which is ontologically dependent on God.
.God, knowing all reality at once and eternally
., has no need of ratiocinative thought, and so no need of logic.
.Of course God does know the nature of being
., and it is from that nature that we humans abstract logic.
Well, both mechanistic and teleogical explanations seem derivable from known facts. — TheMadFool
Ockham's razor is in order.
Which theory is simpler? — TheMadFool
My understanding:
You're claiming that as an explanation, teleology is as good as the mechanistic.
Am I correct? — TheMadFool
If yes, then it must be a choice between the two explanations. Ockham's razor directs us to choose the simpler model. — TheMadFool
So, we reject teleology because it's more complicated than the alternative mechanistic explanation. — TheMadFool
Nonsense! As I said Okham's razor (the Principle of Parsimony) only applies when we must choose between alternate hypotheses. That is not the case here. For you to justify the application of parsimony, you need to show that mechanism is logically incompatible with teleology. — Dfpolis
I don't think that's correct. Newton's theory of gravity isn't incompatible with Einstein's relativity. — TheMadFool
The choice between the two in favor of Einstein was, in part, based on the simplicity of Einstein's which explained away the force of gravity as a curvature of space due to mass. — TheMadFool
If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term.
But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.
The pure concepts of understanding are synthesized with the sensible intuitions. They are not projected onto nature, but have a structure such that there's continuity between the subject and object. — Marty
We can consider them neither as subjective, nor objective, as they are rightfully called transcendental — the conditions of possibility for either as such. — Marty
It then follows that we do have knoweldge of the world, simply through certain conceptual and intutional categories (always in pairs), just not things-in-themselves. — Marty
If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the term.
But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.
When Kant says we can't know the noumenon he means we do not have the capacity of an intellectual intuition. Which is a type of non-conceptual, non-sensory intuition of the world as it is that God would supposedly have. — Marty
1. Why would the complexity of mechanical explanation be a reason to then opt out for teleological explanations? Wouldn't that be a form of appealing to consequence because our mechanical explanations as of now under-determined the relevant facts? Many mechanists claim that there have been advances in biology/evolutionary theory that replace teleological explanations before. Could it not just occur later? — Marty
2. How do you generally answer people who offer the argument that we couldn't differentiate between something in evolution as being a by-product of selection (spandrels), or an actual form of adaptive selection? That is, what is adapted for, or what can be a suppose end of adaption, is not falsifiable? — Marty
3. Similar to (2), how do we differentiate between seemingly teleological events, and teleological events? Such as a snowfall rolling down a hill isn't going down the hill because it's end is the bottom. But it seems like, say, metabolism is directed towards converting food for-the-sake-of energy. — Marty
4. How do you generally response to the statement that, "Given that things are set up in a certain way, x just happens." I know you could theoretically offer a compatible teleological explanation, but why would one want to even begin to do so? — Marty
5. What books do you particularly feel are the best for getting a handle on teleology? — Marty
I think this misunderstands my question. I'm not saying mechanistic and teleological explanations are at odds. I'm asking why even have teleological explanations at all? You said earlier because the complexity of certain phenomenon would be too complex to explain mechanistically, but that seems to appeal to the under-determination of the relevant facts. That isn't enough to then say that we ought to have teleological explanations.This question seems to assume what I deny, i,e, that mechanical explanations are opposed to teleological explanations. So, in employing teleological reasoning, there is no denial of the necessity of mechanisms to attain ends in the natural world. Choosing one form of explanation has nothing to do with denying the relevance of the other. When we do choose, we typically whatever is the simplest or most efficient mode of explanation. If you want to know how a spider will respond to a fly caught in its web, it is much more efficient to ask what is the end of a web than to model the neural state of the spider and its response to visual inputs and vibrations of its web.
I am unsure what you are asking about evolution, but as I show in my paper (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution), one can fully accept the mechanisms of evolution while concluding that it has targets (ends). Nor is evolution based, as is often claimed, on pure randomness. So, it is not an example of order emerging from mindless randomness. — Dfpolis
Falsifiability applies to hypotheses. The relevant hypothesis is that evolution is random, not deterministic. This is incompatible with the mechanistic position that evolution is fully compatible with physics. In physics, the only random process is quantum measurement -- which cannot have occurred before the emergence of intelligent observers. So, if one holds that evolution is compatible with physics, then it is not random, but fully deterministic. In other words, at least up to the advent of intelligent life, the species that have evolved are fully latent in the initial state of the cosmos and the laws of nature.
How are these determinate ends achieved? By applying the laws of nature, microscopically and macroscopically, to initial states. The microscopic application is relevant to the mechanisms of genetic mutation, while the macroscopic application is relevant to the mechanisms of natural selection.
So, there is no need to choose between the existence of determinate ends and the operation of fixed laws. They are different ways of conceptualizing the same reality. — Dfpolis
Not every event is teleological in the sense of being "for the sake of" something else. Every event is teleological in the sense of being determined either by the laws of nature in general or by some rational agent. As Aristotle points out, some events are accidental in the sense of resulting from the coincidence of lines of action directed to other ends. You and I might meet at the store because I need eggs and you need peas, and then become friends, but our becoming friends was not the end of either of us in going to the store. So, snowballs might roll down hill because gravity is necessary for life to evolve (as shown by the physics behind the fine-tuning argument.)
Let me add that the existence of ends, even for the sake of something else, does not imply that we understand, or even can understand, the ordering of the proximate to the final ends. — Dfpolis
How do we know whether something has a result of x, rather than x is the intended consequence of certain processes?The fact that things are determined to x means that x is the end of the system. So, the problem is not whether there is an end, for that is a given. The problem is why should we think of x as an end? Often there is no reason to think of x as an end, as there is often no reason to think of an end as effected by detailed mechanisms. We humans have limited powers of representation, and so we abstract those features of a situation we consider to be most relevant. If we do not consider the attainment of x as important, we will generally not consider it as an end. If we see its attainment as important, we are more likely to see it as at least a proximate end.
The pure concepts of understanding don't "exist". They are transcendental. They merely create the conditions of possibility for us to understand/experience nature. We realize the form of the concepts in the possibility of any experience whatsoever being constitutive of them. They are natural insofar as nature is just merely the phenomenal character of these concepts applied. The argument to prove this is just transcendental: X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y—where then, given that Y is the case, it logically follows that X must be the case too.If there were "pure concepts of understanding," then synthesizing them with what is sensed before we are aware of it would leave us confused as to what belongs to the "pure concept" and what belongs to nature as we are sensing it. Thus, they would be projected upon our understanding of nature.
As there is no evidence whatsoever for any "pure concepts of understanding," there is no reason tor believe that the object of awareness is other than nature. Of course to say that it is nature is not to say it is nature exhaustively, but only that it is nature as interacting with us as subjects. — dfpolis
They have no Being. They are ideal. Being isn't a real predicate in Kantian metaphysics. We reason from existence, and not to it. That is, we don't apply it.To consider them to be anything, we must first have evidence of their being. Kant's authority is not evidence. — dfpolis
We know it as a form of limitation of our understanding — as something that we're not. It's known in that sense negatively. I sometimes think of it in the way Aquinas conceived of what God is by what he's not. The difference is that Kant just bars the idea of any positive description.If noumena cannot be known by sensory experience, if they are "not an object of our sensible intuition," then the only way of knowing them is by some direct, mystical intuition ("the intellectual"). But, Kant tells us that "we cannot comprehend even the possibility" of this. (This is a most peculiar claim, for if he cannot comprehend the possibility, he cannot sensibly write about the possibility.)
What cannot be known by the only two ways we have of knowing (sensory and mystical experience) cannot be known in any way. So, Kant's noumena are epistemologically indistinguishable from nonbeing. How is it rational to take as a principle of one's theory, of one's understanding, the existence of something you claim to be absolutely unknowable? — dfpolis
I wasn't talking about divine psychology. I'm merely stipulating that subjects do not have the power to know in the same way that a God would — that includes intellectual intuition. Which if we don't, we run back towards the noumenon for Kant.Clearly, we do not know as God knows. God knows by knowing His own act of sustaining creation in existence (creatio continuo). We know by interacting, in a limited way. with a portion of creation. It does not follow from this that we do not know some of the same objects, the same noumena, that God knows. Indeed, if we are to know at all, we must know the being God knows Hew holds in existence.
So, I can grant that "we do not have the capacity of an intellectual intuition," taken as "a type of non-conceptual, non-sensory intuition of the world as it is that God" has, without denying that we know, in a limited way, what God knows exhaustively. — dfpolis
I'm not saying mechanistic and teleological explanations are at odds. I'm asking why even have teleological explanations at all? — Marty
You said earlier because the complexity of certain phenomenon would be too complex to explain mechanistically, but that seems to appeal to the under-determination of the relevant facts. That isn't enough to then say that we ought to have teleological explanations. — Marty
That isn't enough to then say that we ought to have teleological explanations. — Marty
How do we know the heart was selected for too circulate blood throughout the body, as oppose to it being a by-product of another form: the heart going "bump-bump-bump". How do we devise a hypothesis that can test for which was selected instead of merely being a by-product? — Marty
The question was how do we differentiate between non-teleological ends such as the one I mentioned, and teleological ones? — Marty
How do we know whether something has a result of x, rather than x is the intended consequence of certain processes? — Marty
The pure concepts of understanding don't "exist". They are transcendental. — Marty
They merely create the conditions of possibility for us to understand/experience nature. — Marty
We realize the form of the concepts in the possibility of any experience whatsoever being constitutive of them. — Marty
They are natural insofar as nature is just merely the phenomenal character of these concepts applied. — Marty
The argument to prove this is just transcendental: X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y—where then, given that Y is the case, it logically follows that X must be the case too. — Marty
They have no Being. They are ideal. — Marty
Being isn't a real predicate in Kantian metaphysics. — Marty
We reason from existence, and not to it. That is, we don't apply it. — Marty
We know it as a form of limitation of our understanding — as something that we're not. — Marty
I sometimes think of it in the way Aquinas conceived of what God is by what he's not. The difference is that Kant just bars the idea of any positive description. — Marty
I wasn't talking about divine psychology. I'm merely stipulating that subjects do not have the power to know in the same way that a God would — that includes intellectual intuition. Which if we don't, we run back towards the noumenon for Kant — Marty
This violates the principle that no signal can travel faster then the speed of light. — Dfpolis
If you studied both theories, you would find that Einstein's is much more complex — Dfpolis
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