...for one willing to die for it! — Wayfarer

You know, we all die, it's sure to come about whether you will it or not.

The Buddhist philosophy of 'two truths', conventional and mundane, echoes the same understanding you find in Eriugena. — Wayfarer

Could you explain what you mean here, isn't the conventional the mundane? What's supramundane?

Here is one of the oddities of our liturgical and theological discourse: we do not know what the word “God” means. We have a well enough grasp of the grammatical rules for intelligible use of the term (even militant atheists know how to use it in a sentence), but Christians standing within the Catholic tradition readily admit their ignorance of its referent.

This is actually a problem which we have with most words, we don't really know what they mean. We know how to use the words, and do use them quite intelligibly, but when asked what the word actually means, we are often at a lose to provide a coherent explanation. What happens is that when we use the word in common usage, there is usually a clear referent, a thing which is being referred to. So we really don't need to know what the word means, as long as we know what the thing is which is being referred to by the word. When we use words in common practise we know the referent, not the meaning.

Take the word "chair" for instance. There is no doubt in my mind, that you and I would each produce a different definition of what that word means, therefore we don't really know what the word means. However, we can both competently use the word, and know what each other is saying, because we would be using it to refer to a particular chair, and this would be obvious.

Why do you not believe that the same is the case for the word "God"? We probably wouldn't produce the same definition of "God", so we don't really know what the word actually means, just like other words. But when we use the word, we know what the thing is which is being referred to, so we can all use the word competently. How is this any different from any other word? In fact, as long as we all agree that there is only one thing which could possibly be referred to by this word, than it is de facto impossible that one could be confused as to what the referent is. Then it really doesn't matter what the word "God" means, because it doesn't have a meaning, it just has a referent. And just like if we were sitting in a room talking about the chair in the corner of the room, the meaning of "chair" is irrelevant, because we both know the referent.

Perhaps Aquinas' most famous line is that God is a being whose existence is His essence. Therefore there is really nothing to say about what God is, except that God is.

Sorry, I meant 'conventional and supramundane' (saṁvṛiti and Paramārtha). The latter means 'supreme' or 'ultimate'; 'supramundane' is 'beyond the world'.

Take the word "chair" for instance. There is no doubt in my mind, that you and I would each produce a different definition of what that word means, therefore we don't really know what the word means. However, we can both competently use the word, and know what each other is saying, because we would be using it to refer to a particular chair, and this would be obvious. — Metaphysician Undiscovered

My point is a somewhat Wittgensteinian one - we are lulled into thinking we understand something by the habitual way in which we talk about it. That is why when the word 'God' is bandied about, it lulls us into thinking we really know what we're talking about, when what we really are talking about is a mysterium tremendum et fascinans which, according to the book from which that term is taken, ought to make the hair on the back of your neck stand up.

With tables and chairs and the furniture of common discourse, whereas philosophers might wish to make these appear more mysterious than they are, we both know what is meant by them. Chairs are for sittting on, tables for eating off. But when it comes to the 'ground of being', as soon as the term enters into discourse via a conglomerate of images and connotations, then it's already a form of idolatory - hence that quote from McCabe above. It is a case of 'familiarity breeding contempt'. I think it's important to acknowledge that in this matter, we really don't know what we mean, that words are simply signs or 'fingers pointing at the moon'. Otherwise the divine is reduced to the term in an argument, which is precisely what has happened in most discourse about it.

Yes that all makes sense. So the eternal is becoming in the moment, but by the time it has become, it has passed into the past?

Yes I do consider something approximating aerviternal, with beings performing acts equivalent to angels. For me this is manifest as an army of such beings attending to your every move*. But in a removed(veiled) sense, as if one is on an operating table with a team of light beings working on the mechanics of your being. This can also be seen as a multidimensional now, in which there is an eternal moment** and an eternity of such beings as a firmanent, inside the very being of each of us. Something which is difficult to convey.

*By an army of beings in attendance, I am referring, perhaps to nature spirits, the beings forming the many and diverse kingdoms of nature.

**in this eternal moment, I see like a hub, or interchange between all moments, wherein they are the one moment.

So the eternal is becoming in the moment, but by the time it has become, it has passed into the past? — Punshhh

More precisely, the schema I described has the eternal never passing into the past. That is how it is outside of time. Imagine that we always experience time at the present, such that we observe things as they pass into the past. Now consider that there is something which always remains prior to this, so that it never passes into the past, and we never observe it. We know it is there due to the logical necessity of arguments like the cosmological argument.

Do you recognize, that due to the nature of free will, it is necessary to conclude that the entirety of what we call "the physical world", must come into existence at every moment of the present, as time passes? Free will allows us to make substantial changes to the physical world, at any moment of the present. Because anything in the physical world can be changed at any random moment of the present, we can conclude that no aspect of the physical world exists prior to the present. Therefore the entire physical world comes into existence at each moment of the present. The future is present to us, as a complete void of nothingness in front of us. I think of it as a wall in front of me, one which prevents me from doing anything, or even seeing anything, on the other side, because I have a physical body, and no physical existence can be on that other side.

However, we experience a continuity of existence. We see objects and activities, and notice that their existence continues in a very consistent manner, which we can predict, despite the fact that all physical existence must come into being anew, at every moment of the present. This continuity is described by Newton's first law, the law of inertia. The fact that an existing thing will continue to exist, as it has in the past, indicates that when the thing comes into existence at each moment of the present, something must cause it to come into existence in a way which is consistent with how it came into existence at the last moment, and in the past in general. We can refer to Neo-Platonic Forms as the cause of such continuity, what causes an object to come into existence in the way it does, at each moment.

Yes I do consider something approximating aerviternal, with beings performing acts equivalent to angels. For me this is manifest as an army of such beings attending to your every move*. But in a removed(veiled) sense, as if one is on an operating table with a team of light beings working on the mechanics of your being. This can also be seen as a multidimensional now, in which there is an eternal moment** and an eternity of such beings as a firmanent, inside the very being of each of us. Something which is difficult to convey. — Punshhh

If we assume, as I described, that the physical world comes into existence at each moment, then willful actions can be understood as an altering of the Forms which dictate the way that the world will come into existence. So I don't assume "an army of such beings", as you describe, I think there is simply subtle differences to the way that the brain and nervous system materializes at each moment, as time passes, and these subtle changes result in the parts of your body materializing in slightly different places (movement). What causes these differences in the first place is the immaterial form, the soul, operating within those Forms.

This is somewhat contrary to Newton's first law. This law states that a body will not change its direction of movement unless acted upon by a force. It is generally assumed that the force must be of an external origin. But here we have an internal source. So the immaterial Forms, which dictate how the body will come into existence at each moment, act from the inside of the body, producing a continuity described by the law. The willing agent has the power to alter these Forms from within, influencing the way that the body will come into existence at each moment.

If we consider the necessity of such Forms, we can see that each and every body must have a Form particular to itself. Massive bodies such as planets, stars, and galaxies, have Forms which we as human beings cannot alter. We only have the capacity to alter the Forms of tiny bodies. Nevertheless, since we understand that all physical existence is similar, we must conclude that these massive bodies come into existence at each moment of time as well, and are therefore governed by Forms. From here we can produce something like the emanation of Plotinus. There is first, the Form of One which dictates the mass of the entire universe as it comes into existence at each moment of time. The smaller masses are subsequent in the emanation, with the Forms of the smallest particles of matter having the least influence. The power of God's will is to produce the Form of One, the power of the human being's will is to produce the Forms of the smallest particles of matter.

My point is a somewhat Wittgensteinian one - we are lulled into thinking we understand something by the habitual way in which we talk about it. — Wayfarer

I have little sympathy for Wittgenstein. Where in "On Certainty" he assumes that there is a point where doubt becomes unreasonable, I am one to contest this. Wittgenstein argues that knowledge can only proceed from a foundation of certainty. We must have certainty with respect to what words mean, in order that we can proceed to have knowledge. But his argument is circular, we are certain about these things because we take them for granted, yet he insists that we must take them for granted (i.e. it is unreasonable to doubt them) because we are certain about them. So not only are we "lulled into thinking we understand something by the habitual way in which we talk about it", as you say, but he argues that we are "certain" about these things, and it is unreasonable to doubt these things. These things, which are unreasonable to doubt, (and they are unreasonable to doubt simply because of that habit), these certainties, form the foundation, the base our entire knowledge.

That is why when the word 'God' is bandied about, it lulls us into thinking we really know what we're talking about, when what we really are talking about is a mysterium tremendum et fascinans which, according to the book from which that term is taken, ought to make the hair on the back of your neck stand up. — Wayfarer

My point is, that this is not only true about the word "God", it is true about any word, even the foundational ones which massive structures of knowledge are based on. These include words like "universe", "sun", "earth", "matter". We use them in a way which is indicative of the knowledge which we have. But all of these words we can doubt. Do we really understand what the universe is, or what the sun is, or even the earth, or matter? The ancient people thought they knew what the sun and the earth were, but they didn't understand the relationship at all, without an understanding of the solar system. So they really didn't know what the sun was, or the earth, and quite possibly (I would say probably), we still don't. To this day, we say that the sun rises and sets, and that's really how we perceive it. When I see the sun out there, moving through the sky, I'm not imagining all these spinning, and circular motions which the science describes. And even if I did, how would I know that it's really the best description of these things?

With tables and chairs and the furniture of common discourse, whereas philosophers might wish to make these appear more mysterious than they are, we both know what is meant by them. — Wayfarer

But I think we know just as well, if not better, what is meant by "God", as by "chair". God is the creator of all existence. But what's a chair, something you sit on, something with legs? Either word, God or chair, all we need is simple agreement on what we are talking about, and there is no problem. The thing is, that there are a whole lot of words which we do not have such simple agreement. Now, with the decline of religion, "God" has become one of them.

Notice how my position differs from yours. You think, like Wittgenstein, that we have certainty about certain words, and we have built knowledge on that certainty. I think that such certainty is an illusion, we've been lulled into assuming certainty, when it's really like a false bravado, a certitude. Furthermore, I think that we can take a word like "God", and define that word very simply, like "creator of all existence", and be very certain of the meaning of that word, because the meaning is produced by that definition. All this requires is to agree on the definition. In this case, we know that the certainty is a function of the definition, such that the certainty only exists so long as the definition is adhered to.

I will give this schema more thought, my own position might be orthogonal to this. In that I see material extension as primary here and time is a peculiarity of its expresssion and development(causality etc). This is because we are in a state of incarnation within a material realm, with strict rules, or conventions of causality. However that in eternity material is of less importance and is far more malleable similarly with time. So an eternal state of being experiences a pregnant moment, of eternal duration. It's difficult to explain, but there is duration without time, wherein time is an ornament, or quality of something being considered, experienced, or expressed.

Compare the kalam/cosmological argument:

1. whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. the universe began to exist
3. therefore the universe has a cause of its existence

And:

1. whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence
2. causation began to exist
3. therefore causation has a cause of its existence

The 1^st premises are the same. This latter argument is clearly nonsense, violates identity (the 1st law). Causation is one more cause than causation...?

So what's the difference anyway? Well, the difference is the application of the 1^st premise, and the implications thereof, of which 3 is wrong here. The "whatever" part is a generic wildcard. The analysis, then, is that the 1^st premise must be delineated, it's applicability is not unconditional, not just anything can replace "whatever". Before applying the 1^st premise, the application to whatever it's being applied to, must be justified. (And, towards that, keep mentioned quantum phenomena and expansion of the universe, in mind.)

As shown, if spacetime and causation are aspects of the universe, then 1 cannot be applied to the universe, the universe cannot take "whatever"'s place.

Right. So what you're saying is that the Universe itself must exist, before there can be any 'causality'? That if space-time and causality are aspects of the Universe, then the Universe can't be said to have a cause, because 'causes' only come into play once there is a Universe?

I just got an email about the latest Closer to Truth interview series, on Why Cosmic Fine-Tuning Demands Explanation (haven't watched it yet). Also went to a book launch recently on the same topic (by two physicists).

It seems a related argument to the Cosmological argument, except for instead of 'cause' it is talking about 'order' - why do natural laws exist? How come the Universe is such that matter, stars, life, exist when it might easily not be that way? What is the cause of the order?

That seems close to the question you're asking. And your answer here is, order itself is something which pre-supposes 'something to be ordered'. Order is only a meaningful concept when something already exists.

If that is what you're arguing, I think the subtle point you're missing is that your view of 'causality' amounts to what Aristoteleanism would call the 'efficient cause', i.e. the kinds of causes that can be described in terms of series of antecedent factors giving rise to some effect. So in that context, you're correct, there can't be any sense of 'cause' outside those that can be observed in the Universe.

But the metaphysical notion of 'first cause' is more like 'why did order arise from chaos in the first place?' It's more like: how can there be sequences of events that gave rise to causal relations (among other things)?

The fine-tuning arguments are about the fact that were any one of a very small set of 'fundamental constraints' even slightly different, then order would not have arisen at all. So it appears as though the 'game is rigged' (in Fred Hoyle's phrase) in such a way that stars>matter>life were woven into the equations from the get-go. In other words, the constraints precede what we perceive as phenomena.

Of course, 'natural theology' will be inclined to answer that this is because 'God made it so'. And the response to that from 'natural science' is, well, we can't have that, because it suggests something outside science, and, after all, that is what we're trying to avoid.

Astrophysicist Sandra Faber declared that there were only two possible explanations for fine-tuning. “One is that there is a God and that God made it that way,” she said. But for Faber, an atheist, divine intervention is not the answer.

“The only other approach that makes any sense is to argue that there really is an infinite, or a very big, ensemble of universes out there and we are in one,” she said 1.

This appears to concede that 'chance' is not a feasible argument, due to the very small likelihoods involved. But multiplying universes indefinitely, one gives a much bigger field for chance to work with, so to speak. This is a suprisingly common rationale for the so-called 'multiverse' conjecture.

I think that a kind of open-minded agnosticism is the best attitude - there are obviously many large imponderables in these questions. But I also think there's a big problem in trying to 'explain laws'. Many things can be explained on the basis of scientific laws, but now the attitude seems to be, if we can infer what is at the basis of these laws, then we will (to use Hawking's memorable phrase) 'know the mind of God'. So I do wonder whether this amounts to a kind of 'reverse engineering of reality' enterprise. And about that I'm very dubious.

The 1st premises are the same. This latter argument is clearly nonsense, violates identity (the 1st law). Causation is one more cause than causation...? — jorndoe

The latter argument is nonsense only because you make a category error. The first premise "whatever begins to exist...", refers to particular things. "Causation" refers to a concept, a generality. So the first premise is meant to read "any particular thing which begins to exist...", and you are replacing "any particular thing" with a generality, a universal, or concept, "causation", which, because it is an abstraction is not a particular thing. So you have committed a category error.

Craig does not delineate the "whatever" (wild-card) in the 1^st premise thus, but it seems you do.
I'm guessing Craig would hang causation on his deity of choice all the same (God "caused" it all).
Can you specify accurately how you delineate the "whatever" then? (The universe yes, spatiality ?, time ?, causation no, "whatever" else ?)

A per this old post, we know plenty concrete about causation already (including quantifiable).
In terms of ordinary ontology, the "whatever" part would, presumably, apply not just to object-likes, but also process-likes, collections of causal chains included.

Differently expressed objection:

Craig implicitly extends causation beyond the universe, and thus have to justify this before applying the 1^st premise to the universe.

Craig does not delineate the "whatever" (wild-card) in the 1st premise thus, but it seems you do. — jorndoe

I don't accept Craig's formulation, partly due to this ambiguity. In other versions that I have read the authors are clear to distinguish between material objects and immaterial concepts. Craig does not seem to do this, so we have ambiguity as to whether "whatever" refers to just material objects, or to immaterial as well as material objects.

Craig implicitly extends causation beyond the universe, and thus have to justify this before applying the 1st premise to the universe. — jorndoe

Again, I do not agree with the way that Craig extends causation beyond the limits of the physical universe without providing a clear distinction between efficient causation and final causation.

Can you specify accurately how you delineate the "whatever" then? (The universe yes, spatiality ?, time ?, causation no, "whatever" else ?) — jorndoe

I assume causation to be a temporal term. To say that something is a cause, is to give temporal priority to it. Physical, or material existence, is existence which we describe with spatial reference. If there is a cause of all physical (spatial) existence, this implies that there is time prior to physical existence.