You should be able to answer without seeing the relevance.

Let's try again.

Suppose I gave the following argument to you:

-We only find judgments about whether it is raining in individuals.
-Therefore, it is only ever raining to some S.

Is this is good argument?

Nope. I asked you a question.

You don't think that everything in the world is a judgment, do you? What definition of judgment are you using?

It doesn't matter if you see the relevance. You should be capable of answering.

No, nor have I ever implied this.

Can you please answer my most recent question now?

Sure, so is whether it's raining a judgment?

No. We can make a judgment about whether it's raining, but whether it's raining is a fact about water, the sky, and so on.

Sure. We agree about that. So we make judgments about whether it's raining. But that's not the same as whether it's raining. Not everything is a judgment. Just some things are.

Yes, but I never claimed otherwise.

Now can you please respond to my previous question, about whether the argument I gave, about how it is only ever raining to some S, is a good argument?

As I noted two or three times, judgments are a particular sort of activity that individuals perform. But not everything is a judgment.

A good argument to whom, and for what?

I am asking you whether the argument in this post:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/252725

Gives us good reason to believe that it's only ever raining for some S. If I presented you with that argument, would you find it convincing? Why or why not?

Again, we just agreed that whether it's raining isn't just a judgment right?

So if you're asking whether it's raining based on a judgment to some S, whether it's raining is a fact that's independent of the judgmnet that S makes.

So we agree that the fact that we only find judgments about whether it's raining in individuals, does not establish that it is only ever raining to some S?

Right. Rain is an objective phenomenon. There's plenty evidence of objective rain.

OK, now I'm going to present a similarly structured argument.

-We only find judgments about whether something is good in individuals.
-Therefore, things are only ever good to some S.

Is this a good argument?

The conclusion has nothing to do with the premise, and it's possible for the premise to be true while the conclusion is false.

Great. So we agree this is a bad argument.

Yet this seems to be the very argument you provided, for why things are only ever good to some S.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/252711

It looks like your argument was bad, so we have to throw it out.

Now, we come back to the original question again:

What is your reason for believing that things are only ever good to some S?

Great. So we agree this is a bad argument. — Snakes Alive

You changed it after I typed my response.

Your conclusion was initially "Therefore it's only raining to some S"

OK, so what do you think of the edited argument?

-We only find judgments about whether something is good in individuals.
-Therefore, things are only ever good to some S.

Is a good argument

Why is the rain argument bad, but the goodness argument good? They have the exact same form.

I explained that already. The rain conclusion has nothing to do with the premise. The premise is about judgments of "good"

Let's try again.

Look at these two arguments side by side.

Argument 1:

-We only find judgments about whether it is raining in individuals.
-Therefore, it is only ever raining to some S.

Argument 2:

-We only find judgments about whether something is good in individuals.
-Therefore something is only ever good to some S.

As I understand it, your claim is that Argument 1 is bad, while Argument 2 is good.

Why?

"It is raining," as an objective fact, isn't a judgment.

"Good" is a judgment

We can make judgments both about whether it is raining, and whether something is good, correct?

My question is, why does the fact that we only find judgments about whether something is good in individuals, tell us anything about whether things are only good to some S?

My question is, why does the fact that we only find judgments about whether something is good, tell us anything about whether things are only good to some S? — Snakes Alive

Again, the whole idea of "good" is that it's a judgment, an assessment.

We can make judgments about whether it's raining, but rain isn't a judgment.

It's weird that I'd have to explain that to you, because you'd have to have basically no conception of what "good" is versus something like "rain." It's like trying to explain it to a robot.

We can judge that it is raining, but this does not mean that that it is raining is a judgment.

Likewise we can judge that something is good, but this does not mean that that something is good is a judgment.

We can judge that it is raining, but this does not mean that that it is raining is not a judgment. — Snakes Alive

How can you ask that right after I type: "We can make judgments about whether it's raining, but rain isn't a judgment"?

Are you reading what I'm typing? (That's not a rhetorical question, I expect you to answer.)

This is why I asked earlier whether you thought that the world only consisted of judgments. You said you didn't, and that whether it was raining wasn't a judgment.