Then I haven't followed your point. Are you agreeing that "good" is indefinable? — Banno
Moral judgements, like all judgements, are true, or they are false. This follows from their predicate-subject form.
Moral propositions imply an action. That is, one ought act in accord with true moral propositions. — Banno
When I say "It is raining" does that, on your view, mean the very same thing as "I think it is raining"? — Moliere
From the SEP article linked earlier...
Moore's main argument... ...was what has come to be known as the “open-question argument,” though he actually stated in a couple of slightly different ways. Consider a particular naturalist claim, such as that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasure.” If this claim were true, Moore argued, the judgement “Pleasure is good” would be equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure,” yet surely someone who asserts the former means to express more than that uninformative tautology. The same argument can be mounted against any other naturalist proposal: even if we have determined that something is what we desire to desire or is more evolved, the question whether it is good remains “open,” in the sense that it is not settled by the meaning of the word “good.”
Insofar as people believe that moral utterances can be true or false they're simply mistaken. They have mistaken beliefs about the ontology of moral utterances.
— Terrapin Station
I would argue that anyone who holds that moral utterances cannot be true or false have mistaken beliefs about thought and belief. — creativesoul
Sure, and then what you'd offer as empirical support would be? — Terrapin Station
I think the line of thinking would be to say that we have conflicting emotions, and moral duty is just another emotion, a sort of pleasure, that some people have. — Moliere
Yep. I'm more or less agreeing that it is an odd question - asking for support for their being something "wrong with them" where that's not about the judgement of the person making that judgment... — Banno
But, what sort of support does one need to make the judgement that kicking a puppy is wrong? — Banno
You can try the sentences in different contexts to see if they're different. — Andrew M
Well-being (eudaimonia) is central to Aristotle's (and arguably Plato's) ethics and political philosophy. — Andrew M
if someone thinks that kicking the pup is fine, then I wouldn't say they have a different preference to me in the way I like vanilla and they like banana. I, and I hope you, would say rather that there was something quite wrong with them — Banno
I don't know if you never understand what I write or if you never really want to address it. — Terrapin Station
So we're assuming Aristotle's ethics or something? — Terrapin Station
Whereas if they say, "That pizza tastes good", they are likely commenting on the high quality of that particular pizza. So a use can be objective, even when discussing pizza. — Andrew M
No, it can't. There is no objective quality (in that sense of the word "quality," I'm not saying there are no objective properties.) — Terrapin Station
Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims? — Andrew M
Do you think that well-being (and suffering) is something we can make objective claims about? — Andrew M
Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims?
— Andrew M
I have no idea. We'd need to do the empirical research and do pretty extensive polls. — Terrapin Station
Do you think people ordinarily intend objectivity when making moral claims? — Andrew M
They either think/believe that something is unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour or they do not. — creativesoul
Whereas if they say, "That pizza tastes good", they are likely commenting on the high quality of that particular pizza. So a use can be objective, even when discussing pizza.
— Andrew M
No, it can't. There is no objective quality (in that sense of the word "quality," I'm not saying there are no objective properties.) — Terrapin Station
Some may, Some may not. Do most people have a clear idea of 'philosophical' objectivity (whatever that is)? — ChrisH
It seems to me that people use moral language in many different ways and senses. As you pointed out earlier "people use language in more nuanced ways than they're often given credit for".. — ChrisH
A low quality pizza might have old ingredients and be partially cooked (or burnt), whereas a high quality pizza would have fresh ingredients and be properly cooked. Do you reject pizza quality as objective because it depends on facts about humans (e.g., what is edible, healthy, palatable, etc.)? — Andrew M
If so, does that then carry over to other properties as well such as an object's color? — Andrew M
Yes, so it is an empirical question. For one interesting piece of empirical research on what people believe, see https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/ . Also see Brian Leiter's comment which brings up relevant issues. — Andrew M
What the philosophical debate is about is whether moral claims have objective truth conditions. What “the folk” think about the matter is neither here nor there. If one is interested in that sociological question, that’s fine, but presenting this issue as pertinent to the “long and complex philosophical debate” obscures the nature of the research being done. — Tim Maudlin
Yes, so it is an empirical question. For one interesting piece of empirical research on what people believe, see https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2010/12/objective-moral-truths/ . Also see Brian Leiter's comment which brings up relevant issues. — Andrew M
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