A realist must prove that a stone exists even when it's not being perceived by any mind. Can you do that? Please explain to me how this can be done? — TheMadFool
This is hilarious, because you probably don't realise that, when analysed, that will be found to say either nothing of any relevance, like a tautology which completely misses the point, or something obviously mistaken. And of course, you don't provide any argument at all in support of this, as expected. Well, except the above "argument", of course, which is clearly just a bare assertion. — S
Knock down argument! You win. — S
The burden is on you here, not me. You need to demonstrate a contradiction if that's what you're suggesting - and no, not by begging the question or making a number of bare assertions, as obviously that's fallacious. Given that it's you, however, this is probably asking the impossible. — S
Metaphysician Undercover, do you ever wonder whether you're hopelessly out of your depth here on this forum? — S
I never claimed to be a direct realist or indirect realist. I'm only showing what they would claim and how it really isn't any different than what the idealist is claiming. Does an idealist have direct access to their own mind, which is part of reality, and then indirect access to other minds? Would an idealist call the access to their minds and others, "real", as in the access is an actual property of reality and the knowledge the idealist has on this is completely and totally accurate?That's your view as a direct realist but the idealist disagrees. The idealist will say that sense data occurs and that you incorrectly believe that this sense data counts as direct perception of some external-world material thing (and the indirect realist will agree at least on this point, though accept that the occurrence of sense data is a response to stimulation by some external-world material thing). — Michael
Then the idealist needs to explain what they mean by "sense data", "perception", and "experience", if they don't mean what everyone else means when they use those terms. How does one explain "sense data" without using non-mental things like senses and objects that exist external to the mind.But just as the realist can infer the existence of other minds from the things they experience, so too can the idealist. The only difference is that the realist infers the existence of other minds from what they believe to be the direct perception of some material body, whereas the idealist infers the existence of other minds from the occurrence of certain kinds of sense data. I don't see why this latter view entails solipsism.
One can think it valid to infer the existence of other minds from experience without believing that experience is the direct perception of an external world of material things (and so without believing that there exists an external world of material things).
One can believe that (many) minds exist, that sense-data exists, but that that's it; that there isn't also some external world of material things like atoms. One can be an idealist without being a solipsist. — Michael
I'm saying that a system of measurement and rules are abstracts. If you want to argue that they're not abstracts, that's fine, but I'd just ask what particular, concrete thing(s) they are then. — Terrapin Station
Re coherence, I'm not talking about contradictions. I'm talking about not being able to make any sense out of it whatsoever. We'd need to be able to make sense out of it to claim a contradiction. We can't get a proposition and its negation out of something we can make no sense of. — Terrapin Station
Firstly, I don't even need to argue that they're not abstracts, if that's what I thought, if you're only making a claim without any supporting argument. A claim without any supporting argument can simply be dismissed.
Secondly, I don't really care what you call them. And, like I said before, I would rather avoid going down that route of whether they're abstracts or not. For starters, it isn't even clear to me what's meant by that. They are what they are. We don't need to call them anything extra. — S
Now, you're going to have to be way more specific here and go into further detail about that, because it makes sense to me. It should make sense to anyone who speaks English. — S
An hour is "the duration of 9,192,631,770 [x 3,600] periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom" (at a temperature of 0 K). — Michael
I was using "argue" informally there. I just meant "If you want to say that they're not abstracts."
Re "they are what they are," that's what I'm getting at--exactly what they are ontologically. Are you claiming that systems of measurement and rules are ontic simples? — Terrapin Station
I don't know how to be more specific about something not making any sense. If it makes sense to you, that's fine, but what am I supposed to do with that? — Terrapin Station
Sorry to disappoint you, but a tautology provides the most reliable premise. That's why it's as you've admitted, a "knock down argument". — Metaphysician Undercover
I've demonstrated the contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
You doubt that a stone exists? Or you doubt that the assumptions of idealism are unwarranted? — S
Great, more philosophy jargon. Please translate that. — S
If you can't explain what it is about it which doesn't make sense to you, then your claim can simply be dismissed as unwarranted. I'm speaking in English in a way that makes sense, and in a way that other people can understand. I'm not saying anything like "fribgfh cgjjdfk hjkkfdf vhh" or "hat the field flying at to was". — S
Ah, just as I suspected. You don't understand why what you're doing is fallacious. Maybe one day you'll learn why, but I'm done trying. — S
I doubt both.
If you ask my opinion I'd prefer to be a realist but there seems no way of proving realism. I'd have to demonstrate that a stone exists even in the absence of anyone perceiving it. That is impossible because existence is proven by being perceived; at least that's the gold standard. People put it succinctly as ''seeing is believing''. If then someone asks you to believe without seeing then that's self-refuting no? — TheMadFool
Now idealism. How am I to prove everything is in the mind? I'd have to show that objects cease to exist when not perceived. This is exactly where realism hit rough weather. — TheMadFool
So, we can't prove either realism or idealism. We can only make an educated guess on the issue and I would prefer realism because idealism seems more complex. Occam's razor? — TheMadFool
That objects cease to exist when not perceived is implausible. Why would any reasonable person believe that? — S
Ontic simple = basically it doesn't reduce to something else ontologically. An ontic simple is an "elementary particle" of sorts for ontology in general. — Terrapin Station
For example, the idea of existents that have no location makes no sense in my view. Everything extant has some (set of) location(s). — Terrapin Station
If the idea of existents with no locations makes sense to you, okay, you say it does, but I can't do anything with it unless you'd be able to explain how any existent could obtain without having a location. — Terrapin Station
Again, I'm not saying that anything is a contradiction. I'm saying I can't make any sense of it. If you don't care to try to explain it so that I could make any sense out of it, then we're just stuck. It's not going to make sense to me, and you aren't going to bother to try to explain it. — Terrapin Station
Re the other part, that's what I'm talking about in all of this--what things are ontologically. If you're not interested in that, then again, a conversation probably just won't get started. — Terrapin Station
It only doesn't make sense to you because of your assumption that everything must have a location. That's not my assumption, and you haven't justified it. So it's not my problem, it's yours. You're the one who isn't making sense whenever you make your location category error. — S
What the idealist is taking issue with, is the notion that an unconceived object is conceivable. Consequently, your question cannot be constructed in any way acceptable to the idealist, since the idealist will interpret the question as being self-refuting. — sime
Is conception a la idealism a correlative fact in your view, or is it what objects are?
In other words, are you saying that one might be an idealist who allows mind-independent objects, whether they're perceived or not, as long as we correlatively conceive of them, too?
Or is the conception what the objects are? (And then we'd have to figure out how it would make sense posit an unperceived conception, and whether the conception has to be present-to-mind for that or not.) — Terrapin Station
Actually, you don't seem to have tried very hard, just asserting over and over, that the burden is on me to prove that what you are saying is nonsense. But in reality the burden is on you to demonstrate how your so called thought experiment makes any sense at all. and that you are not just asking us to imagine an impossible scenario. I've shown you why it is an impossible scenario and you seem to have no rebuttal for that, only more nonsense, claiming that something could have a measurement without being measured.
My failure to understand why what I am doing is fallacious is a product of your inability to explain why what I am doing is fallacious. And your inability to explain why what I am doing is fallacious is due to the fact that it is not fallacious. Oh well, so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Assuming your definition of "an hour", then unless there is someone to count those periods of radiation, and determine whether there is that designated rock at this precise moment, the question is completely nonsensical. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then the idealist needs to explain what they mean by "sense data", "perception", and "experience", if they don't mean what everyone else means when they use those terms. How does one explain "sense data" without using non-mental things like senses and objects that exist external to the mind. — Harry Hindu
I'm just trying to clarify your definitions here: if not-P is inconceivable to S, is P an "assumption" on S's part? In other words, for any claim where we can't conceive of an alternative, are we making an assumption? — Terrapin Station
My point is just that one can claim that only mental phenomena exists without having to believe that only one's own mental phenomena exists, and that one can claim that there is direct (or indirect) evidence of other minds without having to believe that there is direct (or indirect) evidence of something like the material things the realist believes in. — Michael
But the idealist would have to explain what kind of evidence would be evidence of other minds, but not also evidence of material things. I would suspect special pleading. — S
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.