A realist must prove that a stone exists even when it's not being perceived by any mind. Can you do that? Please explain to me how this can be done? — TheMadFool

That's tantamount to proving that a stone exists, and simply pointing out that the assumptions of idealism are unwarranted. You doubt that a stone exists? Or you doubt that the assumptions of idealism are unwarranted? If the latter, then show me why the assumptions of idealism are warranted.

Try to understand that what you're expecting of me is unreasonable.

(Chuckles to self)
Ehhhhh......Mr. Potatohead. That’s just me being really confused. It’s your experiment, so the onus is on me to grasp the intent of it, what’s supposed to be demonstrated by it. After I give my understanding the best I can, if you don’t come back with “THAT’S what I’m talking about, Willis!!!!” Then I got nothing.

I hate it when I got nothing.

I'm saying that a system of measurement and rules are abstracts. If you want to argue that they're not abstracts, that's fine, but I'd just ask what particular, concrete thing(s) they are then.

Re coherence, I'm not talking about contradictions. I'm talking about not being able to make any sense out of it whatsoever. We'd need to be able to make sense out of it to claim a contradiction. We can't get a proposition and its negation out of something we can make no sense of.

This is hilarious, because you probably don't realise that, when analysed, that will be found to say either nothing of any relevance, like a tautology which completely misses the point, or something obviously mistaken. And of course, you don't provide any argument at all in support of this, as expected. Well, except the above "argument", of course, which is clearly just a bare assertion. — S

Sorry to disappoint you, but a tautology provides the most reliable premise. That's why it's as you've admitted, a "knock down argument".

Knock down argument! You win. — S

The burden is on you here, not me. You need to demonstrate a contradiction if that's what you're suggesting - and no, not by begging the question or making a number of bare assertions, as obviously that's fallacious. Given that it's you, however, this is probably asking the impossible. — S

Measurement is "1. the act or an instance measuring. 2, an amount determined by measuring."

I've demonstrated the contradiction. You claim that a thing could have a measurement without an act of measuring. This is what you said: "If a stick happens to be a metre in length, then it happens to be a metre in length, and that's that." To say that the stick has a measurement without being measured, clearly contradicts accepted definitions of "measurement". Now the burden is obviously on you, to provide a new, and acceptable definition of "measurement" which supports your position. You can't just assume that there is such a definition, and base your argument on that, using words in this nonsensical way. To say that a stick has a measurement without being measured is just a meaningless, nonsensical use of words. That's all.

Metaphysician Undercover, do you ever wonder whether you're hopelessly out of your depth here on this forum? — S

I don't wonder about that, I recognize it as a fact every day. This stuff is so incredibly shallow.

That's your view as a direct realist but the idealist disagrees. The idealist will say that sense data occurs and that you incorrectly believe that this sense data counts as direct perception of some external-world material thing (and the indirect realist will agree at least on this point, though accept that the occurrence of sense data is a response to stimulation by some external-world material thing). — Michael

I never claimed to be a direct realist or indirect realist. I'm only showing what they would claim and how it really isn't any different than what the idealist is claiming. Does an idealist have direct access to their own mind, which is part of reality, and then indirect access to other minds? Would an idealist call the access to their minds and others, "real", as in the access is an actual property of reality and the knowledge the idealist has on this is completely and totally accurate?

But just as the realist can infer the existence of other minds from the things they experience, so too can the idealist. The only difference is that the realist infers the existence of other minds from what they believe to be the direct perception of some material body, whereas the idealist infers the existence of other minds from the occurrence of certain kinds of sense data. I don't see why this latter view entails solipsism.

One can think it valid to infer the existence of other minds from experience without believing that experience is the direct perception of an external world of material things (and so without believing that there exists an external world of material things).

One can believe that (many) minds exist, that sense-data exists, but that that's it; that there isn't also some external world of material things like atoms. One can be an idealist without being a solipsist. — Michael

Then the idealist needs to explain what they mean by "sense data", "perception", and "experience", if they don't mean what everyone else means when they use those terms. How does one explain "sense data" without using non-mental things like senses and objects that exist external to the mind.

What does the idealist mean with their use of "other" as in "other minds", if not external, or apart from your mind? What is it that separates your mind from others? What is the medium in which all these minds exist, if not some external world? Aren't you confusing anti-realism with idealism?

I'm saying that a system of measurement and rules are abstracts. If you want to argue that they're not abstracts, that's fine, but I'd just ask what particular, concrete thing(s) they are then. — Terrapin Station

Firstly, I wouldn't even need to argue that they're not abstracts, if that's what I thought, if you're only making a claim without any supporting argument. A claim without any supporting argument can simply be dismissed.

Secondly, I don't really care what you call them. And, like I said before, I would rather avoid going down that route of whether they're abstracts or not. For starters, it isn't even clear to me what's meant by that. They are what they are. We don't need to call them anything extra.

Re coherence, I'm not talking about contradictions. I'm talking about not being able to make any sense out of it whatsoever. We'd need to be able to make sense out of it to claim a contradiction. We can't get a proposition and its negation out of something we can make no sense of. — Terrapin Station

Okay, then you should have just said it that way to begin with instead of using philosophy jargon. It's clearer and more easily understood that way. Now, you're going to have to be way more specific here and go into further detail about that, because it makes sense to me. It should make sense to anyone who speaks English. What exactly is your problem?

If it's the location thing, then it's just your weird view about that which is the problem. Unlike you, I recognise that it's a category error, remember?

Firstly, I don't even need to argue that they're not abstracts, if that's what I thought, if you're only making a claim without any supporting argument. A claim without any supporting argument can simply be dismissed.

Secondly, I don't really care what you call them. And, like I said before, I would rather avoid going down that route of whether they're abstracts or not. For starters, it isn't even clear to me what's meant by that. They are what they are. We don't need to call them anything extra. — S

I was using "argue" informally there. I just meant "If you want to say that they're not abstracts."

Re "they are what they are," that's what I'm getting at--exactly what they are ontologically. Are you claiming that systems of measurement and rules are ontic simples?

Now, you're going to have to be way more specific here and go into further detail about that, because it makes sense to me. It should make sense to anyone who speaks English. — S

I don't know how to be more specific about something not making any sense. If it makes sense to you, that's fine, but what am I supposed to do with that?

An hour is "the duration of 9,192,631,770 [x 3,600] periods of the radiation corresponding to the transition between the two hyperfine levels of the ground state of the caesium-133 atom" (at a temperature of 0 K). — Michael

S's question asks whether there would be a rock an hour after all the people died. My objection was that "an hour" is a measurement which can only be carried out by a human being. So the assumption of "an hour after all the people died", is nonsensical, or even contradictory because "an hour" only exists as a product of measurement.

Assuming your definition of "an hour", then unless there is someone to count those periods of radiation, and determine whether there is that designated rock at this precise moment, the question is completely nonsensical. The question assumes that a comparison can be made between those periods of radiation, and the existence of a rock, without anyone to do the comparison. S does not recognize that question as meaningless nonsense.

I was using "argue" informally there. I just meant "If you want to say that they're not abstracts."

Re "they are what they are," that's what I'm getting at--exactly what they are ontologically. Are you claiming that systems of measurement and rules are ontic simples? — Terrapin Station

Great, more philosophy jargon. Please translate that.

I don't know how to be more specific about something not making any sense. If it makes sense to you, that's fine, but what am I supposed to do with that? — Terrapin Station

If you can't explain what it is about it which doesn't make sense to you, then your claim can simply be dismissed as unwarranted. I'm speaking in English in a way that makes sense, and in a way that other people can understand. I'm not saying anything like "fribgfh cgjjdfk hjkkfdf vhh" or "hat the field flying at to was".

Sorry to disappoint you, but a tautology provides the most reliable premise. That's why it's as you've admitted, a "knock down argument". — Metaphysician Undercover

Learn to sarcasm. And learn to read what I said properly: "...like a tautology which completely misses the point...".

Ironically, you're missing the point about missing the point! :rofl:

I've demonstrated the contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, just as I suspected. You don't understand why what you're doing is fallacious. Maybe one day you'll learn why, but I'm done trying.

You doubt that a stone exists? Or you doubt that the assumptions of idealism are unwarranted? — S

I doubt both.

If you ask my opinion I'd prefer to be a realist but there seems no way of proving realism. I'd have to demonstrate that a stone exists even in the absence of anyone perceiving it. That is impossible because existence is proven by being perceived; at least that's the gold standard. People put it succinctly as ''seeing is believing''. If then someone asks you to believe without seeing then that's self-refuting no?

Now idealism. How am I to prove everything is in the mind? I'd have to show that objects cease to exist when not perceived. This is exactly where realism hit rough weather.

So, we can't prove either realism or idealism. We can only make an educated guess on the issue and I would prefer realism because idealism seems more complex. Occam's razor?

Great, more philosophy jargon. Please translate that. — S

Ontic simple = basically it doesn't reduce to something else ontologically. An ontic simple is an "elementary particle" of sorts for ontology in general.

If you can't explain what it is about it which doesn't make sense to you, then your claim can simply be dismissed as unwarranted. I'm speaking in English in a way that makes sense, and in a way that other people can understand. I'm not saying anything like "fribgfh cgjjdfk hjkkfdf vhh" or "hat the field flying at to was". — S

For example, the idea of existents that have no location makes no sense in my view. Everything extant has some (set of) location(s). If the idea of existents with no locations makes sense to you, okay, you say it does, but I can't do anything with it unless you'd be able to explain how any existent could obtain without having a location.

The question isn't relevant to the idealist. For the question conceives of an unperceived object, which isn't what the idealist is taking issue with.

What the idealist is taking issue with, is the notion that an unconceived object is conceivable. Consequently, your question cannot be constructed in any way acceptable to the idealist, since the idealist will interpret the question as being self-refuting.

The idealist is rebelling against the realist's understanding of an object's existence as transcending the entire space of perceptual and conceptual constructs, as opposed to merely transcending acts of perception.

The realist's central task is therefore to establish whether an idealist is naming objects in terms of particular acts of conception or perception. The realist cannot find such naming conventions useful, for the realist's chief interest is in making experimentally testable speculative inferences about the future and he consequently demands that names convey speculative implications.

In contrast, the idealist whose only concern is to dismiss the idea of mind-independent entities as being incoherent, isn't interested in predicting the future. His use of names therefore does not coincide with the realist's use of names.

Is conception a la idealism a correlative fact in your view, or is it what objects are?

In other words, are you saying that one might be an idealist who allows mind-independent objects, whether they're perceived or not, as long as we correlatively conceive of them, too?

Or is the conception what the objects are? (And then we'd have to figure out how it would make sense posit an unperceived conception, and whether the conception has to be present-to-mind for that or not.)

Ah, just as I suspected. You don't understand why what you're doing is fallacious. Maybe one day you'll learn why, but I'm done trying. — S

Actually, you don't seem to have tried very hard, just asserting over and over, that the burden is on me to prove that what you are saying is nonsense. But in reality the burden is on you to demonstrate how your so called thought experiment makes any sense at all. and that you are not just asking us to imagine an impossible scenario. I've shown you why it is an impossible scenario and you seem to have no rebuttal for that, only more nonsense, claiming that something could have a measurement without being measured.

My failure to understand why what I am doing is fallacious is a product of your inability to explain why what I am doing is fallacious. And your inability to explain why what I am doing is fallacious is due to the fact that it is not fallacious. Oh well, so be it.

I doubt both.

If you ask my opinion I'd prefer to be a realist but there seems no way of proving realism. I'd have to demonstrate that a stone exists even in the absence of anyone perceiving it. That is impossible because existence is proven by being perceived; at least that's the gold standard. People put it succinctly as ''seeing is believing''. If then someone asks you to believe without seeing then that's self-refuting no? — TheMadFool

If the alternative to my position which you describe above logically leads to consequences which are far more absurd, which it does, then you should reject or at least revise the premise or premises which lead there.

Now idealism. How am I to prove everything is in the mind? I'd have to show that objects cease to exist when not perceived. This is exactly where realism hit rough weather. — TheMadFool

That objects cease to exist when not perceived is implausible. Why would any reasonable person believe that?

So, we can't prove either realism or idealism. We can only make an educated guess on the issue and I would prefer realism because idealism seems more complex. Occam's razor? — TheMadFool

We can prove realism, just not in accordance with a standard which sets the bar impossibly high, which is unreasonable to begin with. So it's down to you.

That objects cease to exist when not perceived is implausible. Why would any reasonable person believe that? — S

To me it always seemed like when toddlers believe that they and/or other things disappear when they cover their eyes or hide under a blanket.

It seems like insofar as that belief goes, some people don't move past it. They get stuck in that stage in that regard.

Ontic simple = basically it doesn't reduce to something else ontologically. An ontic simple is an "elementary particle" of sorts for ontology in general. — Terrapin Station

Okay. I still don't care whether it's that or something else. This seems like a diversion.

For example, the idea of existents that have no location makes no sense in my view. Everything extant has some (set of) location(s). — Terrapin Station

Yes, in your view.

If the idea of existents with no locations makes sense to you, okay, you say it does, but I can't do anything with it unless you'd be able to explain how any existent could obtain without having a location. — Terrapin Station

This is that same unreasonable request. There's no internal contradiction, so it's possible in my model. That's explanation enough. You'd have to argue that it's impossible without begging the question.

Again, I'm not saying that anything is a contradiction. I'm saying I can't make any sense of it. If you don't care to try to explain it so that I could make any sense out of it, then we're just stuck. It's not going to make sense to me, and you aren't going to bother to try to explain it.

Re the other part, that's what I'm talking about in all of this--what things are ontologically. If you're not interested in that, then again, a conversation probably just won't get started.

Again, I'm not saying that anything is a contradiction. I'm saying I can't make any sense of it. If you don't care to try to explain it so that I could make any sense out of it, then we're just stuck. It's not going to make sense to me, and you aren't going to bother to try to explain it. — Terrapin Station

It only doesn't make sense to you because of your assumption that everything must have a location. That's not my assumption, and you haven't justified it. So it's not my problem, it's yours. You're the one who isn't making sense whenever you make your location category error.

Re the other part, that's what I'm talking about in all of this--what things are ontologically. If you're not interested in that, then again, a conversation probably just won't get started. — Terrapin Station

It's not so much that I'm not interested, it's that it's a separate issue, and off topic here.

It only doesn't make sense to you because of your assumption that everything must have a location. That's not my assumption, and you haven't justified it. So it's not my problem, it's yours. You're the one who isn't making sense whenever you make your location category error. — S

I'm just trying to clarify your definitions here: if not-P is inconceivable to S, is P an "assumption" on S's part? In other words, for any claim where we can't conceive of an alternative, are we making an assumption?

What the idealist is taking issue with, is the notion that an unconceived object is conceivable. Consequently, your question cannot be constructed in any way acceptable to the idealist, since the idealist will interpret the question as being self-refuting. — sime

Then the idealist is simply wrong. One can demonstrably conceive of an unconceived object. I can, at least. Why should I believe that anyone else is so different from me in this respect?

I can also predict where this is going to go, and that the idealist will make an error in his or her reasoning here. "But you're conceiving of it!". Yes. Yes I am.

Is conception a la idealism a correlative fact in your view, or is it what objects are?

In other words, are you saying that one might be an idealist who allows mind-independent objects, whether they're perceived or not, as long as we correlatively conceive of them, too?

Or is the conception what the objects are? (And then we'd have to figure out how it would make sense posit an unperceived conception, and whether the conception has to be present-to-mind for that or not.) — Terrapin Station

In general I understand George Berkeley and his philosophy of subjective idealism as being a precursor to twentieth century Phenomenalism. For I can only make sense of Berkeley's arguments for Idealism when they are interpreted as grammatical statements that identifies the very meaning of "X exists" with the empirical conditions under which "X" is asserted.

I understand Berkeley's notion of 'ideas' as not referring to conceptual, metaphysical or psychological entities, but much more weakly as referring to acts of observing or thinking.

Of course, looking at an actual object called "X" is not comparable to thinking about "X" when there are no objects present with the same name.

The idealist, who is not concerned with the correlation of thought, language and perception might as well rename his mental image of "X" with the letter "Y" and reserve the use of "X" for exclusive referring to an actually present object named "X". By doing so, he could then forbid the construction of the question "Does X exist when unperceived?" as being nonsensical, in being in violation of his rule for using "X".

He is then free to say "Y exists when unperceived", for it is understood, by definition, as only referring to a thought.



.

Actually, you don't seem to have tried very hard, just asserting over and over, that the burden is on me to prove that what you are saying is nonsense. But in reality the burden is on you to demonstrate how your so called thought experiment makes any sense at all. and that you are not just asking us to imagine an impossible scenario. I've shown you why it is an impossible scenario and you seem to have no rebuttal for that, only more nonsense, claiming that something could have a measurement without being measured.

My failure to understand why what I am doing is fallacious is a product of your inability to explain why what I am doing is fallacious. And your inability to explain why what I am doing is fallacious is due to the fact that it is not fallacious. Oh well, so be it. — Metaphysician Undercover

One. More. Time.

You must either demonstrate an internal contradiction or you must argue in support of your key premises. Why the hell should I care if you're committed to a certain definition and to certain premises which I am not committed to? I simply do not care, unless and until you give me a reason to. You cannot just assert that this is how it is or that I'm not making sense or some shit. You keep going about this in the wrong way - in a way that is fallacious. But if you can demonstrate otherwise, then that would be worth my time. However, I've given you plenty of opportunities, and you keep on failing, so I don't have high hopes.

Assuming your definition of "an hour", then unless there is someone to count those periods of radiation, and determine whether there is that designated rock at this precise moment, the question is completely nonsensical. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is genuinely very funny. But what's interesting is that you don't mean it to be. Do you know that there actually exist driverless cars now? Imagine if a driverless car was set on a course to travel from Manchester to Exeter, and then we all died before it reached its destination. It wouldn't continue to travel in miles per hour? It wouldn't be going, say, 30 miles per hour in an easterly direction? Even if the speedometer displayed "30mph", and even if the needle on the compass was pointing towards "E"? What about the windshield? Would it not be 1.5m2, even though it was made to that specification? What about the clock? When enough time has passed that the time displayed changes from "18:00" to "19:00", would an hour not have passed?

You're either talking dumb or you're thinking dumb or both.

Then the idealist needs to explain what they mean by "sense data", "perception", and "experience", if they don't mean what everyone else means when they use those terms. How does one explain "sense data" without using non-mental things like senses and objects that exist external to the mind. — Harry Hindu

The nature of sense-data (or "qualia") is a difficult subject for both the idealist and the realist (e.g. the "hard problem of consciousness"). And, yes, both sides of the argument should provide a full account of it if they want to defend their position. But that's a separate issue to your claim that idealism entails solipsism, which is the claim I'm addressing. My point is just that one can claim that only mental phenomena exists without having to believe that only one's own mental phenomena exists, and that one can claim that there is direct (or indirect) evidence of other minds without having to believe that there is direct (or indirect) evidence of something like the material things the realist believes in.

I'm just trying to clarify your definitions here: if not-P is inconceivable to S, is P an "assumption" on S's part? In other words, for any claim where we can't conceive of an alternative, are we making an assumption? — Terrapin Station

Without assuming what you do about location, then I don't understand what the problem is. There isn't one as far as I can tell. That assumption seems to be the only thing causing a problem. It's just like someone saying something like, "I don't understand how there can be a sheep in a field without that field having been painted blue in its entirety". The obvious problem here is the assumption that there can't be a sheep in a field without that field having been painted blue in its entirety. Now, would this be your problem or theirs?

My point is just that one can claim that only mental phenomena exists without having to believe that only one's own mental phenomena exists, and that one can claim that there is direct (or indirect) evidence of other minds without having to believe that there is direct (or indirect) evidence of something like the material things the realist believes in. — Michael

The idealist would have to explain what kind of evidence would be evidence of other minds, but not also evidence of material things. I would suspect special pleading.

But the idealist would have to explain what kind of evidence would be evidence of other minds, but not also evidence of material things. I would suspect special pleading. — S

They can argue that we have evidence of things other than one's self (as the realist does) but also that the notion of material things is incoherent, whereas things like consciousness and sense-data are immediately apparent, and so therefore these other things must also be consciousness and/or sense-data.

Is it special pleading when the realist says we have evidence of material things but not of magic or the supernatural?