But all of this is predicated on a desire to promote human flourishing in a context of social harmony, so again we can say 'If we want to promote human flourishing in a context of social harmony then we should value some acts and dis-value others, and cal the former morally correct and the latter morally incorrect. There is no contradiction then if others who do not value social harmony do not agree with our moral assessments, even though it certainly seems to be the case that the vast majority of people will agree that social harmony is of primary importance. — Janus

It's true that people can choose to value different things. But suppose one values murder and theft. Consistently acting on those values erodes or destroys the social foundation on which any values at all can be pursued including their own. Which is to say, it is parasitical on what is truly valuable.

Another way to think of a flourishing morality as distinctive is that it operates as a natural focal (or Schelling) point in a complex coordination game between people. That is, if we were all to independently assume some common rules for pursuing our various interests, what would be the most pragmatic and natural set of rules to assume? A pithy maxim here would be the golden rule, which crops up in many different cultures.

Thanks. We do seem to share a position, or at least they're very close...

Goodness is not a fact on my view either. Rather it is something discovered and aspired towards. — creativesoul

Yes.

Your talk of a "natural" standard here is obviously inappropriate, as it is the opposite of that. It is an artificial standard. — S

No, it's a natural and pragmatic standard. It's hard to get much useful work done when people keep randomly dropping in to pop you off and take your stuff.

Oh dear. What's he gone and done this time? First that thing with the bus, now he's been messing with trains. I predict that Theresa will make him the new Transport Secretary once failing Grayling has been given the boot. — S

We should start a new meme. "Blame Boris!"

Consistently acting on those values erodes or destroys the social foundation on which any values at all can be pursued including their own. Which is to say, it is parasitical on what is truly valuable. — Andrew M

It is not inconceivable that a certain type of person who loves living dangerously as an outlaw could want to live in a society where no one trusted anyone at all, and everyone blamed no one but themselves if someone got the better of them (by stealing from, raping or murdering, them for example).

Of course I agree that most people are not at all like that, and we could want to say on that normative basis that it is not natural for humans to be like that; but would saying that be justified? Would it not be an unwarranted jump from normal to natural.? From what is plausibly believed to be most commonly valuable to asserting what is "truly valuable" in some unspecified absolute sense?

For what it's worth, I think we are mostly in agreement; it's just that I insist on the inclusion of that (to me) all important "if" in our explanation of moral principles; I don't believe they can stand on their own without it.

Also, as an aside, we are under no obligation to tolerate those who would live within society without honouring it's commonly held values...Right, but then who among us can claim to not only honour in thought (pay lip service to, perhaps?), but unfailingly live by, those values? So, dishonouring those values is always going to remain a matter of extent; and how much 'cheating' we should or perhaps can (being pragmatic) tolerate.

Yup. You're all three mistaken. — creativesoul

Typical. Some people just don't learn. :lol:

Let me know when you find a way out of the pickle? Yes? Do you remember where you ended up contradicting yourself if you gave an answer? I'll remind you...

"X is moral relative to A" is false if A does not believe that X is moral and true if A believes that X is moral.

And...

A's belief can be false.

How is that possible if the truth of "X is moral" is relative to A's belief? — creativesoul

This is a straw man. I have not said or accepted:

"X is moral relative to A" is false if A does not believe that X is moral and true if A believes that X is moral.

or

A's belief can be false.

However, I did say that "X is moral relative to A" is false if X is not moral relative to A. (Which is obviously true).

and

Moral statements are truth-apt, and some of them are false. (Or beliefs if you prefer. What we're talking about didn't seem to matter).

For example, "X is immoral", is false or at least unwarranted if interpreted as per moral objectivism.

And, "X is immoral", is false relative to my standard of moral judgement, if my standard of judgement doesn't entail that X is immoral.

You have great difficulty with statements like the latter. You try to demonstrate a contradiction, but you do so fallaciously by misinterpreting the statement or failing to understand what a contradiction is.

Pffft,

Meh.

@Terrapin Station

Well, there was a point there, but it did not strike home. As I recall it, folk were suggesting that one difference between subjective and objective beliefs was that objective beliefs had evidence, while subjective beliefs were expressions of opinion; or some such.

Now just to be clear, my view is that the objective/subjective distinction is misguided. My aim is not to show that moral judgements are objective, nor that empirical judgments are subjective.

We were comparing judging a cup to be blue - presumably an objective quality - with judging kicking a pup to be bad - presumably a subjective quality.

In both cases, evidence is available; in both cases, an opinion is required.

I think it clear that this way of distinguishing objective and subjective beliefs falls to my examples. You might think otherwise.

But suppose one values murder and theft. Consistently acting on those values erodes or destroys the social foundation on which any values at all can be pursued including their own. Which is to say, it is parasitical on what is truly valuable. — Andrew M

A better foil might be the Will to Power: conscientiously acting so as to achieve power for oneself. How consistent could such an approach be? Could this lead to one flourishing?

And this presents neatly the problem with the open question argument. Is it good to conscientiously acting so as to achieve power for oneself? "No, but I don't care".

(and @Janus)

Contrast to those who say good is subjective.

If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another.

Hence a subjectivist cannot claim their moral view is true. — Banno

So I can’t claim that my view that liquorice is disgusting is true because some people like it?

Can you show how that view would be a consequence of what I said?

You derived the conclusion that the subjectivist cannot claim their view to be true from the premise that two contradictory views can both be right if subjectivism is true. I just replaced the word “goodness” with “the taste of liquorice“ (and removed “moral” from “moral view”).

I just replaced the word “goodness” with “the taste of liquorice“. — Michael

And in so doing you moved to a preference instead of an imperative. One says what Michael likes. The other, what everyone should like.

And in so doing you moved to a preference instead of an imperative. — Banno

Do moral subjectivists claim that moral statements are imperatives? If not then this critique on the internal consistency of moral subjectivism doesn't work in principle.

One says what Michael likes. The other, what everyone should like.

So assuming that moral subjectivists claim that moral statements are imperatives, you're saying that he can't claim that the truth of "everyone should like X" is subjective?

And in so doing you moved to a preference instead of an imperative. — Banno

Even then, does it matter? Does the validity of an argument depend on the subject? Surely something like modus ponens is valid whatever terms are substituted in?

I assume then that whatever implicit premise was in your argument (and there must be one, because as it stands your conclusion doesn't follow from your explicit premise) is true where the subject is goodness but false where the subject is the taste of liquorice. I assume this implicit premise has something to do with imperatives. It would be useful if you could spell it out.

In both cases, evidence is available; in both cases, an opinion is required. — Banno

What sort of evidence would there be for anything being morally wrong, though? And as I explained earlier, it's conflating different senses of "opinion."

You just have to look at what the basic needs of human beings are. For example, food and water are universally valuable for human beings. — Andrew M

How do we get to needs that aren't dependent on wants?

For example, you only need food and water if you want to stay alive. If you want to die via a hunger strike, you rather need to avoid food and water. (Well, avoid water in that case if you want it to be quicker.)

Moral judgements are mental by definition — Janus

But that's all I'm saying! So why would anyone be arguing otherwise? (Now it could be because of the word "judgment," but that's why I said "moral properties" or "moral whatever-we-want-to-call-'ems, whatever word you think would best make your case re moral somethings that aren't mental")

I wasn't commenting on what they can be motivated by. What they can be motivated by is different than the judgments (or moral whatevers) themselves, which is what I'd be talking about when I talk about moral judgments (whatevers) per se.

They're not the same sense of good — Andrew M

Quite right. I should think a determination made on the basis of good with an expected return is an empirical good.
(you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours. Or, it is good to pay the parking tickets in order to stay out of court. Lady Jane: it’s very good indeed to slow that f’ing train down so’s not to scatter pieces of me over 6 counties, dammit!!!!!)

A good which determines an action because such action is good in itself, is a principle good.
(I’ll scratch your back because it itches; I’ll pay my tickets because I was too cheap to use a meter; Lady Jane: do whatcha gotta do Tom. I know I’m toast. Somebody......please.......shoot Boris for me)

Which begs the question.....is there a principle “good”?

Not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions. — creativesoul

Like what? What do you mean? Give an example. Rocks existed prior to our conceptions, but they don't seem relevant in this context.

Goodness, on my view, does not requires our awareness of it. — creativesoul

For what purpose? To exist, you mean? So what's goodness, then? What kind of thing is it? It's a concept, right? What would your claim even mean? It's far too vague for me to make much sense of or see the supposed relevance.

No, it's a natural and pragmatic standard. It's hard to get much useful work done when people keep randomly dropping in to pop you off and take your stuff. — Andrew M

What? I don't understand why you think that it's natural, or rather, if you think that it's natural, why your analogy was with something obviously artificial, namely monetary value.

Well, there was a point there, but it did not strike home. As I recall it, folk were suggesting that one difference between subjective and objective beliefs was that objective beliefs had evidence, while subjective beliefs were expressions of opinion; or some such.

Now just to be clear, my view is that the objective/subjective distinction is misguided. My aim is not to show that moral judgements are objective, nor that empirical judgments are subjective.

We were comparing judging a cup to be blue - presumably an objective quality - with judging kicking a pup to be bad - presumably a subjective quality.

In both cases, evidence is available; in both cases, an opinion is required.

I think it clear that this way of distinguishing objective and subjective beliefs falls to my examples. You might think otherwise. — Banno

My point was that your analogy was inappropriate if it was meant to suggest a) that the two situations are judged in the same way, and b) that the two situations have the same kind or strength of evidence.

Maybe you didn't mean to suggest that. But one thing's for sure: you haven't shown otherwise. It's because of these differences that I end up concluding that moral objectivism is unwarranted, whilst moral subjectivism is, so they're pretty important differences.

You derived the conclusion that the subjectivist cannot claim their view to be true from the premise that two contradictory views can both be right if subjectivism is true. I just replaced the word “goodness” with “the taste of liquorice“ (and removed “moral” from “moral view”). — Michael

Indeed. It's the same logical form in both cases. That he says that there's no contradiction with the one, but there is with the other, means that he is being inconsistent.

Moreover, it should be obvious that there is no contradiction in either case, because within each case, the one and the other are clearly not identical.

The statement "It's good for me" is obviously not identical to "It's bad for him". There's obviously no contradiction there. And it's the same for "It tastes good for me" and "It tastes bad for him".

And in so doing you moved to a preference instead of an imperative.
— Banno

Do moral subjectivists claim that moral statements are imperatives? If not then this critique on the internal consistency of moral subjectivism doesn't work in principle. — Michael

This looks like the same kind of error that creativesoul kept reverting to. He kept reverting to an interpretation that is not accepted under moral relativism, and then reasoning on from that point to draw logical consequences which, taken as a whole, are completely irrelevant because he is just begging the question to begin with.

It's kind of funny that I've been having this same problem simultaneously with two different people in two different discussions.

A better foil might be the Will to Power: conscientiously acting so as to achieve power for oneself. How consistent could such an approach be? Could this lead to one flourishing?

And this presents neatly the problem with the open question argument. Is it good to conscientiously acting so as to achieve power for oneself? "No, but I don't care". — Banno

It depends on what you mean by "power for oneself" and "one flourishing".. Power to do what? Be benevolent and compassionate towards, or suppress, exploit and torture, others?

So, I agree this trope of the "Will to Power" does "neatly present the problem with the open question argument" because it shows that what is good is dependent on what is aimed at, and what one feels, that is it depends on what one's moral sensibilities and vital aims are.

@Andrew M's argument in the passage you are responding to seems to be basically the same as Kant's Categorical Imperative. It assumes that any deception or exploitation of others will be self-defeating; and I'm not convinced that that the human situation is anywhere near as clear cut as that.

What sort of evidence would there be for anything being morally wrong, though? — Terrapin Station

Here is the broken pup. Here is the crying owner.

Here is the broken pup. Here is the crying owner. — Banno

Where's evidence of any moral properties there?

Do moral subjectivists claim that moral statements are imperatives? If not then this critique on the internal consistency of moral subjectivism doesn't work in principle. — Michael

An interesting point. Perhaps you are right. But we would need to take care with the wording.

A moral statement is one that says what ought be the case. Hence, it is an imperative by definition. SO saying moral statements is not an imperative is not quite right; rather they must say that there are no moral statements, that, for example, moral statements are all of them mere expletives.

Now some folk do claim this. I say that they are wrong; that "Don't kick the pup!" is not the very same as "Shit!". You might disagree, that's your call.

Where's the evidence of any blue in "the light is of such-and-such a frequency"?

A moral statement is one that says what ought be the case. Hence, it is an imperative by definition. — Banno

I don't think many moral subjectivists would agree. Richard Brandt in Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics says "[Objectivism and subjectivism] have been used more vaguely, confusedly, and in more different senses than the others we are considering. We suggest as a convenient usage, however, that a theory be called subjectivist if and only if, according to it, any ethical assertion implies that somebody does, or somebody of a certain sort under certain conditions would, take some specified attitude toward something".

You're obviously going to find that moral subjecitivism is inconsistent with a view of morality that isn't subjectivism, which is all you seem to be doing - being that you seem to be pushing prescriptivism - but then you're not really showing that subjectivism is inconsistent; you're just asserting that it's false.

If objectivism is the thesis that moral statements are true then I'd say that Richard Brandt's notion of subjectivism is not exclusive of objectivism -- and so the two are not really opposed.

Because, after all, we can assert true statements -- and the statements we choose to assert often do imply some kind of specific attitude we have towards something. Especially so with moral matters, where anger and respect are very frequent emotions.

If objectivism is the thesis that moral statements are true — Moliere

It's the thesis that moral statements are made true by objective features of the world. In non-moral matters we would have the objectively true statement "the speed of light in a vacuum is 299,792,458 m/s" and the subjectively true statement "liquorice is disgusting".