Alright. Then the two are still not opposed.

If I say "The speed of light in a vacuum is 299,792,458 m/s" then that implies that I believe said statement. The statement is made true by objective features of the world, but my belief is a subjective attitude towards said statement.

Where's the evidence of any blue in "the light is of such-and-such a frequency"? — Banno

That's what we're referring to with the term "blue"--light of that frequency.

@Michael

a subjectivist cannot claim their moral view is true. — Banno

This still stands, I think.

It assumes that any deception or exploitation of others will be self-defeating; — Janus

Hm. Not to speak for @Andrew M, but I would say instead that one who claims to transcend morality in the way described cannot come back and claim to be doing the right thing. That's one consequence of being beyond good and evil.

It's kind of funny that I've been having this same problem simultaneously with two different people in two different discussions. — S

Perhaps you might reconsider what is being said, then.

↪Michael If objectivism is the thesis that moral statements are true then I'd say that Richard Brandt's notion of subjectivism is not exclusive of objectivism -- and so the two are not really opposed. — Moliere

Yep.

This still stands, I think. — Banno

Perhaps, but it doesn't follow from your premise as I've pointed out. The apparent implicit premise – that "goodness" is concerned with imperatives – isn't one that many subjectivists would agree with, so you haven't shown subjectivism to be internally inconsistent; you've just asserted that it's false with a question-begging assumption.

That's what we're referring to with the term "blue"--light of that frequency. — Terrapin Station

Firstly, we used the word "blue" with great success before we knew that definition.

Secondly, why not say that this is what we are referring to with the term "good" - actions that avoid broken pups and crying children.

Richard Brandt in Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics says "[Objectivism and subjectivism] have been used more vaguely, confusedly, and in more different senses than the others we are considering. — Michael

Yep. So leave that language aside. It leads to bad philosophy.

There are better ways to deal with these issues - consider for one, direction of fit. A clear difference between "the cup is blue" and "Kicking pups is bad" that we might all agree on.

Sure they could claim they were doing the right thing...the right thing to serve their ends. Or on the other hand, there is no "the right thing" there are only right things: that is, things which work...so they could claim they were doing a right thing.

The apparent implicit premise – that "goodness" is concerned with imperatives – isn't one that many subjectivists would agree with — Michael

And if they don't, then perhaps my argument does not apply; yet if they don't, my conclusion remains, although for other reasons. Either way, they cannot claim that imperatives have a truth value.

And yet, imperatives have a truth value.

Therefore, subjectivism fails.

Yep. So leave that language aside. It leads to bad philosophy. — Banno

Or you could continue on to the next sentence which reads "We suggest as a convenient usage, however, that a theory be called subjectivist if and only if, according to it, any ethical assertion implies that somebody does, or somebody of a certain sort under certain conditions would, take some specified attitude toward something."

Either way, they cannot claim that imperatives have a truth value. — Banno

They don't claim that their moral statements are imperatives. They claim that their moral statements are about their attitudes, and have a truth value.

OK, but on analysis, such claims could not be moral claims. After all, they claim to have transcended morality.

I doubt that they would want to claim to be making moral claims.

They don't claim that their statements are imperatives. They claim that their statements are about their attitudes, and have a truth value. — Michael

They.

But what does @Michael think?

They.

But what does Michael think? — Banno

What I think is irrelevant. What matters is whether or not your argument about the internal consistency of moral subjectivism is valid, or at least cogent, which it doesn't seem to be.

What I think is irrelevant. — Michael

Then I should not bother reading your posts? :razz:

What matters is whether or not your argument about the internal consistency of moral subjectivism is valid, — Michael

My argument is that moral subjectivism leads to an inability to make moral claims.

I think that stands.

My argument is that moral subjectivism leads to an inability to make moral claims. — Banno

Your argument hasn't shown that it does because it asserts that moral statements are prescriptive which the moral subjectivist denies. If you want to see what moral subjectivism leads to then you have to assume that moral subjectivism is true, and if moral subjectivism is true then moral statements are about our attitudes. That doesn't lead to an inability to make moral claims – or at least you haven't yet tried to show that it does.

Is it possible to have a subjective morality then? What if I said that I consider actions to be morally right (for me, not for others, mind) that lead to my flourishing (as I understand flourishing)? Then I am not making any universal or absolute moral claims; I would merely be expressing ,my personal moral principles.

It's probably easier to see this point if you substitute 'ethical' for 'moral'. Ethics is concerned with how best to live, with how best to act, and could more suitably be based upon the exercise of practical wisdom than on following would-be universal principles. So, how does it really make me feel when I kick the puppy?

If you want to see what moral subjectivism leads to then you have to assume that moral subjectivism is true, and if moral subjectivism is true then moral statements are about one's attitude. — Michael

I don't disagree.

Let's try this. Moral statements have a truth value. Subjectivist theories deny this. Therefore subjectivist theories are wrong.

Firstly, we used the word "blue" with great success before we knew that definition. — Banno

What does that have to do with anything? Blue is an electromagnetic frequency. It's just like lightning is an electrical discharge between clouds and the ground. You don't have to know that that's what lightning is in order for it to be that.

Secondly, why not say that this is what we are referring to with the term "good" - actions that avoid broken pups and crying children. — Banno

When I asked you for the evidence of something being morally wrong, you said "Here is the broken pup. Here is the crying owner." Now you've changed that to avoidance of the broken pup and crying owner. To start with re that suggestion, presumably, re arguing that this isn't just a way that anyone feels, you're not talking about someone intentionally avoiding broken pups and crying owners, you're talking about something that would count as avoidance where that's not due to a preference, right?

And although subjectivist theories are wrong, that's not the main point here. The main point is that all this guff about subjective and objective morality is off centre.

Blue is an electromagnetic frequency. — Terrapin Station

That's a pretty gross oversimplification.

Moral statements have a truth value. Subjectivist theories deny this. Therefore subjectivist theories are wrong. — Banno

Subjectivists don't deny that moral statements have a truth value. Moral subjectivism is a cognitive meta-ethics, not a non-cognitive meta-ethics.

Yeah. Not much point in continuing, Terra. Have it your way.

That's a pretty gross oversimplification. — Banno

We can detail what's going on objectively in a lot more detail, but you need to do that, too.

First, you need to start by even settling on anything that you're claiming morality is objectively. Is it identical to a "broken pup"? To a non-preferential/non-intentional avoidance of broken pups (which says nothing about avoiding breaking them), or what?

Yeah, big surprise that you'd bow out without being able to support your view. Unfortunately, that won't stop you from repeating the same vague nonsense the next time this comes up.

Subjectivists don't deny that moral statements have a truth value. Moral subjectivism is a cognitive meta-ethics, not a non-cognitive meta-ethics. — Michael

Fuck.

Too many replies (not just you) that look to make basic errors.

Michael, I think your approach interesting, but the format of this discussion makes it difficult to follow the reasoning.

Let's go back again, and look at the difference between moral statements and statements of preference. A statement of preference says what the speaker prefers for themselves. A moral statements says what the speaker prefers for everyone.

Would you agree with this?

Sure, you win. IF that's what this was about.

It's more just annoying. I wish that one time someone who argues objective morality would follow through and present what they take to be evidence of objective moral whatevers, where they don't turn out to just be speaking so loosely that they're not actually claiming objective morality at all after all (while not wanting to admit that) or where they don't just snake off once you critically press them at all (and especially where they snake off to start the same rigamarole from the start later, in another context)

It has the flavor of dealing with conmen or sleazy salesmen. That's not how philosophical or scientific dialog should go. I've done the same stupid dance with others tens or hundreds of times over decades. Not one person has ever followed it through. But people still keep spouting the same nonsense.

A statement of preference says what the speaker prefers for themselves. A moral statements says what the speaker prefers for everyone.

This set the scene for the discussion here, in post #2.

A statements of mere preference is not, then, a moral statement. "I don't kick pups" is not the very same statement as "No one should kick pups". The first we might call a preference, the second we might call an imperative.

Relativism, subjectivism and other such views suggest, on the face of it, that moral statements, despite looking like they apply to everyone, are actually no more than statements of preference. In the grammar described above, they commit to there being no moral statements, all of them being reduced to statements of individual preference.

On this account, a moral statement M does not itself have a truth value, but instead is only ever the subject of a propositional attitude. Tom believes M; or M is true for group G; or some such.

But, moral statements do have a truth value.

Hence moral statements are more than statements of preference.

Now, it's clear that if you do not think that moral statements have a truth value, you do not need to accept this argument. @Michael.

But that is not the same as showing that the argument is invalid.

It's more just annoying. I wish that one time someone who argues objective morality would follow through and present what they take to be evidence of objective moral whatevers, where they don't turn out to just be speaking so loosely that they're not actually claiming objective morality at all after all (while not wanting to admit that) or where they don't just snake off once you critically press them at all (and especially where they snake off to start the same rigamarole from the start later, in another context) — Terrapin Station

Well, first I'm not arguing for an objective morality. I'm saying the objective/subjective distinction is a non-starter.

And second, I have presented evidence, but for some reason you don't appear to recognise it. Here is the broken pup. Here, the crying child. These are consequences of the pup being kicked; and these are not good. Therefore kicking the pup is also not good.