This still stands, I think. — Banno

It never stood to begin with.

Well, first I'm not arguing for an objective morality. I'm saying the objective/subjective distinction is a non-starter. — Banno

You're arguing that it's not just preferences/feelings.

And second, I have presented evidence, but for some reason you don't appear to recognise it — Banno

It can't just be any old bullshit that won't be critically challenged. You have to be able to meet the critical challenges. Everyone can just say some usually vague bs that can't meet any objections/challenges.

You listed two things that don't have anything at all to do with morality in themselves. One was listing stuff that we make moral judgments about, and the other ("avoidance") was vague, especially if it was supposed to refer to something that's not preferences/feelings--which is what you were arguing morality is not.

Here is the broken pup. Here, the crying child. These are consequences of the pup being kicked; and these are not good. — Banno

"These are not good" is a judgment you're making about the evidence you presented.

You were supposed to be presenting evidence that "These are not good" (or just "not good") is not just a statement of preferences/feelings.

Perhaps you might reconsider what is being said, then. — Banno

Sure. I followed your discussion with Michael to some extent, and I more or less agreed with him. Then came the part where you said that a moral statement is one that says what ought to be the case. I reject that as incomplete, as it erroneously excludes statements that say what is good, which are obviously moral statements. You say that they're not excluded, because you say something along the lines that to say the one is to say the other, and/or that the one logically implies the other. That's what I reject. And I explicitly rejected it ages ago when you brought it up before. So your criticism of moral subjectivism isn't simply criticism of moral subjectivism, it's criticism of moral subjectivism which relies on something that a moral subjectivist need not accept by virtue of being a moral subjectivist. Really, it's not about moral subjectivism at all, it's about your own separate claim. Which should go some way to explaining why I said what I did in relation to what you said.

How's that?

You listed two things that don't have anything at all to do with morality in themselves. — Terrapin Station

Hang on. I listed a broken pup and a crying child.

How could you claim that these "don't have anything to do with morality"?

And is that "in themselves" a hint at some philosophical baggage? Is the cup blue in itself?

a moral statement is one that says what ought to be the case. — S

So... you do not think that morality is about what we ought do?

Odd.

So... you do not think that morality is about what we ought do?

Odd. — Banno

Wow. Talk about taking what I said out of context.

Really?

So just to be clear, you do think that moral statements are about what we ought do?

How could you claim that these "don't have anything to do with morality"? — Banno

Because it's just a broken pup and a crying child. It's not "It's good to have a broken pup" or "It's bad to have a broken pup" or "It's (morally) permissible to have a crying child" or "It's (morally) prohibited to have a crying child" or anything like that.

The MORAL part is the "It's good"/"It's bad"/etc.stuff. A broken pup is a broken pup. Absent persons' preferences/feelings/etc. the broken pup in itself doesn't say anything whatsoever about/it's not any evidence at all of anything MORAL. It's just a fact that there's a broken pup. You were supposed to be providing evidence of the MORAL part, not what the moral part is a judgment about. There's no dispute that the moral stuff is a judgment about something that's not itself a preference or feeling. The issue is whether the MORAL stuff is just preferences/feelings. To provide evidence that the moral stuff is not just preferences of feelings, you need to provide evidence of the MORAL stuff occurring outside of preferences/feelings.

Then came the part where you said that a moral statement is one that says what ought to be the case. I reject that as incomplete, as it erroneously excludes statements that say what is good, which are obviously moral statements. You say that they're not excluded, because you say something along the lines that to say the one is to say the other, and/or that the one logically implies the other. That's what I reject. — S

So you think that I think that I am wrong to say that moral statements are used to say what ought be the case, because you think that this excludes statements about what is good, because... you think that saying what is good is not the same as saying what we ought to do?

Really?

So just to be clear, you do think that moral statements are about what we ought do? — Banno

Are you trying to be funny? I made the point that moral statements include statements in a moral context about what we ought or ought not do, as well as what is moral or immoral. I also made the further point that I reject the link that you're drawing between the two, whether that link be that the one means the other, or that the one logically implies the other, or both.

A statements of preference says what the speaker prefers for themselves. A moral statements says what the speaker prefers for everyone. — Banno

This is simplistic and misleading. A moral subjectivist will not, cannot (consistently), "say what the speaker prefers for everyone" if that is taken to mean that they want to assert a principle that everyone should follow.

A moral subjectivist can say what she would prefer that everyone should do, but although that is more than simply "what the speaker prefers for themselves" it is nonetheless still a personal preference. Your argument is simplistically equivocating on the meaning of the notion of personal preference.

Hang on. I listed a broken pup and a crying child.

How could you claim that these "don't have anything to do with morality"? — Banno

Those only have something to do with morality insofar as most people's feelings of compassion will be exercised by them. It's all to do with common human feelings, but you don't want to admit that, even though you have no argument to support your 'position'.

The MORAL part is the "It's good"/"It's bad"/etc. A broken pup is a broken pup. Absent persons' preferences/feelings/etc. the broken pup in itself doesn't say anything whatsoever, it's not any evidence at all, of anything MORAL. It's just a fact that there's a broken pup. — Terrapin Station

So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't see the moral import.

I doubt that. I suspect that rather, you pretend not to see the moral import because it suits your theory. I don't think you a sociopath.

A statements of preference says what the speaker prefers for themselves. A moral statements says what the speaker prefers for everyone. — Banno

"I prefer x" is not a statement of preference? LOL

So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't see the moral import. — Banno

You're supposed to be providing EVIDENCE of the moral stuff occurring in the broken pup itself.

Saying "you don't see the moral importance?" isn't providing evidence. Where is the moral stuff IN the broken pup itself? The broken pup is a broken pup. Where is the moral stuff?

One person could say, "There's a broken pup. Producing broken pups is morally recommendable."

Another could say, "There's a broken pup. Producing broken pups is morally reprehensible."

You want to claim that one is getting correct properties in the broken pup itself. What properties? How do they obtain, exactly? How do we check who is getting the properties in the broken pup itself correct?

Where is the moral stuff IN the broken pup itself? — Terrapin Station

Again, what is the baggage behind your adding "itself"?

Why is kicking pups bad? The evidence is before you, in the broken pup and crying child.

itself — Terrapin Station

Again, what is the baggage behind your adding "itself"? — Banno

You're saying the MORAL stuff is IN the broken pup. You're saying that it's not just a judgment that people make about the broken pup. So that's what I'm referring to with it being IN the broken pup (itself) and not elsewhere (such as how people feel about it), simply about the broken pup.

Why is kicking pups bad? — Banno

Because people FEEL that it's bad.

So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't see the moral import. — Banno

So, this should be "So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't feel any compassion?"

Of course if you feel compassion then your moral feeling is engaged. If you don't then you may well be what is commonly referred to as a sociopath or a psychopath.

A moral subjectivist will not, cannot (consistently), "say what the speaker prefers for everyone" — Janus

Yep. But that is what moral language requires. Hence they cannot make moral claims, So you agree with me.

So, this should be "So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't feel any compassion?" — Janus

Right, and if you feel compassion, and that's the sort of thing that we're talking about, then why is anyone arguing against these things being ways that individuals feel about the stuff in question?

You're saying the MORAL stuff is IN the broken pup. — Terrapin Station

THat would be an odd turn of phrase. You're saying the blue is in the cup, it's not just a judgement people make about the cup. SO you did not judge it blue rather than turquoise?

Of course they cannot make moral claims (if by that you mean universalizing claims) but they can certainly make statements about their own moral preferences.

You're saying the blue is in the cup, — Banno

No, I'm saying its in the way electromagnetic radiation is reflected from the cup. How anyone judges a color is irrelevant to this. We can check the color objectively via a variety of instruments. It's a property of nonmental stuff.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/252563

Cool.

I don't know why. I'm certainly not.

How anyone judges a color is irrelevant to this. — Terrapin Station

How anyone judges a colour is irrelevant to the cup being blue?

Yes, when we're talking about objective color. That's the whole point of objectivity. Objective things are not at all dependent on anyone's judgment, perception, etc. They obtain independently of us.

I suppose I can't get over the notion that the subjectivist accounts wants to claim that such and such statements are true subjectively.

The way I parse that is to say that the subjectivist thinks that all moral statements are in some way reducible to or are really saying something other than what they are saying on their surface. So that

(1) "Kicking the pup is wrong" is true

is reducible to or is actually saying

(2) "I feel that kicking the pup is wrong" is true


But these sentences do not mean the same thing. One is referring to the action "Kicking", and the other is referring to the speaker's state of mind or attitude towards the action.


We can set up some rules around subjective truth, I suppose, but then it seems to me that we're not talking about truth anymore. Truth is a property of statements. And (1) does not mean the same thing as (2). I could say that if a speaker says (1) then (2), but I could not say that the truth value of (1) is the same as the truth value of (2).

In the case where someone says, just to make it easier to see, that kicking the pup is right for instance -- (1) would be false, yet (2) would be true.

Contrast to those who say good is subjective.

If goodness is subjective, then you can be right and I can be right, even if our views contradict one another.

Hence a subjectivist cannot claim their moral view is true. — Banno

They can claim (or better, assert) that their moral view is true for them, which is to say that the moral view is true to their own moral feelings.