Moral claims aren't true or false.

@Terrapin Station

You want to make a distinction between moral statements and empirical statements based on the evidence - is that right?

Could we at least agree on this: the difference is in the direction of fit, not in the evidence. One says how things are, the other how things ought be?

That seems more coherent to my eyes. But your account differs from @S or @Michael -- who seem to want to say they are subjectively true.

So it is not true that one ought not kick pups.

But these sentences do not mean the same thing. — Moliere

The open question - the theme of this thread.

Yup, definitely.

I want to get back around to the open question argument again. But I wanted to revisit my Casebeer first and see if I thought differently about him than I do now before saying much. He takes on the open question argument in arguing for natural ethical facts, but I remember not feeling convinced by it.

You want to make a distinction between moral statements and empirical statements based on the evidence - is that right? — Banno

I don't want to. This has nothing at all to do with what I want. It's simply a fact that moral properties or whatever we want to call them only occur via mental activity, while other properties, other phenomena, occur independent of minds.

the difference is in the direction of fit, — Banno

I honestly have no idea what that's saying. If that's a common phrase I'm not familiar with it.

One says how things are, the other how things ought be? — Banno

Yes. But some folks want to claim that how things are can BE identical to how they ought to be. I'm inquiring just how that would be the case, just what the evidence would be for it.

They can claim (or better, assert) that their moral view is true for them, which is to say that the moral view is true to their own moral feelings. — Janus

Right. But a moral claim, by it's very nature, says what is true for everyone: Everyone ought do X.

So it is not true that one ought not kick pups. — Banno

It's neither true nor false. Truth value is a category error for moral claims. (See noncognitivism.)

It's simply a fact that moral properties or whatever we want to call them only occur via mental activity, while other properties, other phenomena, occur independent of minds. — Terrapin Station

So is "seven" is mind-independent, or only subjective?

Or does this juxtaposition of objective and subjective fall on analysis?

I say the latter.

So is "seven" is mind-independent, or only subjective? — Banno

In my view numbers, mathematical objects in general, do not occur mind-independently. I'm a nominalist in various senses, including that I reject the notion of any real (or objective) abstracts. Mathematics is a way that we think about relations, with most of it an abstracted extrapolation of thought about some basic relations we experience. Mathematics is not identical to any objective relations.

I honestly have no idea what that's saying. — Terrapin Station

Yep. That's apparent.

One says how things are, the other how things ought be? — Banno

That'a all it means

But some folks want to claim that how things are can BE identical to how they ought to be. I'm inquiring just how that would be the case, just what the evidence would be for it. — Terrapin Station

Well, when folk do not kick pups, then things are as they ought be. The evidence, presumably, would be the absence of kicked pups.

Let's try this. Moral statements have a truth value. Subjectivist theories deny this. Therefore subjectivist theories are wrong. — Banno

Not all of them deny that. There are both cognitivist (moral statements are truth-apt) and non-cognitivist (moral statements aren't truth-apt) subjectivist theories. Mine is the former.

The evidence, presumably, would be the absence of kicked pups. — Banno

That's evidence of no kicked pups. It's not evidence of any mind-independent "ought" property.

It seems as if you don't understand the distinction, but it's very weird that you do not.

Mathematics is a way that we think about relations, with most of it an abstracted extrapolation of thought about some basic relations we experience. Mathematics is not identical to any objective relations. — Terrapin Station

So mathematics is somewhere between objective and subjective.

Could moral statements have also be somewhere between objective and subjective?

After all, we do all agree that kicking pups is wrong. It's not like my preference for vanilla milkshakes.

So mathematics is somewhere between objective and subjective. — Banno

No, I didn't say anything like that. It's subjective. Again, mathematics is NOT identical to any objective relations. I explicitly said that mathematics is a way we think. Thought is not objective by definition.

It seems as if you don't understand the distinction, but it's very weird that you do not. — Terrapin Station

Well, perhaps I do understand it, and since I want to show you that it fails, it's no wonder that what I say is enough to keep you coming back for more. Presumably you see something in what I am saying, otherwise you would go do something else.

After decades of discussions with tens if not hundreds of different people about this, I'm desperate for anyone to actually provide the evidence they claim to be able to provide. Again, it's frustrating that no one ever does.

If you want to show that it fails, then provide the evidence that the two (a fact of there being or not being "broken pups" and a nonmental fact about "oughts") are the same thing somehow.

No, I didn't say anything like that. It's subjective. Again, mathematics is NOT identical to any objective relations. I explicitly said that mathematics is a way we think. Thought is not objective by definition. — Terrapin Station

And yet, objectively, here are seven exclamation marks: !!!!!!

If it is subjective, is that no more than a question of opinion? If you say there are six, are you right or wrong? Mathematical statements are subjective but have a truth value? SO why not moral statements?

After all, we do all agree that kicking pups is wrong. It's not like my preference for vanilla milkshakes. — Banno

We probably all agree that turd milkshakes are wrong, but that doesn't make them objectively wrong. does it?

And yet, objectively, here are seven exclamation marks: !!!!!! — Banno

Aren't you familiar with nominalism? No two numerically distinct things are identical. (Re there objectively being "seven" of something)

I'm desperate for anyone to actually provide the evidence they claim to be able to provide. — Terrapin Station

But here it is: the broken pup. What do you think?

It's odd to me that you do not recognise this evidence.

But here it is: the broken pup. What do you think? — Banno

I think I'm looking for the ought property.

Yet, yet instance of seven marks is, itself, objectively seven marks. Nominalism doesn't get you past the identity of a given thing itself.

We probably all agree that turd milkshakes are wrong, but that doesn't make them objectively wrong. does it? — Janus

But if the distinction between objective and subjective fails, no one need give a fuck about if it is objectively wrong.

Just wrong will suffice.

I think I'm looking for the ought property. — Terrapin Station

Look instead for just the ought. It's right there.

Yet, yet instance of seven marks is, itself, objectively seven marks. Nominalism doesn't get you past the identity of a given thing itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's not objectively "seven marks"--that's a way of thinking about the marks.

Look instead for just the ought. It's right there. — Banno

You mean that it obtains somehow without being a property? :meh:

A moral statement says what the speaker prefers for everyone.

Would you agree with this? — Banno

I for one don't agree with that. That's the position known as moral universalism. I don't agree with that, since in some cases I think that that would be the wrong interpretation. You can exclude these cases where that would be the wrong interpretation, and thereby render them inapplicable, with your notion of what makes a statement a moral statement. But that would then mean that I don't agree with your notion of what makes a statement a moral statement. It seems obvious that these are not merely statements, but moral statements, by virtue of the subject matter.

But here it is: the broken pup. What do you think?

It's odd to me that you do not recognise this evidence. — Banno

My feelings when I see the broken puppy are clear evidence that I should not injure puppies, and that I prefer that no one else does either; but my feelings cannot be evidence for anyone else. If they have no feelings, or even have feelings of joy, when they see the injured puppy, then what is to be done about that?