Damnit. I'm supposed to be setting up IP addresses.

Here are seven exclamation marks: !!!!!! — Banno

@Terrapin Station - does the statement above have a truth value?

Not quite, us thinking about the marks is definitely a way of us thinking about the marks. That's our thoughts after all.

But it's more than that. The number of marks is also a truth of the instance itself.There is a distinction between, for example, "seven marks" and "five marks" in this context. One reports the number of marks in this individual instance correctly. The other does not.

It much the same as an instance where people might disagree over whether I have a cake in my fridge. We open the fridge and are presented with a cake on a plate.

There are multiple ways we might think about this encounter. Someone might take what they see and say: "Yes, there is a cake in my fridge." Another person might take what they see and say: "There is no cake in my fridge."

Both of these will be our way of understanding the instance in question (each is a human thought and perception), but these thoughts are distinct in that one reflects what is in my fridge (" Yes, there is a cake" ) and the other ( "There is no cake) does not.

The same applies to the exclamation marks in this example. Some thoughts ("there are five marks") are wrong with respect to what is true of this instance. Other are correct ("there is seven marks").

If someone thinks that it is OK to kick puppies, are they right?

Not quite, — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, quite. I take it you buy natural kinds?

Just wrong will suffice. — Banno

To say something is just wrong just is to assert that it is wrong regardless of anyone's opinion; and this is what is usually meant by saying that something is objectively, not merely subjectively, the case.

does the statement above have a truth value? — Banno

No.

True/false has to do with whether something matches facts or not.

I'm not sure what you are trying to talk about here. My point was just you are correct to think our thoughts are involved here, that our understanding of numbers is our way of thinking.

The "not quite" is because these thoughts don't constitute the existence of the there things we might be thinking about-- e.g. our thoughts about numbers aren't the numerical truth we are thinking about, much like our thoughts about a tree aren't the tree we are thinking about.

They may feel and think it is right. It's not a matter of being right or wrong; it's a matter of whether it is more or less universally felt and thought to be wrong. That is as close as you can get to objectivity when it comes to morals.

What makes this: !!!!!!! not one mark, for example?

The fact there are seven "!" marks present.

Now, it is also true: "!!!!!!!" is also one mark, (a singular "!!!!!!!" entity), two marks ("!!" "!!!!!" entities next to each other), two marks ("!" "!!!!!!!" entities next to each other), two marks ( "!!!" "!!!!") next to each and so on, etc., of for entities of every combination, but this never changes there are seven individual "!" marks present.

If we are talking about the number on individual marks, the person who say anything other than seven will be wrong by the truth of this instance "!!!!!!!."

It's misleading to refer to such statements as statements of preference, or worse, statements of mere preference. They're moral statements, or statements of moral judgement, so that's what I'll call them. It's clear that they're about moral matters from the subject matter, like kicking puppies. We already went over this ages ago, and you didn't really have an answer.

If your tactic is to just define away your opposition through moral universalism, then I find that trivial. There's nothing stopping me from doing that to you, only through moral relativism instead.

And yes, we agree that moral statements are truth-apt.

The fact there are seven "!" marks present. — TheWillowOfDarkness

First, per nominalism, there aren't any two of the same mark (re them literally being the same), are there?

Here are seven exclamation marks: !!!!!!

does the statement above have a truth value? — Banno

No. — Terrapin Station

OK, so I think we are done. If you do not think that such a statement has a truth value, I don't anticipate making any progress here.

and this is what is usually meant by saying that something is objectively, not merely subjectively, the case. — Janus

Fine. I'm just suggesting we drop the objective and subjective talk as unhelpful.

And yes, we agree that moral statements are truth-apt. — S

Were you aware that @Terrapin Station thinks otherwise?

Indeed. Just lots of entirely different instances of marks with their own numerical identity. So lets say we have two sets of seven marks "!!!!!!!" and "!!!!!!!." These are never identical.

Each does have a numerical value of 7, but is is not achieved thorough a universal numerical value delivering an identical meaning of 7 to each.

Rather, the value of 7 is a feature of each unique set on its own terms. Just as two different people have brown hair solely in how they exist, these sets both have value of 7, solely in how they are present as a unique individual. The 7 of one set is never the 7 of the other. The similarity (7) is formed entirely out of difference.

Just lots of entirely different instances of marks with their own numerical identity. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's not real that there are different things and not just one.

Were you aware that Terrapin Station thinks otherwise? — Banno

I'm aware that our positions are quite similar, but that he may well be a noncognitivist, as you suggest. I however am not. I'm familiar with the emotivist line of argument which says that moral statements are not truth-apt, because they're emotional expressions like "Yay!" and "Boo!", and that "Yay!" and "Boo!" aren't truth-apt. I don't agree with that argument, although I agree that emotion has an important relationship with morality and our linguistic expressions in relation to morality, and that they are kind of like "Yay!" and "Boo!", but not enough like them to warrant the conclusion that moral statements aren't truth-apt.

You have a strange understanding/confusion about nominalism then.

The whole point of nominalism is that the singular, general or universal doesn't exist at all, that existence is characterised by many different things, rather than a singular universal which defines or determines the all. Nominalism is an understanding that only difference/different things are real (by "real", I assume you mean something that exists).

If your tactic is to just define away your opposition through moral universalism, — S

It's not.

Fine. I'm just suggesting we drop the objective and subjective talk as unhelpful. — Banno

That's fine, but at least acknowledge that there is a difference between claiming something is wrong, simpliciter, and saying that you think something is wrong. The disagreement here is not merely on account of the use of the terms 'objective' and 'subjective'.

but at least acknowledge that there is a difference between claiming something is wrong, simpliciter, and saying that you think something is wrong. — Janus

...I said as much, many times.

Well, first I'm not arguing for an objective morality. I'm saying the objective/subjective distinction is a non-starter.

And second, I have presented evidence, but for some reason you don't appear to recognise it. Here is the broken pup. Here, the crying child. These are consequences of the pup being kicked; and these are not good. Therefore kicking the pup is also not good. — Banno

Do you realise that only a moral nihilist and sickos would deny that conclusion, and for two very different reasons. I don't recall you mentioning moral nihilism once, and I doubt that any of us here are sickos regarding kicking puppies. You've instead been talking a lot about moral subjectivism, but the typical moral subjectivist wouldn't deny that. Even the typical non-cognitivist wouldn't deny that, they'd just interpret "not good" differently, in a way that means it isn't truth-apt. And even the typical moral nihilist doesn't really judge stuff like that any differently, they're just in denial about right and wrong - they would also probably just word it differently.

And yet you still believe that you could be warranted in claiming that something is wrong, simpliciter; or in other words you still believe that it could be true that something is simply absolutely wrong. don't you? If you do still believe that, the problem you face is how to provide evidence for such an absolutizing claim, or a cogent argument that such claims are justifiable. That is just what you have failed to provide as far as I can see.

Do you realise that only a moral nihilist and sickos would deny that conclusion — S

Yep. That's rather the point of the example.

And yet you still believe that you could be warranted in claiming that something is wrong, simpliciter; or in other words you still believe that it could be true that something is simply absolutely wrong. don't you? If you do still believe that, the problem you face is how to provide evidence for such an absolutizing claim, or a cogent argument that such claims are justifiable. That is just what you have failed to provide as far as I can see. — Janus

Absolutely - Why add this? Too much baggage.

And yet, as S said...

Do you realise that only a moral nihilist and sickos would deny that conclusion... — S

(sic.)

So we all agree, and yet we rant on for page after page.

Something is astray here...

Yep. That's rather the point of the example. — Banno

Okay. But you realise that that's a very small target? It won't apply to most of us here. I for one am neither a moral nihilist nor a sicko. Kicking puppies is wrong. The only issue for me is how that's interpreted and so on.

The only issue for me is his that's interpreted and so on. — S

Hu?

Odd, it seems, if we agree that kicking puppies is wrong, that so much energy was expended in demanding evidence...