Hu? — Banno

Your conclusion is simply about kicking puppies and stuff like that being not good. Yes? Well, that doesn't do anything for all of us who agree that it's not good, which is all of us besides moral nihilists (who deny good and bad) and sickos (who disagree because they'd say that it's good).

We disagree over other issues, like the issue of how moral statements should be interpreted.

Odd, it seems, if we agree that kicking puppies is wrong, that so much energy was expended in demanding evidence... — Banno

Are you serious? To my knowledge, no one has demanded evidence that kicking puppies is wrong. That's far too simplistic or too uncharitable an interpretation of what's being demanded. Put some more effort in, and you might get it right. Also, maybe try to understand that people go by different interpretations, and that that isn't always explicit. I think that that would help.

So you think that I think that I am wrong to say that moral statements are used to say what ought be the case, because you think that this excludes statements about what is good, because... you think that saying what is good is not the same as saying what we ought to do? — Banno

I recognise the distinction between an "is" statement and an "ought" statement. The meanings are not identical. Nor does the one logically imply the other.

What's the problem? You think otherwise for some reason?

Pretty much spot on, again.

So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't see the moral import.
— Banno

So, this should be "So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't feel any compassion?"

Of course if you feel compassion then your moral feeling is engaged. If you don't then you may well be what is commonly referred to as a sociopath or a psychopath. — Janus

Yeah, that's what it boils down to. Might as well just cut to the chase instead of deliberately concealing it with vague terminology. The moral feelings are what's fundamental.

Page 24 has calls for evidence, but not for whether this puppy crap is wrong or not. The call is for the morality grounding the judgement that this puppy crap is wrong.

...........like using a Band-Aid to remedy a heart attack: the answers to moral questions are never going to be found in the near-infinite complex of worldly examples.

Indeed. We see eye to eye yet again.

I suppose I can't get over the notion that the subjectivist accounts wants to claim that such and such statements are true subjectively.

The way I parse that is to say that the subjectivist thinks that all moral statements are in some way reducible to or are really saying something other than what they are saying on their surface. So that

(1) "Kicking the pup is wrong" is true

is reducible to or is actually saying

(2) "I feel that kicking the pup is wrong" is true


But these sentences do not mean the same thing. One is referring to the action "Kicking", and the other is referring to the speaker's state of mind or attitude towards the action.


We can set up some rules around subjective truth, I suppose, but then it seems to me that we're not talking about truth anymore. Truth is a property of statements. And (1) does not mean the same thing as (2). I could say that if a speaker says (1) then (2), but I could not say that the truth value of (1) is the same as the truth value of (2).

In the case where someone says, just to make it easier to see, that kicking the pup is right for instance -- (1) would be false, yet (2) would be true. — Moliere

Well, I'm a moral subjectivist, but as I explained earlier, you'd be parsing it wrong with me if you did so like that, because for me it's not so much about what people mean, but rather what's the best interpretation in terms of the results. It's a practical way to look at it, I would say. There are problems with other interpretations in terms of the logical consequences, and moral subjectivism avoids this. All moral statements are false or unwarranted? Not a good consequence. That's counterintuitive. Therefore, interpret in accordance with moral subjectivism and Bob's your uncle.

↪Banno They may feel and think it is right. It's not a matter of being right or wrong; it's a matter of whether it is more or less universally felt and thought to be wrong. — Janus

SO again, let's bring in the open question.

Suppose that what is good is what is more or less universally felt and thought to be right.

But couldn't they all be wrong? It seems so.

So what is good is not the very same as what ismore or less universally felt and thought to be right.

That is as close as you can get to objectivity when it comes to morals.

Soo much the worse for objectivity.

I, and I suspect most of you, are not going to decide what is right and what is wring by conducting a poll.

We disagree over other issues, like the issue of how moral statements should be interpreted. — S

Sure. But it seems that we agree, at least most of the time, as to what we ought do.

And isn't working out what to do the point of ethics?

We blow our points of disagreement out of ll proportion.

To my knowledge, no one has demanded evidence that kicking puppies is wrong. — S

You missed it. @Terrapin Station was most insistent.

Ah, I see @Mww drew attention to this.

the answers to moral questions are never going to be found in the near-infinite complex of worldly examples. — Mww

Well said. The answer will always be in the doing.

SO... and help me out here... you think that we cannot move from the is in "it is moral to do X", to the ought in "we ought to do X"?

Not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.
— creativesoul

Like what? What do you mean? Give an example. Rocks existed prior to our conceptions, but they don't seem relevant in this context. — S

Let us simplify by performing the following operation...

Not all conceptions [snip]of goodness[endsnip] can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

...and we'll all see that we're left with the following...

Not all conceptions can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

How do we know if something exists prior to our naming and describing it?

All conceptions of "goodness" are existentially dependent upon highly complex thought/belief replete with value assessment. All conceptions are heavily influenced by language. They are informed by it.

That which exists prior to our conception(s) of it is not; cannot be. That which is discovered to exist in it's entirety is not; cannot be.

What's the difference between the term "goodness" and my conception?

If "goodness" were equivalent to my notion thereof, I would have never been able to discover otherwise. I once thought something was the right thing to do, and found myself painfully aware of being mistaken.

Goodness is something we learn about solely by virtue of looking for it. It cannot be equivalent to our notion, for notions consist of language. Trees and goodness does not.

It is the quality inherent to all good things.

Sure. But it seems that we agree, at least most of the time, as to what we ought do.

And isn't working out what to do the point of ethics?

We blow our points of disagreement out of all proportion. — Banno

That's the point of normative ethics. This discussion is about meta-ethics. You should know, you created it.

You missed it. Terrapin Station was most insistent. — Banno

No, you missed it. We both read what Terrapin Station said. The only difference is that I understood it. I'm confident in my ability to go over it with him and get his confirmation that I do indeed understand it. Whereas I doubt that that would work out with you and him.

When people are kicking off all around you about how you're interpreting something that someone said, that should at the very least give you pause for thought.

SO... and help me out here... you think that we cannot move from the is in "it is moral to do X", to the ought in "we ought to do X"? — Banno

Let's put it this way: I am sceptical. Now, if you think that you can logically demonstrate otherwise, then please give it a go.

This distinction is that important to you? Ok.

This distinction is that important to you? Ok. — Banno

They're two different things. You started a discussion on one of them, then switched to the other. Why? Because your argument isn't faring too well? Okay.

Let us simplify by performing the following operation...

Not all conceptions [snip]of goodness[endsnip] can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

...and we'll all see that we're left with the following...

Not all conceptions can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

How do we know if something exists prior to our naming and describing it? — creativesoul

No, please just clarify what you meant. That's all that I was after. I don't need to answer your question for that.

If you like.

If you like. — Banno

What I would like is for you to stay on topic. But I suppose that that's asking too much of you?

You want me to stay on my own topic.

A thread has a life of its own. Better to treat the topic as a strange attractor than a fixed point.

@S But that thing about meta-ethics and normative ethics is odd. Do you really thing them distinct? As if one did not have anything to say about the other...

Or does this juxtaposition of objective and subjective fall on analysis? — Banno

Could moral statements... also be somewhere between objective and subjective? — Banno

Pity most folks don't understand the importance of this due to their misleadingly reductive definitions of each term. As if a human subject is not constituted of a bunch of social relations (an intersubjectivity) which notions of morality are dependent on.

Perhaps we think of this as a version of scientism? A desire to keep objective stuff "clean"?

Not a big fan of the term 'scientism' but certainly the very human need to neatly box up concepts to make them more understandable. Unfortunately, in this case, it makes a coherent position on morality impossible.

@Terrapin Station Any theory that puts you in a position of not being able to count should cause you pause.

Not a big fan of the term 'scientism' — Baden

Nor am I. Ok, let's just put it down to being overly neat. Morality needs to be messy.

Yes, without problematizing notions like 'subjective' and 'objective' we get nowhere. And you get folks running back and forth to Wikipedia and quoting theoretical buzzwords polluted by the same issues in a frantic effort to be self-consistent. Without actually thinking.

So, re morality as properly understood, beyond the intersubjective, there is no pure 'objective' and beyond social relations as constituted by human experience, there is no pure 'subjective'. And looking for, or demanding, 'evidence' of morality at either extreme of the spectrum is futile and self-defeating.