I've been reading Martha Nussbaum. Are you at all familiar? Far more useable than the stuff going on here.

Not as much as I should be. If you have a particular recommendation, PM me. Cheers.

Still reading. Maybe a forthcoming thread, though.

:up:

I probably do have it wrong. But in trying to pin down what your getting at I just couldn't see what exactly was true about the moral statements anymore. It seemed like the statements were truth-functional, as you admit, but then they had a different kind of truth -- a subjective truth. So that "P" is true in F, where "P" refers to some moral statement and F refers to some frame of reference, usually the moral actor.

But I am unable to differentiate this from the notion that moral statements are just whatever we happen to feel is right -- which seems to me to fall squarely in with non-cognitivism.

So I just feel confused in trying to parse your account, I guess.

You have a strange understanding/confusion about nominalism then. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I wasn't characterizing that last bit as nominalism. But lol at the idea of you adopting a "teaching position" when you're not even familiar with natural kinds.

You missed it. Terrapin Station was most insistent. — Banno

I was demanding evidence not that that kicking puppies is wrong, but that "kicking puppies is wrong" is not only a preference that people have, a way that people feel, etc. In particular, people had claimed that "kicking puppies is wrong" is somehow in "the act itself" of kicking puppies. So I challenged that claim by asking for any evidence of it. What I'm really looking for is evidence of any moral property (or whatever we want to say moral 'stuff' is) being anywhere other than in our judgments, our feelings, our preferences, etc. It doesn't matter what the moral property would be. Folks could use anything as their example--whatever they think is easiest to demonstrate.

It's very curious that you'd think that if something only occurs in our minds, in our way of thinking about things, then we'd not be able to do the thing in question.

You want me to stay on my own topic.

A thread has a life of its own. Better to treat the topic as a strange attractor than a fixed point. — Banno

Okay, a thread has a life of its own. I want to talk about goldfish. Let's all talk about goldfish now, instead of the original topic or whatever Banno wants to talk about. It's goldfish now.

So long as we're talking about goldfish instead of the original topic, Banno can make a get away without having to come up with a proper reply to criticism or conceding.

What's that you say? Red herring? No, no, no, let's just talk about goldfish instead. What's your favourite type of goldfish? Mine is a Fantail.

But that thing about meta-ethics and normative ethics is odd. Do you really thing them distinct? As if one did not have anything to say about the other... — Banno

They're distinct. If you don't know the distinction, look it up.

For what it's worth, I think we are mostly in agreement; it's just that I insist on the inclusion of that (to me) all important "if" in our explanation of moral principles; I don't believe they can stand on their own without it. — Janus

I agree, but I think that conditional is simply "If life has value then ..." in an ordinary sense. If so, then that value constitutes a universal standard for measuring one's actions against. Everyone having their own arbitrary preferred standard is no standard at all.

A better foil might be the Will to Power: conscientiously acting so as to achieve power for oneself. How consistent could such an approach be? Could this lead to one flourishing? — Banno

Great example. The Will to Power is to morality as a counterfeit coin is to the real thing. The counterfeiter may do quite well for a time (perhaps even their lifetime) but nonetheless devalues the real currency and is always at risk of being exposed for who they really are. Not an example of a flourishing life by any reasonable standard.

And this presents neatly the problem with the open question argument. Is it good to conscientiously acting so as to achieve power for oneself? "No, but I don't care". — Banno

Yep.

Hm. Not to speak for Andrew M, but I would say instead that one who claims to transcend morality in the way described cannot come back and claim to be doing the right thing. That's one consequence of being beyond good and evil. — Banno

Exactly. Yet ethical subjectivism erases just that distinction by treating morality and the Will to Power as categorically equivalent.

How do we get to needs that aren't dependent on wants? — Terrapin Station

From an evolutionary perspective, we want food and water because we need them to survive. We don't need them because we want them.

For example, you only need food and water if you want to stay alive. If you want to die via a hunger strike, you rather need to avoid food and water. (Well, avoid water in that case if you want it to be quicker.) — Terrapin Station

As a human being you need food and water to stay alive, wants motivate you to fulfill those needs. And no-one wants to die via a hunger strike. They want to overturn some injustice that they value more highly than their own survival. That can be highly moral. That doesn't mean they cease to think food and water are valuable. Indeed the power of the act depends on other people being well aware that they are valuable.

Which begs the question.....is there a principle “good”? — Mww

I think eudaimonia, per Aristotle. That is the universal standard by which we can evaluate the actions of ourselves and others in everyday life, as well as the participants in the train hypothetical.

No, it's a natural and pragmatic standard. It's hard to get much useful work done when people keep randomly dropping in to pop you off and take your stuff.
— Andrew M

What? I don't understand why you think that it's natural, or rather, if you think that it's natural, why your analogy was with something obviously artificial, namely monetary value. — S

For why I think it's natural, see my earlier comment on natural focal points here.

The diamond ring example was just to show that there can be a distinction between perceived value and actual value (by some metric).

"If life has value then ..." in an ordinary sense. — Andrew M

We just need to say how it would be that life (or anything) has value outside of what anyone thinks about it.

Everyone having their own arbitrary preferred standard is no standard at all. — Andrew M

I don't know of anyone who thinks that moral stances are arbitrary, by the way.

From an evolutionary perspective, we want food and water because we need them to survive. — Andrew M

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus, that is)?

(By the way, if you believe that everyone prefers to live, then your antinatalism makes little sense.)

Yeah, but if you are aware of Aristotle well enough to come up with eudaemonia, I shall assume you are just as aware there is something antecedent to it, and necessary for it. Or at least qualifies its meaning.

And I would also ask if you think ethics, the general domain from which eudaemonia arises, re: “living well” or some such, is the same as morality? If so, I submit that the participants in the train hypothetical and all such manufactured moral dilemmas have precious little to do with the general conception of “living well”.

We just need to say how it would be that life (or anything) has value outside of what anyone thinks about it. — Terrapin Station

As I've already pointed out, food and water are valuable for human beings regardless of what anyone thinks about it.

You can lead a horse to water, but if he disvalues the water it will soon be a dead horse. Preference or perceived value need not be the same as actual value.

I don't know of anyone who thinks that moral stances are arbitrary, by the way. — Terrapin Station

You either appeal to something in the world that justifies why you think your moral view should be the standard. Or else you appeal to your preferences. The first characterizes moral realism. The second is just saying you like vanilla while someone else likes strawberry. Which characterizes ethical subjectivism.

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus, that is)? — Terrapin Station

Not sure of your point. You would forgo those things either because they are not available or because you choose to forgo them for some reason, against one's usual instincts. They are still basic human needs.

your antinatalism makes little sense — Terrapin Station

What are you talking about?

Not sure of your point — Andrew M

My point at the moment is just that I want you to answer that question. I knew I shouldn't have typed more, because this is the most important part of the post.

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus)?

Yeah, but if you are aware of Aristotle well enough to come up with eudaemonia, I shall assume you are just as aware there is something antecedent to it, and necessary for it. Or at least qualifies its meaning. — Mww

Can you elaborate?

And I would also ask if you think ethics, the general domain from which eudaemonia arises, re: “living well” or some such, is the same as morality? If so, I submit that the participants in the train hypothetical and all such manufactured moral dilemmas have precious little to do with the general conception of “living well”. — Mww

I strongly disagree. One's moral judgments are informed by the rational understanding that everyone's life and well-being are essential values to them. Everyone has an equal claim here.

Isn't it a fact that we need a lack of food and water to not survive (ceteris paribus)? — Terrapin Station

Your question makes no sense. We need food and water to survive. We don't need to not survive.

It's a fact that we can survive or not survive, no?

Yes. So?

Right, and in order for us to survive, certain conditions must be met, just like in order for us to not survive, certain conditions must be met.

Do you not agree with that?

Yes. And what is valuable to a human being is life and well-being, not death and suffering.

And what is valuable to a human being — Andrew M

Valuable to a human being--aren't you arguing that what is valuable is not dependent on to a human being? That's the whole gist of your disagreement with me, isn't it?

Make it valuable for a human being, if that helps. I'm talking about what is valuable for human beings independently of personal opinions or preferences.

Make it valuable for a human being, if that helps. I'm talking about what is valuable for human beings independently of personal opinions or preferences. — Andrew M

Right. So let's get back to that.

When you say that we need food and water to survive, are you saying something different than there are conditions that must be met for remaining alive?

Yes, I'm also saying that the (implicit) values of life and well-being are part of the natural function of being human.

Yes, I'm also saying that the (implicit) values of life and well-being are part of the natural function of being human. — Andrew M

Okay, so what is evidence of any implicit values of life and well-being, or where does that obtain/what is it a property of, etc.?