Certainly everyone has an equal claim, but that which satisfies the claim does not necessarily satisfy the being of equal. It would seem that the more narrow the conception of being equal, as life and welfare, the more exact the principle which validates it. Everyone may broadly deem himself worthy of e.g., a nice car merely because he feels he’s earned it by doing his job, but to deem himself worthy of life, he cannot revert to the judgement that he has done his job well. Does anyone honestly think Lady Jane wants Tom to slow the train for no reason better than she’s got an altogether respectable multi-generational heritage?

Life and well-being may be part of the function of being human, but what it is to be human is not contained in its function.
—————-

Elaboration = arete = virtue.

“....Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws. For the universality with which these should hold for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human nature, or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed. The principle of private happiness, however, is the most objectionable, not merely because it is false, and experience contradicts the supposition that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct, nor yet merely because it contributes nothing to the establishment of morality-since it is quite a different thing to make a prosperous man and a good man, but because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather undermine it and destroy its sublimity, since they put the motives to virtue and to vice in the same class and only teach us to make a better calculation, the specific difference between virtue and vice being entirely extinguished....”

I probably do have it wrong. But in trying to pin down what your getting at I just couldn't see what exactly was true about the moral statements anymore. It seemed like the statements were truth-functional, as you admit, but then they had a different kind of truth -- a subjective truth. So that "P" is true in F, where "P" refers to some moral statement and F refers to some frame of reference, usually the moral actor.

But I am unable to differentiate this from the notion that moral statements are just whatever we happen to feel is right -- which seems to me to fall squarely in with non-cognitivism.

So I just feel confused in trying to parse your account, I guess. — Moliere

Okay, so you accept that they're truth-functional (that's a useful term, I'll have to remember that one). That's a start.

Now, why say "just" whatever we happen to feel is right? Is that supposed to indicate that it's trivial or that there's a credible alternative or both? Because I would argue that there's no credible alternative in light of the logical consequences of these proposed alternatives. And I'd also argue that moral judgement isn't trivial.

And why non-cognitivism here?

Now, why say "just" whatever we happen to feel is right? Is that supposed to indicate that it's trivial or that there's a credible alternative or both? — S

It's to indicate that there is nothing else besides whatever we happen to feel is right. In comparison I might say that moral statements are whatever we happen to feel is right, and they are also truth-functional statements which make a claim about a fact.

Because I would argue that there's no credible alternative in light of the logical consequences of these proposed alternatives. And I'd also argue that moral judgement isn't trivial.

And why non-cognitivism here?

If moral judgment is based in feeling, and there is no fact to the matter, and you don't believe that all moral statements are false then it seems to me that leaves you with either this notion of subjective truth that you're talking about, or simply stating that moral statements are not truth-functional, in spite of their surface grammar.

And I can't make heads or tails out of the notion of a subjective truth so non-cognitivism is about where I land in making sense of your view.

For why I think it's natural, see my earlier comment on natural focal points here.

The diamond ring example was just to show that there can be a distinction between perceived value and actual value (by some metric). — Andrew M

I followed your link, but I didn't find any explanation for why you think it's natural there. Just a few assertions that it's natural, and few references here and there without a clear link between the one and the other.

Here are some things which it makes sense to call natural: trees, grass, oxygen, mountains, rocks, rivers. Morality is like this??

Also, regarding your analogy, okay, but that depends on how you're using "actual value". I can see some people reserving the use of that term for value that is not relative to an artificial standard like monetary value. An anti-realist on value might say that monetary value isn't actual value.

And the analogy wasn't great, given that you're trying to argue that morality is natural. Bit weird to use an analogy with an artificial standard in this context.

I know what they are perfectly well. I was just ignoring them because they weren't relevant to the point I was making.

And natural kinds is a terrible concept anyway. Scientific disciplines deal with describing states of the world, not conceptual rules. We might say natural kinds are a certain from of universalist illusion.

To clarify, my view about whether there's a fact of the matter with regards to morality is no different in logical form to my view about whether there's any truth in moral statements. My answer is either no, there's neither: which is the case if we interpret moral statements in the way that yourself and moral objectivists interpret them; or there's both, but the statements and facts would only reflect morality in the subjective and relative sense. For example, the statement "For me, kicking puppies is wrong" would be true, and the corresponding fact would be that, for me, kicking puppies is wrong. Of course, I wouldn't accept that "Kicking puppies is wrong" is true in a simplistic, objective sense. Nor would I accept that it's a fact that kicking puppies is wrong in that same sense.

I wouldn't be inconsistent and claim that there's no fact of the matter, but that there are truths, in the same sense and respect. If there are truths, then there are corresponding facts.

And I can't make heads or tails out of the notion of a subjective truth so non-cognitivism is about where I land in making sense of your view. — Moliere

Probably shouldn't bring it up, because we'd probably have to get into a big tangent about it, but on my view, truth is subjective because it's a judgment that individuals make about the relation between a proposition and something else (the something else can be facts/states of affairs (correspondence), usefulness/utility (pragmatism), the other propositions the individual assigns "true" to (coherence), consensus, etc.)

Not a big fan of the term 'scientism' but certainly the very human need to neatly box up concepts to make them more understandable. Unfortunately, in this case, it makes a coherent position on morality impossible. — Baden

Does it?

Let us simplify by performing the following operation...

Not all conceptions [snip]of goodness[endsnip] can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

...and we'll all see that we're left with the following...

Not all conceptions can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

How do we know if something exists prior to our naming and describing it?
— creativesoul

No, please just clarify what you meant. — S

I did. All conceptions are linguistic. Not everything conceived of is. Goodness is one such thing.

So, the trick is as old as many a historical debate. How do we distinguish between our conceptions and what we're conceiving of? If you cannot answer the question, then you cannot know how to acquire knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming and describing it.

How do we know if or that something exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it?

The objective/subjective dichotomy fails here, and regarding many things that consist of both and are thus neither.

What I'm really looking for is evidence of any moral property (or whatever we want to say moral 'stuff' is) being anywhere other than in our judgments, our feelings, our preferences, etc. — Terrapin Station

Sure, and I see that you will not accept the properties I show you, saying that the wrong is not to be found in the broken pup. I point out that blue is not found in the cup, but you insist that it is.

Let's try a different line.

You talk of subjectivism, yet use "we" and "our".

We spoke before about how we all agree that a broken pup is not A Good Thing.

These things are shared. Yet you claim they are internal.

How do you get around that?

Terrapin denies shared meaning. A fatal flaw that is contradictory to everyday events. I have negated his position, which falls apart at the seams, by virtue of establishing how shared meaning works. Another forum... but...

I have an old bathtub out the back. Several generations of goldfish have lived their lives out there.

Every now and then a Grey ibis comes to visit and wipes out the larger fish. It will catch fish larger than it can eat, and leave them next to the pool to die.

The result seems to be a diminution in the colour of the fish over time, to a sort of muddy-gold colour.

I rather like it.

Let's let him have a say. Seems he has some idea of what he is doing.

All for it. I'm not holding my breath for anything new. Has yet to have come.

They're distinct. If you don't know the distinction, look it up. — S

but as if one did not have anything to say about the other...

No. Meta ethics feeds on, and shits into, ethics.

Yet ethical subjectivism erases just that distinction by treating morality and the Will to Power as categorically equivalent. — Andrew M

That's it. Ethical subjectivism denies ethics rather than engaging. Well put.

Which begs the question.....is there a principle “good”?
— Mww

I think eudaimonia, per Aristotle. — Andrew M

Eudaimonia is popular again. And that's fine - it's a worthy goal. But I would maintain that it's not what might be called a principle good. And I'd argue for that using the open question argument.

And that's not begging the question, @Mww.

I agree, but I think that conditional is simply "If life has value then ..." in an ordinary sense. If so, then that value constitutes a universal standard for measuring one's actions against. Everyone having their own arbitrary preferred standard is no standard at all. — Andrew M

I think you've drilled down to it! We expect everyone who would participate in our communal life to value that life and concomitantly, life in general. We also expect them to value the lives of the individuals, both animal and human, who are part of the common web. In other words we expect them to feel that value, and we expect their thoughts and actions to reflect that feeling. If they want to rely on and benefit from the communal life, and yet do not share the feelings and thoughts of common value then they seem to cheating. And yet, due to innate selfishness, most of us do cheat, more or less.

Absolutely - Why add this? Too much baggage.

And yet, as S said...

Do you realise that only a moral nihilist and sickos would deny that conclusion... — S

(sic.)

So we all agree, and yet we rant on for page after page.

Something is astray here... — Banno

The 'absolutely' is there to indicate that I think you seem to be claiming that goodness is some human-independent, quasi-empirical quality analogous to, for example, a wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum.

@S, @Terrapin Station and I have been arguing, on the other hand, that what we call goodness is what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life. There is no justification for our ideas of goodness beyond that.

There is thus no ought that derives from an is, but instead oughts derive from ifs. If we want to share in society, and contribute as well as benefit, then we ought not to lie. steal, rape, murder and so on. On the other hand, if I feel and think like a criminal, and I want to benefit without contributing then I ought to lie, steal, rape, murder and so on.

As S said above:

The moral feelings are what's fundamental. — S

That's what we have been arguing about, not about what is commonly felt and thought to be right and wrong, good and bad.

The 'absolutely' is there to indicate that I think you seem to be claiming that goodness is some human-independent, quasi-empirical quality analogous to, for example, a wavelength of the electromagnetic spectrum. — Janus

Isn't it curious that when I point out what goodness isn't, people read it as my pointing out what goodness is...

Then you acknowledge that goodness is human-dependent, dependent on human moral sensibility, human dependent in ways that empirical phenomena are not?

Exactly. Yet ethical subjectivism erases just that distinction by treating morality and the Will to Power as categorically equivalent. — Andrew M

I think you are distorting the meaning of the Will to Power here. The thing is that though there are common moral codes that most of us accept as necessary for harmonious social life, each of us (those who think for themselves at least) has our own variant that diverges more or less from those common moral codes to enact our own conception of our individual flourishing. In other words, no one lives, or wants to live, strictly according to the Categorical Imperative, but most of us accept its overarching principles.

S and I have been arguing, on the other hand, that what we call goodness is what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life. There is no justification for our ideas of goodness beyond that. — Janus

Indeed, you have.

This is why I found one of S's recent threads ironically amusing.

So here is my reply, yet again.

Consider: goodness is what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life.

Now the Open Question Argument would have us look to this and consider, could something be what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life, and yet not be good?

And the answer, it seems to me, is yes.

So I conclude that this part of what you are asserting is not right.

And I don't think that this part of my argument has been responded too. I may have missed it.

Then you acknowledge that goodness is human-dependent, dependent on human moral sensibility, human dependent in ways that empirical phenomena are not? — Janus

Well, I don't think I ever said otherwise. What I denied was that this made it subjective - somehow hidden; or simply a question of feeling.

I say one thing is not the case, and folk think that implies I must think that the extreme opposite is the case.

Me ‘n’ the rest of the boys on the Group W bench acknowledge your superior logicianness

Now the Open Question Argument would have us look to this and consider, could something be what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life, and yet not be good?

And the answer, it seems to me, is No. — Banno

I think you meant to write "Yes" here, so I will assume that you did. If something that accords with the most common, cross-cultural feelings of communal life (about what is good, to be explicit here) could nonetheless not be good, then this begs the question as to on what grounds it could fail to be good.

So now we can have fun filling in the forms and playing with the pencils on the bench there.

Yet you have been analogizing between moral propositions and empirical propositions, and seem to have been claiming that both are truth-apt in the same kinds of ways, which suggests that their respective truths are both dependent on determinate states of affairs that are not human-dependent. You offered the "broken pup" as an example of such a state of affairs. Now you seem to be resiling.from your previous arguments.

In other words, no one lives, or wants to live, strictly according to the Categorical Imperative, but most of us accept its overarching principles. — Janus

Folk want other people to live by the categorical imperative.

Not in all cases, I would say.

When an antenna is pointed at a distant star, it will move a little bit too far, going past the mark. It then has to stop, and move backwards again, just a little bit. Because it is so large, it will again miss the mark, but by somewhat less, and again have to stop and move forward. And so on, until this back and forth motion makes no measurable difference, and the antenna is pointing at the star.

I understand engineers call it hunting.