Not trying to speak for Banno, but absolutely agree with him it fails. If the moral subject is both constituted of/by social relations and embedded in social relations, and the term 'objective' in terms of morality is that which applies equally to all moral subjects i.e. the complete world, or set of worlds, of social relations then the dichotomy fails. The 'objective' is in the 'subjective' as much as the 'subjective' is in the 'objective'. i.e. For the subject to function as moral agent, it is necessarily a socially constituted entity, in some sense both 'objective' and 'subjective'. — Baden

Do you want to draw this out, then? I think that if we do, it can be shown that you're making an error somewhere in relation to what I'm saying or suggesting about the subjective-objective distinction. Even if you show that it fails when applied to some particular context, that doesn't mean that it fails in general, or that it fails in the context that I'm talking about. I'm saying that we can take a particular aspect, and say of that aspect that it's subjective, and not objective, at the same time, and in the same sense, and in the same respect. What I suspect that yourself and Banno do is to fail that criteria. I suspect that you're talking about two different respects, say, that it's subjective in one respect, but objective in a different respect. That's not a contradiction, and the distinction obviously remains useful. I suspect that yourself and Banno are jumping to a conclusion and missing the point.

My moral subjectivism accepts the subjective aspect, and can acknowledge objective aspects, but simply points out that these objective aspects don't seem relevant in the way that a moral objectivist seems to suggest. Generally speaking, is there both? Yes, of course. The broken pup is objective. How I feel about it is subjective. But the question is, what's relevant with regards to morality, and in what sense, and why?

Not trying to speak for Banno, but absolutely agree with him it fails. If the moral subject is both constituted of/by social relations and embedded in social relations, and the term 'objective' in terms of morality is that which applies equally to all moral subjects i.e. the complete world, or set of worlds, of social relations then the dichotomy fails. The 'objective' is in the 'subjective' as much as the 'subjective' is in the 'objective'. i.e. For the subject to function as moral agent, it is necessarily a socially constituted entity, in some sense both 'objective' and 'subjective'. — Baden

None of that has anything to do with what I'm actually talking about though. You're talking about how we interact with others, preconditions for certain things, etc. I'm talking about where moral judgments (or whatever moral xs, whatever you want to claim has moral properties or however you'd want to characterize it) occur, in terms of physical location(s). I'm talking about just what physical stuff moral whatevers are a property of. I'm focusing on the judgment (or whatever) itself, as a physical phenomenon, just like we could talk about a painting itself, as a physical phenomenon a la pigments suspended in some medium and applied to canvas. With paintings, you could also talk about the necessity of social relations, etc., but that's a different topic than what the painting is, where it is or isn't located, as a physical object.

For the subject/object distinction to fail, one has to be claiming that there are not (a) brains functioning in a mental way, as well as (b) things that aren't brains functioning in a mental way.

If someone wants to claim there is no (a) or (b) or both, that's fine, but then we should first figure out what the person believes there is ontologically instead, including what their ontology of mind is (assuming they believe there are minds or at least mental phenomena).

If the moral subject is both constituted of/by social relations and embedded in social relations, — Baden

So for example, if you were saying that moral judgments (or whatever you'd call things like "murder is bad") are somehow embedded in social relations, I'd want you to explain just how the moral whatevers physically obtain in social relations--just what "murder is bad" and the like are properties of, where in social relations they're located, etc.

So, because lots of people share moral feelings, and thus moral judgement, on certain issues, then if we stick two people in a room together, then they'll probably agree over these issues, in a normative sense. — S

We tend to establish moral rules/norms by appealing to shared values, but the fact that values are shared, per se, isn't what establishes moral "truth" (although, shared values are precisely from whence normative ethics are derived, for practical reasons) . Personal moral values exist as brute facts, and they're inexorably relative; "moral truth" is something more than mere personal preference.

Let's say the two people in the room do [morally] value kicking puppies. They could compete over access to the only puppy in the room, or they could come to some sort of mutually beneficial agreement that serves the values they do happen to have (puppy kicking). The truthiness of their moral accords depend on whether or not they actually serve/defend their extant values in the environment they are in (or perhaps whether or not their professed values are their actual/sufficiently important values). For example, if fighting over access to the puppy reduces the amount of time that they would otherwise spend kicking it, then aggression for puppy control can be framed as an objectively immoral act in that situation because it directly disservices their moral values. They could go on to form a puppy-time-share agreement, thereby maximizing overall puppy-kicks, and call it morally praiseworthy. If all humans were hard wired to value puppy-kicking in this way, then that's what our moral agreements would serve.

Without naming them here, the most common strong values of any group will tend to form the basis of their normative cultural content; and because there are indeed values which are universal to nearly all humans, and because we share similar environments, our normative moral frameworks/ethical prescriptions have converged toward the same archetypes and outcomes (lucky us Grover).

So what's the problem, right? Well, the problem is that this is supposed to be a discussion about meta-ethics, not a discussion about normative ethics. — S

As is hopefully clear from the puppy example, the point I'm making is indeed a meta-ethical one (which may or may not relate to yours and Baden's disagreement or miscommunication). The truth of specific normative content is transitory, like the next optimal move in a given chess game, but the relationship between our desires and our lousy environment is not: achieving our own goals in a populated environment means considering the goals of others along with the environment we are in. In other words, morality isn't just any greedy hedonism, it's socially responsible hedonism in a world where intentions, methods,and outcomes can be fact-checked. (We could split semantic hairs regarding the "consideration" component, but when individuals extend no moral consideration whatsoever, no useful moral discussion with them can take place (they're a moot point). I prefer to describe the failure (or inability) to consider the needs of others as a breakdown of morality. Informally, it's as if morality itself is an ad hoc system of categorizing the various ways in which we might fail to consider the needs/values/goals/desires of others).

I think it boils down more to finding a better way to talk about morality than fundamental disagreements about what it is. — Baden

The way that we talk about it, and the way that we interpret the way that we talk about it, is definitely of importance, and I don't think that @Banno has fared too well in demonstrating that he understands and appreciates this importance.

Is it as important as normative ethical matters? Agree or disagree, that itself doesn't even matter in this context. It's just a red herring.

You're both talking past me. Have a look at the schema and go from there. Where is the error? Let me put it this way, I'm claiming there are only social relations, which when packaged in individual bodies, we call 'persons' or 'subjects'. And there is no moral agency, no persons or subjects, without this constitution. So, I'm not just saying this or that, I'm saying the whole binary approach is wrongheaded and prevents a full view of where and how morality obtains. That doesn't mean the subject/object distinction is useless in every field but it's much more useful for scientific enquiry than philosophic / moral enquiry.

Not trying to speak for Banno, but absolutely agree with him it fails. — Baden

(“It” being the subjective/objective dichotomy)

For the subject to function as moral agent, it is necessarily a socially constituted entity, in some sense both 'objective' and 'subjective'. — Baden

If that is true, how does the subjective/objective dichotomy fail, when subsequently described as consisting of both parts?

Even human reason itself, when reduced as far as possible, retains the thinking subject and the object of his thought. As long as humans are in the conversation, it is impossible for the subject/object dichotomy to fail. It is every bit as impossible for the subjective/objective dichotomy to fail as soon as the internal subject/object is transferred to the external world, and becomes an object of perception or understanding by any other similar subject.

The internal subject/object dichotomy is moral philosophy; the external subjective/objective dichotomy is practical anthropology. The only real, important consideration should be.....how are the two related, what is it that relates them. And because the fundamental ground is the human himself, the what and the how absolutely must be reducible to him in a singular form.

Personal moral values exist as brute facts, and they're inexorably relative; "moral truth" is something more than mere personal preference. — VagabondSpectre

So where would you say moral truth occurs aside from personal preference?

Let me put it this way, I'm claiming there is only social relations, which when packaged in individual bodies, we call 'persons' or 'subjects'. — Baden

Wait, so you're saying that if we took one person and every other person but that one were to die or disappear, that one person would no longer exist? I'd be very curious about your ontology if that's what you're saying. (Presumably you'd think that the Twilight Zone episode "Last Man on Earth" is simply incoherent?). And would two people be enough for someone to exist? Three?

You're both talking past me. — Baden

Oh the irony.

Have a look at the schema and go from there. Where is the error? Let me put it this way, I'm claiming there is only social relations, which when packaged in individual bodies, we call 'persons' or 'subjects'. And there is no moral agency, no persons or subjects, without this constitution. So, I'm not just saying this or that, I'm saying the whole binary approach is wrongheaded and prevents a full view of where and how morality obtains. That doesn't mean the subject/object distinction is useless in every field but it's much more useful for scientific enquiry than philosophic / moral enquiry. — Baden

I'm going to speak bluntly and reply that I don't particularly care about what you're saying, unless you can show that it's of relevance to what I'm saying. I'm fine with granting that you can demonstrate a failure in the context that you want to talk about, but if that context is not the same as my context, then your demonstration of failure doesn't apply to what I'm saying, and the failure is more a failure of you to correctly identify what's relevant here.

If you think that you can demonstrate a failure in my context, then go ahead and try. Your context seems irrelevant.

If you want to work with my context, then go back and properly address my last reply.

so you're saying that if we took one person and every other person but that one were to die or disappear, that one person would no longer exist? — Terrapin Station

Of course not, because they would have already been constituted socially before you removed the others. Isn't that obvious? But if you took a human newborn out of all social relations not only would it not become a person, it would almost certainly die.

I think it boils down more to finding a better way to talk about morality than fundamental disagreements about what it is. — Baden

Meta-meta-ethics :cool:

So where would you say moral truth occurs aside from personal preference? — Terrapin Station

Normative ethical truth occurs in the way an action/agreement actually considers/preserves the genuine personal preferences of interested agents. (Example: if we had a chance meeting in an elevator, and we both happened to be armed with knives, it would be objectively immoral for us to attack one another without provocation given that it would directly harm our desire to avoid injury and continue living).

I'm going to speak bluntly and reply that I don't particularly care about what you're saying, — S

I'm not asking you to care. I suppose you replied to my post by accident. Keep your fingers under better control next time.

Of course not, because they would have already been constituted socially before you removed the others. Isn't that obvious? — Baden

I've been around philosophy long enough to never assume that anyone might not be claiming something that seems insane to me.

"Constituted" is often used in the sense of "comprised of." If x is constituted of y and z, then x is identical to y and z.

You're not using "constituted" in that manner then?

How would you say that nonmental things consider something? How does that work physically?

I'm not asking you to care. I suppose you replied to my post by accident. Keep your fingers under better control next time. — Baden

Predictable reaction. Okay, let's take me out of it then, because I suspect that your bias is now interfering. Presumably, you'd want a reasonable person to care. If so, then why would a reasonable person care about what you're saying, if what you're saying misses the point?

I'm saying the whole binary approach is wrongheaded and prevents a full view of where and how morality obtains. — Baden

You wrote this while I was writing. This I agree with: where and how morality obtains has no need of the binary approach, other than serve as the reason the moral investigate should begin.

That doesn't mean the subject/object distinction is useless in every field but it's much more useful for scientific enquiry than philosophic / moral enquiry. — Baden

Why not turn philosophic/moral inquiry into a science?

I don't mean "contemplate", I mean "service". I'm using the "treatment" connotation of consider; to consider something is to treat it with attention and kindness

So in your view nonmental things can treat something with attention and kindness?

where and how morality obtains has no need of the binary approach, o — Mww

Well, unless it's located in one place and not another.

The bright pixels of my monitor aren't treating my eyes very kindly right now.

Not very kindly at all...

Bed time for me!

We're off-topic now. I'll get round to elaborating with individuals when and if I think it will be useful. But my effort here is just to support my contention that @Banno is justified in problematizing the subject/object distinction, not to claim that everyone else's position is completely wrong, but that that element causes issues which drive moral views that are not actually that dissimilar in substance away from each other. It's polarising.

And I drew a picture, for which you should be eternally grateful.

Guys, the black-white distinction fails. You see, some things are black, and some things are white. Believe it or not, some things are even black and white. And it's the same for loads of other distinctions: dark-light, hard-soft, wet-dry, you name it.

Therefore, these distinctions all fail. Mind = blown.

Note though that others, while they might not agree, are actually engaging. I hate to say it, but I think you're being a tad... unreasonable. :wink:

Note though that others, while they might not agree, are actually engaging. I hate to say it, but I think you're being a tad... unreasonable. :wink: — Baden

I've engaged to the extent of analysing what you've said, and reaching the conclusion that it misses the point. What more do you reasonably expect of me? If you can give me a good enough reason to reconsider that assessment, then I will do so.

Note though that others, while they might not agree, are actually engaging — Baden

Although how much good is it doing? You're not continuing to follow through. :wink:

I've had over a dozen replies in an hour and I'm eating lunch. But believe me, I always follow through. :halo:

For the obtaining of morality it could well be one place and another, as long as they are of the same kind, which of course they must be. But that’s not a subjective/objective dichotomy, the demonstration post-obtain, is.

That's fine. We just need the evidence then of moral whatevers obtaining in a nonmental location.