So can a person have private morals?
Morals are rules to live by; but if rules cannot be private, morality cannot be private.
So could Nietzsche follow a rule that was understood only by himself? — Banno
How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno
A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule. — Banno
Now my guess is that this will become a discussion of the merits of the private language argument well before the end of the first page. That's not the point. Rather, if the private language argument is correct, is it compatible with an existential approach to morality? — Banno
How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno
Yes - that's the wiggly tooth I want to probe.
How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno
The arguments against a private language have a more general form that argues against private rules. A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule. — Banno
So can a person have private morals? — Banno
How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno
This seems to steer very close to a purely semantic discussion. Are purely private moral rules actually moral, or rules? Depends on your definitions. — Echarmion
It seems to me the decision making process is different as a purely psychological fact. Following a personal rule feels different internally. — Echarmion
You can stipulate that you're going to use the word "rule" so that it necessarily isn't something that pertains to just one person, but that doesn't say much except announce to us how you're going to use a term. — Terrapin Station
But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and so on a for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know - to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243
I have no criterion of correctness. — PI 258
The arguments against a private language have a more general form that argues against private rules. A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule.
So can a person have private morals?
Morals are rules to live by; but if rules cannot be private, morality cannot be private.
So could Nietzsche follow a rule that was understood only by himself?
This, by way of attracting attention to a discussion between ↪Janus and myself.
Now my guess is that this will become a discussion of the merits of the private language argument well before the end of the first page. That's not the point. Rather, if the private language argument is correct, is it compatible with an existential approach to morality? — Banno
How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno
But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and so on a for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know - to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.
— PI 243
I have no criterion of correctness. — Luke
The arguments against a private language have a more general form that argues against private rules. A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule. — Banno
Morals are rules to live by; but if rules cannot be private, morality cannot be private. — Banno
I don't think he ever suggested such a thing. To relate to the private language argument, it would have to be a moral rule that even in principle can't be expressed. — frank
Rather, he concluded that one's private use of the word "red" within a language game cannot be given a meaningful a priori definition in terms of one's immediate sensations, due to such a definition being a circular tautology that is superfluous to, and likely unrepresentative of, one's actual private use of "red", as well as saying nothing informative to oneself or others. — sime
There could be no criteria for doing so. — Banno
Nietzsche could have no criteria for correctness in his moral principles. — Banno
the inventor of it would need to translate it into some common language that she was already familiar with. — Janus
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