So can a person have private morals?

Morals are rules to live by; but if rules cannot be private, morality cannot be private.

So could Nietzsche follow a rule that was understood only by himself? — Banno

If Nietzsche had his own set of rules to live by, and told no one what those rules were. then his set of rules would be understood only by himself. If he told someone what his set of rules were, then they would be understood, or at least known to, someone else.

I haven't been arguing that anyone could create a set of rules that no one else could understand, so unless you want to deny that someone could have their own private set of moral rules, it's not clear to me what we could disagree about in this connection.

so unless you want to deny that someone could have their own private set of moral rules, it's not clear to me what we could disagree about in this connection. — Janus

Yes - that's the wiggly tooth I want to probe.

How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident?

How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno

I can be diligent or occasionally lapse in my adherence to not stepping on the cracks, or wearing my underpants back to front, or that other thing I don't want to tell you; they are not accidents. I would think a better question would be, what makes them moral?

I tried to ask the hermit at the bottom of the garden, as he is the most moral person I know, but unfortunately, he has taken a vow of silence - either that or he just doesn't like me any more.

A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule. — Banno

That seems false or arbitrary. I don't get why it wouldn't count. Just because you don't want it to?

Now my guess is that this will become a discussion of the merits of the private language argument well before the end of the first page. That's not the point. Rather, if the private language argument is correct, is it compatible with an existential approach to morality? — Banno

That seems relatively insignificant if it's actually incorrect, though.

How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno

I don't not kick the puppy by mere accident. That's pretty darn absurd. I don't kick it because, in your lingo, I have a private rule. Why would you conclude, "It's a mere accident!"? :brow:

(Of course, my rule is not so private now I've told you about it).

This seems to steer very close to a purely semantic discussion. Are purely private moral rules actually moral, or rules? Depends on your definitions.

Yes - that's the wiggly tooth I want to probe.

How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno

It seems to me the decision making process is different as a purely psychological fact. Following a personal rule feels different internally.

The arguments against a private language have a more general form that argues against private rules. A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule. — Banno

You can stipulate that you're going to use the word "rule" so that it necessarily isn't something that pertains to just one person, but that doesn't say much except announce to us how you're going to use a term.

So can a person have private morals? — Banno

You can't have anything other than private morals. Just like you can't have anything other than private meaning. Morals and meaning pick out phenomena that only occur in brains functioning in mental ways (there's zero evidence otherwise), and there's no way to make that phenomena be something other than that.

The private language argument is not correct, by the way.

How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno

In other words, from an observer's perspective, if we pretend we're behaviorists, and necessarily we're talking about parsing behavior that we can't assume amounts to a rule, because it's apparently arbitrary.

But that's only when we stipulate/assume all of those things (and pretend they're all that matter).

This seems to steer very close to a purely semantic discussion. Are purely private moral rules actually moral, or rules? Depends on your definitions. — Echarmion

Seems so to me as well.

It seems to me the decision making process is different as a purely psychological fact. Following a personal rule feels different internally. — Echarmion

I'd make what could potentially be more or less the same point, only worded differently. Perhaps a related point. The one influences what we do or don't do, the other just sort of happens accidentally. With one, I wilfully act in accordance with my rules, whereas with the other, I just act, and stuff happens, and if by mere accident, then I didn't mean it to. I mean not to kick puppies. I purposefully do not kick them. It's certainly no mere accident that I don't generally do this, except when I've lost my football. Let the play continue!

You can stipulate that you're going to use the word "rule" so that it necessarily isn't something that pertains to just one person, but that doesn't say much except announce to us how you're going to use a term. — Terrapin Station

It seems a bunch of us are in agreement that what Banno was saying there seems to amount to a triviality.

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and so on a for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know - to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

I have no criterion of correctness. — PI 258

If to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions, is to hold within one's mind a principle, and adhere to that principle, then all rules are private. If to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions, is described as something other than this, then I think it's likely that you have an incoherent description of what it means to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions.

The arguments against a private language have a more general form that argues against private rules. A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule.

So can a person have private morals?

Morals are rules to live by; but if rules cannot be private, morality cannot be private.

So could Nietzsche follow a rule that was understood only by himself?

This, by way of attracting attention to a discussion between ↪Janus and myself.

Now my guess is that this will become a discussion of the merits of the private language argument well before the end of the first page. That's not the point. Rather, if the private language argument is correct, is it compatible with an existential approach to morality? — Banno

My inclination is to say "yes" -- but with a hasty addition that if all we end up doing is the same, but with different words, then it's really hard to tell the difference between existential ethics from traditional ethics. So while I am inclined to say "yes", especially because the burden is just asking about possibility so it seems likely we could come up with some scenario where this all makes sense, it might also be the case that we're missing the point if we're formulating ethics in terms of traditional morality. ((I'm tempted to go on a tangent about Kant here))

But, as I understand it at least, I don't know if it is possible for Nietzsche to understand a rule all on his own -- if it's a rule then he is formulating it in a language. So if he understands it all on his own then it must be some trans-linguistic understanding.

Kinda wondering what the puppy did? :wink: no, your rule was not private when you did not kick the puppy and it became an external behavior. morals and rules are internal in that they are unique to that individual reality but exhibited by behavior externally.

So could Nietzsche follow a rule that was understood only by himself? — Banno

I don't think he ever suggested such a thing. To relate to the private language argument, it would have to be a moral rule that even in principle can't be expressed.

From my viewpoint;

"So can a person have private morals?"
No, although the internal morals may be a way of managing information in response to and for the earlier emotive system, the inevitable result is behaviors exhibited. Often they are displayed through a series social interactions.

"Morals are rules to live by; but if rules cannot be private, morality cannot be private."
Morals and rules are not synonymous, Rules are often a codification of morals.However if any behaviors are the result any of the above then it is not private.

So could Nietzsche follow a rule that was understood only by himself? well perhaps theoretically yes, as a internal management categorization of information in response to the emotive mechanism.. The behaviors exhibited may result in no one else knowing what his morals are.

How does following one's own private rules differ from mere accident? — Banno

The following of rules requires a faculty or source of principles such that following rules doesn’t disempower the source of the rules. There can’t be such a thing as morality if rules are constructed without both the means and a reason to follow them. If there is such a source, and it is employed as intended, accident is prevented.

Enter deontology. Like it or not, subscribe to it or not, it does answer the question.

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and so on a for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know - to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.
— PI 243

I have no criterion of correctness. — Luke

Curiously, he only directly refers to "private language" in three passages:

259. Are the rules of the private language impressions of rules?—
The balance on which impressions are weighed is not the impression
of a balance.

269. Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man's
behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a word: that it
means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria
for his 'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word,
but not the right one. And, lastly, criteria for his understanding the
word right. In the second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand'' might be called a "private language".


275. Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself "How blue
the sky is!"—When you do it spontaneously—without philosophical
intentions—the idea never crosses your mind that this impression of
colour belongs only to you. And you have no hesitation in exclaiming
that to someone else. And if you point at anything as you say the
words you point at the sky. I am saying: you have not the feeling of
pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies 'naming the sensation' when one is thinking about 'private language'. Nor do you think
that really you ought not to point to the colour with your hand, but
with your attention. (Consider what it means "to point to something
with the attention".)

259 appears to reject an a priori approach to understanding first-person phenomenology in terms of privately defined linguistic definitions (e.g. as in Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Husserl's Logical Investigations)

275 Nevertheless attributes a meaning of sorts to thinking of first-person experience in terms of a private language, namely "the feeling of pointing into yourself when one is thinking about private language"


269 Attributes sense to the notion of "private language" when referring to third-person behaviour.

The arguments against a private language have a more general form that argues against private rules. A rule that is only understood by one person does not count as a rule. — Banno

Only according to Banno and Banno's Wittgenstein :)

Morals are rules to live by; but if rules cannot be private, morality cannot be private. — Banno

But Wittgenstein stressed the very importance of ethical and aesthetic judgements and railed against the very understanding of aesthetics and morality in terms of linguistic convention. See Wittgenstein's Poker. He in fact rejected the utility and sensicality of reducing ethics and aesthetics to mere linguistic conventions.

To take a non-moral example, Wittgenstein didn't conclude that a private understanding of redness is impossible because redness is a term belonging to public language whose meaning therefore must refer to public convention. Rather, he concluded that one's private use of the word "red" within a language game cannot be given a meaningful a priori definition in terms of one's immediate sensations, due to such a definition being a circular tautology that is superfluous to, and likely unrepresentative of, one's actual private use of "red", as well as saying nothing informative to oneself or others.

This doesn't rule out a person discovering, a posteriori , an implicit rule that he discovers to be descriptive of his actual private word usage, only that such a rule cannot be the prescriptive force of his use of the word, due to Humean considerations that reject the platonistic conception of logical necessity.

I don't think he ever suggested such a thing. To relate to the private language argument, it would have to be a moral rule that even in principle can't be expressed. — frank

One of the many problems with the private language argument is that it's not at all clear what "in principle understandable" versus "in principle not understandable" would even amount to. (And of course I'd have to pretend that something is going on re understanding that is very different than what I believe is really going on).

Rather, he concluded that one's private use of the word "red" within a language game cannot be given a meaningful a priori definition in terms of one's immediate sensations, due to such a definition being a circular tautology that is superfluous to, and likely unrepresentative of, one's actual private use of "red", as well as saying nothing informative to oneself or others. — sime

This strikes me as nonsensical. One cannot give a "meaningful definition" a priori to an immediate sensation because it would be a tautology (so what?) and unrepresentative (that wouldn't imply that you can't do it) and uninformative (again so what?)

That's it. Nietzsche could have no criteria for correctness in his moral principles. That's different, it seems to me, to Satre, who publicly stated support for Marxism; although as I understand him, there was no further reason to support Marxism that his choice.

It's important o see that this is not a criticism, since it doesn't point to some contradiction in their ideas.

Noted. I'm over thinking it again. I'll offer no excuse but procrastination.

@Moliere - thanks for you reply, you can see the issue. We choose, and choose agin and again. If that choice follows a pattern, it follows a rule. But then,if the choice follows a rule, is it free?

((I'm tempted to go on a tangent about Kant here)) — Moliere

Go on.

See Wittgenstein's Poker. — sime

A tedious read.

so unless you want to deny that someone could have their own private set of moral rules, — Janus

According to the private language argument following a private rule is incoherent. There could be no criteria for doing so.

SO that's the direction here.

There could be no criteria for doing so. — Banno

There can't be private criteria for the private rule because?

What exactly do you mean by "private rule" though? A rule that no one else could understand, or merely a rule that no one else does understand because they have not been told about it. I've asked you to answer this question before, and you seem reluctant to do so.

What I'm talking about is a private rule which is obviously understood by the one stipulating it in the terms of some common language; in other words it is private only insofar as others have not been told what it is. I stipulate that because I agree that it would not be possible for anyone to develop an entirely private language, since to understand, and even to develop in the first place, that new language, the inventor of it would need to translate it into some common language that she was already familiar with.

Nietzsche could have no criteria for correctness in his moral principles. — Banno

Try to imagine for a moment that for Nietzsche "criteria for correctness" were irrelevant. It's just like aesthetics where there can be no definitive criteria for correctness. It would be a matter of what feels right, and that could be different for each individual. Probably not all that different within the class of individuals who are capable of feeling compassion and empathy, though!

the inventor of it would need to translate it into some common language that she was already familiar with. — Janus

The issue there, though, just becomes whether it would be possible to develop some personal cryptographic code that no one could crack. I don't know how we could know whether it's possible "in principle" or not, which is why I said this earlier: "it's not at all clear what 'in principle understandable' versus 'in principle not understandable' would even amount to." How would we know that some cryptographic code is in principle not crackable versus it simply contingently being the case that no one has been able to crack it yet? (And we can ask the same thing a la "How would we know that some cryptographic code is in principle crackable but just no one has been contingently able to crack it yet?" )

It strikes me as one of those things where people are ("subconsciously") like, "Yeah, understandable versus not understandable 'in principle'--that sounds all nice and fancy and philosophical, like we're saying something rigorous and important," but when you ask anyone what the heck the difference amounts to, how we can discern either, all they can do is more or less go, "Duh . . . I dunno <shrug>"

Well, especially in regards to rule-following and existentialism Kant seems like a great touchstone. As I read him, though his purposes were clearly different from the existentialists, he kind of lays a foundation for existential thought. This is because freedom is such a central value to his ethics. In a way, if we take him at face value as saying that the categorical imperative says the very same thing in each iteration, his only criteria for whether a rule is moral is

1) Does it wind up contradicting itself if every moral actor follows it? If no then go to 2 --

2) Are you motivated strictly from a sense of respect for the moral law when you act on such and such a principle? If yes then moral, if no then at least legal but not moral.


which allows for a greater range of actions than a lot of moral systems before Kant.

Now where Nietzsche differs is probably on the emphasis on 1 -- the possibility for universality isn't as important to Nietzsche. But what Kant did is articulate a way of ethical thinking that allowed an individual to act on their own conscience in spite of whatever surroundings they may find themselves in -- so your society may believe that such and such is good, but as long as you believe otherwise and you are acting out of respect for the moral law and everyone could theoretically adopt your rule then your action is moral.

In other words he articulates a way for moral rules to be private in a particular sense -- if not quite in the sense I take the private language argument to mean when it describes a private language.

What's really interesting about Kant's rules is that what makes them moral is not the rule, though the rule must actually pass some formal criteria, but the motivation behind an actor's act. So we can have several persons who are following the same rule, are acting in the same way, but only the person who knows in their heart of hearts that they are doing it out of respect would know that their action is moral (at least if they are Kantian, of course).

Hence why this all opens up thinking, or perhaps serves more as a propaedeutic, to existential ethics -- it's about one's relationship to a rule, and its motivation, and largely excludes our social milieu. Nietzsche just takes this line of thinking further, absent its reliance on theological underpinnings (which are pretty obvious whenever we read Kant, even if his formal theory does not rely upon theology).


So this gets back around to, in my mind, on just what we mean by private or public -- because a private rule by Kant is still, in principle, articulatable (oi, I butcher the language so), even if it is not shared. And though it be articulatable we can have no behavioristic criteria for determining if an act is moral, though we can check if it follows the rule.

(a few edits for clarity)