I like the way you're actually battling with an idea that being on this forum has made you consider, which you don't actually want to consider. — Wayfarer

Considered and rejected.

I don't remember what your hypothetical scenario is (I'm guessing that it's just something about meaning when no people exist).

Why is insisting that it's imaginable any different than someone insisting that it's imaginable that there are emotions like happiness, sadness, etc. when no people exist, or someone insisting that it's imaginable that there are ecliptics when there are no solar systems, etc.?

Intentionally produced patterns are not the same as naturally occurring patterns; the former are semantically meaningful, and the latter are not — Janus

How would you class the Fibonacci sequence? Is it a naturally occurring pattern, void of semantic meaning, or is it intentionally produced?

In order to 'set the meaning', you already have to be able to say what something means. And that is something Rover cannot do, beyond 'sick 'em, Rover', or 'over there!' — Wayfarer

What? That needs an explanation, because at first blush it simply seems false. Why couldn't I just coin a name at the time? I don't have to say anything. I can just look at something and coin a name for it, then that's what it means in my language.

As I explained above, S apparently believes that a "christening of meaning" (at least per communal usage) makes some sort of objective, persistent abstract existent obtain, an abstract existent for which it's a category error to contemplate location, concrete properties, etc. — Terrapin Station

I would advise against trying to engage with him productively. He seems like a dead end. He won't really listen, he'll just keep pushing his view, asserting this and that, and so on. He has shown little interest in engaging my position on its own terms or working out the problems with his own position which I identify.

I'm trying to imagine anything that could persuade me to believe that notions of objective, persistent, abstract existents aren't simply examples of a type of projection. — Terrapin Station

Well, straightaway, for me, it's counterintuitive to apply the categories you do for stuff like this. Stuff about the necessity of a physical location, stuff about a subject being required. And then I think about why that is. And I consider your explanation, and it just doesn't work out. It just doesn't seem right. And then, of course, that fits my view about the persistence of post-human stuff such as rules and meaning, which I believed separately anyway, and which wouldn't fit with your view. So the explanation comes together for me. I'm going with what I find works best, and although my account might not be complete, it is working for me better than yours.

I think the subjective approach can explain a whole bunch of stuff. Stuff related to understanding, as I've acknowledged throughout. But it shouldn't try to transcend where it works. It shouldn't try to be more than an epistemology, and venture into the world of logic or metaphysics. When it does that, it becomes anthropocentric, and we should all know that anthropocentric models can fail spectacularly, as history has shown.

For me, it's difficult to separate epistemology from ontology. If I'm going to ask myself, "How do we know that 'dog' still means something if no people exist," I don't know how I could answer that without exploring just what meaning is ontologically in the first place. At it seems to me like once we know that, it's easy to answer the epistemological question.

For me, it's difficult to separate epistemology from ontology. — Terrapin Station

Yeah, and I think that that can lead to some of the biggest problems in metaphysics. It leads to what raises big red flags for me.

If I'm going to ask myself, "How do we know that 'dog' still means something if no people exist," I don't know how I could answer that without exploring just what meaning is ontologically in the first place. At it seems to me like once we know that, it's easy to answer the epistemological question. — Terrapin Station

Sure, in that sense it seems alright. I do the same thing. But the sort of thing I meant by that - and if you're a metaphysical realist then you should agree with me here - is the kind of thinking that goes, "But how do we know that the cup is still there?", which is fine in a sense, but not in the sense where it is being asked because in their head they're imagining a link between knowledge and existence, such that the cup can't exist at the time without us knowing that it does at the time. That's a gross overestimation of the role that our knowledge plays, in my assessment. It's anthropocentric.

Sure, in that sense it seems alright. I do the same thing. But the sort of thing I meant by that - and if you're a metaphysical realist then you should agree with me here - is the kind of thinking that goes, "But how do we know that the cup is still there?", which is fine in a sense, but not in the sense where it is being asked because in their head they're imagining a link between knowledge and existence, such that the cup can't exist at the time without us knowing that it does at the time. That's a gross overestimation of the role that our knowledge plays, in my assessment. — S

I'm a metaphysical realist in general, but I believe that some things, like emotions, desires, thoughts, etc. are only mental phenomena. That's not giving them any different status aside from placing that phenomena in a particular location--brain activity.

I'm a metaphysical realist in general, but I believe that some things, like emotions, desires, thoughts, etc. are only mental phenomena. That's not giving them any different status aside from placing that phenomena in a particular location--brain activity. — Terrapin Station

Okay...

So, do you agree with my point there being cases where the role of knowledge in relation to metaphysics is being overestimated?

Okay...

So, do you agree with my point there being cases where the role of knowledge in relation to metaphysics is being overestimated? — S

In the cases like you're describing, I'd just say that the person is confused. Knowing something and how we know it is often not the same thing as what we know about. (They're only the same when the topic is knowledge itself.)

In the cases like you're describing, I'd just say that the person is confused. Knowing something and how we know it is often not the same thing as what we know about. (They're only the same when the topic is knowledge itself.) — Terrapin Station

People too quickly jump into thinking, "But how can that be so without me knowing about it?", as if our knowing about it determines the metaphysics. As if the world won't just carry on as before, only without us and our knowledge.

I suspect that this is where people are going wrong with both metaphysical idealism and linguistic idealism. It's a bad way of thinking.

People too quickly jump into thinking, "But how can that be so without me knowing about it?", as if our knowing about it determines the metaphysics. As if the world won't just carry on as before, only without us. — S

I agree with that, but I don't think it implies that meaning would exist if we didn't, any more than emotions, desires, etc. would exist if we didn't. Some things are mental "in nature" and some are not. The mental-in-nature stuff requires things with minds.

It's no different than saying that some things are, say (to use your other thread), potato-oriented (we don't have a word like "potatal" lol) in nature and some things are not. So we're just not going to have potato-oriented phenomena if potatoes do not exist.

Anyone who is willing to assert that a correlation between different things does not always require, include, and depend upon a creature capable of drawing it...

Raise your hand...

Like we're in grade school. Love it.

I don't remember what your hypothetical scenario is (I'm guessing that it's just something about meaning when no people exist). — Terrapin Station

You really don't remember?

That there is meaning when no people exist is my conclusion, utilising the thought experiment. That conclusion leads to the conclusion that meaning, once set, is objective.

You could put it in your neutral way of talking about ink marks on a piece of paper if you want to. It's a scenario where everyone is dead. An hour previously, when everyone was still alive, these ink marks had meaning. On that we presumably agree. But, of course, I would say that, afterwards, as before, they're not just ink marks: they have a meaning.

Anyone who is willing to assert that a correlation between different things does not always require, include, and depend upon a creature capable of drawing it...

Raise your hand...

Like we're in grade school. Love it. — creativesoul

See me after class.

What about the Rosetta stone? Big fucking thing with scribblings on it dug out of the earth.

Did the words have meaning before they were discovered again? Have they had meaning since they were written in the same way? What about when it was unknown and forgotten in the earth?

I've been trying to follow the discussion but I lost the thread. Will someone help me get back on track?

Simple.

When is meaning?

When is meaning? — Mww

But... but why is dog?

That there is meaning when no people exist is my conclusion, utilising the thought experiment. That conclusion leads to the conclusion that meaning, once set, is objective.

You could put it in your neutral way of talking about ink marks on a piece of paper if you want to. It's a scenario where everyone is dead. An hour previously, when everyone was still alive, these ink marks had meaning. On that we presumably agree. But, of course, I would say that, afterwards, as before, they're not just ink marks: they have a meaning. — S

Yeah of course that scrap of paper, with those blotchy squiggles, have meaning after all humans are dead. Say a bird grabs the paper and utilises the paper for nest padding. Voilà, now its meaning is warmth and insulation or some shit like that. The real question is: is there meaning when no life at all exists?

Answer one, answer both.

What about the Rosetta stone? Big fucking thing with scribblings on it dug out of the earth. — fdrake

It's awesome. Such a treasure.

Did the words have meaning before they were discovered again? Have they had meaning since they were written in the same way? What about when it was unknown and forgotten in the earth? — fdrake

Yes, yes, and yes.

I've been trying to follow the discussion but I lost the thread. Will someone help me get back on track? — fdrake

There's a whole bunch of different aspects to this discussion. What was intended as my main focus pretty much went out the window, and now it's a rehash of realists vs. idealists on linguistic meaning, which was Part 2 of my previous discussion.

Ancient texts were introduced to show the faults of idealism with regards to linguistic meaning. The idealists have predictably failed to come up with a reasonable response to this.

When is meaning?
— Mww

But... but why is dog? — fdrake

Exactly. Ask @Terrapin Station. He has the answers to these kind of questions. :lol:

Where is Tuesday?

I understand what you are saying. But you're begging the question. How is it embodied? How does it travel from the marks to the reader? Absent humans or any similar intelligence, what constitutes the difference between meaningful marks and any other configuration of reality? — Echarmion

The meaning is embodied in the repeating patterns of the text. That's what makes it possible to decipher the meaning of the text. The question "How does it travel from the marks to the reader" incorporates an assumption that the meaning is somehow something magically 'over and above' the marks. It is not. We see the marks, we examine the marks, we analyze the repeating patterns of the marks and we attempt to decipher the meaning that we surmise is there.

The differences between intentionally produced, semantically meaningful marks and naturally occurring marks are physical; the natural marks have no sets of different recurring patterns, whereas if there are recurring patterns in natural marks they will be simpler and 'all-over' like ripples in sand, for example.

Ancient texts were introduced to show the faults of idealism with regards to linguistic meaning. The idealists have predictably failed to come up with a reasonable response to this. — S

And you have some kind of information transfer/encoding approach to the meaning of the words on the Rosetta stone. We could work out what they meant because there was a meaning to be worked out; rooted in the information content of causal chains of language use connecting their ancient word use with our modern translation?

Yeah of course that scrap of paper, with those blotchy squiggles, have meaning after all humans are dead. Say a bird grabs the paper and utilises the paper for nest padding. Voilà, now its meaning is warmth and insulation or some shit like that. — emancipate

You're late to the discussion, so perhaps you missed me say about a trillion times that I'm only talking about linguistic meaning. What you're describing is a different kind of meaning: meaning as a tool, or some shit like that.

The real question is: is there meaning when no life at all exists? — emancipate

Yes. Linguistic meaning.

And you have some kind of information transfer/encoding approach to the meaning of the words on the Rosetta stone. We could work out what they meant because there was a meaning to be worked out; rooted in the information content of causal chains of language use connecting their ancient word use with our modern translation? — fdrake

You have a way with words. I doubt I could've put it like that.

I like it. You and Janus each get a gold star for your contributions.

And Terrapin too, since bouncing back and forth off of each other has been productive to some extent, and I wouldn't have even created this discussion if it wasn't for his line of enquiry which really got me thinking. Although I'm still peeved about his "dodge" and "dodecaphony" shenanigans!

You have a way with words. I doubt I could've put it like that. — S

Blame @Pierre-Normand.

Yes, and I think decipherability is the key point in talking about this in order that a distinction be made between encoded linguistic patterns and random marks when discussing ancient texts; and similar scenarios, such as an alien civilization wiping itself out but leaving physical or digital writings, in which I think it also makes sense to call the writings meaningful because they would be potentially decipherable to us (in theory even if not in practice). However, in any scenario where there are no meaning makers at all left and no potential, even in theory, for decipherability, the connection is short-circuited, and I don't think it then makes sense to identify meaning (or non-meaning). So, the most sensible way of talking about this from my point of view is to admit meaning does not have to be in the here and now (it's not tied to some active brain state etc) but there must be potentializability for it to make sense to talk about it being instantiated in any given text.

(This is not to get at the "truth" of the matter, but to try to offer the least problematic solution.)

What do you mean by "Fibonacci sequence"? Do you refer to natural phenomena such as the whorls of seeds on the face of a sunflower, or a written series of numbers where each one (except of course the first) is the sum of the two preceding numbers?