They have characteristics, yes, but not empirically measurable properties. — Theorem
Aristotle’s philosophy was framed in the context of a different epoch. — Wayfarer
What is not being appreciated, is that the OP is written 'post Descartes'. Descartes divided the whole issue along completely different lines to Aristotle. So from a post-Cartesian point of view, of course Aristotle's conception of matter doesn't make sense. But the question uncritically operates from a post-Cartesian point of view, which of course we nowadays all embody, without understanding what that shsift in perspective really entails. In order to properly critique the Aristotelian conception of 'hyle' requires an understanding of the context in which such an idea made sense. — Wayfarer
How would there be a property that's not empirically measurable (whether it's been measured yet or not)? — Terrapin Station
Examples would include phenomenal, intentional and normative properties. — Theorem
Those are brain states. Brain states are measurable. — Terrapin Station
Why would you think you need to explain change, anyway, by the way? — Terrapin Station
If there were a lack of change, would that need to be explained? — Terrapin Station
No, they're not. — Theorem
Because some people argue that change is not real, while others argue that permanence is not real. — Theorem
Yeah, they are. What they have in common with brain states is that they're identical to them. That seems painfully obvious to me. — Terrapin Station
So just in case someone argues that x is not real, then x needs to be explained? — Terrapin Station
I deny that they are identical by pointing out that share nothing in common and you retort by re-asserting that they are identical. Nice one! — Theorem
Look, brains are wet, solid, made of neurons, weigh about 3 pounds on average, have a volume of about 1450 cubic centimeters on average, etc. Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have none of those properties — Theorem
Look, brains are wet, solid, made of neurons, weigh about 3 pounds on average, have a volume of about 1450 cubic centimeters on average, etc. Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have none of those properties
— Theorem
Likewise, here, I simply have to say, "Thoughts, feelings, sensations and values literally have those properties"--why wouldn't that be a sufficient comment if your denial is a sufficient comment? — Terrapin Station
There wasn't an epoch in which there were real abstracts or in which properties were somehow separable from substance, etc. It's maybe understandable why Aristotle made the mistakes that he did, but that doesn't make them not mistakes. — Terrapin Station
How much did my thought weigh? — Andrew M
Didn't we do this already? (Or was it someone else?--I don't recall). It doesn't make sense to talk about the weight of all physical phenomena. I didn't pick apart each property he was listing in the post, and I didn't talk about the fact that mental phenomena are not identical to the entirety of the brain at all times--it's a subset of brain structure/function, because I knew it was pointless to get into details with him. — Terrapin Station
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